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Introduction
“Nothing Like Going to an Authority!”
This element of “Caesarism” is ineradicable (in mass states).
Max Weber, 19181
What problems does foreignness solve for us? [.  .  .] Is foreignness a site at 
which certain anxieties of democratic self-rule are managed?
Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner, 20012
STARS’  SOVEREIGNT Y 
In February 1927, in a photograph published in Motion Picture Magazine, Mary 
Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks appeared in the pleasurable company of friends 
and colleagues amidst ocean breezes on sun-kissed sands at their beachfront 
property near Laguna Beach. It seemed a serene and much-deserved escape from 
their bustling careers. Yet, even a casual magazine reader likely could not help but 
notice that the image told more than the story of two stars’ belated vacation at their 
second home. Most of the individuals, including Pickford and Fairbanks, smiled 
for the camera while proudly raising their right arm and stretching their hand to 
the sky (figure 1).3 A long caption identified their distinct gesture as the “Fascisti 
salute” and explained that “Doug” and “Mary” used it to “greet visitors at their 
beach camp in true Italian style” after learning it in Italy during a meeting with 
none other than Benito Mussolini.
Less than a year earlier, in the spring of 1926, the two Hollywood royals had 
paid a much-advertised visit to Italy, with stops in Florence, Naples, and Rome, 
where they expressed enthusiasm for Fascism.4 In the capital, they met with the 
Italian dictator, and Pickford greeted the press with what a local daily described 
as a “saluto fascista.” Likewise, before readying himself for the camera, Fairbanks 
“proudly placed the fascist pin in his buttonhole, promising to carry it in and out 
of Italy, as long as he was in Europe,” to his wife’s approving nod.5 Their various 
public engagements, including a visit to the Circus Maximus and the Imperial 
Fora, where they posed doing the Fascist salute, were the subject of intense 
coverage and visual display (figures 2 and 3).6
The meeting with the Duce most likely occurred on May 10, 1926.7 It lasted 
only fifteen minutes, from 4:30 p.m. to 4:45 p.m., but it gained wide (albeit brief) 
notoriety on both sides of the Atlantic.8 At Palazzo Chigi, the headquarters of the 
figure 1. Pickford, Fairbanks, and friends giving the Fascisti salute, 1927. “Mrs. Doug,” 
Motion Picture Magazine, February 1927, 58.
figure 2. Douglas Fairbanks in Rome at the 
Circo Massimo. Douglas Fairbanks Collection, 
General Publicity, Academy of Motion Pictures 
Arts and Sciences. Courtesy of AMPAS.
figure 3. On a visit to the Roman Forum,  
Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks give the 
Fascist salute. Il Messaggero, April 29, 1926, 5. 
Courtesy of Archivio Storico Capitolino, Rome.
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Italian government, Mussolini received the two celebrities and conversed with 
them about moving pictures. He also asked them to use their contacts with the 
American press to publicize that, contrary to rumor, he and the Italian nation were 
in great physical and economic health. Italian and American newspapers reported 
the participants’ mutual displays of respect and exquisite courtesy. They made it 
clear that the Duce was no less a star than the Hollywood couple, as his guests had 
recognized when they arrived in Italy. To Italian reporters, Fairbanks confessed 
his awe of the Duce’s exceptionally energetic personality (“like an airplane pro-
peller”) and charisma (“all you need is to look at him to realize that”).9 Similarly, 
the New York Times duly reported that Fairbanks expressed admiration for “the 
progress and modernity of Italy” but was much more expansive in recounting how 
the American actor treated the Duce like a film star. “I have seen you often in the 
movies,” Fairbanks allegedly gushed, “but I like you better in real life.”10 For his 
part, Mussolini did not hesitate to treat his celebrity guests as his fans and offered 
them a Hollywood-like gift: his autographed photograph.11
In 1927, the Motion Picture Magazine caption reminded readers of that special 
moment and included the memorable line “There’s nothing like going to an 
authority!” Historians may not be able to identify who uttered the striking phrase; 
it may have even been an editorial flourish. Considering the arranged unanimity 
of the gestures and that Pickford and Fairbanks were the hosts, parents, or 
employers of the scene’s other participants, it is likely that the caption expressed 
the sentiments of one or the other. No matter who signed off on the caption, 
in theory, the image and the well-documented Roman meeting with Mussolini 
should have disturbed contemporary observers. After all, just a few years earlier, 
Pickford and Fairbanks had raised millions of dollars for Woodrow Wilson’s “war 
for democracy” against Europe’s autocratic regimes. Something had changed; now 
they were publicly flaunting their personal encounter with Europe’s most flamboy-
ant dictator. The unusual pairing of the erstwhile democrats with the authoritar-
ian leader did not provoke outrage or protests—except among a few antifascist 
dissenters. Instead, the visit summoned curiosity and marvel, as if it were a natural 
meeting of like-minded celebrities.
The meeting did not have the same meaning for the two parties. The pro-re-
gime Italian press was enthusiastic about the Hollywood duo’s visit since it meant 
a Hollywood homage to both the archeological beauty of old Italy and Mussolini’s 
modernizing aspirations. It was an endorsement that the Italian dictator took great 
pride in, considering the couple’s international fame. Yet, what was the meeting’s 
significance for Pickford and Fairbanks as American celebrities? What exactly 
could the notion of “authority,” conventionally associated with political leadership, 
bestow upon them in the Hollywood context?
In this study, I assume that what occurred in Rome had much more than anec-
dotal significance. Instead, it revealed a morphological kinship between the popu-
larity of the Hollywood royals and the authority of the Italian dictator. It was a 
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newsworthy event that, I argue, rested on two converging historical phenomena: 
the rising political import of celebrity culture and the growing popularity of 
authoritarian political leadership. Even in their contingency, the widely advertised 
Roman meeting, the Los Angeles beach scene, and the caption reveal the increasing 
public significance of both film stars and political leaders beyond their respective 
realms of screen and political culture. This contention begs several questions. How 
was it possible that in apparently nativist and isolationist 1920s America, a foreign 
leader like Mussolini, who never set foot in the country, could become a paragon 
of authoritative leadership? Why did the praise for a foreign dictator’s authority in 
political and popular culture develop at the same time when access to suffrage and 
civil rights (i.e., the passing of the Nineteenth Amendment), employment oppor-
tunities, and consumer choices were expanding? When and how did film stardom 
and political leadership, as apparently distinct institutions of mass governance, 
become comparable, parallel, and analogous? Was this phenomenon specifically 
linked to the immediate postwar period and to the 1920s? After all, about a dozen 
years later, when the Duce had become widely seen as “a blowhard whose strutting 
often inspired derisive cackles,” the more ominous Hitler was widely known in 
America but almost invisible on American screens. U.S. newsreel editors declared 
taboo most shots of Hitler, not just the close-ups, as his chilling and provocative 
authority was not to be publicized.12
One approach to comparing Mussolini with 1920s Hollywood stars would rely 
on a tempting, but limiting, side-by-side analysis of personal charm and appeal-
ing performative style. Inherent in this celebrity-centered comparative reading is 
a top-down approach to stars’ relationship to their followers. Cultural historians 
might instead argue that personal charisma and performances matter a great deal, 
but they ought to be placed in dialogue with the social and cultural circumstances 
that enable certain individuals to emerge as popular authoritarian figures. While 
I find both the top-down and the culturalist approaches to be productive, I argue 
that what is needed is a third, complementary one. Comparisons of famous and 
charismatic individuals in different countries, in fact, overlook the most consis-
tent factor of their popularity: namely, how distinct publicity practices shape stars’ 
media representations. The effectiveness of these practices is itself informed both 
by the stars’ charisma and broad social and cultural dynamics, but their mediating 
role deserves close attention.
Preliminary definitions of publicity are in order. In 1968, historian Alan R. 
Raucher noted that as a modern profession publicity “sprang from multiple ante-
cedents [. . .] not entirely separate, including press-agentry and advertising, from 
which in the early 1920s it sought to assert itself.”13 Press agentry was a theatrical, 
ostensibly vulgar, Barnum-like mode of influencing the press with free publicity, 
often by way of monetary compensation, and was already being practiced during 
election campaigns. Advertising, in contrast, was a much more explicit strategy 
of conveying information toward a straightforward commercial goal: promoting 
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and selling products or services. By the early twentieth century, these activities, 
as well as their names, oscillated between information and commerce, news and 
products, facts and promotion. At the same time, while indebted to practices of 
press agentry and advertising, the dissemination of information for promotional 
purposes also represented a reaction to the news-making practices of Progressive 
muckraking. Initially Progressives had denounced corporate “secrecy” as detri-
mental to the public interest. Reacting to these charges, corporations began making 
use of publicity strategies to defend themselves against damaging criticism.14 They 
hired publicity specialists, variously known as “publicity experts” or “specialists in 
relations with customers,” and “came to sponsor the largest and most important 
experiments in publicity before 1917.”15
This date was not a random choice. Raucher points to the start of a process that 
was eventually affected by a watershed moment in American media history. The 
U.S. government’s 1917 decision to enter World War I mobilized a massive insti-
tutional and commercial apparatus of pro-American initiatives both domestically 
and internationally. Publicity was not unknown to the film industry or to politi-
cal campaigning, of course. Even before there was a Hollywood, moving picture 
companies had realized that publicity practices could expand the popular aura 
of screen actors beyond their film roles. Similarly, since the turn of the century, 
presidential contenders, from the publicity-obsessed Theodore Roosevelt to the 
media-shy Woodrow Wilson, had turned to publicity strategists to manufacture 
and broadcast narratives, images, and slogans about their politics and about them-
selves. The publicity machine of the Great War, however, generated an entire reper-
toire of new practices of mass communication and public opinion management. In 
the short term, the war-fueled publicity machine engaged Mary Pickford, Douglas 
Fairbanks, Charlie Chaplin, and William S. Hart into serving the national interest 
by selling Liberty Bonds and promoting Wilson to new heights of domestic and, 
especially, international celebrity. This was a safe, patriotic—and thus virtually 
unanimous—cause, but a political one nonetheless. In the longer term, such 
innovations taught the burgeoning film and public relations industry that, through 
skillful publicity, stars and public leaders could sell a whole range of political and 
cultural ideas to the public in America and overseas.16 In ways that became more 
systematic, institutionalized, and transnational after the Great War, the success 
of stars’ and politicians’ public management brought mass entertainment, poli-
tics, and news ever closer and inaugurated the familiar crisscrossing of attributes 
between popular and political stardom on both domestic and international ground.
The Divo and the Duce studies how the public notoriety of Hollywood actor 
Rudolph Valentino, the “Divo,” and Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, the “Duce,” 
indexed and shaped a broad range of 1920s celebrity-centered publicity initiatives 
that interwove news-making, media economics, and political communication. 
While it is attentive to their distinct career trajectories, my approach shows that, 
despite never having met each other, the Divo and the Duce form a productive 
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pairing. For a few years, from the very early 1920s to Valentino’s untimely death in 
1926, the two Italian-born icons showcased a comparable type of fame that 
exceeded each man’s respective domain. With the 1921 release of The Four Horsemen 
of the Apocalypse and The Sheik, the ideal and passionate lover Valentino was pro-
moted as Hollywood’s first truly foreign star. His fame was not limited to fantasies 
of screen romance. In carefully managed pronouncements to the press, he spoke 
against women’s rights, democracy, the Hollywood industry, and even American 
masculinity. At first glance, these were not advisable positions to hold due to 
the potential of alienating the moviegoing public. At the same time, however, 
Valentino did not touch upon what Thomas Doherty defines as “the controversial 
issues and causes célèbres of the 1920s—immigration restriction, labor strikes, or 
[the long public trial against] the anarchists Sacco and Vanzetti.”17 And neither 
did Mussolini, who, whatever his domestic agenda, was careful not to meddle in 
American politics, which would have risked damaging his political and diplomatic 
relationships with U.S. officials.18 Still, after the October 1922 March on Rome, the 
large-jawed, Caesar-like Duce was widely promoted in America not just as anti-
Communist exemplar but also as a paragon of antidemocratic male leadership. His 
fame lasted for little more than a decade, until Italy’s imperial campaigns in East 
Africa in 1935–36 and his concurrent formation of the Axis alliance with Hitler. 
Throughout the 1920s, though, Mussolini’s name, image, and opinions pervaded 
American media through interviews, syndicated columns, (auto)biographical ac-
counts, books, and films. Popular media broadcast his authoritative pronounce-
ments—which Valentino appeared to share—about modern leadership and the 
importance of traditional gender roles.
With different degrees of success, official and unofficial publicity agents—
whether filmmakers, journalists, ambassadors, or newspapers editors—estab-
lished and managed the Italian duo’s public personas. By repurposing the public 
relations practices used during World War I and working in the service of press 
syndicates, Hollywood studios, and business conglomerates, these publicity 
enablers had diverse purposes that ranged from journalistic self-advocacy to 
studio advertisements to political and financial gain. I shall refer to them as the 
architects of ballyhoo, to use a 1920s expression popularized by writer and publi-
cist Silas Bent.19 Whatever their individual agendas, their work shared a common 
repertoire of journalistic and narrative techniques. Of these, the most sensational 
and Boorstinian one—the publicity stunt—bestowed upon the Divo and the Duce 
the authority to shape consumer choices and manage modern crowds at home 
and abroad.20
Focusing on the promotional activities around these two foreign-born celebri-
ties provides significant advantages. First, by looking at Valentino and Mussolini 
as a pair, and not as representatives of the distinct domains of entertainment and 
politics, I aim to foster a dialogue between the usually divergent disciplines of 
film and political studies. These scholarly disciplines have looked at the Divo and 
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the Duce, respectively, as a subversive model of masculinity (film and cultural 
studies) and as a popular anti–Red Scare icon (history; political studies). Pairing 
them offers new insights into one of the earliest interweavings of film stardom 
and political leadership in the emerging celebrity-centered media economy that 
shaped advertising, news-making, and political communication. As Graeme 
Turner has noted, the success of celebrity culture is rooted in its ability to “generate 
large amount of content” and “secure a relationship of interdependency between 
media outlets.”21 Over the course of my research, the popularity of Valentino and 
Mussolini, especially in their outspoken endorsement of antidemocratic govern-
mentality, revealed the emergence of a novel public discourse about authority and 
citizenship.
A second advantage of my focus on the interweaving of stardom and political 
leadership is that it also foregrounds two other historical dynamics—antinativ-
ism and anti-isolationism—one opening America to its own national diversity, the 
other opening it to the world. On the one hand, even before America’s participa-
tion in the Great War, growing misgivings about the melting pot ideal were at least 
in theory legitimizing the foreign culture of immigrant communities within the 
country’s popular and political scene. In 1916, the intellectual Randolph Bourne 
characterized the country’s great democratic experiment as “a transnationality.”22 
A few years later, despite the passage of anti-immigration legislation, American 
film culture witnessed a dramatic internationalization. “In the roaring converter 
of war more than nations are fusing,” Photoplay boasted. “The Iowa lad is learning 
that the French aren’t frog-eaters, nor are the Italians ‘Ginnies.’ ”23 The acceptance 
of international diversity in America opened the way to novel formulations of 
male character, personality, and leadership. The Divo and the Duce, I will argue, 
became popular not despite, but because of their widely advertised national and 
racial otherness. Their diversity offered license for daringly authoritarian political 
statements, most pointedly against women and the democratic process, while still 
enabling them to remain as charming and exotic specimens, ready-made for news 
and photographic coverage.
As for opening the United States to the world, the war catalyzed the country’s 
political, financial, and cultural engagement with other nations. The assistance 
provided by American financial centers to European nations, banks, and film 
industries enabled Wall Street and Hollywood to achieve financial and commercial 
dominance. The worldwide fame of Hollywood’s stars alerted U.S. financial and 
government leaders about the impact of celebrities’ transnational branding for 
America’s commercial and geopolitical reach.24 The postwar collaboration between 
the industry’s top organization, the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of 
America (MPPDA), and the U.S. State Department, even if their economic and 
political interests were not always precisely aligned, warrants the consideration 
of the role the international framework played in the Divo’s and the Duce’s rise 
to fame. In brief, America’s growing domestic acceptance of foreign cultures and 
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their divergent ideas of leadership and gender relationships went hand-in-hand 
with the expanded projection of American culture onto the world.
A third advantage of focusing on both stars, and specifically of reading them 
through the lens of publicity practices, is that it allows us to avoid the teleological 
temptation to simply match celebrities’ personas with the popular enthusiasms 
of 1920s America. Instead, I follow promotional mediators’ deeds along a histori-
cal trajectory of personal and institutional agendas and continuous adjustments, 
rather than postulating the somewhat ahistorical closed circuit between charis-
matic figures and popular reception.25 Stars’ popularity was not a fait accompli but 
the result of actions taken by individuals on the basis of institutional imperatives, 
guesswork, and artful manipulation of popular rituals and preferences.26 If celeb-
rity culture is a given phenomenon today, it was not during and after World War I, 
when women and men made decisions that would create a new public, political 
role for film stars and a new cultural import for political figures.
Overall, this publicity-centered historiographical framework has enabled me to 
unearth new evidence related to the Italian duo’s intersecting trajectories, such as 
Valentino’s ghostwritten political pronouncements and Mussolini’s rarely studied 
biographical exposés and screen appearances. It has also led me to new archival 
repositories that reveal the “Pink Powder Puffs” scandal as a publicity stunt and 
identify its architects. Ultimately, research into the promotion of each man’s celeb-
rity has enabled me to recognize links in film history to 1920s debates about public 
opinion management and propaganda in democratic America.
This volume consists of three parts and a conclusion. In the three chapters of 
part 1 (“Power and Persuasion”), I reconstruct the historical context of public-
ity practices that first informed the wartime alliance between Hollywood and the 
White House and that after the war affected the relationship between American 
cinema and U.S. public culture at home and abroad. In the five chapters of parts 2 
(“The Divo, or the Governance of Romance”) and 3 (“The Duce, or the Romance of 
Undemocratic Governance”), I detail the promotional strategies deployed to shape 
and maintain the popularity of Valentino and Mussolini.
In chapter 1 (“Popular Sovereignty, Public Opinion, and the Presidency”), I start 
from the 1915 Supreme Court decision that ruled that motion pictures were “not to 
be regarded [. . .] as organs of public opinion” but as “a business pure and simple.”27 
Yet, the history of how the Wilson administration worked with Hollywood to 
shape public opinion during America’s participation in World War I shows how the 
executive branch embraced cinema as a legitimate force in public discourse. The 
Wilson-appointed Committee on Public Information (CPI) worked with Holly wood 
to advertise the nation’s war effort to domestic and foreign audiences alike. 
The Treasury Department engaged such Hollywood superstars as Mary Pickford 
and Douglas Fairbanks to market its Liberty Bonds. These new displays of patri-
otic persuasion and authority were extremely influential; not only did they pro-
mote Wilson’s visionary leadership and Hollywood stars’ political credibility, but 
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they also inaugurated a powerful new correlation of national political ideals with 
celebrity culture.
As many observers noted, however, the wartime explosion of publicity activities 
by a small group of government officials, media operators, and businessmen 
constituted a challenge to the core democratic principle of popular sovereignty. 
In chapter 2 (“Cultural Nationalism and Democracy’s Opinion Leaders”), I trace 
the intellectual debates about the impact of public opinion management on the 
fabric of American national identity, U.S. democracy, and political leadership. 
Concerned intellectuals, editorialists, and political scientists—most notably 
Walter Lippmann and John Dewey—reflected on the surprising efficiency with 
which unscrupulous private management of public opinion—in which cinema 
stood out as a paragon of visual suggestiveness—could end up dominating the 
nation’s political discourse. Public relations operatives such as Edward Bernays 
embraced the role of public opinion managers as fundamental to advertising and 
consumer education—practices he saw as utilitarian and democratic.
In chapter 3 (“Wartime Film Stardom and Global Leadership”), I return to the 
wartime collaboration between Hollywood and the U.S. government, but this time 
from the perspective of the film industry. Specifically, I examine the effects of 
war propaganda on two of Hollywood’s most important stars: Mary Pickford and 
Douglas Fairbanks. Their widely reported participation in the Liberty Loan drives 
in 1917 and 1918 turned them into on- and off-screen icons of both the Hollywood 
film industry and U.S. democracy. Pickford became the nation’s sweetheart and a 
model of resilient and evergreen Americanness, and Fairbanks became a flashier 
update of Theodore Roosevelt’s ideal of the athletic and strenuous life. After the 
war, the film industry and its Wall Street backers recognized in film stardom 
the key vector for the industry’s financial capitalization, market consolidation, 
and global hegemony. In conjunction with the growing global alliance between 
Hollywood and Washington, Pickford’s and Fairbanks’s American branding pro-
moted the country and its interests around the world. By the middle of the 1920s, 
however, both began to age out of their juvenile personas. Other charismatic idols 
sporting a more exotic flair, such as Greta Garbo, Ramon Novarro, and Rudolph 
Valentino, were exciting a younger generation of film audiences.
Part 2 (chapters 4, 5, and 6) focuses on how film roles and publicity often failed 
to match in the ways they shaped Valentino’s public image from the beginning 
of his career in the late 1910s to the immediate aftermath of his death in 1926. 
In chapter 4 (“The Divo, New-Style Heavy”), I focus on the years before and 
immediately after Valentino’s breakout role in The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse 
(March 1921). His pre-1921 performances, including the one as seductive exotic 
villain in The Married Virgin (1918), help us to understand how his persona was 
made to attract sympathy so much that later screenwriters and publicists used it 
in tales of either moral conversion or Americanization (or both). June Mathis’s 
script for The Four Horsemen created the role of the charming but vulnerable 
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(and thus sympathetic) seducer, who initially displays a kind of primal sexual 
desire but eventually sacrifices himself to authentic love. Still, Mathis did not 
control the film’s publicity and its impact on the broader American public. The 
film’s studio, Metro Pictures, and Valentino’s unofficial publicist, Herbert Howe, 
promoted his image as a “new style heavy,” that is, as an exotically unrepentant 
lover, which became particularly resilient and found its most complete cinematic 
embodiment in The Sheik (November 1921).
In chapter 5 (“The Ballyhooed Art of Governing Romance”), I focus on the 
production and reception history of The Sheik, whose construction of Valentino 
as an assertive, authoritarian male type belied the evidence of his earlier screen 
roles and his known lifelong dependency on strong women. The film’s release also 
coincided with political pronouncements, possibly ghostwritten by Howe, in which 
the Divo insisted on the necessity of a “leader for a nation, for a state, for a home” 
in ways that intertwined antidemocratic rhetoric with opposition to women’s new 
civic and cultural freedom.28 The chapter juxtaposes this political stance with a 
series of on- and off-screen occurrences aimed at expanding, but also taming, 
the quickly clichéd image of the Sheik. In such films as Camille, Blood and Sand, 
and Monsieur Beaucaire, written or managed by Mathis or his wife, art director 
Natacha Rambova, he was turned into as an unselfish lover willing to embrace 
sacrifice and defeat. Similarly, the articles that novelist and publicist Elinor Glyn 
ghostwrote for Valentino portrayed him as part caveman, part inveterate roman-
tic. Reviews and letters to editors of film magazines were dismayed at how these 
productions compromised his more popular image of an authoritarian ruler of 
women’s and spectators’ romantic longings.
In chapter 6 (“Stunts and Plebiscites”), I detail the ways in which promotional 
experts sought to resurrect Valentino’s stardom following the lull in his popularity 
beginning in 1924. United Artists publicity men Harry Reichenbach and Victor 
Mansfield Shapiro sought to restore his prospects by designing publicity stunts 
that cast him as a Sheik-like romantic figure. Shapiro presided over the “Pink 
Powder Puffs” scandal, which started with an anonymous editorial in July 1926 
that challenged Valentino’s heterosexual masculinity. The actor’s response gar-
nered newspapers’ front pages and a massive attendance for his latest film, The Son 
of the Sheik. Valentino’s sudden death in late August, moreover, would not bring an 
end to this publicity. His handlers collaborated with the funeral home’s publicity 
manager to stage and manage a media display of unanimous grief. Few in America 
could remain indifferent; even Fascist representatives residing in New York sent 
Blackshirts to place a wreath on his flower-covered bier as if Mussolini himself 
were paying patriotic homage to the Divo. By then the American press had already 
turned the Duce into a competing version of the Sheik.
Part 3 turns to similar publicity processes across the Atlantic, looking at the 
thoroughly modern efforts to craft Mussolini’s public appeal. This section also 
challenges the culturalist approach that posits an unmediated rapport between 
Introduction    11
the Duce’s virile image and his American audiences. In American political and 
diplomatic circles, Mussolini represented the perfect anti-Bolshevik ally, but his 
celebrity status resulted from the contributions of a range of mediators, including 
diplomats, journalists, editorialists, and writers. Chapter 7 (“Promoting a Romantic 
Biography”) details the actions of these individual promoters, who were variously 
affiliated with the Italy America Society (IAS), a lobbying group with links to the 
U.S. State Department, Wall Street, and the press. Created in 1918 to promote 
American financial and geopolitical interests in Italy, from industrial investment 
to postwar debt compliance, IAS became an influential PR agency for Mussolini in 
America. One of its members was the U.S. ambassador to Italy during the March 
on Rome, William Washburn Child, who contributed significantly to Mussolini’s 
acceptance in America, initially in high government circles and later in the court 
of public opinion, particularly through his ghostwriting services and connections. 
The Duce’s image in financial circles and in the press also benefitted greatly from 
the work of Thomas W. Lamont, a founding member of IAS and J. P. Morgan’s 
chief executive, and from the tireless mediation of the Italian ambassador, Prince 
Gelasio Caetani. Their public relations efforts, together with the publication of 
The Life of Benito Mussolini (1925) by the Duce’s former lover, Margherita Sarfatti, 
and largely ghostwritten autobiographies like Child’s My Autobiography (1928), 
filtered any discussion of Mussolini’s despotism through a celebratory exposé of 
his personal life that romanticized his humble upbringing, iron discipline, and 
popular charm.
In chapter 8, I detail the specific ways in which the few film productions 
featuring Mussolini emerged out of this network of Italian and American media-
tors. The Eternal City (1924), shot in Rome by George Fitzmaurice and featuring 
Mussolini as himself, resulted from the contacts between the U.S. State Department, 
MPPDA’s chief Will Hays, IAS’s factotum secretary Irene di Robilant, and 
Ambassador Caetani. Despite their collective effort, the film proved disappoint-
ing and led Mussolini to demand control over future projects. The opportunity 
came when Fox, in search for a world-renowned celebrity to test its new propri-
etary sound technology, cast the Duce as himself in an address to Americans and 
Italian Americans in a Movietone News short entitled The Man of the Hour 
(1927). The results appeared remarkable: never before had Americans heard the 
Duce speak in English directly to them (he also addressed Italian immigrants in 
Italian). Critics’ praise focused on his acting style and star quality, as if his 
plebiscitarian appeal trumped any questions about his antidemocratic domestic 
politics. At the same time, American newsreel companies enhanced Mussolini’s 
cinematic visibility in America as an exemplar of undemocratic governing.29 Fox 
and Hearst, for instance, edited the newsreel footage of the Istituto LUCE, the 
cinematographic arm of the Fascist state, and inserted it into their own effective 
distribution networks from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s. A collage of LUCE 
footage was also the basis for Columbia’s much-promoted Mussolini Speaks (1933). 
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The danger of these productions, as Caetani’s most eloquent communications 
described it, was that the Duce ended up as a character actor in someone else’s 
story and not the protagonist of his own.
The question of Hollywood’s historical relationship with powerful political 
players, from mainstream American parties to totalitarian regimes, has received a 
great deal of scholarly attention in recent years. Although researchers have begun 
to study studio moguls’ contacts with the Wilson administration during World 
War I,30 most scholars have chosen to focus on the 1930s relationship of Hollywood 
to aspiring California governors and U.S. presidents31 and the menace of Nazi 
Germany.32 In the 1920s, however, Hollywood and Washington began to partner 
with each other to regulate and institutionalize forms of public coexistence and 
mutual benefit. The familiar narrative that sets up Hollywood scandals in oppo-
sition to the Hays Office tells an important but only partial history of personal 
confrontations, institutional regulations, and occasional collaborations. What is 
left out are other significant convergences that emerged after World War I on the 
basis of a shared, pressing need: the management of ever-increasing and diverse 
crowds capable of accessing film theaters, consumer goods, and voting booths.
Hollywood’s euphoric self-mythologizing as America’s progressive and 
democratic arena par excellence emerged concomitantly with the consolidation of 
film stardom as an effective technique of cultural and commercial regimentation. 
The industry’s self-serving promotion of moviegoing as a democratic practice 
postulated film audiences’ spontaneous preference for stars or films within the 
conveniently self-celebratory notion of cinema as a universal and democratic art.
The selling of the Great War and of star-studded Hollywood films at home 
and abroad educated government officials, film studios, and public relations 
specialists on both coasts about the political potential of charismatic male per-
sonalities and film stars. What ensued was a striking gathering of ideals about 
men’s personalities and views on authoritative leadership that prevailed over mass 
conformism and challenges of modern life like women’s rights and labor strife. As 
such gendered ideals pervaded political and film discourses, political figures were 
made to exude celebrity-like charisma while film stars came to be seen as masters 
of public opinion and social mobilization, at least for patriotic causes if not yet for 
social justice campaigns. Celebrity-centered publicity was key to the articulation 
of an apparently un-American attitude: a suspicion of the inadequacy of liberal 
democracy. At a time when ideas about dictatorship were preferable to the chaos 
of “mobocracy,” Hollywood and Washington began to converge—sometimes 
haphazardly—on the promotion of public figures capable of effectively managing 
public opinion. Film celebrities emerged, on- and off-screen, as imagined author-
ities and leading men (i.e., sheiks, barons, Zorros, industry captains) capable of 
turning threatening crowds into well-managed consumers. Similarly, politicians 
emerged as iconic leaders capable of turning citizens, whether recently enfran-
chised or not, into identifiable targets for political campaigns. In a tumultuous 
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decade marked not only by social protests, nativism, and radical immigration 
restrictions but also by the rise of a multiclass consumer base and the expansion 
of civic and employment opportunities for women, the Divo and the Duce were 
similarly branded as captivating authority figures and charismatic male models 








Popular Sovereignty, Public Opinion, 
and the Presidency
Any discussion of the political laws of the United States has to begin with 
the dogma of popular sovereignty. [. . .] When a man or party suffers from 
an injustice in the United States, to whom can he turn? To public opinion? It 
constitutes the majority.
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 18351
IN THEORY
Alexis de Tocqueville’s systematic examination of U.S. political institutions devoted 
several pages to the issue of popular sovereignty and came to celebrate it as one 
American democracy’s master tenets. Written a few decades after the presidencies 
of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, Democracy in America surprisingly 
did not include a section on the presidency. For the French observer, the figure of 
the president was “an inferior and dependent power” before the legislature, “not 
a part of the sovereign power” but simply “its agent.”2 Half a century later, in a 
different media environment, a little-known political scientist named Woodrow 
Wilson translated Tocqueville’s diagnosis into a denunciation. Wilson lamented 
the weakness of the executive office vis-à-vis not just Congress but also the new, 
dramatically expanded power of public opinion, by which he meant newspapers’ 
much expanded commercial and political import. In Congressional Government, 
Wilson critiqued the American system for its parceling of power and lack of per-
sonal accountability, saying that it resulted in a presidency that was “too silent and 
inactive” and unable to represent “real leadership” against the press’s “ ‘government 
by declamation’ and editorial-writing.”3 In 1893, exactly two decades before becom-
ing president, Wilson was still describing the executive exactly as Tocqueville had, 
as “the agent, not the organ, of sovereignty.”4 At the same time, however, Wilson 
was also devising an alternative approach to governance by articulating a critical 
difference between “the powers or processes of governing,” lodged in the presi-
dency, and the people’s “relations of assent and obedience” to those powers and 
processes. The appreciation of “the degree of assent and obedience” as “the limits, 
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that is, the sphere, of sovereignty” would eventually change the perception of his 
office as executive in chief and ultimately mark his own presidency.5 The effective-
ness of the chief executive, he came to argue, rested on its ability to control public 
opinion and thus to counter the “revolution in journalism,” which was dangerously 
and arbitrarily “assuming the leadership in opinion.”6 Similarly, in Constitutional 
Government in the United States (1908), he argued that the “part of the government 
[that] has the most direct access to opinion has the best chance of leadership and 
mastery; and at present that part is the President.”7
Together with the revolution in journalism, another major change was affecting 
presidential elections and politics. Although incomplete, by 1912 a new system of 
state primaries was gaining national significance by taking nominating power 
away from the party bosses and replacing their smoke-filled back rooms with 
the apparent openness of party conventions.8 For decades, aspiring or established 
political leaders had to master individual relationships inside the party machine 
through personal favors and exchanges that patterned their political life from 
nomination to governance. Steadily operating in the background, lifelong politi-
cal professionals preferred unremarkable and easily controllable candidates who 
stood out for their personal honesty and ordinariness (so-called dark horses). The 
new primary system changed the game. “Direct popular choice of candidates has 
arrived,” George Kibbe Turner of McClure’s Magazine noted in 1912, “and candi-
dates, not parties, must introduce themselves directly to the voters.”9 In the new 
system, the press became something of a platform: newspapers had to explain and 
popularize candidates’ personalities as much as their policies. “The democracy of 
the printing-press had come,” boasted Turner, with Theodore Roosevelt’s mastery 
of publicity in mind.10
Although to many observers the press was a force controlled by political and 
financial elites, its role in public opinion’s free exchange of ideas was undisputable. 
The First Amendment to the Constitution recognized and protected free speech 
and the press’s independence from government interference. In the mid-1910s the 
same right was explicitly denied to motion pictures even though by then cinema 
had been used for the propagation of news and opinions (and not just entertain-
ment) and had already played a significant role in presidential politics. It is worth 
referring here to a very famous legal decision that included a specious and often 
overlooked assessment of cinema’s status in American society.
In early January 1915, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the appeal of the 
interstate film exchange Mutual Film Corporation, which had lost its case against 
the State of Ohio’s decision to create a censorship board. Motion pictures may 
be harmless per se, state judges had argued, but their effects were not. Before 
the highest court in the land, the Mutual lawyers retooled what had been their 
ancillary argument, an unconstitutional curtailing of free speech, behind their 
main charge of a curtailing of interstate commerce and thus of property rights. 
Censoring motion pictures, the Mutual lawyers now forcefully claimed, equaled 
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censoring such comparable “publications” as works of art and the press.11 The 
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the moral and educational rhetoric linked 
to motion pictures, describing them as “insidious in corruption,” prone to rely on 
“prurient interest” for things that “should not have a pictorial representation in 
public spaces,” and thus rightly subject to government restriction. The formula 
that the U.S. Chief Justice Joseph McKenna used to reject the proposed equation 
of motion pictures with free speech and the press, has become quite well-known. 
“The exhibition of moving picture is a business, pure and simple,” Justice McKenna 
wrote, “originated and conducted for profit, like other spectacles.” Less cited, 
at least by film scholars, is the remainder of the sentence, which ruled that moving 
pictures could not be regarded “as part of the press of the country or as organs 
of public opinion.”12 In refuting their status as a legitimate or responsible force in 
public discourse, the Supreme Court denied moving pictures protection from state 
or federal censorship. The court’s rejection impinged upon the deceptively neat but 
historically variable, knotty, and ultimately inaccurate distinction between private 
enterprise, represented by the film companies, and public interest or, to put it 
simply, between private gain and public benefit.13
While an obvious counterargument could stress that newspapers, like moving 
pictures, were private businesses created for a combination of private gain and 
public benefit, a whole range of actual practices had already contradicted and were 
about to challenge head on the Supreme Court ruling. Promotional synergies 
between cinema and political campaigning had already emerged at the turn of 
the twentieth century, but in the 1910s the same process underwent a remarkable 
development. During his tenure, President Wilson exploited motion pictures not 
only for his election campaigns but more significantly to secure support for his 
war policies. The film industry’s involvement in the war effort raised both the pres-
ident’s favorability and Hollywood’s stature in American public opinion. During 
his presidency, the U.S. engagement in World War I effectively disproved any legal 
theory limiting cinema’s role to merely business and introduced new and enduring 
means of enhancing its political effectiveness. The office that the government 
instituted for its propaganda activities, the Committee on Public Information 
(CPI), did not bother to distinguish between motion pictures and the press. 
Instead, it sought to coordinate all sorts of mass communication media—including 
newspapers, periodicals, cartoons, photography, and advertising—to convey its 
wartime messages and shape America’s public opinion. In turn, the film industry 
relentlessly sought to contribute to the war effort by claiming that its business and 
cultural activities fulfilled a national necessity.
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP AND PUBLICIT Y
Up to the late 1880s, political campaigns consisted mainly of public rallies and 
staged political oratory that limited candidates’ geography of reach and influence 
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no matter the newspaper coverage. At the turn of the twentieth century, presidents 
exploited the much-expanded circulation of print and, especially, visual media to 
elevate the power of the executive over the legislature and to expand their cultural 
currency. Quite significant in this regard were the 1892 and the 1896 presidential 
elections. The introduction of illustrated lectures using magic lanterns (or stereop-
ticons) in 1892 visualized party platforms and extended candidates’ familiar politi-
cal oratory without the need for their physical presence. Even more remarkably, 
the introduction of motion pictures in 1896 shifted public attention away from 
candidates’ policy positions and political eloquence toward their biography and 
personality. The case of the Republican candidate William McKinley is most 
symptomatic of this emerging trend of effective communication in absentia. His 
handlers staged a “front porch campaign” from his home in northern Ohio; pro-
duced illustrated lectures about his life, filled with cartoons; and hired the famous 
Edison inventor W. K. L. Dickson to film William McKinley at Home (American 
Mutoscope and Biograph Co., 1896). If until then, “political theater and theatrical 
entertainments were rivals of sorts,” the few dozen feet of this film constituted 
an utter novelty: they gave the stationary McKinley visual ubiquity throughout 
the nation.14 Furthermore, the short one-shot film could produce a compelling 
personal narrative that the press expanded upon, contributing to what Charles 
Musser has defined as a “politicized feedback loop between vaudeville screenings 
and the press.”15 Turning a campaign’s planned effect into spontaneous reporting 
would become a decisive dynamic in media politics even outside the context of 
presidential elections.16
After McKinley’s assassination six months into his second term, on September 
6, 1901, Vice President Theodore Roosevelt was sworn in as president. Already a 
national icon thanks to his unique ability to manage press and publicity, which 
included the celebratory filming, real and not, of his Rough Riders’ heroic feats 
in Cuba, Roosevelt soon became “the first U.S. president to have his career and 
life chronicled on a significant scale by motion picture companies.”17 His ability 
consisted in cultivating personal relationships with top reporters inside and out-
side the White House, as well as in experimenting with press agentry, which up 
to that point had been the exclusive domain of the theater, the opera, and the 
circus.18 Sooner than any other politician, he began to appreciate how motion 
pictures could offer a novel and expansive mode of mass communication beyond 
electoral campaigns. His life on screen amounted to more than one hundred 
films recorded from 1898 to his death in 1919, including his political campaigns, 
troop parades, and world trips. Roosevelt’s experience of strenuous life on the 
frontier and his writings, filled with illustrations by Frederic Remington, inspired 
numerous Western films. On the other hand, his manipulative relationship 
with the press even inspired a few satirical films. Edwin S. Porter’s The Terrible 
Teddy, the Grizzly King (Edison, 1901), which was based on a cartoon, parodied 
Roosevelt’s management of publicity by featuring him as a hunter followed by 
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two characters carrying signs reading “My Press Agent” and “My Photographer.”19 
With him, the link between motion pictures and presidential figures reached a 
novel level of mythopoetic intensity. In 1910, Moving Picture World described him, 
with typographical emphasis, as “a picture man.”20 Roosevelt’s celluloid perfor-
mances enabled his swaggering personality, warrior temperament, and interna-
tional fame to reach the widest possible audience. Before than any other politician, 
he realized that the film medium’s all-embracing appeal would enable him “to fuse 
polyglot audiences into a single mass following, albeit at the box office rather than 
the ballot box.”21
In 1912, in fact, while mired in a mutually destructive competition with his 
former protégé William Howard Taft for the Republican presidential nomination 
and being forced to run on the Progressive Party ticket, Roosevelt lost the elec-
tion to a Democratic candidate who was temperamentally his opposite. Woodrow 
Wilson knew very well that he lacked TR’s personal magnetism and mass appeal. 
“He is a real, vivid person,” the then New Jersey governor wrote a friend before the 
elections. “I am a vague, conjectural personality, more made up of opinions and 
academic prepossessions than of [.  .  .] red corpuscles.”22 Yet, within a few years, 
Wilson managed to bring cinema to a level of partnership with the government 
that Roosevelt never managed to reach.
The 1912 campaign reveals how the co-optation of new media affected the 
reserved Wilson. Initially, he limited himself to the use of pamphlets that reproduced 
his printed speeches and magazine articles. Yet, to compete with Roosevelt, Wilson 
began to rely on phonographic recordings and motion pictures. The reproduction 
of his distinct oratorical talent for “modulated tones and precise selection and pair-
ing of words” popularized the impression that Wilson was “a voice of reason and 
reform.”23 It was a performative advantage that his campaign exploited by ensuring 
that newspapers advertised the phonographic records and sent them out along with 
motion pictures “in order to have him both seen and heard in theaters.”24
These new media practices inaugurated a new campaign style. It did not matter 
that Wilson scorned the recordings as “canned speeches” nor that he felt uneasy 
before movie cameras to the point that Motography described him as “an invol-
untary actor in the ‘photo-play.’ ”25 Over time he grew into being a media-savvy 
political candidate, particularly appreciative of the power of the moving image. 
In between his two elections, in fact, the rise of his political reputation was inter-
twined with the emergence of early newsreels, such as Pathé Weekly (aka Pathé 
Weekly Review), Gaumont Weekly, The Mutual Weekly, and Universal Animated 
Weekly.26 With a multimedia campaign insisting on his level-headed tempera-
ment and rhetoric, Wilson gained the support of newspaper editors and common 
citizens and scored a landslide victory. More than a hundred still and motion-
picture cameras captured his inauguration in March 1913. As a sign of things to 
come, Wilson enjoyed how the film cameras portrayed him like a royal dignitary, 
towering over cheering crowds before a Congress adorned in American flags.27 
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Ultimately, Roosevelt’s cinematic visibility, while intense, did not augment his 
“bully pulpit” in ways that radically affected his well-known public persona. On 
the other hand, Wilson began his presidential campaign without a national profile, 
but during his time in office, he intertwined politics and motion pictures in such 
a way that his political leadership came to complement what he once described as 
cinema’s universal language.
Such intertwining took time. Before examining the propaganda machine that 
Wilson set in motion during the U.S. involvement in the First World War, two 
series of events alerted him to the cinema’s extraordinary power as a tool of public 
relations. The first began with the White House screening of D. W. Griffith’s The 
Birth of a Nation on February 18, 1915, ten days after its release and a week before 
the Supreme Court’s Mutual Film Corporation decision (February 23).28 News of 
the screening elicited accusations of racism against the president at a time of much-
needed national solidarity, and the ensuing controversy possibly constituted one 
of the most glaring counterarguments to the justices’ ruling. The second series of 
events relates to the rarely documented approaches that filmmakers, producers, 
distributors, and exhibitors made to Wilson in the form of letters, telegrams, and 
meeting requests on the subject of the war between 1914 and 1917. This unrelenting 
pressure and, at times, Wilson’s own response reveal that industry representatives 
clearly understood the potential role film could play in the country’s public life, 
as well as in their industry’s future, if they could somehow personally involve the 
president.
POLITICS WRIT TEN WITH LIGHTING
Film historians have often referred to D. W. Griffith’s controversial blockbuster as 
one of the first motion pictures, if not the first one, to be screened at the White 
House. President Wilson allegedly commented on the screening with a memo-
rable remark: “It is like writing history with lighting. And my only regret is that 
it is all so terribly true.” Historians have repeatedly reported this unconfirmed 
comment since the 1930s, possibly the decade that saw the most systematic con-
vergence between Hollywood and Washington.29 Historian Mark E. Benbow and 
biographer A. Scott Berg have recently noted that Wilson almost certainly never 
said it.30 What is true, however, is that the screening did take place and animated 
a huge controversy. When several commentators publicized the president’s alleged 
endorsement, Wilson tried to deny it, both publicly and privately, without much 
conviction or success.
The decision to screen Birth of a Nation at the White House resulted from a 
unique set of overlapping factors. On a personal level, Thomas Dixon, the white 
supremacist author of the film’s source novels, was a friend of Wilson’s from Johns 
Hopkins University’s graduate school. On a cultural level, while most screenings 
at the White House in 1915 were proposed in conjunction with pressing issues of 
Popular Sovereignty, Public Opinion, and the Presidency    23
national neutrality and preparedness, a much-anticipated colossal production by 
the likes of D. W. Griffith was likely to have appeared capable of fostering national 
solidarity.31 As for the film’s racist narrative and depictions—which should have 
been recognized as inciting divisions rather than unity—they could not have been 
a novelty to Wilson, who knew Dixon’s personal convictions and work. What may 
have balanced them out was Wilson’s fondness for a very attractive representation 
of President Lincoln as a compassionate and reconciliatory national figure, which 
Ida Tarbell had first popularized in a 1897 serialized biography and which Dixon 
had continued to expand upon in his works.32 A few months into the European 
war and a year before the heated 1916 presidential campaign, the image of Griffith’s 
Lincoln as reuniting national figure and “a reaffirmation of the values of an older 
America” was also supposed to mute the divisive national loyalties of European 
immigrants on U.S. soil.33
Yet, as soon as news of the event reached the press, Wilson began to receive 
countless requests of official confirmation from individuals and civic groups that 
opposed the film’s racial politics and called for its ban from circulation.34 He first 
hesitated to respond. When the volume of protests did not subsidize, he instructed 
his secretary Joseph Patrick Tumulty in early March 1915 to answer any letter on 
the topic with this standard, self-justifying rejoinder that denied prior knowledge 
or later approval of the film’s ideological perspective:
It is true that The Birth of Nation was produced before the President and his family 
at the White House, but the President was entirely unaware of the character of the 
play before it was presented and has at no time expressed his approbation of it. Its 
exhibition at the White House was a courtesy extended to an old acquaintance.35
The statement encapsulated what many came to consider the sad truth about his 
position: his public denial of an endorsement was not the same as a condemna-
tion.36 It would take years for Wilson to express publicly reservations about the 
film, and when he did, it was out of concern for the reactions of African Americans 
as both loyal civilians and U.S. soldiers and for the needs of the war effort, not 
because of the film’s racist and manipulative historical revisionism.37
The story of protests, disorders, and attempted bans of The Birth of a Nation 
is well known to film historians.38 One of its less known but significant wrinkles 
is how the incessantly self-promoting Dixon, in his several contacts with Wilson, 
was both perceptive and boastful about cinema’s unprecedented influence on 
Americans’ electoral choices. In May 1915, he wrote a letter to the White House 
in response to the public controversy over Griffith’s film. After describing cinema 
as not just “a new art” but “the mightiest engine for molding public opinion,” 
he contended, exaggerating the figures, that when a political message reaches 
the screens of thirty thousand theaters, “no group of politicians can resist the 
onslaught.”39 He arrogantly claimed to have collaborated with Griffith not just to 
produce a revisionist account but also and ultimately to execute a major electoral 
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design. The film’s “real big purpose,” he contended, “was to revolutionize Northern 
sentiments by a presentation of history that would transform every man in my 
audience into a good Democrat!” He concluded by claiming to be the first person 
able to conjoin mass entertainment and electoral politics: “The next political cam-
paign,” he asserted with obvious reference to the coming elections, “will witness a 
revolution in political methods.”40
The archival record does not include Wilson’s response, but the president likely 
recognized in Dixon’s argument the familiar self-promoting efforts of several film 
industry representatives who had been pounding on Wilson’s office door since 
1914 with all sorts of requests for collaboration. Pressed by the risk of censorship 
legislation and engaged in lifting cinema’s public moral stance in response to the 
discrediting charges of civic and religious groups, film industry representatives 
articulated an insightful awareness about cinema’s role in the new climate of 
mediated mass politics. Meanwhile, while the nativist Wilson was not immediately 
concerned with the European war, others were, or appeared to be.
PREPAREDNESS
After the early May 1915 sinking of the ocean liner Lusitania, which cost 128 
American lives, and ahead of the 1916 election campaign, months of lively public 
debates about U.S. intervention shaped Wilson’s public stance about the European 
war. In late 1915, the president began to promote domestic policies centered 
on “preparedness” or “armed neutrality.” The new stance did not contradict his 
former pacifist one, but, given the post-Lusitania discussions about the state of 
America’s military defense, it was better suited to his ambition for a second term. 
The subject of preparedness had newfound domestic relevance and was affecting 
ideas about the future of America’s national unity, democracy, and, in Roosevelt’s 
words, its “virility and moral fiber.”41
The motion picture industry saw Wilson’s need to communicate his new po-
sition on preparedness to the nation as a unique public relations opportunity. It 
was a critical time for an industry in search of responses to the threat of cen-
sorship, particularly after the Supreme Court’s Mutual Film Corporation decision 
in 1915.42 The studios viewed gaining national relevance as one such response. To 
achieve it, they sought to expand their commercial reach through incorporations 
and alliances and through a full professionalization of their business practices. 
These restructuring efforts paralleled broader dynamics that were changing the 
country’s social and cultural landscape. Since the turn of the century, America’s 
transformation from a continent of discrete and scattered communities to broad-
er, interconnected ones had radically altered processes of production, delivery, and 
consumption. From 1914 to 1917, the film industry sought to establish a national 
film distribution system, institutionalize a star system at all levels of its business 
activities, and, as the European war persisted, expand its markets in Europe and 
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South America. While the war was raging in the Old World, the film industry 
was experimenting with ways to instill the Wilson administration’s neutrality and 
preparedness policies through a “mass produced and nationally marketed prod-
uct.”43 These packaging efforts permeated both fiction and nonfiction productions 
and were intended to obviate any state-directed censorship initiatives. They were 
also meant to counter the flood of letters from representatives of local censor-
ship boards and civic and religious groups petitioning for a federal motion picture 
censorship bill in response to what they viewed as films’ pernicious influence on 
the country. To achieve their goals, film industry representatives sought Wilson’s 
endorsement of their plan for Hollywood’s self-regulation by making explicit 
promises of electoral votes and broad support for the president’s new war-related 
position—from passive pacifism or neutrality to preparedness.44
Two 1916 productions, The Eagle’s Wing (Bluebird Photoplay) and Civilization 
(Thomas H. Ince Corp.), are key examples of the ways the film industry sought 
to aid the president’s consensus building for his new policies. At the center of the 
production of The Eagle’s Wing was the Motion Picture Board of Trade of America 
(MPBTA), an association created in September 1915 to represent the business of 
the entire film industry, in both internal and external matters. Chaired by J. Stuart 
Blackton, with Carl Laemmle as the manufacturers’ vice president, the board 
met with Wilson, who granted it national recognition in late January 1916.45 Fraught 
with internal divisions, however, the MPBTA was eventually disbanded, and in 
its place the industry created a new protective league, the short-lived National 
Association of the Motion Picture Industry (NAMPI), chaired by stage impre-
sario and sports promoter William A. Brady.46 Before its dissolution in June 1916, 
MPBTA had planned filming Wilson “in a speaking attitude” to illustrate a speech 
he had delivered in Cleveland the previous January.47 The result was a fictionalized 
five-reel tale of war preparedness, entitled The Eagle’s Wing, which Universal dis-
tributed for its subsidiary Bluebird Photoplay in early December. The film helped 
secure appropriate legislation.48
Even more helpful to the president’s cause was Thomas H. Ince’s pacifist epic, 
Civilization (1916), a moral parable telling of the conversion of a brilliant inventor 
of deadly submarines whose losses turn his king from warmongering sovereign 
to servant of a greater power and thus of human civilization. Produced by Ince, 
the film signaled the ideological partnership of a producer-director with the pres-
ident, rather than a rapprochement between the White House and a film trade 
association. In the spring of 1916, John H. Blackwood of the New York Motion 
Picture Corporation proposed screening Civilization for the president since the 
film, as he wrote in his letter, “is an eloquent and tremendous preachment in favor 
of peace, along the identical lines that President Wilson has been following for the 
past twenty months.”49 A year after the Lusitania tragedy, Wilson was still publicly 
supporting a pacifist stance even while promoting industrial and military buildup. 
Not only did the White House grant Blackwood’s request, but the president also 
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invited Ince to his home in New Jersey and agreed to be filmed for what became 
the film’s new prologue.50 The new publicity emphasized how Wilson, as “Chief 
Director of the United States,” warmly congratulated Ince, “Chief Director of the 
Cinema.” In return, Ince publicly offered his vote for the president “because he is 
saving civilization by keeping us at peace.”51 And he offered much more. The film’s 
intertitles matched Wilson’s rhetoric about peace and preparedness and became 
its cinematic feedback loop, propagating the president’s message in a most effec-
tive way. A decade later, Terry Ramsaye, owner and editor-in-chief of the Motion 
Picture Herald, reported the Democratic National Committee press representative 
William Cochrane’s comment on this novel synergy. Civilization had “a large influ-
ence in the Wilson victory at the polls,” Cochrane declared. “It put pictorial mean-
ing into the slogan ‘He Kept Us Out of War’ on which Wilson was re-elected.”52
Beyond fiction films, requests of public partnership from companies and 
individuals specializing in newsreels were particularly intense in this period. 
Paramount/Famous Players, Hearst, and Universal, for instance, were seeking 
endorsement for their commercial efforts, which they masked as patriotic. In 
spelling out the rationale for these schemes, industry representatives were quite 
articulate about the difference between films’ and newspapers’ modes of influence 
and about publicity’s personalizing effects more broadly. For instance, in a March 
1916 letter to Tumulty, noted war correspondent and Paramount Pictographs’ 
editor Edward Lyell Fox stressed how, in contrast with the print press, newsreels 
compel viewers to consume their content and as such secure a much wider reach.
A man opens his newspaper or magazine; he reads an article, the subject of which he 
is prejudiced against, and he turns the page; he avoids it. In a moving picture theater 
he pays to get a seat; he finds our magazine reel sandwiched in the bill between plays 
and he cannot get away from it no matter how prejudiced he may be against a certain 
subject. In other words, when we run animated cartoons showing President Wilson 
to be doing big things for this country [,  .  .  .] 2,000,000 people a day are looking 
at them.53
Fox’s letter also included the suggestion of closely associating the Wilson 
administration’s policy with the personality of its chief executive. Beyond the use of 
animated diagrams about the European and American situation, the proposed film 
was to consist of “a day with the President” to reveal to all Americans what kind of 
man he was and what kind of challenges he faced on a daily basis. For the shrewd 
Paramount official, a production like this would achieve “a better culminating 
effect by Election Time.” Possibly out of temperamental reservations, Wilson rejected 
the offer of turning Paramount’s publicity department into a presidential public 
relations office, but his decision did not stop others from making the same kind of 
proposal. In the summer of 1916, two weeks before being elected as NAMPI’s first 
president, Brady sent an original proposal to the White House. His plan was to 
film President Wilson delivering “kindergarten” speeches on peace, prosperity, 
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“or any of the other slogans of the campaign” and interweave the footage with 
intertitles of the speech’s content and with “illustrations carrying out what he 
is talking about.”54 As he did before, Wilson declined the offer, lamenting to 
Tumulty his “self-consciousness in the face of the camera” and limiting his personal 
involvement to writing rhetorical pronouncements that film companies could use 
as intertitles in their newsreels.55 Still, he must have appreciated these professional 
suggestions detailing what cinema could do for his policies and governance. Barely 
a year later, he instituted the most effective public relations office ever established 
by an American president.
The following spring, in fact, while the censorship issue remained a 
preoccupation for the entire American media landscape, its critical and much-
less-talked-about counterpart, expression, began to emerge. Designated as 
acceptable governmental publicity, expression implied a serviceable convergence 
of friendly political narratives with popular ones. As such it signaled a momentous 
change for political communication, one that duplicated what was occurring in 
the arena of corporate public relations. In the early twentieth century, as Karen 
Russell and Carl Bishop have noted, “ ‘publicity’ moved from being something that 
newspapers gave to a person, event or issue, to being something that businesses 
and industries provided” in response to charges of monopoly and lack of trans-
parency.56 Such a turning point led to the rise of corporate publicity programs 
and initiated the careers of many public relations consultants—beginning with 
Ivy Lee.57 The emergency of the European war forced the Wilson administration 
to also enter the public relations business through strategies that were based on 
a systematic propaganda effort that ultimately trained countless individuals in 
the new promotional craft. On April 6, 1917, the U.S. Congress approved Wilson’s 
declaration of war against Germany. Shortly thereafter, the government mobi-
lized the food, manufacturing, and weapons industries and passed mandatory 
conscription laws. It also instituted a public relations office that sought to shape 
the ways the war and the president’s actions were communicated and received. The 
once media-shy president was media shy no more.
WILSON AND WARTIME FILM PUBLICIT Y
I am no expert in publicity, as you know, but [. . .] deeply concerned about 
the apparent growth of the mob spirit in the country.
Woodrow Wilson to George Creel, July 21, 191858
About a week after the U.S. declaration of war against Germany, the president 
signed Executive Order No. 2594, which established the government’s first 
propaganda office, the Committee on Public Information (CPI). At its helm was 
one of his most loyal and combative campaign supporters, the journalist George 
Creel. “The idea of the Committee,” as the usually well-informed political scientist 
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Elmer E. Cornwell noted in 1959, “was the President’s so far as one can tell.”59 It was 
not. But the attribution of its creation to Wilson perfectly dovetails with the views 
of the relationship between active leader and passive electors that the president 
had laid out as a political scientist.
Rhetorically aimed at broadcasting the “gospel of Americanism,” the CPI was 
given a vital and demanding goal: persuading the United States and other nations 
that the war had become tragically necessary and that all Americans and allied 
populations needed to appreciate and support the president’s plan for victory. In 
order to achieve its purpose, the CPI set out to control the flow of information 
domestically and internationally.60 While Creel would regularly deploy the formu-
laic explanation that the CPI was interested in the “expression” of information and 
not in its “repression,” the specter of federal censorship raised fierce objections 
and harsh personal criticism—against him and the president. Nothing remotely 
comparable to the CPI had ever been created before in America.61 As Tocqueville 
had understood in the mid-1830s, the country had always taken pride in the free 
public circulation of information.62 Censorship appeared to many as an antidem-
ocratic, European perversion. Participation in the European war, however, created 
new scenarios. At stake, according to the pro-war advocates, was the question of 
the country’s national defense, which justified the CPI’s raison d’être. In the 
letter to the president that allegedly led Wilson to sign the CPI executive order, 
the secretaries of state, war, and navy clarified the new organization’s dual purpose:
It is our opinion that the two functions—censorship and publicity—can be joined, in 
honesty and with profit, and we recommend the creation of a Committee on Public 
Information.63
At first, great attention was given to the issue of censorship. Anticipating a press 
backlash against what could be viewed as an all-powerful censorship commission, 
the CPI’s first-issued document was the “Preliminary Statement to the Press” (May 
28, 1917). It included a quote from President Wilson meant to appease the press 
and the country:
I can imagine no greater disservice to the country than to establish a system of cen-
sorship that would deny to the people of a free republic like our own their indisput-
able right to criticize their own public officials. While exercising the great powers 
of the office I hold, I would regret in a crisis like the one through which we are now 
passing to lose the benefit of patriotic and intelligent criticism.”64
The same document explained the use of censorship specifically in relationship 
to information that either would directly aid the enemy or was “likely to cause 
anxiety, dissent or distress.” Like a phenomenological treatise, the document 
distinguished between different categories of news and subtypes of censurable 
information.65 Still, the justification for censorship went hand in hand with its con-
structive counterpart: publicity. In modern conflicts, the gathering and circulation 
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of news is key since “public opinion is a factor in victory no less than ships and 
guns,” the document read. The fighting role of the press was then “the creation 
and stimulation of a healthy, ardent national sentiment.”66
More surprisingly, the justification for the entire enterprise seemingly chal-
lenged the foundation of democratic participation. “The motive for the establish-
ment of this internal censorship,” the document stated, “is not merely fear of petty 
criticism, but distrust of democratic common sense. The officials fear that the people 
will be stamped by false news and sensational scare stories.”67 By investing the 
notion of “democratic common sense” with such negative connotations, Creel’s 
apparent dismissal of the basic tenet of democracy—“the will of the people”—may 
appear shocking today. In truth, his statement relied on the even more popular 
(and recent) theory of “crowd psychology,” which many of his readers knew quite 
well. Elaborated in Europe by Gabriel Tarde, Scipio Sighele, and, most famous-
ly, Gustave Le Bon, crowd psychology held that popular masses were drawn like 
“primitive beings” to impressionable images and analogies, ignored “logical argu-
mentation,” and thus did “not reason or [. . .] reason[ed] falsely.”68 Not only was the 
CPI in a position to tame the herdlike impressionability of democratic common 
sense, but it had to for the nation’s security. Referring to the 1914–1917 period, 
Creel later argued that after three years of “divisive prejudices,” the CPI could 
finally replace selfish and irrational inclinations with a “mass instinct of fraternity, 
devotion, courage, and deathless determination.”69
To reach his goal, Creel shaped the CPI into a multidimensional public rela-
tions agency, with several divisions all aimed at fostering national unity, the right-
eousness of the cause, and revulsion for the enemy. With $100 million to spend at 
its own discretion, the CPI promoted various initiatives that were greatly facilitat-
ed by its institutional alliance with the Association of National Advertisers. The 
committee printed a daily diet of government news and pronouncements, known 
as the Official Bulletin. With a print run of 100,000 copies per issue, it effectively 
constituted America’s first national daily newspaper. The CPI also printed over 
75 million pamphlets, mostly of Wilson speeches, as well as posters and cartoons 
to be given to the press or distributed freely. Furthermore, Creel oversaw a 
speakers’ bureau of 75,000 individuals, the so-called Four-Minute Men, in charge 
of delivering talking points in movie theaters during intermissions. Their speeches 
were printed in more than 750,000 copies and reached about 5,000 communities.70 
And, of course, the committee entered the business of visual communication by 
playing all sorts of roles in producing and commissioning posters, illustrations, 
still photographs, and motion pictures. Its Division of Pictorial Publicity relied on 
the work of established illustrators including Charles Dana Gibson, Joseph Pennell, 
and James Montgomery Flagg, the creator of the famous Uncle Sam recruiting 
poster I Want You for U.S. Army.71 The CPI also produced photographs and films 
about military preparedness and European battles, and it did so while maintaining 
close relations with a film industry that was keen to please the government.
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From the start, the choice of Creel raised questions. Collier’s Weekly writer 
Mark Sullivan initially found that, for a job that he believed required effective 
and smooth diplomacy, Creel was “the most unsuitable of men.”72 Why would the 
allegedly media-wary Wilson choose an acrimonious muckraker who had brought 
trouble wherever he worked, from Kansas City to Denver, with his sanctimonious 
anti-vice and pro-suffrage crusades? The answer requires an understanding of the 
specific job demands that Creel helped design and that Wilson gladly endorsed 
knowing with whom he was dealing.
Creel was a long-standing reformist, extremely loyal, and quite resourceful; most 
importantly, he was both well connected and fearless about managing the press. 
Although he personally knew several media players, he was not compromised by 
cozy business relationships with them. Over the years, instead, he managed to 
remain both inside and outside of the country’s small community of public opin-
ion operators.73 In the early 1910s, he raised his national profile by publishing books 
in favor of suffrage and against child labor and by writing muckraking articles for 
Everybody’s Magazine and Century Magazine. In 1916, he strengthened his polit-
ical prominence as a member of the Democratic National Committee’s publicity 
division and as a New York Times contributor.74 A loyal Wilson supporter for years, 
he also published a pro-campaign volume, Wilson and the Issues, praising the 
president “as a leader, as a nucleating force.” On trial in the electoral competi-
tion that pitted the reasonable Wilson against what Creel called the “bonfires 
of jingoism” was one of democracy’s key values: “the capacity of a people for 
self-government.”75 A few months later as head of the CPI, Creel found himself 
challenging that very tenet.
In his many prewar articles, Creel advocated the mobilization of all national 
resources, not just the armies, and maintained that, while updating the president’s 
older political diagnosis, “confusion and indirection are not so much an indict-
ment of President Wilson, as they are an indictment of our governmental system.”76 
While his reputation for being confrontational followed him, he also developed 
new imaginative and practical ideas about leadership that boldly combined politi-
cal management and celebrity appeal. In December 1916, Creel wrote about one of 
Hollywood’s biggest stars in relation to what the country’s mood ought to have been 
and rarely was. “The Government ought to hire Douglas Fairbanks,” he noted in 
Everybody’s Magazine, “and send him over the country as an agent of the Bureau of 
Grins.”77 These inventive and ironic public expressions of party loyalty and support 
for strong and idealized leadership did not go unnoticed.
The evidence suggests that the CPI was probably his idea. Wilson, in fact, 
accepted the proposal that Creel had sent him a few days after the declaration of 
war. In that letter the journalist stressed the need “for expression not repression”—
as he recounted years later.78 Publicly, however, to give the CPI maximum political 
leverage, Wilson wanted to convey that the CPI was his idea and responsibility: 
“I would suggest that Creel say that the Committee on Public Information was 
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created by me,” he wrote in a letter to Tumulty.79 On April 13, while officially acting 
on the recommendation of the secretaries of the State, War, and Navy Depart-
ments for the creation of an “authoritative agency to assure the publication of all 
the vital facts of National defense,” the president announced that he had selected 
Creel for the agency’s top job.80
Immediately criticized as “the censor” and the “publicity manager of the war,” 
Creel was “repeatedly damned by a large portion of the press and distrusted by a 
certain portion of the public.”81 It must be noted that what also fueled widespread 
opposition to the issue of voluntary and involuntary censorship were the public 
debates and Congressional negotiations about the Espionage Act (June 1917) and 
the Sedition Act (May 1918), which covered wartime expressions of opinion. The 
persistence of those debates on the un-American character of censorship kept 
informing arguments against Creel during the war and long after its end.82
WASHINGTON TURNS TO HOLLY WO OD
The initial institutional rapprochements between the film industry and the gov-
ernment were not difficult. NAMPI’s recently appointed director, Brady, had 
friends everywhere and was acquainted to both Creel and Tumulty. Brady was 
quick to realize that an alliance with the government was a unique opportunity 
for the film industry. In June 1917, after meeting Creel and several Hollywood rep-
resentatives in his New York office, he wrote the White House with a remarkable 
pledge. He had a plan to “bring the motion picture [industry] under full control,” 
without the interference of any political or private interest, and turn it into “the 
most wonderful system for spreading the National propaganda at little or no cost.” 
The industry, he boasted, “could in two weeks to a month place a message in every 
part of the civilized world.” It had a method in place that was “far more effective 
than the newspapers.”83 It was an impressive pitch.
Satisfied by the pledge, Wilson wrote back and asked Brady to “organize the 
motion picture industry in such manner as to establish direct and authoritative 
co-operation” with the CPI.84 Wilson’s stated intention was not just to bring 
Hollywood “into fullest and most effective contact with the nation’s needs” but 
also “to give a measure of official recognition to an increasingly important factor 
in the development of our national life.”85 While Brady understood the proposed 
recognition as legitimation for the industry, it was Creel who had first suggest-
ed the concept and it was Wilson who gave it a broad cultural articulation that 
matched his policies’ idealism and universalism. In his response to Brady, the 
president noted:
The film has come to rank very highly as a medium for the dissemination of public 
intelligence, and since it speaks the universal language it lends itself importantly to 
the presentation of America’s plans and purposes.86
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This memorable characterization would soon be published in both American 
and British film periodicals.87 On June 30, Brady telegrammed the president his 
appreciation for the U.S. government’s invitation to the motion industry to “throw 
its weight to the last ounce into the task confronting the American people,” and 
he pledged the “undivided conscientious and patriotic support of the industry in 
America.”88 Brady did not reveal the tensions that NAMPI had experienced with 
key members of the Motion Picture Exhibitors’ League of America. Instead, in 
an effort to give leverage and prestige to NAMPI and prevent individual member 
producers from establishing independent relationships with the White House, 
he preferred to show a unified industry front.89 Initially, the trade periodicals 
expressed some caution about the convergence between film and government, but 
they did not deny their support. The commercial and public relations advantages 
promised to be significant.90 What Hollywood continued to request was to be 
classified by the U.S. government as one of the “essential industries,” a recognition 
that the War Industries Board apparently granted in the winter of 1917.91 Notwith-
standing this recognition, the archival record shows that the industry continued 
to press the government to declare movie theaters critical to the war effort—even 
by way of rebranding them “temples of democracy.”92
NAMPI’s first institutional actions were forming the War Cooperating Com-
mittee (WCC) and supporting the First Liberty Loans. The WCC, whose illustri-
ous membership included William Fox, Thomas Ince, Jesse Lasky, Carl Laemmle, 
Marcus Loew, Joseph Schenck, Lewis Selznick, and Adolph Zukor, made a 
significant public assurance to work with several government branches. Several 
initiatives were put into place in conjunction with the War, Navy, and Treasury 
Departments; the Departments of Agriculture and Labor; the United States Food 
Administration (USFA); and the United States Civil Service Commission.93 For 
instance, the USFA collaborated with the War Cooperation Committee in pro-
ducing and distributing short-subject films, including newsreels of Wilson and 
USFA director Herbert Hoover, and involving film exhibitors in screening slides 
and filmed advertisements about food conservation under the motto “Food will 
win the war.”94
Still, the most popular form of collaboration between NAMPI and the 
government was the series of Liberty Loan campaigns, which received exceptional 
newspaper coverage due to the involvement of Mary Pickford, Douglas Fairbanks, 
Charlie Chaplin, and Sessue Hayakawa. This initiative was not under the purview 
of the CPI. Treasury Secretary William A. McAdoo had devised it a month before 
the WCC’s formation.95 The Liberty Bond drives were extraordinarily successful: 
four were held during the war and one, the Victory Bond drive, afterwards. The 
film industry participated in all of them by cooperating in the production and 
exhibition of posters, slides, and star-studded short films. It also planted adver-
tisements in trade papers and newspapers and solicited stars to speak on behalf of 
bond sales at so-called Liberty Bond rallies.96
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Covered nationwide by the press, the Liberty Loan campaigns represented the 
most sensational face of the alliance between Hollywood and the government, 
united in the effort of selling the war to a largely isolationist American public. 
Alliances between politicians and performers were nothing new. Notable prece-
dents included Lincoln’s celebrated trips to Matthew Brady’s photographic gallery 
during the Civil War. What was new, however, was that through the Liberty Bond 
drives a new generation of politicians “were able to view their constituencies as 
audiences,” as Leo Braudy famously put it.97
The democratic appeal to the crowd meant a reliance more on leaders’ symbolic 
draw than on their actual policies. The intertwining of film and government 
publicity infused both American moviegoing and everyday life. Advised by trade 
periodicals, movie theaters began advertising the war effort by plastering their 
lobby and outside walls with portraits of Wilson and posters of Liberty Bond cam-
paigns and war films; allowing Four-Minute Men to speak during intermissions; 
instructing musicians to play the national anthem or other patriotic tunes; and 
screening patriotic slides that celebrated both the war effort and motion pictures’ 
contribution to the cause. The goal of these initiatives was to make sure audiences 
viewed movie theaters not only as sites of relief from the inconveniences of the 
war but also as places where they could contribute, in a pleasurable communal 
gathering, to the material and moral needs of the nation. The ultimate aim of the 
film industry was to ensure its essential relevance to the cause.
While several governmental agencies dealt with motion pictures, the CPI 
sought to centralize and coordinate most film initiatives through its Division of 
Films, established by presidential order on September 25, 1917. Under the direc-
tion of Charles S. Hart, a former advertising manager of Hearst’s Magazine, the 
CPI Division of Films developed five major tasks: turn the footage provided by 
the Navy and Signal Corps—the government agencies for still and motion picture 
war documentation—into weekly film releases; write pro-government scenarios 
for commercial film productions; produce documentaries; distribute and promote 
war films, whether produced by the CPI, the Allies, or private companies; and 
coordinate their international distribution with the Foreign Film Division.98
It became increasingly clear that the Wilson administration, even with all its 
agencies, could not act alone from both production and distribution standpoints. 
While the photographic section of the Signal Corps, as Creel later maintained, 
produced “an enormous amount of material [of] the very highest propaganda 
value,” its one-reel films were widely deemed to be of inferior quality.99 They 
were not made by professional cameramen, did not have high production 
values, and were repetitive in the choice of subject (i.e., military parades, domestic 
preparedness, behind-the-frontline preparations). While screened for free, they 
rarely found exhibition in regular movie theaters.
In 1918 the CPI produced a few feature films of distinction, including the 
most successful of them, Pershing’s Crusaders, an eight-reeler that secured more 
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than four thousand bookings, as well as the five-reelers America’s Answer and 
Under Four Flags.100 The Signal Corps’s best footage, with additional material pro-
vided by the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, was used for the Official War 
Review, also known as the Allied War Review. By the end of the conflict, the CPI’s 
official newsreel output amounted to thirty-one weekly issues and about seven 
thousand domestic bookings. Its distribution, however, was the source of distressing 
negotiations with Pathé, Universal, Mutual, Gaumont, and other foreign newsreel 
companies.
No matter their lengths, the CPI productions exuded a recognizable patriotic 
idealism, which was greatly heightened in the feature-length films. For instance, 
Pershing’s Crusaders, which focused on war preparations from weapon production 
and the arrival of U.S. soldiers in France to Liberty Loan rallies, opened with an 
intertitle that deployed pure Wilsonian rhetoric to echo its religious title. Its final 
section read as follows:
The young men of America are going out to rescue Civilization. They are going to 
fight for one definite thing, to save Democracy from death. [.  .  .] This mighty ex-
odus of America’s manhood to the plains of Europe may well be called “the Eight 
Crusade.”101
Unsurprisingly, the film’s last intertitle was devoted to Wilson, “Champion of 
Humanity’s Cause.”102 Similarly hagiographic, another feature, America’s Answer, 
opened with a montage of the build-up to the war—“a glowering sky, men of 
different walks of life poised for action”—and of Wilson simply introduced as 
“Our Leader.”103
By the late 1910s, at least until Congress’s refusal to ratify the peace agreement 
and the U.S. entry into the League of Nations, Wilson had established himself 
as a familiar and reassuring presence to American and international audiences 
alike. His explicit cinematic visibility was mostly in newsreels, produced with 
different promotional purposes. As he grew more comfortable in front of the 
cameras, he appeared in numerous short films while signing laws, taking part in the 
draft lottery, inspecting military equipment and troops, and attending parades.104 
Also, Wilson’s image had circulated extensively in still pictures, advertisements, 
and postcards. By the war’s end, his media ubiquity had allowed him to reap the 
remarkable political benefits of a strengthened executive office.105
On his way to the Paris peace conference in 1919, several newsreels documented 
his journey to Europe, entertained on board the ship by the films of Griffith, 
Pickford, Fairbanks, and Chaplin; being greeted as a hero in France, London, and 
Rome; and finally meeting heads of state in Versailles. One of the few postwar 
dramas dedicated to him, The Great Victory, Wilson or the Kaiser (Screen Classics, 
January 1919), dramatically juxtaposed the American and the German leaders, 
from youth to mature age, and the forms of government they stood for—autocracy 
versus democracy.106 It did not document his deteriorating health. Four months 
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after his death, on February 3, 1924, the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Society 
released a compilation documentary, The Woodrow Wilson Film Memorial. It 
alternated views of the president giving speeches, signing documents, and meeting 
world’s leaders with, among others, images of Pickford directly delivering the lat-
est propaganda film to the president during the fifth Liberty Bond drive (figure 4). 
Boasting intertitles filled with laudatory narratives and eulogies, the film praised 
him as “world-known authority” and “model of intelligence, sobriety and determi-
nation.” Beyond the moral and intellectual tribute, however, the film also advanced 
a notion of charisma that combined Francis Galton’s eugenics with Gustave Le 
Bon’s crowd theory: “The personal magnetism of the man [. . .] the light of his gray 
eyes—the fine poise of his well-shaped head—the beautiful rhythm of his vigorous 
sentences—held audiences breathless under their mystic spell.” In the end, the film 
proposed a clear rationale for Wilson’s failure to have the Republican-held Con-
gress approve the peace treaty and the U.S. membership in the League of Nations 
in 1920: “While foreign peoples were idolizing him,” a final intertitle read, “our 
own yellow press kept stabbing at him with cutting headlines.”107
figure 4. Mary Pickford sending Liberty Bond films to President Wilson, 1919. Photograph 
from the Mary Pickford Collection (General, 1911–1920), Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and 
Sciences. Courtesy of AMPAS.
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Wilson’s indirect management of publicity initiatives affected the presidency in 
ways that Theodore Roosevelt’s physical and oratorical skills did not. On Wilson’s 
behalf and to his advantage, the CPI and the Treasury Department mobilized loyal 
journalists, editors, speakers, artists, publicists, advertisers, celebrities and film-
makers capable of devising novel ways to reach vast sections of the electorate and 
influence their opinion. As political scientist Elmer Cornwell noted, these perva-
sive publicity activities “were a major factor underlying this growing public ten-
dency to see the Federal Government personified in Presidential terms.”108 Neither 
Warren Harding nor Calvin Coolidge would set in motion anything comparable. 
Despite Wilson’s reserved and intellectual temperament, he became, at least for a 
brief period, a celebrity in his own right in the United States and an even bigger 
one beyond the national borders.
During the nineteen months of the United States’ involvement in the First 
World War, Hollywood played a direct and indirect role in heightening the status 
and appeal of presidential leadership. The film industry produced fiction films 
that were sympathetic to the war effort but also contributed to expanding the 
reach of Wilson’s moral and military decisiveness. In a sort of cultural loop, both 
war films and stars’ off-screen patriotic engagement infused a disparate range of 
moving pictures with a nationalistic dimension. On the ground, the range of col-
laborations between Hollywood and the executive branch anointed cinema as an 
organ of public opinion, akin to the press. As such, they strikingly contradicted the 
pronouncements of another branch, the judiciary. The CPI distinguished motion 
pictures from the printed press and other journalistic venues not according to 
juridical categories that separated commercial activities from civic ones but 
in medium-specific terms—News Division, Films Division, Pictorial Publicity 
Division. On a more speculative level, from the late 1910s the pressing issue of 
public opinion and its relationship to the changing, multinational face of American 
democracy came to dominate key public debates. Even the most learned observers 
could not avoid looking at cinema as a paragon of mass-mediated public opinion 
influence and management. It is to these debates that we shall turn to identify 
the political frameworks at stake in how observers and practitioners viewed the 




Cultural Nationalism and Democracy’s 
Opinion Leaders
Probably not one man in a thousand is geared with sufficient heart action to 
run counter to a false public opinion. [. . .] There are just two such men in our 
hundred and odd millions today.
Douglas Fairbanks, writing about T. Roosevelt and W. Wilson, 19181
Any description in words, or even any inert picture, requires an effort of 
memory before a picture exists in the mind. On the screen the whole pro-
cess of observing, describing, reporting, and then imagining, has been ac-
complished for you.
Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion, 19222
NATIONAL DEMO CR ACY
The war taught many lessons to American politicians and intellectuals. Past pro-
gressive understandings of what nationalism entailed gave way to more aggressive 
ones in the thick of novel practices of public opinion management. When in 1910 
Roosevelt unveiled the program that came to be known as the “new nationalism,” 
his politics of countering the era’s profit-driven individualism and mobilizing a 
national sentiment for novel forms of welfare amounted to an inspiring platform 
for constructive, progressive change.3 The program also shared a surprising ideo-
logical convergence with The Promise of American Life, a volume that progressive 
intellectual Herbert Croly had written in 1909, four years before cofounding the 
New Republic. To today’s readers, the word nationalism conveys ideological fanat-
icism and military belligerency. In Croly’s analysis, nationalism was as a powerful 
unifier for a stronger democratic America. “It may discover,” he argued, “that the 
attempt to unite the Hamiltonian principle of national political responsibility and 
efficiency with a frank democratic purpose will give [. . .] a new power to democ-
racy.”4 Together with the New Republic’s other two cofounders, Walter Weyl and 
Walter Lippmann, Croly was rather blind to nationalism’s domestic and, especially, 
international implications. Leading up to the war, ideas about America’s power 
in the world, largely associated with Roosevelt’s nationalist democracy, appeared 
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to many progressive intellectuals to be legitimate and benign, notwithstanding 
an implicit advocacy for imperialist expansion. A prideful rhetoric of national 
democracy pervaded New Republic editorials and Wilson’s speeches. But it also 
informed the publicists’ and the president’s efforts to shape public opinion about 
America’s place in the world and about the war’s meaning for America. Over 
time, the New Republic intellectuals came to disapprove of the unilateralist and 
imperialist policies first promoted by Roosevelt and then enacted by Wilson. 
Instead, they came to advocate a more restrained exercise of power politics. For 
his part, Wilson’s actions showed publicists and readers alike how to discriminate 
“between those who would make power and those who would make democratic per-
suasion the ruling force in world politics.”5 It was a move away from Rooseveltian 
power politics toward a strategy that viewed “world opinion” as the most effective 
“guarantee of peace.”6
The CPI’s management of public opinion led many intellectuals to recognize 
disturbing occurrences of jingoistic manipulation and near-autocracy in the 
modern democratic experience. Until the sinking of the Lusitania, they hardly 
regarded nationalism as a conceptual rival to internationalism, but when they 
joined the country’s war chorus, they realized that nationalism could acquire ag-
gressive military connotations and sharp xenophobic edges. Randolph Bourne, 
a New Republic contributor and one of the most lucid voices in American 
intellectual life, saw the difference between the cultural nationalism he advocat-
ed and the destructive political nationalism prevalent in Europe and spreading 
across the Atlantic. In a June 1917 issue of the Seven Arts, he reproved his New 
Republic colleagues’ “leadership for war” and their alignment “with the least 
democratic forces of American life.” In his view, the government’s systematic 
and effective management of public opinion, aided by illiberal forces, urged a 
pressing examination of world liberalism and world democracy. His article also 
called for a long-overdue investigation about the meaning of nationalism and 
democracy in America.7 Bourne died prematurely in 1918, but his calls did not 
go unanswered.
In this chapter I discuss some of the period’s critical contributions about 
political power and mass-mediated persuasion particularly, but not exclusively, 
among the influential editors of the New Republic. I examine the positions of 
Walter Lippmann and John Dewey on the delicate balance between demo-
cratic life and public opinion management, and I also discuss pervasive and 
glaring blind spots about alternative, transnational appreciations of America’s 
exceptionalism. Cinema was not extraneous to these debates. Motion pictures 
became, especially in Lippmann’s work, a paradigmatic form of powerful and 
manipulative knowledge: he referred to crowds’ lingering prejudices as “pictures 
in their head” to bemoan the irrational process of mass communication and 
reception. The war decade saw more than the intervention of dystopian intel-
lectuals, however. Enthusiastic publicity supporters were seeking ways to grant 
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civic and commercial validation to public opinion management. History proved 
them right.
UNIVERSALISM AND PLUR ALISM
We are provincials no longer.
Woodrow Wilson, second inaugural address, March 19178
On paper, Wilson’s eloquent rhetoric was not especially straightforward, but his 
message was compelling and became even more so during wartime. Key to his 
communicative success was the mediating role of personal emissaries and CPI 
activists. With great efficacy, they projected his charismatic presence and oratory 
into the exclusive circles of America’s intellectual and business elites and the more 
expansive national press. They translated and broadcast Wilson’s widely repeated 
phrase that Americans entered World War I “for no selfish advantage” and that the 
U.S. troops were “the armies of God” sent on a mission to redeem the continent.9 
Wilson’s own communication armies divulged his high-minded millenarian and 
transcendent rhetoric about America as a paragon of democracy for mankind.10 
Ultimately, his Fourteen Points appeared as a covenant of peace, drafted to grant 
justice to weak nations and stateless minorities through the recognition of all 
peoples’ legitimate interests under universal justice.
At war’s end, America and the Allied powers continued to view the conflict 
through Wilson’s eyes: as the Old World’s “final emancipation” from “autocratic 
authority” and as America’s way “to redeem [it] by giving it liberty and justice.”11 
Wilson’s civic religion led to morally inflected international policies that achieved 
very practical results. As Daniela Rossini put it, “Wilson led the United States 
in the transition from its provincialism and isolationism toward international 
engagement and world political leadership.”12 Not only was he the first “statesman 
to propose a supranational political organization, the League of Nations,” but he 
was also “the first American president to urge his compatriots to become citizens 
of the world.”13 No other president had ever achieved such intense ideological 
mass mobilization in America or the world. It should not be surprising that when 
comparing Roosevelt with Wilson, Croly thought of the former as a “hero” and 
the latter as a “saint,” which contributed to a sacralized political legitimation of the 
modern statesman.14 Only in retrospect did Croly, Lippmann, and even Dewey 
see how their “cant of idealism” had blinded them to Wilson’s “autocratic and 
coercive methods,” which had led to the creation of an artificial national enthusiasm 
and unity.15
By turning the war into a crusade for democracy, Wilson’s political millenarian-
ism represented a universalistic, apparently all-inclusive aspiration. In truth, it was 
not. On the one hand, it was fraught with divisiveness as it presented a remarkable 
undercurrent of social Darwinism. Wilson’s Anglo-Saxonism informed his notion 
of American exceptionalism, which compromised not only his internationalist 
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democratic program but also his view of national differences in America. Even 
though he twice opposed immigration restriction bills that called for a literacy 
test, he abhorred “hyphenated” immigrants because, in Hans Vought’s words, 
“they acted as groups, and put selfish group interests blindly above the national 
interest.”16 On the other hand, Wilson’s millenarianism informed a distinct notion 
of American exceptionalism, which hindered his internationalist program because 
it sanctioned, paternalistically, the call for collective security to “restrain national 
egoism.”17
The peace conference and its aftermath shattered these aspirations and pro-
voked disturbing realizations. Wilson wanted a people’s peace, and instead 
what he and his American supporters were forced to accept was a punitive one. 
Versailles put into question the meaning and promise of Wilsonian Americanism 
and defeated the idealism of Wilson’s brainchild, the League of Nations. The 
Republican Senate did the same by blocking U.S. entry into the league in 1920, as 
many former supporters turned against the president. The New Republic rejected 
the Versailles Treaty, claiming it “merely [wrote] the future specifications for 
revolution and war.”18 Wilson’s suppression of all dissent during the war years 
and his postwar betrayal of his idealist and internationalist principles shattered 
the remnants of American progressivism, marginalized new liberalism until 
the Depression reintroduced some of its principles, and disillusioned the new 
liberals’ longing for a great reformist leader, “something of a saint and something 
of a hero.”19
Over time, historians and commentators have posited that Wilson himself 
contributed to the defeat of his own idealistic policies. As Lippmann observed 
in 1919, Wilson’s decision not to promote the League of Nations prior to the end 
of the war led to his failure to design a world community. But his racially isola-
tionist ideology may have also contributed to the failure of his global politics. 
Under his presidency, the CPI sought to address the country’s various national 
constituencies by targeting the ethnic press with news, bulletins, and various 
propaganda communications, all published in translation. But Wilson, like 
Roosevelt before him, dealt with immigrants either as outsiders or as subjects to 
be Americanized and, as such, as a domestic problem seemingly divorced from 
foreign policy.20 While domestic pluralism was not an easy option for the presi-
dent, in the mid-1910s progressive intellectuals had elaborated alternative views 
that would find fertile ground in 1920s film culture. Two in particular deserve 
mention.
In his influential essay “Democracy versus the Melting-Pot,” published in the 
Nation in 1915, the Jewish American philosopher and academic Horace M. Kallen 
identified in “the practical fact of ethnic dissimilarity among the whites of the 
country” a subject unknown to authors of the Constitution.21 Writing against the 
primacy of the pure “English American,” Kallen explicitly critiqued the nativist 
positions embraced by the prominent sociologist E. A. Ross and President Wilson, 
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among others. He judged their “resentment of the ‘hyphenated’ American” as 
“righteous and pathetic”22 and sought to disengage Americanism from Anglo-Sax-
onism. Once in America, he argued, immigrants had found economic prosperity, 
but they also turned their ethnic and national differences “from disadvantage to 
distinctions.”23 This was possible, he continued, because “on the whole, American-
ization has not repressed nationality. Americanization has liberated nationality.”24 
He thus compared American society to a symphonic orchestra in which “each 
ethnic group is the natural instrument, its spirit and culture are its theme and 
melody, and the harmony and dissonances and discords of them all make the 
symphony of civilization.”25
This conclusion both anticipated and influenced the work of the aforemen-
tioned Randolph Bourne, whose famous essay “Trans-National America” 
appeared a year later in the Atlantic Monthly. “The failure of the melting-pot,” 
Bourne argued, “far from closing the great American democratic experiment, 
means that it has only just begun.” By admitting the necessity for “a clear and 
general readjustment of our attitude and our ideal,”26 Bourne recognized that 
America’s “unique sociological fabric” could open a path to a new kind of cos-
mopolitan unity and interchange and avoid the dangers of European nationalism. 
Calling for “a higher ideal than the ‘melting pot,’ ” whose long predominance had 
inspired an Americanism conjugated mainly in the past tense, he concluded with 
this sentence:
America is coming to be, not a nationality but a trans-nationality, a weaving back and 
forth, with the other lands, of many threads of all sizes and colors.27
Rare among intellectuals of the time, Bourne understood that the notion of 
immigrants’ isolation from their homelands matched Americans’ widely held belief 
of their own nation as isolated. “To stigmatize the alien who works in America for 
a few years and returns to his own land,” he wrote, “is to ignore the cosmopolitan 
significance of this migration.”28 The war in his view made untenable the isolation 
from Europe as well as the tradition of remaining “aloof and irresponsible.”29 On 
the constructive side, Bourne maintained that the work of the “younger intelli-
gentsia of America” was to aim at a “higher cosmopolitan ideal[, . . .] a spiritual 
welding, which should make us, if the final menace ever came, not weaker, but 
infinitely strong.”30
Even though the discursive emergence of a “trans-national” and cosmopolitan 
America did not overcome the competing racial discourses and anti-immigration 
policies, it nonetheless revealed the highbrow formulation of cultural plural-
ism—later expanded upon by John Dewey—that saw parallel reverberations in 
American popular culture.31 Eventually, lowbrow versions of cultural pluralism 
emerged in the performative arts and sanctioned an attraction to foreign per-
sonalities and their elevation as testimonials for a new America. One question 
remains: in a cultural environment where large, powerful sections of American 
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public opinion viewed transnational exchanges as miscegenational, how could any 
embrace of foreign performers’ masculinity be possible and even desirable? A pos-
sible answer lies in reframing the question. Rather than considering foreignness as 
a problem, it may be helpful to regard the foreigner, to quote Bonnie Honig, “as a 
device that allows regimes to import from outside (and then, often, to export back 
to outside) some specific and much-needed but also potentially dangerous virtues, 
talent, perspective, practice, gift, or quality that they cannot provide for them-
selves.”32 As we shall in the remainder of this study, in the context of lively debates 
about public opinion management as both a growing cultural phenomenon and 
as a controversial political instrument, foreignness could be regarded as “a site at 
which certain anxieties of democratic self-rule are managed [. . .] as a way to frame 
other issues of democratic theory and citizenship.”33
POWER AND PERSUASION
Before the end of the war, while some commentators praised Wilson’s ability to 
avoid democratic inaction or, even worse, “mobocracy,” others accused him of 
bypassing the authority of Congress and autocratically manipulating the will 
of the people. Implicitly attacking the president, a Chronicle editorial from 1918 
called CPI director George Creel America’s “publicity dictator.”34 After the war, 
many progressives and former Wilson supporters expressed fears that war-
time propaganda practices were not about to end. “Shaping public opinion has 
become an essential industry,” wrote John Dewey in 1918. A year later Progressive 
journalist William “Will” Henry Irwin, who had directed the CPI’s program of 
overseas propaganda, warned that special interests continued “to slant, to bias, 
to color the news,” well after the armistice was signed.35 From the left, Socialists 
attacked Creel’s promotion of Wilson as enhancing a dangerous “hero worship” 
that “leads a mad stampede away from an orderly movement toward concentration 
of power, in order to follow some Messiah.”36 Toward the end of the 1910s, a few 
political cartoons in the New York Tribune depicted Wilson with a good dose of 
sarcasm. One of them captured the president as a farmer planting the seeds of the 
peace treaty, watered by his oratory, in the garden of public opinion, not far from 
the U.S. Senate (figure 5).
Because the press’s exposure of party corruption required candidates to present 
themselves directly before their electors, politicians understood that their ability to 
influence the press was the only antidote against an out-of-control public opinion 
determining government policies. The challenge was to limit the “questions to 
which public opinion can apply,” as Harvard president Abbott Lawrence Lowell 
had put it.37 In other words, since in principle most scholars equated democracy 
with popular sovereignty and understood democracy as “government by public 
opinion,” the challenge was to distinguish proper public opinion from crowds’ 
irrational beliefs without denying legitimate demonstrations of popular will.38
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One of the volumes most explicitly stressing the dangers of “crowd-mind” and 
“crowd-behavior” was Everett D. Martin’s The Behavior of Crowds. In contrast to 
the antidemocratic stance of Le Bon but mindful of Tocqueville’s warning about 
the tyranny of democratic majorities, Martin argued that “democracy has indi-
rectly permitted, rather than directly caused, an extension in the range of thought 
and behavior over which the crowd assumes dictatorship.”39 His solution relied 
on the Deweyan empowerment of education, which he viewed as the prerogative 
of a select group of individuals, “men capable of philosophical tolerance, critical 
doubt and inquiry [. . .] who can rise above vulgar dilemmas and are deaf to crowd 
propaganda.”40 It was an elitist view that several public figures openly supported, 
including most famously Walter Lippmann, oftentimes on the basis of their direct 
experience of mass-mediated war propaganda.
figure 5. President Wilson planting the seeds of his peace treaty. New 
York Tribune, September 2, 1919, 1.
44    Power and Persuasion
At the center of these ideas was the concern that the massive expansion of the 
means and venues capable of informing public opinion challenged old formula-
tions of popular sovereignty. Since the mid-1910s, as Progressivism was retreating 
from mainstream political discourse, Lippmann had begun to reflect on the 
relationship between public opinion and political action within democratic life. 
His war experience as columnist, assistant to the secretary of war, and general 
secretary of a secret intelligence unit, the War Data Investigation Bureau, informally 
known as the Inquiry, shaped his understanding of information’s critical role for 
policy making.
Based at the New York Public Library on 42nd Street and made of histori-
ans and geographers, the Inquiry was entrusted with drawing Europe’s postwar 
internal borders ahead of the peace conference. Between late 1917 and early 1918, 
Lippmann and his associates drafted a memorandum that “delineated the new 
European frontiers, explained how each decision was made, and illustrated the 
points with maps.” Wilson “added six general principles of his own on the terri-
torial points,” and the Inquiry memorandum became the basis of the president’s 
historical Fourteen Points speech to Congress on January 8.41 After this initial 
success, the rest of Lippmann’s war experience as propagandist and as a member 
of the American entourage in Paris was disheartening.42 His immediate superior, 
Edward M. “Colonel” House was demoted, and the press bureau was handed 
to Creel. Lippmann despised the CPI director’s approach to propaganda as a 
means to win the war but not to secure long-lasting peace. Disappointed at how 
Wilson’s concessions at Versailles had profoundly undermined the principles of 
the peoples’ war, he returned to the States and in the New Republic excoriated 
the treaty as a “prelude to quarrels in a deeply divided and hideously embittered 
Europe.”43
In the following years, he published three dystopian volumes that reflected not 
only on the dangers of propaganda but also on the distorting effect of the press 
in contemporary democracy. Against the faith in the press as a necessary com-
ponent of democratic governance, in Liberty and the News Lippmann denounced 
what he called the “plebiscite autocracy, or government by newspapers.” The result 
of the current situation, he wrote, is that political decisions “tend to be made by 
the interaction, not of Congress and the executive, but of public opinion and 
the executive.”44 In this scenario, private interest groups shape, or even produce, 
mainstream public opinion and in so doing control the government’s policy and 
actions. “This shift in the locus of sovereignty,” he somberly concluded, “has placed 
a premium upon the manufacture of what is usually called consent.”45
Lippmann directed his warning at the “protection of the sources of [. . .] opin-
ion,” which he hailed as “the basic problem of democracy. Everything else depends 
upon it.”46 His rather elitist solution was the employment of “expert organized report-
ers,” who were not just individuals but also “institutes of government research” 
and “private agencies” assessing the technical work of government branches.47 
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Postulating that “the real enemy is ignorance,” Lippmann advocated a disinterested 
news service impervious to special interests. Without it, he foresaw a country’s 
degeneration into a dictatorship of the Left or of the Right. He redefined the 
traditional notion of “liberty,” rejecting its traditional meaning as “permission” 
and reformulating it instead as “a system of information increasingly independent 
of opinion.”48
Two years later, Lippmann’s outlook grew darker. The issue was not just the 
quality of the press or the legitimacy of government intervention in the production 
of news but the precarious assumption that human beings receive and process 
opinions through their rational faculties. In Public Opinion, he articulated his 
anxieties about the possibility of governing an ever-expanding mass citizenry 
democratically. Democratic theory, he contended, rested on the “doctrine of the 
omnicompetent citizen.”49 In truth, in his view, common citizens did not necessarily 
make intelligent judgments even when presented with objective information. His 
wartime experience had taught him that facts could be manipulated and distort-
ed and that human reception was not solely governed by rational faculties but 
operated on the basis of stereotypes formulated to confirm previous judgments 
and guarantee self-respect. Knowledge is ultimately linked not to experience but 
to preconceptions, which he aptly labeled “pictures in our head.” These mental 
representations affect our physical perceptions: “We do not first see and then 
define, we define first and then see.”50 Humans’ first impetus is not the search 
for the truth itself, particularly if such pursuit means abandoning the comfort of 
familiar stereotypes. Referring to the famous allegory of Plato’s cave, Lippmann 
argued that newly unchained prisoners, after a lifetime of mistaking shadows for 
real entities, decline resolutely to turn their heads.51
Lippmann’s dystopian notion of mediated democracy was dependent on his 
growing recognition of the imperfect workings of human knowledge. Rather 
than the traditional binary model of individual subjects responding to the out-
side world, human knowledge resulted in his view from “the insertion between 
man and his environment of a pseudo-environment” to which “his behavior is 
a response.” Thus, Lippmann argued, “the analyst of public opinion must begin, 
then, by recognizing the triangular relationship between the scene of action, 
the human picture of that scene, and the human response to that picture.” The 
ensuing conclusion was politically troublesome: “what each man does is based 
not on direct and certain knowledge, but on pictures made by himself or given 
to him.”52
As his lexicon and discussion reveals, Public Opinion was not a mere academic 
exercise, but its references to moving pictures showcased a connection to pop-
ular culture as a most effective model of human knowledge and a most perva-
sive one of mass experience. The expression “pictures in our head,” in fact, while 
long associated with Lippmann’s analysis, had appeared in comparable forms in 
trade and film periodicals. A Photoplay editorial from September 1918, “War and 
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the Fifth Estate,” had self-servingly praised cinema for providing Americans with 
the only true understanding of the war. “As they gained a first-hand knowledge 
of events from the physical pictures on the screens,” the editorial read, “their 
mental pictures of the war broadened into a true perspective of its overwhelming 
importance.”53 Whether or not Lippmann read film magazines, he was quite sensi-
tive to the power of films as sources of mental pictures. “The moving picture,” he 
argued, “often emphasizes with great skill this double drama of interior motive and 
external behavior.”54 When viewed as part of the history of visual representation, 
nothing could be “comparable to the cinema” because “photographs have the kind 
of authority over imagination to-day, which the printed word had yesterday, and 
the spoken word before that. They seem utterly real.” In a point that recalls the 
politicized feedback loop discussed earlier, he also noted that “the moving picture is 
steadily building up imagery which is then evoked by the words people read in their 
newspapers.”55 To illustrate moving pictures’ cultural and political import, Lippmann 
turned to the most glaring example of his time, Griffith’s racist blockbuster.
Your hazy notion, let us say, of the Ku Klux Klan, thanks to Mr. Griffith, takes vivid 
shape when you see the Birth of a Nation. Historically it may be the wrong shape, 
morally it may be a pernicious shape, but it is a shape, and I doubt whether anyone  
who has seen the film and does not know more about the Ku Klux Klan than  
Mr. Griffith will ever hear the name again without seeing those white horsemen.56
Four decades before Daniel Boorstin’s dystopian notion of “pseudo-events,” 
Lippmann’s identification of pseudo-environments rested on a denunciation of the 
fallibility of human knowledge and, with it, of democracy. In a modern world that 
is “hurried and multifarious,” he argued, citizens can make no judgments about 
the world based on firsthand knowledge but have to rely on facts and prejudg-
ments, or stereotypes, created by them or created for them.57 The author of Pub-
lic Opinion thus recognized that the original dogma of democracy, that rational 
knowledge should inspire policy, is but an impossible dream. No trustworthy press 
could ultimately cure the structural defects of democracy: the average man is 
unable or unwilling to process the barrage of information in order to formulate a 
competent opinion about a subject. Rather than just press bureaus, always subject 
to possible stereotypes and agendas, what Lippmann advocated were “intelligence 
bureaus,” transparent and accountable, whose modus operandi was largely 
technical. “Representative government,” he argued, “cannot be worked success-
fully, no matter what the basis of election, unless there is an independent, expert 
organization for making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make 
the decisions.”58 Disillusioned with mass democracy and the press, Lippmann 
envisioned an insurmountable gap between well-informed insiders, who ultimately 
run the country, and distracted outsiders who think their opinion matters. In one 
of Public Opinion’s last chapters, Lippmann struck a final blow to democratic 
theory when he contended that “the common interest very largely eludes public 
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opinion entirely, and can be managed only by a specialized class.”59 John Dewey 
famously described Public Opinion as “perhaps the most effective indictment of 
democracy as currently conceived ever penned.”60
In 1925, Lippmann painted an even darker view of democracy, if that was 
possible. In The Phantom Public he sought to “bring the theory of democracy onto 
somewhat truer alignment with the nature of public opinion.”61 After positing that 
public opinion is “not the voice of God, nor the voice of society,” he identified 
it as simply the voice of spectating common citizens, who have neither the time 
nor the preparation to attend to their government’s affairs. They have to place 
their trust in the hands of actors, whose opinions and goals are not an “emanation 
of some common purpose.”62 Liberalism, he admits with a mea culpa, had been 
contributing to this mistaken judgment.
For when public opinion attempts to govern directly it is either a failure or a 
tyranny [. . .] The theory of democracy has not recognized this truth because it has 
identified the functioning of government with the will of the people. This is fiction.63
By positing a “radical difference between the experience of the insider and [that 
of] the outsider,” Lippmann was endorsing a conception of elitist democracy.64 
He knew he was not alone. In The Phantom Public he referred to works that also 
regarded popular sovereignty as a fiction and that endorsed an elitist approach of 
modern democracy.65 He expressed particular sympathy for the German sociolo-
gist Robert Michels, whose Political Parties, published in the United States in 1915, 
popularized the concept of the inevitability, or iron law, of oligarchy in democratic 
societies. In later years, together with Alfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca, Michels 
became known as one of the key exponents of elitist theory and a supporter of the 
political experiment of Italian Fascism.66
Against Lippmann’s elitist conception of politics, the philosopher, psychologist, 
and educational reformer John Dewey strove to defend the pragmatist wisdom 
of participative democracy. A widely known public intellectual versed in many 
disciplines and a public voice in matters of psychology, education, and aesthetics, 
Dewey had always expressed a profound belief in the values and practices of 
democracy. Pressed by Lippmann’s writings on the unfeasibility of any democratic 
project, Dewey responded with the 1927 volume The Public and Its Problems. 
In it, he vehemently advocated for citizens’ active role in shaping social issues 
and affecting decision-makers through communication and education. “Only 
through constant watchfulness and criticism of public officials by citizens,” he 
maintained, “can a state be maintained in integrity and usefulness.”67 Propaganda 
may not be eliminated, but a possible alliance of sound pedagogy and psychology 
with the scientific method could guide citizens, students, and workers along the 
path of correct reasoning. With the aid of communal life and “communicated 
experience,” Dewey argued, “the cure for the ailments of democracy is more 
democracy.”68 In contrast to Lippmann, he viewed modern media not as the 
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arena where questions of public interest could potentially be accurately framed 
and structured but as a domain that generally distracts citizens from such ques-
tions. “The movie, radio, cheap reading matter and motor car,” he argued, “did 
not originate in deliberate desire to divert attention from political interests,” but 
that “does not lessen their effectiveness in that direction.” He then concluded that 
“it is hard work to sustain conversation on a political theme; and once initiated, it is 
quickly dismissed with a yawn.”69
To sum up, after the war experience, a renewed interest in public opinion 
became a major subject for editorialists as well as social and political scientists, 
no matter their ideological stance. At the start of the 1920s, attention to public 
opinion shifted from political and institutional concerns to the broad spectrum 
of social life, often touching upon the effects of manufactured consensus on 
political institutions. The co-optation of the disciplines of social psycholo-
gy and, later, sociology led to public opinion being considered not strictly as 
political opinion but more as set of popular beliefs, including their formation, 
logic, and impact.
This interdisciplinary recasting affected the discipline of political science. The 
range of interests of Charles E. Merriam, founder of the behavioral approach 
to political science and a notable professor at the University of Chicago, was 
paradigmatic.70 A pragmatic supporter of educating the citizenry, local partic-
ipation, and representative democracy, Merriam had been the CPI’s director of 
propaganda in Italy in 1918. A vehement supporter of scientific rigor, he promoted 
the study of political phenomena in the early 1920s through the intersection of 
a wide range of research methods.71 Merriam saw the still rising and imperfect 
discipline of social psychology, more than individual psychology, as opening 
up the field to what he called “political psychology.”72 After observing in a 1920 
survey of the Progressive era’s political debates that, “of the three powers of 
government, the executive was the greatest gainer in public esteem,” he became 
interested in the question of leadership.73 Rather than juxtaposing civic incom-
petence and rational leadership, he advanced an enlightening methodological 
insight according to which “the attractiveness of the leader and the attraction 
of the follower are the same phenomena, viewed from different sides.”74 Notable 
scholars responded to his call for “studies of the qualities of political leadership.” 
They included political historian, presidential advisor, and later member of 
Roosevelt’s brain trust William Yandell Elliott of Harvard, who looked at 
European examples for modern leadership and found Mussolini to be the 
“prophet of the pragmatic era in politics.”75
The end of the purely political approach to the study of public opinion took 
several directions. Armed with new scientific ambitions, some scholars began 
focusing on voting behavior and explored an alliance with psychological methods 
for the “measurement of public opinion.”76 The intersection of propaganda anal-
ysis and scientific method saw its most transformative impact in the 1930s and 
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1940s work of communication theorist Harold D. Lasswell.77 On the other hand, 
outside the domain of political discourse, the ongoing reflections over the use 
of war propaganda prompted the emergence of cross-disciplinary interests in 
social behavioral techniques. Once the assumption of rational human conduct 
was bracketed off, a whole host of disciplines, including anthropology, sociology, 
and psychology, began to investigate the rational and irrational aspects of human 
behavior. Most remarkable, however, was the work conducted outside academic 
walls among the communication professionals in the emerging domain of the 
consumer economy.
DEMO CR ACY AND C ONSUMER CULTURE
Unlike concerned political observers and theorists, a whole class of profession-
al journalists, press agents, and publicity experts argued that Germans’ coarse 
approach to propaganda was giving the term a bad name. In their view, propaganda 
was “an essentially harmless refinement on the traditional American marketplace 
of ideas.”78 As Jackson Lears has noted, for them “advertising the war effort was an 
exercise in democratic social engineering, not Prussian regimentation.”79 The post-
war years were momentous: advertising saw an unprecedented explosion of rele-
vance and visibility in American business and social life. Publicists and advertisers 
began to see themselves as part of the same legitimate and effectual profession. 
By the 1920s the idea of audience manipulability had well-established academic, 
political, and professional currency. At the annual meetings of the professional 
advertising association, it was quite common “for heads of prestigious universities 
and national leaders [. . .] to enthusiastically hail advertising as ‘an agent of civili-
zation,’ and ‘the producer of desires which ends in creating demands.’ ”80 What was 
in certain circles a doctrine of influence, in others could be “professionalized into 
the psychology of suggestion, which cast the consumer as an easy mark for the 
informed marketing strategist.”81
The emergence of publicity as a legitimate profession did not occur in a vacuum 
but sprang from multiple antecedents, including the often-overlapping practices 
of theatrical press agentry and commercial advertising. In broad terms, publicity 
embodied the Progressives’ opposition to corporate “secrecy,” which they con-
demned as detrimental to the public interest.82 Even before the creation of the CPI, 
early twentieth-century American corporations realized that the best way to fight 
the charges of the muckraking press was to use the press to disseminate positive 
publicity about themselves.
In theory, news making and plain advertising or publicity were separate 
endeavors at odds with each other. In 1906, however, the Bookman had accused 
publicity practitioners of manufacturing “tainted news,” and in 1914 the New York 
Times had described the conflict in Europe as the “the first press agents’ war.”83 
In the mid-1920s, accusations against publicity adopted a novel formula: public 
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relations were not only akin to propaganda but were also described derogatively as 
“higher hokum”—a ploy, that is.84 Yet, the press never came to condemn publicity 
or the PR profession for long or to distance itself from these practices. As Alan R. 
Raucher noted long ago, “the publicity’s men’s desire to have material printed and 
the editor’s need for copy produced a marriage of convenience.”85
The most outspoken and self-promoting representative of the rising public 
relations industry was a young Cornell graduate named Edward Bernays. He had 
served as press agent for Enrico Caruso and the Ballets Russes, worked for the 
CPI’s Foreign Press Bureau, and attended the Paris Peace Conference as a mem-
ber of the press team. His knowledge of the psychology of influence came from 
experience, readings, and a prominent family connection: he was Sigmund 
Freud’s nephew twice over.86 Shrewd and ambitious, in 1919 he established his 
own business in New York, promoting himself as “public relations counsel,” and 
acquired academic credentials by teaching courses on public relations at New York 
University in the early 1920s. He published one of the first books on public rela-
tions in 1923, Crystallizing Public Opinion, which he followed in 1928 with the even 
more ambitious volume Propaganda.87 While engaging critically with Lippmann’s 
views about the dangerous manipulability of public opinion, Bernays did not often 
acknowledge his debts to the writings of the New Republic editor and at times 
turned him into an apologist for public relations.88
At the center of Bernays’s understanding of the opportunities associated with 
publicity and public opinion management was his experience with the Creel 
Commission. In his recounting, it had “opened the eyes of the intelligent few in 
all departments of life to the possibilities of regimenting the public mind.”89 
In contrast to German wartime practices, “modern propaganda,” Bernays wrote 
in 1927, “is a consistent, enduring policy of creating or shaping events to influ-
ence the relations of the public to a given enterprise. Perhaps ‘public relations’ is 
a more accurate term than propaganda.”90 Whatever the name, he argued, “the 
conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of 
the masses is an important element in democratic societies.”91 In a chapter in 
Crystallizing Public Opinion entitled “Propaganda and Political Leadership,” he 
lamented that “the methods of our contemporary politicians, in dealing with 
the public, are as archaic and ineffective as the advertising methods of busi-
ness in 1900 would be today.” The great challenge of our modern democracy, 
he remarked, “is how to induce our leaders to lead [. . .] When Napoleon said, 
‘Circumstance? I make circumstance,’ he expressed very nearly the spirit of the 
public relations counsel’s work.”92 To Bernays, the affinities between the Corsican 
leader’s brilliance and the emerging professional field were obvious. After all, 
he remarked, “good government can be sold to a community just as any other 
commodity. True, it is an intangible product [. . .] but not more intangible than 
the creation of a desire for breakfast foods or a new style of hats or a new phil-
osophic thought or theory.”93 The modern principles and practices of “universal 
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education” for the common man have only expanded the possibilities of 
mani pulation, not reduced them. “Instead of a mind, universal literacy has 
given him a rubber stamp [.  .  .] inked with advertising slogans [.  .  .] but quite 
innocent of original thought” because of propaganda’s “organized effort to spread 
a particular belief or opinion.”94
Due to his success and his reputation, it is not surprising that Bernays worked 
also for Hollywood, albeit briefly. Possibly recognizing how his talent best fit 
the task of promoting studio stars, William Fox assigned him in 1917 “the spe-
cial handling of Theda Bara in Cleopatra.” He devised catchy slogans and sought 
to appeal to respectable spectators by stressing the film’s educational value (i.e., 
Egyptomania, Roman history, art history). But his plans clashed with an industry 
culture that in the case of Bara preferred “an easy stimulation of the senses and their 
imagination by powerful mass effects [and] by voluptuousness.”95 In publications 
and personal documents, he denounced Hollywood’s sensationalist schemes as 
part of “a crude, crass, manufacturing business.”96 In a career that spanned decades, 
he rarely worked again for the film industry, preferring instead to collaborate 
with Cosmopolitan magazine, the publisher Bernarr MacFadden, and several 
large corporations.
Still, Bernays succeeded in his goal of redeeming the business of publicity from 
associations with Barnum-like trickstering to a semirespectable profession, one 
that he helped popularize as public relations. While his critics viewed his tactics 
as evidence of opportunism and deception, Bernays sought to invest his role 
with a serious intellectual status and an allegedly responsible social goal—as an 
opportunity to expand the knowledge of a busy public. He had learned valuable 
lessons about the critical role of established opinion leaders from the prince of 
publicity men, Ivy Lee. He had applied them as early as 1913, when he managed 
to have medical and religious authorities endorse a controversial stage play on 
syphilis, which eventually led to a widely publicized performance at Wilson’s 
White House. What he ultimately perfected was the codification of strategies for 
the creation of newsworthy events and their widespread popularization through 
the use of experts or celebrities who provided “leader approval.” In his view, even 
presidents could benefit from endorsement. In 1924 he organized a promotional 
event for President Coolidge’s election bid. Asked to reverse the widespread 
opinion that Coolidge was “weaned on a pickle,” Bernays thought of co-opting 
Broadway dancers and actors, including Al Jolson, for an official breakfast at the 
White House.97 The pseudo-event aimed to produce stories and photographs 
of the president in the company of individuals who “symbolized warmth, 
extroversion and Bohemian camaraderie.” At the event Jolson sang “Keep Cool-
idge.” The headline on the New York Times front page read “Actors Eat Cakes with 
the Coolidges: President Nearly Laughs.”98 Bernays used these testimonials as part 
of a much-emulated strategy of publicity stunts, which he called “over acts,” which 
secured free news coverage.
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If advertising was an explicit plan to convey information to sell products or 
services, what Bernays practiced and later theorized was something that a 1926 
study identified as “news publicity”—an oblique and much more effective way 
to market an idea, a product, or an individual.99 “The intrinsic nature of news 
publicity material is news [. . .] News publicity is information, not argument,” its 
authors asserted. “It educates, but does not sell. [It] is not directly concerned with 
merchandising, despite the fact that there is an occasional element of news in 
what is for sale.”100 Publicity, in other words, constituted a most effective form of 
information strategy when it masqueraded as news.
Bernays’s celebration of “special pleaders” pervaded the 1920s. Notwithstanding 
Lippmann’s eloquent and legitimate concerns for their impact on democracy, 
the practices that Bernays adopted, reworked, and endorsed became the modus 
operandi of film and political promotion and played no small role in shaping and 
enhancing the fame of Valentino and Mussolini. In a decade often derogatorily 
known as the age of ballyhoo, the industry could count on several Bernays-like 
figures who, albeit largely unknown and operating in the background, had no 
moral qualms about stunts and pseudo-events. In a two-part article, entitled “The 
Business of Motion Pictures” and published in 1927 in the Saturday Evening Post, 
Carl Laemmle commented on the role of “press agents’ stunts” and the bad rep-
utation that “exploitation” had attracted in the press and elsewhere. Defending 
the actions of “ballyhoo men” against moralistic detractors, Laemmle argued 
that “no matter what are the various views and definitions, exploitation, as I take 
it, is merely advertising the picture to the public in an unusual and convincing 
manner.”101 It was actually more than that.
To assess how Bernays’s exemplary work contributed to the changes affecting 
film and press cultures, one has to go back to the Supreme Court’s Mutual Film 
Corporation decision discussed in chapter 1. The stark distinction between the 
motion picture business, which for the court had no value as public interest, and 
the press was doubly contradicted by the facts. Griffith’s radical and influential 
approach to motion pictures from 1915 on, together with the CPI’s co-optation of 
Hollywood in 1917–1918, revealed that cinema was both a business and an organ 
of public opinion very much like the press—not one at the expense of the other. 
The press itself, in fact, was more than a mere conveyer of information and public 
opinion. It was also a private business and a fast-expanding one. Mainstream 
observers of the press’s changes and workings were quite vocal about the illusion 
of any neat distinction between journalistic ideals and commercial realities.
In the late 1920s, journalist and author Silas Bent gave an enlightening 
public talk on the disturbing changes that had recently informed American 
journalism. Entitled “A Menace to Democracy: The Press in America—Is It 
Free?” and published in a 1929 volume, Bent’s talk began by detailing the striking 
technological changes, from the introduction of economical pulpwood pa-
pers and photographic reproduction to transatlantic cables, that had turned a 
Cultural Nationalism and Democracy’s Opinion Leaders    53
limited commercial enterprise into a mass industry with inevitable links to 
powerful commercial and financial interests.102 The profitable partnership with 
advertising had dramatically lowered the cost of newspapers, inflamed harsh 
competition, and tilted news coverage toward sensationalism. While pro-reform 
editorialists may have launched crusades against profiteering, the same papers’ 
news columns did not. Bent denounced the fact that the press was experiencing 
“grave encroachments on freedom of opinion and of speech” from both the 
business and political worlds.103 While revealing the financial dimension of 
the journalistic profession, he noted that the massive revenue increase derived 
from years’ worth of advertising made it “preposterous” to suppose that the news 
business could ignore its best customers. At work, in his view, was not just 
news distortion but a more sinister change in news making and news consump-
tion that turned the reader from recipient of objective reporting into a “ready 
victim of the advertiser’s exploitation.”104
For Bent, the two key strategies were the deployment of “stereotypes,” or 
“stories which appealed to primary passions and unconscious hungers,” and the 
use of celebrities, evident in the press’s penchant “to ballyhoo night club hostesses, 
bathing beauties, pugilists, baseball players, channel swimmers, stunt aviators 
and tennis stars, solely for the aggrandizement of its own pocketbook.”105 With a 
polemic tone suggestive of Lippmann, he concluded that in America “the 
manufacture of public opinion [.  .  .] is in the hands of private enterprise which 
thinks only of its own treasury and very seldom of the public good.”106
The idealized distinction between private business and public good, between 
private and public profit, had been the basis of Progressive politicians’ rhetoric. 
But the outcome of their actions, by an ironic heterogony of ends, intertwined 
private and public domains in creative new ways. In his dated but still useful study 
of business and public relations in early twentieth-century America, Alan Raucher 
questioned the conventional wisdom that opposed Progressivism to unfettered 
business. On the surface, Theodore Roosevelt and muckraking journalism had 
punctured the sacred inviolability of American business giants. In truth, however, 
Progressivism had provided a “rationalization of business through government 
regulation” which, in conjunction with the development of new methods of 
communication, had reformulated the role of American business in the country’s 
polity.107 American businesses may have acted in self-defense against Progressivist 
attacks. But in a move that appropriated a Progressive argument, they also devel-
oped a new public morality—or corporate social responsibility, as we might say 
today. In contrast to William Henry Vanderbilt’s “the public be damned,” uttered 
in 1882 in response to a reporter’s question about railway routes and fares, the 
development of the public relations profession responded to modern corporations’ 
new public-centered stance. It signaled the rejection of a model of unrestricted 
competition and laissez-faire in favor of one ostensibly based on the widest 
possible benefit and thus constantly engaged in the use of mass communication.
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In this light, the heritage of Progressivism lasted beyond its usual chronological 
boundaries. By 1917, in fact, corporations that had faced public hostility and the 
threat of regulations were using publicity agents not just to counter attacks but 
also to publicize proto-welfare programs and new safety measures, as well as to 
promote management’s close relationship with civic leaders.108 News publicity 
was the preferred medium to “make a private cause look like a public cause and 
[. . .] to create of a public cause a public duty.”109 Some, like journalist and editor 
Harper Leech went beyond the straightforward assertion that public relations 
activities were the legitimate function of business and argued that they were none 
other than the guarantors of the right to free speech. In a 1927 polemical contri-
bution, “Is American Business Entitled to the Rights of Free Speech?,” Leech made 
a vehement case in the affirmative. In his presidentially appointed role as public 
relations director of the Railroad Labor Board, Leech stressed that American 
civilization had conferred “upon the masses benefits never before possible to 
them” and denied that business’s “scientific civilization” had any “conscious social 
policy.” Against the development and obvious benefits of capitalist enterprise, he 
denounced as “intellectual perversity” the positions of “radical college professors, 
kept liberals, [and] pink journals of opinion” who denied businesses “the right of 
free speech.” Theirs was an “anti-capitalist” stance that, Leech happily noted, did 
not pervade mainstream media, which was becoming “a vast industry itself.”110
We have come full circle. In 1915 cinema was regarded by the Supreme Court 
as simply a business and thus not as “organ of opinion” entitled to free speech. 
By 1927, it was not simply that the motion picture industry qua national industry 
was recognized as an organ of opinion but also that large corporations, and par-
ticularly public utility companies, had to operate as both businesses and organs 
of opinion. The Great War had played a role. Before 1917, public utility businesses 
had established a few practices that grew to national and international scale dur-
ing the European conflict. As Raucher concedes, the Creel Committee introduced 
a “scope of its operations” on the national and international level that in 1917–1918 
was unprecedented, and the government’s involvement uniquely helped the 
publicity business gain the legitimacy of a professional vocation.111 During the war 
years, the public status of American business was changing: private profit and 
public good were not in opposition any more, as the Progressive rhetoric had 
always intimated, but were running on seemingly parallel tracks. In the arena of 
public opinion, the regimentation of an old profession, variously renamed 
publicity agent, public relations counsel, and so on, discernably intertwined 
business and public interest.
Cinema did not remain impervious to these dynamics. During and immediately 
after the war, through a massive use of public relations activities pervading the 
press and public spaces, cinema emerged as America’s most influential mass 
entertainment and, as such, a public utility of sort. At its center was a key public 
relations device, the authority of celebrities. As special pleaders, celebrities were 
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deployed to manage the rise of American film spectators’ attendance in lavish 
new movie theaters and to broadcast modes of behavior centered on the values of 
individualism, leadership, and success. The next chapter will show how the motion 
picture industry, just as it was acquiring the financial and managerial fundamentals 
of more established corporate entities, gained unprecedented commercial and 
cultural hegemony as an American industry both domestically and in the world. 
Eventually, as we shall see in parts 2 and 3, in synch with its ambitions for transna-
tional appeal, Hollywood’s celebrity culture found itself inevitably crowded with 
foreign figures and infused with international cultural models.
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Wartime Film Stardom and Global 
Leadership 
Charlie Chaplin and Mary Pickford led Pershing’s Crusaders and America’s 
Answer into the enemy’s territory and smashed another Hindenburg line.
George Creel, 19201
PREPAREDNESS,  WAR ,  AND C ONSUMERISM
In the first chapter I discussed how U.S. government agencies set into motion a 
range of propaganda initiatives that relied on an unprecedentedly close collabora-
tion with Hollywood. In this chapter I focus on the same wartime relationship 
from the standpoint of the film industry. Specifically, I am interested in exploring 
Hollywood’s response to the heightened patriotic climate of the war years—before 
and during America’s actual intervention—not in terms of individual films but in 
terms of the industry’s pursuit of national significance. The war granted a novel 
political authority to some of Hollywood’s greatest celebrities, particularly Mary 
Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks, turning them from icons of lowbrow amuse-
ments into recognized representatives of American patriotism. This dynamic 
occurred just as Hollywood sought to gain economic and cultural legitimacy 
through financial consolidation and international expansion. To support the 
war effort, the industry had to make sensitive decisions in terms of pleasing both 
patrons and exhibitors. If films with overtly patriotic themes helped advance the 
argument that filmgoing was not an irresponsible wartime amusement, they still 
needed to walk a fine line between patriotism and entertainment value. Taking 
her cue from an expression of the time, Leslie Midkiff DeBauche describes such a 
combination as “practical patriotism.”2
In the years prior to America’s entry into the First World War, the protection 
of the country was central to the debates surrounding so-called war preparedness. 
Men and women were featured in numerous films fighting to protect their home soil, 
including Sigmund Lubin’s The Nation’s Peril (1915), J. Stuart Blackton’s Battle Cry 
of Peace (1915), and the Public Service Film Company’s Defense or Tribute? (1916). 
Narratives and mode of address were not indifferent to gender. Elizabeth Clarke 
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has showed that when the narrative action was about domestic defense, heroic 
women appeared regularly as daring defenders of the home or the nation.3 The 
serials Pearl of the Army (1916) and Patria (1917), for instance, introduced the very 
possibility of foreign invasion but cast strong and independent heroines as the first 
line of defense. Played by star actresses Pearl White and Irene Castle respectively, 
these serialized adventure tales turned the political issue of preparedness into 
entertaining narratives aimed at the industry’s largest segment—interclass and 
multiethnic female audiences. Released in conjunction with print versions in the 
Sunday papers, these serials popularized their elegant queens as fashionable models of 
vigorous Americanness, thereby contributing to a commodification of patriotism. 
As White’s and Castle’s politicization fully capitalized on their gendered identity, 
consumerism was inscribed in the logic of war necessity and thus not at odds with 
patriotic obligations to frugality and sacrifice.4 Once the war began and narratives 
started focusing on military expansion and not defense, violent actions appeared 
as a “man’s game.”5 Female heroine figure did not disappear, Clarke argues, but 
their stunning on-screen accomplishments were narrowed to a more polarizingly 
gendered necessity: military recruitment. Even in films released before the 
declaration of war, including Womanhood, the Glory of the Nation (April 1917), 
the promotional discourse shifted from celebrating the image of its star, Alice 
Joyce, to campaigns for male enlistment—despite the film’s title.6 But Alice Joyce 
was no Pickford.7
In her systematic assessment of Hollywood’s film production during America’s 
actual war engagement between April 1917 and December 1918, DeBauche has 
argued that “in proportion to the number of films [released], the number of films 
bearing any relation to the events of the war was small,” amounting to 14 percent 
of a total of 568 titles. Half of those were newsreels or documentaries. Main-
stream film producers did not exploit the war themes of preparedness or even full 
engagement and began releasing war-related films in larger numbers only around 
“September 1918, two months before the signing of the Armistice.”8 The limited 
number of war-related productions, however, did not imply that they were insig-
nificant in terms of trade or public discourse. War-related films constituted half 
the industry’s output of prestigious “specials,” longer and more expensive produc-
tions, released between April 1917 and December 1918. Furthermore, the entire film 
industry, including producers, exhibitors, reviewers, stars, and spectators, were 
debating “the appropriate function of popular culture, especially during a period 
of national crisis.”9 Hollywood’s response to the declaration of war was remarkable 
not just for what it did for the patriotic cause, but also for what it enabled the film 
industry to achieve culturally and commercially in the short and long terms.
In DeBauche’s analysis, Hollywood’s practical patriotism took two main narra-
tive directions: an antagonist one, featuring ruthless German enemies, and a cel-
ebratory one, stressing American heroes’ resistance and ultimate victory. Among 
the productions falling into the first category were “hate the Hun” propaganda 
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films, which included The Kaiser, the Beast of Berlin (1918) and Raoul Walsh’s The Prus-
sian Cur (1918). Of the films in the second group, the most famous were Cecil B. 
DeMille’s The Little American (1917), shot just days after the United States declared 
war and starring Mary Pickford, and D.  W. Griffith’s Hearts of the World (May 
1918), starring Lillian Gish. Set in France, the latter repurposed the moralistic 
message of Intolerance (1916) with the urgent agenda of American patriotism, but 
its dated Manichean melodrama turned Griffith “from being the father of the 
cinema to being its grandfather.”10 His quintessential leading lady, Gish, seemed 
to be an outmoded “picture personality” that Pickford, with her multidimensional 
and extracinematic fame, was fast replacing.
LIT TLE 100-PERCENT WHITE AMERICAN
By the time Pickford made The Little American, she had already become a paragon 
of film popularity and publicity. During the first days of block booking, Pickford’s 
steady production of six or eight features a year, compared with Chaplin’s two-reel 
shorts, had made her a distribution force for whatever company with which she 
was working.11 More than any other star, she was uniquely capable of driving “the 
marketing of movie fan magazines, postcards, posters, trading cards, buttons, and 
photographs.”12 A savvy businesswoman, she managed her fame through control of 
her print visibility. Between late 1915 and late 1916, she signed a syndicated newspa-
per column, “Daily Talks,” ghostwritten by her close friend and scenarist, Frances 
Marion.13 The column offered “helpful beauty secrets, advice on friendships, and 
memories of her ‘happy girlhood,’ ” and answered her readers’ questions.14 In one 
June 1916 column, Pickford/Marion enthusiastically praised the Citizens’ Pre-
paredness Parade that had taken place a month earlier in New York City. It was 
a daring move since, as Wilson was campaigning for reelection on an isolationist 
platform, military preparedness did not yet constitute a mainstream position. Still, 
the procession represented a call to arms because it awakened a patriotic spirit that 
Pickford’s later involvement with the war bond drives would fully unleash.15
Of the eight films that Pickford released during America’s involvement in the 
war, halfway into her career as Hollywood superstar, only The Little American 
(July 1917) and Johanna Enlists (September 1918) dealt with the conflict. The former 
was a blockbuster; the latter wasn’t. Production for The Little American, under 
the direction of Cecil B. DeMille, began a week after the war declaration, on the 
same day the CPI was established, on April 13, 1917. Shooting continued dur-
ing the national mobilization and was released on July 2, 1917, as the nation was 
preparing its armies to go overseas. Back in March, a month before production had 
started, Jesse L. Lasky had told DeMille that he wanted the film to arouse “the 
spirit of preparedness [. . .] in American girlhood and womanhood.” Lasky wrote 
to DeMille that he intended to create a character that “typifies the spirit of the 
American Girl in War times, something that would portray a girl in the sort of 
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role that the feminists in the country are now interested in—the kind of girl that 
dominates[, . . .] who jumps in and does a man’s work when men are at the front.”16 
Pickford’s persona on and off screen conveyed an iron-willed patriotism without 
running the risk of destabilizing gender roles. The Little American inaugurated 
such charming and unthreatening political commitment in a way that ultimately 
shaped her later screen characterizations.
In the film, Pickford plays the role of Angela Moore, a young and naïve 
American woman from Washington, DC. Her first name and her birthday (July 4) 
make her a symbol of goodwill and American innocence. Angela is in love with 
Karl Von Austreim, a German American living in the United States. When the war 
breaks out, Karl is asked to return to his native land and join the fight as a German 
officer. Shortly afterward, Angela sails for Europe to assist her dying French aunt, 
and she survives a torpedo attack before finally reaching her destination. Her aunt 
has died, but Angela decides to stay and aid wounded French soldiers. When the 
German forces occupy and pillage the village, she becomes their prisoner and is 
almost raped by a drunken Karl, who stops himself only after recognizing her. 
After Angela persuades him to switch sides out of his love for her, he helps her 
smuggle information to the French army. Eventually caught, they are brought 
before a firing squad but are liberated by a timely bomb blast. One of the film’s key 
dynamics is Angela’s transformation from victim to a patriot who is unwilling to 
stand idle in the face of German atrocities. The intertitles that express her reaction 
eloquently capture and repeat Wilson’s public stance with a timely and perfect 
rhetorical pitch:
I was neutral—’till I saw your soldiers destroying women and shooting old men! Then  
I stopped being “neutral” and became a human being! [. . .]
 I am done with you and your Emperor! I’d rather die free than live in the grip of your 
damnable “system.”
While her character’s change of opinion is critical to the film’s plot, it also encap-
sulates the different ideological positions of the time—from idealistic pacifism to 
practical preparedness to staunch military support. The Little American was one 
the most successful films of the entire war period, and Pickford’s dramatic patriotic 
performance “cast the shadow of the war on all her films.”17 For instance, in June 1917 
the Duluth News-Tribune hailed the film as an extension of her “moral, mental, and 
physical support of the flag.”18 Under the spell of the conflict, Vachel Lindsay later 
mused that “to repudiate this girl in haste is high treason to the national heart,” since 
“democracy crowns those it loves.”19 It should not be surprising then that The Little 
American’s release coincided with the first circulation of Pickford’s promotional tag 
lines “America’s Sweetheart” and “Our Mary.”20 What is certain that the film served 
the Toronto-born Pickford as a springboard for her new patriotic reputation.
From the spring of 1917 and throughout 1918, the press extensively praised 
Pickford’s support for the war effort: fundraising, giving speeches at benefits, and 
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releasing the short, lighthearted comedy 100% American (1918) to publicize war 
bonds. The most visible result of all this activity was the Third and Fourth Liberty 
Loan campaigns, held in both Washington, DC, and New York City in the spring 
of 1918 and featuring Pickford, Fairbanks, and Charlie Chaplin, among others.21 
After the New York drive, the stars brought the campaign to the rest of America 
along with their films: Pickford covered the West Coast, Fairbanks the Midwest, 
and Chaplin the South.22
figure 6. Advertisement for The Little American (Mary Pickford Co., 
1917). Motion Picture News, June 23, 1917, 3833.
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The press described Pickford as a “modern Joan of Arc” and stressed that the 
actress had done more for the cause than “soldier, king, pot or prophet.”23 
Throughout the latter part of 1917 and into 1918, Pickford enhanced her cinematic 
persona to the level of national cultural icon and opinion leader. Her growth as a 
public figure did not mean abandoning her long-standing association with roles 
of very young women characters. Almost exactly bookending The Little American 
were two productions that cast Pickford as an eleven-year-old girl: The Poor 
Little Rich Girl (March 1917) and Rebecca of Sunnybrook Farm (September 1917).24 
Nonetheless, something else had changed since 1916.
Until that year, Pickford had played many characters of non-European descent. 
These included a Native American in Ramona (Biograph, 1910) and A Pueblo 
Legend (1912), a Mexican in Two Brothers (1910), and a Filipina in A Manly Man 
(1911). Pickford played the majority of her nonwhite roles from 1909 to 1912 and, 
after a short hiatus, resumed playing them in 1915, by interpreting a Native Alaskan 
woman in Little Pal and a Japanese one in Madame Butterfly.25 Yet, a year later, as 
Elizabeth Binggeli has shown, “these nonwhite characters abruptly disappeared 
from her repertoire.”26 After 1916, looking like Pickford meant looking indisputably 
white. This was not the case for other popular stars, including Norma Talmadge 
and Colleen Moore, who continued to be exoticized with dark makeup.27 While it 
is true that Pickford’s film impersonations in this period included frequent roles as 
little girls and even as unattractive women, as in Stella Maris (January 1918), these 
changes revealed her growth more in acting virtuosity than in racial adaptability. 
She could cast aside her maturity, her femininity, or her charisma, but “after 1916, 
Pickford did not cast aside her whiteness.” Whiteness came at a dramaturgic cost. 
While in general an idealized white masculinity meant a “noble mastery over base 
bodily desires, including lust, greed, and violence,” the idealized white femininity 
rested on the embodiment of virtue.28 Yet, the mere display of virtue itself posed a 
challenge to narrative developments since generally it is desire, and not virtue, that 
provides dramatic intensity. The solution for Pickford’s characters was to situate 
their whiteness in a preadolescent youth.
Critics and biographers have often discussed Mary Pickford’s career in terms of 
the resilience of her roles as a child or a young girl against the frequency of more 
mature ones. In contrast to her amazingly savvy “creative authority over her silent 
film career,” as Gaylyn Studlar has rightly noted, “many of her most important and 
popular films present her in the role of a child.”29 Still, if we look at her career in 
the context of the nation’s preparation for and experience of the war, something 
else becomes clear. Out of the fifty-two feature films in which Pickford acted, she 
plays a little girl in only seven of them, and in only three does she remain a child 
throughout the story. Significantly, these three films are from 1917, the first year of 
America’s war involvement: The Poor Little Rich Girl, Little Princess, and Rebecca 
of Sunnybrook Farm. Further, her post-1917 collaboration with the former com-
bat correspondent Frances Marion, whose contribution to Pickford films at least 
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from The Poor Little Rich Girl on was particularly evident in the pungent humor of 
the intertitles, helped consolidate Pickford’s association with the playful and vital 
stubbornness of her young characters.
By relying on “juvenescence, virginity, righteousness, feistiness” and embodying 
a “hyperbolic white femininity,” Pickford could embrace a virtuous and resource-
ful screen persona capable of “tragedy with innate feistiness.”30 Rather than facing 
immutable bodily and social limits, her character could achieve final victory through 
“her indomitable white spirit.”31 It was the victory of a young white person’s free 
spirit that overcame either the narrative stasis associated with traditional female 
roles or the doom linked to an apparently insurmountable inferior identity.32 Her 
screen persona, in other words, embodied the combative and energized possibility 
of growth and self-improvement rather than that of resignation and invariable 
destiny. The comedy effects of some of her films derive from the relief, as Binggeli 
has noted, “that her backwardness is merely a product of acculturation and dirt, 
not a problem of blood.”33
By largely impersonating white characters and by being Anglo-Saxon herself, 
Pickford had it both ways: she could effortlessly display racial privilege while 
aligning herself with the early-twentieth-century framework of “personality,” 
which identifies an individual not on the basis of an inner core or unchanging 
character, as was typical in the nineteenth-century epistemology of personhood, 
but from acts of self-improvement and performance.34 During the war years, in 
other words, Pickford’s film characterization coherently intertwined youth and 
whiteness into a celebrity who, beyond her innocent impersonations and whole-
some acting style, exuded racialized patriotism and success from every pore.
Her prewar and wartime screen presence and her visibility on magazine covers, 
in product advertisements, and on postcards had stressed a coherent image of 
a down-to-earth everywoman, sporting long, dangling, golden locks but also 
capable of saucy banter and heroism. On screen and off, Pickford projected ideas 
of indomitable courage and moral righteousness into her films’ domestic and 
foreign markets. After having stopped playing nonwhite roles and after years of 
impersonating white working-class or immigrant figures, her American charm 
became synonymous with white people’s resilience and resourcefulness. Her 
characters’ actions amounted to a “hunt for happiness and beauty in the face of 
misery and ugliness,” which embodied two prewar American attitudes: “the 
‘practical idealism’ of Herbert Spencer’s Social Darwinism, and the advocacy of 
social change of Lester Frank Ward’s Reform Darwinism.”35
In the 1920s Pickford’s political import and recognizable style, made of 
classically simple tastes in fashion and couture, turned out to be somewhat at odds 
with the growing popularity and appeal of transnational actors of less immaculate 
whiteness. To best frame our understanding of this shift, I shall first address 
the war’s impact on the stardom of the other all-American superstar of the time, 
Pickford’s soon-to-be husband, Douglas Fairbanks. Secondly, I shall discuss the 
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postwar reorganization of the industry in terms of financial consolidation and 
cultural institutionalization that increasingly led Hollywood to appreciate its 
public relations clout abroad as well as domestically.
FAIRBANKS,  DEMO CR ATIC AND ELITIST
Publicity at any price has become the predominant passion of the American 
people.
Anita Loos, opening title, His Pictures in the Papers (1916)
A star of the New York stage, in the spring of 1915 Douglas Fairbanks transitioned 
from light stage comedies to light film comedies that revealed an appealing “mas-
culinity that danced a national optimism through speed, agility, and aggressive-
ness.”36 In late 1916, George Creel, soon to head the CPI, wrote his admiration of 
Fairbanks’s “dynamic individuality,”37 and a few months later Photoplay foresaw 
his career as “not only a triumph of acting but a national expression.”38 Starting 
with his film debut and throughout the second half of the teens, Fairbanks’s 
Americanness emerged in spirited, resourceful, and optimistic characterizations 
that turned gangster and Western narratives as well as comic melodramas into 
social satires and energy-filled sermons. His comic adventures addressed widespread 
anxieties about office life, corporate hierarchy, and careerism and their combined 
threat to virile American manhood. His films often combined a romantic narrative 
with a free-spirited display of masculine instincts juxtaposed to the danger of 
overcivilization, usually represented by a corporate office job. As Michael Kimmel 
and others have shown, the regeneration of American masculinity was inherently 
contrary to the pervasiveness of corporate desk jobs with their modern sites (i.e., 
office buildings), technologies of interaction (i.e., typewriters and memos), and 
social encounters, particularly between individuals of different gender and national 
backgrounds.39 In a modern workplace that had finally allowed women, though 
mainly as typists and stenographers, exclusively white male homosociality was 
a thing of the past. Fairbanks’s leading roles provided two recurring types of 
masculine self-affirmation and adaptation to these new environments, neither of 
which were particularly open to interactions with novel types of female characters.
One quality unifying his films is the light, satirical tone of his characters’ actions 
and viewpoints. As Alistair Cooke remarked back in 1940, titles like His Picture 
in the Papers (February 1916), Reaching for the Moon (November 1917), and 
A Modern Musketeer (December 1917) “parodied, with no discernable time-lag, 
the pattern of a rapidly changing social scene.”40 With a very American and at 
times very populist taste that Fairbanks himself helped fashion, his characters 
“briskly demolished” several affectations of his day, including “the Eastern clubman, 
pacifists, blue-bloods, ouija boards, slumming parties, pictorial journalism, 
nervous breakdowns, bobbed hair, and Couéism.”41 This playful and humorous 
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disapproval confirmed Fairbanks as the same jovial star underneath the clothes of 
whichever character he was playing. Mostly set in present-day America, his satirical 
films were also self-reflexive regarding the nature of Hollywood fame. At the end of 
His Picture in the Paper, after Fairbanks’s character has secured enough press cover-
age to prove his manhood and marry his beloved, the final winking intertitle, “Ain’t 
he the reel hero?,” teasingly associates the story’s narrative arc with the made-up 
nature of film celebrity. In his volume on Fairbanks, Richard Schickel has aptly 
argued that the post–World War I novelty of celebrity status pertained to “the realms 
of play” rather than to the traditional notion of worthy achievement.42
Still, satire did not exhaust his characters’ approach to the issue of masculinity 
in a corporatized world. Fairbanks’s more practiced solution was the revitalizing 
adventure set in the West or in faraway lands. This had already been apparent 
in The Lamb, his first film. As the weakling son of a wealthy New York family, 
his character undergoes a transformation through time spent in the wilderness. 
Given the fame of Theodore Roosevelt as the most prototypical masculine hero 
of such transformative narratives, Fairbanks’s audiences could appreciate both 
the “farcical excesses” of his performances and the familiar “stereotype of the 
westernized Easterner.”43 “In this West,” Studlar has noted, “even a mollycoddle 
could attain a manhood in which natural primitive urges found expression 
because such experience recapitulated the past.”44 While these transformations 
were generally interlaced with a good dose of comedic and athletic antics, 
in times of war the regenerative power of the “wilderness cult” maintained a 
vigorous cogency.45
Most of his screen roles did not explicitly address the European conflict or 
America’s subsequent involvement. Still, Fairbanks’s public contribution to the 
Liberty Bonds campaigns, through public appearances and promotional films, 
allowed his persona to become an all-American icon.46 In a remarkable photo-
graph from one of his public appeals, taken on April 8, 1918, Fairbanks is seen 
campaigning for the Third Liberty Drive at the Sub-Treasury Building in New 
York City, now the Federal Hall National Memorial, transfixing a large crowd 
beneath American flags and sharing the platform with an imposing statue of 
George Washington (figure 7).
Despite his intense visibility at these rallies, his only film to address war mobili-
zation explicitly was the antipacifist In Again–Out Again (April 30, 1917), released 
three weeks after the U.S. declaration of war against Germany and following months 
of division between promoters of preparedness and pacifism. In the film Fair-
banks is Teddy Rutherford, a properly named advocate of preparedness, engaged 
to a dull and pale girl named Pacifica Jennings—named after the former antiwar 
secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan. In addition to scenes meant to deride 
peacemakers, the display of Teddy’s athletic energy and vigorous handshake aligns 
the film’s ideological stance with one of the war’s most familiar proponents. Writ-
ten by Anita Loos and directed by her husband, John Emerson, the film was 
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figure 7. Douglas Fairbanks speaking about Liberty Loans in front of the Subtreasury building.  
Photograph from the Douglas Fairbanks Collection, General Publicity, Academy of Motion 
Pictures Arts and Sciences. Courtesy of AMPAS.
the first one to be released by Artcraft Pictures Corporation, a distributor for 
Paramount. Artcraft marketed it by flooding newspapers with “full-page ads 
stating that Uncle Sam congratulated Fairbanks on ‘his great patriotic picture 
[, . . . ] the most timely feature in months, teeming with action, patriotism, thrills 
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and laughs.’ ”47 The film and its campaign burnished Fairbanks with a novel 
patina of patriotic pride. Other Rooseveltian references would soon follow in 
his works.
A few Fairbanks films from 1917 juxtaposed country and urban lifestyles 
by making explicit references to the personality of his lifelong idol, President 
Roosevelt, and his known fondness for the strenuous life. In the comedy-Western 
Wild and Woolly (June 1917), Fairbanks played the son of an eastern railroad 
tycoon, sophisticated and fond of dime novels but unaccustomed to life on the 
frontier. Once he is sent to the West to investigate the feasibility of a new railroad 
route, he proves himself to be a pugnacious leader and is rewarded with success 
and romantic love. The same Rooseveltian contrast between corrupting city 
life and regenerative country life was also at the center of The Down to Earth 
(August 1917), which a critic dubbed as “a five-reel Fairbanksian sermon for 
Teddy Roosevelt.”48
Along with Roosevelt, another of Fairbanks’s heroes and a close friend, at 
least for a while, was the religious preacher Billy Sunday, a “baseball evangelist” 
who shared his athleticism, goodwill, and sense of tough-minded brotherhood.49 
Between 1908 and 1918, roughly corresponding to the emergence of Fairbanks’s 
career, Sunday delivered his popular sermons in week-long road shows, filled 
with tricks, speeches, and athletic entertainments.50 In 1918, Fairbanks and this 
“gymnast for Jesus,” as Sunday was often dubbed, appeared in baseball uniforms 
at a benefit to raise funds for American soldiers in France. To many the two 
figures seem to have congenially similar personalities. The friendship did not last. 
Although Americanism had a positive ring for domestic audiences, it could easily 
turn into aggressive nationalism. When Sunday’s post-1918 sermons favored the 
extermination of the German race, Fairbanks was nowhere to be seen.
Fairbanks’s religious vocation, which consisted of preaching the optimistic 
sermon of physical fitness against social ills, pretensions, and fears, made him akin 
to what Cooke described as a “popular philosopher.”51 This was not just an effect 
of the films on which a loyal group of collaborators routinely worked—from the 
aforementioned Loos and Emerson to writer-directors Allan Dwan and Joseph 
Henabery. It was part of the Fairbanks brand, which promoted character building 
through physical fitness and was broadcast in interviews, fan magazine columns, 
and biographical profiles, as well as several ghostwritten volumes, including the 
bestselling Laugh and Live (1917) and Making Life Worthwhile (1918).52 “He was 
a muscular itinerant preacher,” Cooke pointedly observed, “sailing gaily into the 
social novelties and the occupational neuroses of a new era dizzy with growing 
pains.”53
During the war years, a new facet in Fairbanks’s screen characterizations 
began to appear, though it would fully develop only in the 1920s: an elitist ten-
dency suffused his persona in a few films made between 1917 and 1919. Fairbanks’s 
characters were increasingly transformed from outsiders, who were quick to deride 
Wartime Film Stardom and Global Leadership     67
the rituals and pretensions of Old World nobility, to American aristocrats. Joining 
the familiar routines of social mockery and derision was a novel endorsement of 
personal ambition and entitled leadership. As an explicitly American outcome, 
such celebration solved the apparent contradiction between social and national 
predestination and individual merit.
America has always had its elites. In the preindustrial period, elites marked 
their difference from the nouveaux riches through an emphasis on ancestry, 
education, and taste. Any individual achievement had to be balanced and filtered 
by membership in clubs, Blue Books, and private schools. A few Fairbanks films 
from this period foreground these tensions between aristocracy and merit-based 
individualism. In American Aristocracy (November 1916), he plays Cassius, a 
preindustrial “natural” aristocrat and scion of one of America’s first families. 
Although he is named after the Roman senator who conspired with Brutus to 
kill Caesar, this historical figure’s repute in contemporary America was that of 
honorable patriot, capable of killing a dictator for the creation of a republic.54 
Cassius-Fairbanks operates in a world that looks down on “upstarts,” “climb-
ers,” and trade in general. While Cassius is virile and daring, his romantic rival 
is a fearful malted-milk manufacturer. Cassius invents a new hatpin that makes 
him rich: in combination with his prestigious lineage, such an outcome repre-
sents the perfect American amalgam of earned success and aristocratic predes-
tination. This conjunction of a sense of special distinction with the notion of 
American exceptionalism recurs in The Americano (January 1917), Reaching for 
the Moon (November 1917), and His Majesty the American (August 1919)—all set 
in imaginary republics and kingdoms.55 In these films Fairbanks is no longer the 
gymnastic evangelist but a new American aristocrat who sports the Hamiltonian 
mantle of autocratic leadership and who, due to his inherent superiority, is able 
to bring democracy to Europe and Latin America.56 Fairbanks’s works, even in 
their comedic tempo, exuded a Rooseveltian temperament that bestowed upon 
his protagonists a cogent ethic of personal and global leadership.57 For instance, 
His Majesty the American, released a few months after the signing of the Treaty 
of Versailles in June 1919, provides an example of “imperial reach” that power-
fully appropriates Old World traditions and Americanizes them by sheer force.58 
The costume adventures of the 1920s, set in distant times and exotic locations, 
showcase a more aggressive American aristocratic character without losing the 
familiar ironic touch. From The Mark of Zorro (1920) and Robin Hood (1922) 
to The Iron Mask (1929), Fairbanks would often become the champion of the 
oppressed in distant countries or centuries—a neat conjoining of Rooseveltian 
masculinity with Wilsonian idealism.
Pickford’s and Fairbanks’s respective wartime cultivation of an all-American 
identity would expand after the war. The two stars took part in the 
post-Armistice Fifth Liberty Bond drive (April 1919), known as the Victory 
Loan, during which they continued to publicize their good relationship with 
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the president (figure 4). They also continued to position themselves as digni-
taries at home and in the international scene. Before returning to discuss their 
postwar careers, we need to examine the financial and commercial infrastruc-
tural context that made postwar American cinema dominant domestically and 
internationally and enabled this couple to remain a paragon of all-Americanness 
in 1920s film and public culture.
HOLLY WO OD POWER AND PERSUASION
The war provided a jolt to the challenges that the film industry had been facing 
since well before the U.S. military went to Europe. These included films’ stan-
dardized length, commercial incorporation and financing, studios’ publicity hype 
vis-à-vis promotion of screen personalities, and threat of censorship vis-à-vis 
the industry’s aspiration to cultural relevance. The war helped to reframe such 
challenges by repositioning American cinema nationally and internationally. For 
instance, the recasting of the geopolitical and financial relationships between the 
United States and European countries significantly affected Hollywood’s commer-
cial reach, institutional role, and ideological import. Stars turned out to be privi-
leged vectors for film companies’ balance sheets and domestic market shares, as 
well as for Hollywood’s emerging public profile as a main driver of national and 
international public opinion.
The drive toward cultural institutionalization and financial incorporation 
had started even before the studios were set up in Hollywood. By the mid-1910s, 
producers had begun to adapt to the new feature-length format and reduce the 
number of pictures. The trend escalated during the war. Although the conflict and 
the Spanish influenza diminished foreign distribution, the overall decrease in the 
number of titles and reels was also part of a deliberate “fewer and better” strategy.59 
Out with the cheaper pictures, in with “specials,” which, while often associated 
with stars, secured higher rental costs, longer runs, and higher admission pric-
es. Even independent productions featured celebrities as several stars sought to 
acquire independence from mainstream studios, avoid paying income war tax, 
and produce works of higher artistic merit.
During the war, Famous Players–Lasky and the First National Exchange Circuit 
began acting like integrated corporations that competed over stars’ salaries and 
credits. The company led by Adolph Zukor was originally a studio that entered 
the distribution business after it acquired Paramount. First National followed the 
opposite path: from distribution to production. Established three weeks after the 
U.S. declaration of war, it brought together independently owned theaters and 
state rights franchisees to consolidate exhibitors’ interests against Paramount’s 
controlling distribution practices. Most prominent among such practices was 
block booking, wherein the major studios forced exhibitors to rent packages of 
minor films in order to secure stars’ pictures. First National’s strategy was to corner 
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the exhibition business by creating alliances among the country’s most prominent 
movie theaters and forcing scores of small, independent, and rural movie houses 
out of business. In a system of flat rental fees, theater chains had gained much clout 
over distributors. Competition between Zukor and First National raised the need 
for outside financing to acquire, control, or build movie theaters and produce films 
featuring ever more expensive stars: “the single most important factor determin-
ing a film’s box office success.”60 Pickford and other screen icons found themselves 
in the middle of this war and sought to benefit from the practice of star-series 
distribution.61 Between 1917 and 1918, First National began to hire away Zukor’s 
precious commodities: Pickford, Chaplin, and Lillian Gish, as well as Constance 
and Norma Talmadge. Zukor’s response provided the second act of his ongoing 
battle with First National.
After 1919, emboldened by a fresh infusion of stock financing, Zukor began 
building and acquiring controlling interest in numerous first-class movie theaters 
(more than three hundred theaters by mid-1921), which had been First National’s 
initial key asset.62 In response, through mergers and Wall Street financing, First 
National entered directly into the field of production by building its first studios 
in California. Meanwhile, taking advantage of the ongoing duel between Zukor 
and First National, film exhibitor Marcus Loew created MGM in 1924 by merg-
ing Metro Pictures Corporation with Goldwyn Pictures Corporation.63 By the 
mid-1920s, a few vertically integrated corporations came to dominate the industry 
through their control of theaters and the employment of a variety of “monopolistic 
trade practices such as block booking, blind bidding, price fixing, and a system of 
unfair clearances and runs.”64 If these could be seen as the unredeemable features 
of a shady business, the regularity of profits, the secure financial return of stars’ 
contracts, and the acquisition of prime real estate (or “fixed assets in the balance 
sheet” in accountants’ parlance) reassured Wall Street that the film industry was a 
solid business.
Financing film production, directly or through securities, had already been 
attempted before the war, but after Triangle Film Corporation’s 1917 financial 
debacle, the industry underwent a number of structural changes, particularly 
in terms of partnerships among exhibition outlets or between production and 
distribution firms.65 Broader conditions had also changed. Film stardom had 
grown into a giant national and international cultural phenomenon; Hollywood 
exercised a novel hegemony in international distribution; and Wall Street firms 
had amassed tremendous liquidity in conjunction with massive credit extended 
to European banks and companies. This last point deserves closer examination in 
light of its larger geopolitical implications.
Even during America’s neutrality, the war had offered new commercial 
and financial opportunities to American companies that maintained relations 
with all belligerents in the conflict. According to historian Mary Nolan, “U.S. 
exports increased from $2 billion in 1913 to $6 billion in 1916,” and several banks, 
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most prominently J.  P. Morgan and Company, were the beneficiaries of these 
international transactions.66 To pay for these war goods, Britain sold its foreign 
investments, sent gold to America, and borrowed billions from U.S. banks. The 
consequences of Europe’s massive dependency on the United States were signifi-
cant: the Old World lost its prominence in the world’s financial and commercial 
traffic, America “moved from being a debtor nation to being the world’s number 
one creditor,” and “New York replaced London as the center of world finance.”67 
It was a momentous change in the “character of transatlantic and global capitalism 
and consumer culture.”68 A new global geofinancial nexus would also soon shape 
Hollywood and American film culture.
To conduct its foreign policy, the U.S. government began to engage private 
financial interests in projects of unprecedented scale and reach. Wall Street firms 
started conducting financial rehabilitation of foreign countries in the service of 
the U.S. national interest. While masking the projects as civilizing missions, these 
firms became “financial missionaries to the world.”69 The internationalization of 
the American film business was part and parcel of a geoeconomic policy that 
aimed to secure the political stability of countries identified as important to U.S. 
governmental and business elites. War propaganda made it easy to appreciate that 
a successful policy of American economic intervention would turn foreign coun-
tries into investment sites and markets for American goods and lifestyles.70 The 
Wilson administration had been active on this front early on. The Webb-Pome-
rene Act of 1918 granted immunity from antitrust regulation to companies that, 
once organized into exporting cartels, operated in a trade deemed to be essential 
to the war effort.
Geopolitical strategies brought structural changes to the home front. With the 
strengthening of the U.S. commercial and financial sectors, as Wasko has noted, 
“more money became available for industries that were proven according to the 
investment community’s standards.” By the end of the war, the film business had 
begun to meet those requirements by developing basic industrial methods and 
establishing both a national distribution system and an international one that 
extended to the Far East and South America.71 Quite importantly, as the film 
industry began to oversee its international reach from New York City and no 
longer from its London offices, it came to center both global film distribution and 
finance in the United States.72
Beginning in 1919, a new era of movie financing began. Studios turned to 
investment banks to raise funds by selling stocks and bonds or turned to 
commercial banks to secure loans. A February 1920 article in Variety, while 
inaccurately prophesying the imminent involvement of J.  P. Morgan, described 
the unprecedented incursion of Wall Street’s financing power into Hollywood’s 
commercial sovereignty as an “invasion.”73 While there is no evidence that 
J. P. Morgan considered entering the film business before the 1930s, other bank-
ers did, including Otto and Felix Kahn of the investment bank Kuhn, Loeb and 
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Company and Amadeo Peter “A.  P.” Giannini and his brother Attilio Henry 
Giannini of Bank of America.74 After establishing itself as a rival to J. P. Morgan 
through considerable financial involvement in the railway business, during the 
war Kuhn, Loeb and Company managed to establish a credit relationship with 
France and with the city of Paris. In 1919, flush with financial resources, the firm 
underwrote a $10 million stock issue to Zukor’s Lasky Corporation/Paramount, 
the most important film company in America and thus in the world.
Kuhn, Loeb and Company’s financial decision was based on domestic and 
international considerations. Before proceeding, the company had commis-
sioned H. D. H Connick, vice president of the Morgan-controlled financial firm 
American International Corporation, to do a complete study of Famous Players–
Lasky.75 Filled with statistics and financial data related to imported and exported 
films, box office receipts, and numbers of foreign movie theaters, the study con-
cluded that the largest returns were in exhibition, not production. Addressing 
the widespread concern that stars’ salaries were a major industry problem, the 
report described compensation as a matter of supply and demand and identified 
performers as the key to a film’s exhibition and financial prospects.76 The report 
praised Famous Players–Lasky’s stars and directors, who gave tangible value to 
the company’s films, but also suggested, in an overt recognition of the role of 
publicity, “a more aggressive sales campaign” to increase domestic and foreign 
rental returns.77
Though the report was undated, its emphasis on publicity coincided with the 
publication of a special section on film publicity in the July 1918 issue of Moving 
Picture World.78 The section ran thirty-five pages and included a snapshot history 
of publicity and short articles “by the leading motion picture publicity men,” some 
thirty department heads and press agents. One of the contributors, James L. Hoff, 
defined publicity in opposition to advertising. While advertising consisted of “dis-
play announcements written by an ad writer,” Hoff argued, publicity consisted of 
“text matter that is written by a press agent.” The key difference pertained to cost: 
“the display is paid for and the publicity is not.”79 For many other contributors, 
the value of free publicity depended on press agents’ ability to tailor a message 
to a specific newspaper’s needs. “The newspapers want short stuff, snappy and to 
the point, and so written that it does not have to be rewritten,” maintained one of 
them.80 Publicity could effectively migrate from a studio’s press office or the desk 
of a star’s agent onto a newspaper page if it could masquerade itself as news and 
secure the widest possible attention as such.
Possibly more openly than any other banker, Otto Kahn showed great appre-
ciation for the ways the film business could mold public opinion through news 
publicity. In an address entitled “The Motion Picture,” delivered at the Para-
mount sales convention banquet on May 2, 1928, in Washington, DC, he spoke 
as an industry advocate. He intertwined praise for motion pictures’ soundness as 
both a business and a vector of public sentiment with the recognition of their 
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American, democratic, and even idealistic value.81 To explain how motion pictures 
took hold of “the emotional impulses of the people” and represented the most 
effective democratic factor in American life, even ahead of the automobile and the 
radio, he told of a curious historical coincidence. He recounted the public response 
to the deaths of former Harvard University president Charles William Eliot and, 
of all people, Rudolph Valentino, which in his account occurred on the same day, 
August 23, 1926.82 Both deaths made news, but the reactions of the American 
media and people were dramatically different. For the Harvard president, Kahn 
remarked, “public opinion rendered respectful and reverential tribute.”83 News of 
Valentino’s death, in contrast, “brought forth a veritable flood of popular grief, 
expressing itself in almost hysterical demonstrations as his body was transported 
across the country.” As a response to those who had denounced the disparity of 
merits and reactions, not to mention the questionable taste of public demonstra-
tions, Kahn pointed out what today might seem obvious: cinema’s unique capacity 
to arouse mass responses.
Rather than being a cheap or morbid fad, Kahn continued, for many millions, 
Valentino represented “the very embodiment and symbol [of] romance, beauty, 
grace, chivalry, and youth” because “his art and personality on the screen had 
endowed, enriched, and beautified their lives.”84 News of his death revealed motion 
pictures’ triumph as a most appealing modern phenomenon worthy of most 
serious cultural consideration—and thus beyond the fact that “the credit facilities 
[. . .] are ample [and] their securities have a ready market.” Kahn invited his audi-
ence of investors and businessmen not to linger on high-minded objections but 
to appreciate the distinctively American features of motion pictures’ popularity 
and to consider the commercial and geopolitical advantages of American cinema’s 
world success.85 As both art and popular entertainment, Kahn posited, motion 
pictures “present a striking parallel to that dualism of the spiritual and material 
which I consider as one of the most notable and distinguishing characteristics 
of America.” For Kahn, cinema constituted that most American combination “in 
fifty-fifty proportion” of “hard-headed business capacity and deep-seated ideal-
ism” that could secure major geopolitical returns.86 As a wartime practitioner of 
coupling financial returns with propaganda, Kahn was a most credible postwar 
advocate of aligning Hollywood’s international commercial success with American 
cultural influence. His speech ultimately sought to persuade his listeners to 
divorce cinema from mere entertainment and appreciate it instead as “an 
advertising medium of remarkable effectiveness in making known all kinds of 
American products throughout the world” and thus in shaping world’s public 
opinion about the United States.87 Kahn’s reference to film stars as Hollywood’s 
prime commodity showcases his understanding of their role as the nation’s 
ambassadors in advertising testimonials. It is now time to turn to this dimension 
of the motion picture business—that is, the enormous role of international film 
distribution and its key publicity vehicle: the stars.
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GLOBAL REACH
American film manufacturers need a world-trade, not merely a local fetch-
and-carry.
Photoplay, 192188
One of the most important dynamics affecting postwar American cinema was 
Hollywood’s growing worldwide hegemony. The war favored U.S. companies in 
the competitive European markets by, for instance, cutting off France from Central 
and East European markets and the Germans from the Allied film circuits.89 
According to a 1930 Harvard Business Review article, by 1925 American films 
made up to 95 percent of the total shown in Great Britain, 70 percent in France, 
65 percent in Italy, and 60 percent in Germany. “Few American industries,” the 
business periodical concluded, “are more dependent on foreign markets than the 
motion picture industry.”90 By the late 1920s, foreign markets amounted to about 
35 percent of Hollywood’s total income.91 Together with Wall Street financing, the 
income from foreign distribution helped studios seek control or ownership of the 
best domestic theaters, raise their films’ production values, and compete for and 
develop top global stars. In turn, these additional commercial and entertainment 
advantages helped sustain Hollywood’s success abroad.
This outcome resulted from several concomitant factors but also stemmed from 
a sustained collaboration between Hollywood and the U.S. government that went 
back to the First World War. The American film industry received key logistical 
and publicity help from the CPI during the war. By virtue of the U.S. government’s 
control of the wireless, cable, and postal services across the Atlantic, the CPI 
was able to place said services at the disposal of the film industry, particularly 
through the Foreign Film Division. All told, “some 24 nations were sent 6,200 reels 
of American pictures.”92 In return, the CPI received the authority from the War 
Trade Board to issue licenses to Hollywood films destined for the world’s markets, 
which Creel used to distribute CPI works. The same licensing clause applied to 
foreign exhibitors, who, if found exhibiting German films, were prohibited from 
receiving Hollywood fare. Distribution of the latest Signal Corps and American 
commercial films to Allied populations brought together the government and the 
film industry’s respective goals: war propaganda and commercial profitability.93 
To paraphrase Creel’s famous sentence, Chaplin and Pickford led Pershing’s 
Crusaders and America’s Answer across territories where they would have otherwise 
remained unseen and unwanted.94
While Creel’s intention was to exercise a good measure of control over foreign 
film markets, the resulting CPI policies achieved unexpected long-term results. 
As the U.S. government broadcast American values and lifestyles through printed 
and visual media, Hollywood stars nurtured habits, expectations, and the inter-
national appetite for even more American culture. “The advertising that America 
obtained [.  .  .] by the CPI,” Larson and Mock recognized, “played no small part 
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in the great commercial expansion enjoyed in the 1920s.”95 The industry took 
advantage of this partnership. In the summer of 1917, the National Association of the 
Motion Picture Industry (NAMPI) “was elected to membership in the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce,” which signaled its “recognition within the wider business and 
financial community.”96 In 1918, during negotiations over foreign film distribution, 
Hollywood obtained recognition of its distinct patriotic and educational role, 
which extended not just to “news weeklies, screen magazines, [and] American trav-
elogues” but also, as a NAMPI-CPI agreement reads, to “films purely entertaining 
in nature, but which clearly portray some idea of American life and purpose.”97
The combined effects of the weakening European film industry and American 
cinema’s growing hegemony over Europe mainly through block booking and 
direct control of major movie theaters were long lasting. The trade expressions of 
the time, “Film America” (for Hollywood) and “Film Europe” (for a pan-European 
film industry devoted to Continental coproductions), informed a wave of press 
coverage that characterized their relationship as nothing short of an “undeclared 
war.” “In a ridiculously short time span,” wrote a German trade paper in 1926, 
“Film Europe has become a colony of Film America.”98
The conventional view about the 1922 establishment of the Motion Picture Pro-
ducers and Distributors of America (MPPDA), replacing NAMPI, is that the latter 
found itself to be ineffectual in protecting the film industry’s public stance from 
the many scandals that had tarnished it in the late 1910s and early 1920s.99 Wall 
Street investments had to continue and the alliance with the government had to 
be reinforced against the censorship calls made by religious and moral constituen-
cies. While historically valid, this argument tends to overlook that the MPPDA’s 
newly appointed head, Will H. Hays (formerly Republican National Committee 
chairman, manager of Warren G. Harding’s successful presidential campaign, and 
U.S. postmaster general), had two main goals: to ward off censorship legislation 
and to enhance Hollywood’s international domination. The order of priorities 
might even be reversed. “The MPPDA’s original bylaws,” notes Kristin Thompson, 
“charged it to represent the industry’s interest abroad.”100 In Hays’s hands the 
MPPDA ultimately operated as a public relations machine that changed 
Hollywood’s actual import, not just its image, in the country and the world.
To quash calls for federal censorship, Hays stressed an approach that relied on 
industrial organization and an idealization of “self-government.”101 To represent 
the film industry’s international interests, Hays relied on a Wilsonian rhetoric 
of universalism that was clearly accented with notions of exceptionalism. He 
promoted cinema as enhancing “the international understanding by the peoples 
of the world” but maintained that only “America in the very literal sense is truly 
the world state. All races, all creeds, all men are to be found here.”102 But he also 
publicized and practiced the Wilsonian principle that “western ideas go in with 
the western goods” and the selling of American goods will “convert the people of 
the world to the principles of America.”103 In a 1923 speech delivered in London, 
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Hays outlined the international aims of the film industry: “we are going to sell 
America to the world with American motion pictures.”104 “Trade follows the films” 
became a trope in film and business periodicals.105
While embedding his defense of the film business into a universalistic and 
suggestive rhetoric of republican ideals of democracy and self-determination, it 
is not surprising that Hays viewed the MPPDA “almost as adjunct of our State 
Department.”106 After developing a strong collaboration with the U.S. Department 
of Commerce, whose Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce offered key 
assistance in gathering information on foreign markets and critical advice for 
negotiating foreign countries’ protectionist policies, Hays fostered an even closer 
alliance with the State Department.107 He understood that an alliance with the 
government departments responsible for negotiating with foreign governments 
would be instrumental in expanding the film industry’s global presence. While 
the United States may not have had a clearly defined domestic or a foreign film 
policy, Hays did. In his view, Hollywood facilitated America’s global economic and 
political preeminence within a new global cultural perspective. By the same token, 
the recognition of America’s place in the world impacted the nation’s self-under-
standing and appreciation of what cinema could be as powerful global vernacular.
At a time when, in Victoria De Grazia’s words, “hard-bound lines [.  .  .] still 
divided the high and academic from popular and mass cultures” in Europe, American 
cinema’s popularity made Europeans question “whether old-world states still 
exercised sovereignty over their citizens’ leisure.”108 Was American culture so pow-
erful and pervasive because of the country’s decisive role in winning the war, supe-
rior industrial and commercial organization, and ensuing economic occupation of 
foreign film industries? Or was it because it uniquely appealed to European audiences 
of all classes through its dynamically acted and appealingly shot stories of optimism, 
resilience, and final justice? In other words, was Hollywood success the result of 
power or persuasion? De Grazia notes that European commentators touched upon 
both explanations but, she maintains, “arguably, American movies were more 
responsive to consumer desires than European films,” particularly in conveying new, 
attractive “social identities” that exuded glamour and individual achievement.109 
Although they had emerged out of a distinctively multinational Pacific Coast outpost 
and displayed a sort of “Norman Rockwell preciousness,” these figures—Hollywood 
stars, that is—appeared to Europeans unmistakably American.110
To spectators at large, no matter their national, class, or ethnic background, 
Hollywood stars appeared as models of individual distinction, enviable lifestyles, 
and universal desires. To the studios, stars represented loyal brands, vectors of 
high and standardized quality, sold to both exhibitors and audiences and publi-
cized to the point of saturation in tabloids, film periodicals, and even the daily 
press. If the war had helped to sell America, the celebrities of the 1920s were doing 
the heavy lifting at a time when the advertising industry was relying on their mass 
appeal to design its pitch and reach. Referring to a 1917 Vogue article entitled 
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“Great Actors, as Other Great Men, Are More Alive Than the Herd,” Jackson Lears 
notes that the great actor was exploited as cheerleader, “rousing inert masses into 
disciplined enthusiasm.” As “redemptive celebrity figures” and “demigods on the 
field,” Hollywood stars “became standard features in the testimonial advertising 
that blossomed after the war.”111
What was there to sell? The narrative and stylistic appeal of American cinema 
relied on the aestheticization of an ideological cosmos at once American and uni-
versal, animated by such values as freedom, youth, optimism, and leadership.112 
During the war and immediately after, Pickford and Fairbanks were two of the 
most authoritative—and marketable—representatives of this etiological universe 
whose aura reverberated far outside movie theaters. As democratic leaders of 
public opinion, at least for a few years, they did not seem to have many rivals. And 
yet, in the 1920s, their all-too-American allure left a wide-open space for different 
kinds of marketable characterizations. 
PICKFAIR’S  OLD DIGNITARIES
Beginning in the early 1920s, despite her continuous success, Mary Pickford’s 
much-praised image of innocence and virtue became increasingly at odds with 
the new national mood and with her own real age. “America’s Sweetheart” sought 
to move away from her traditional roles as young girl, but the results were mixed. 
In the ten reels of Little Lord Fauntleroy (1921), she gave an unprecedentedly bra-
vura performance as both a boy and his mother, but her role as Spanish street 
singer in Ernst Lubitsch’s Rosita (1923) was too much of a radical departure from 
her public image. Her 1920 marriage to her boy-man did not mean the end of her 
conventional childish roles, made of curls and long skirts. But the conservative 
image was a paradox for her career. While the aestheticized nostalgia she continued 
to exude in film after film, from Through the Back Door (1921) to Sparrows (1926), 
was particularly successful in small-town America, it condemned her to being an 
anachronism.
Opposing her curls was the bobbed hair of the flapper, who became synony-
mous with the modern, worldly woman, who was American in youth and sexual 
daring but cosmopolitan in manners and fashion. Between 1919 and 1920 Alla 
Nazimova, Constance Talmadge, and Gloria Swanson adopted the new hairstyle 
just as the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment had begun to have a special 
significance for younger generations of fans who viewed new grooming and dress 
codes as evidence of expected emancipation. Unlike Pickford’s characters, real 
and fictional flappers were young women comfortable with their overt sensuality, 
as Clara Bow, Louise Brooks, and Joan Crawford were to reveal. By the middle 
of the decade, gossip columnists were publishing career obituaries about Mary 
Pickford. Her “reign is over,” the former unofficial Valentino publicist Herbert 
Howe noted in 1925: “she has outlived the popularity of her type.” In her place, he 
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wrote, “We now have with us the flapper generation that rolls both its socks and its 
cigs, and even hips a flask now and then.”113 The flapper’s worldliness did not just 
signify her loss of innocence and a bold assertion of sensuality; it also signaled a 
cosmopolitan that reproduced the “infinitively more attractive [.  .  .] sophistica-
tion of old Europe.”114 After describing the flapper as “the most authoritative and 
intelligent movie reviewer,” Howe elected her as the true “representative public” 
vector of the new Hollywood taste, since “it doesn’t matter much what men like; 
the women lead to the box office.”115
Throughout the 1920s, the domestic authority Pickford had gained as a cul-
tural icon during the war kept declining. America was elsewhere, and Pickford, 
now in her late thirties, had overextended her youth. When Pickford had her hair 
bobbed after her mother’s death in June 1928, the event made the front page of the 
New York Times.116 Grief, rage, and disappointment were some of the sentiments 
expressed by her nostalgic fans. Even though her first talking picture, Coquette 
(1929), became her biggest box-office success and secured her an Academy Award 
for Best Actress, the career of “the Bank of America’s sweetheart,” as Zukor once 
called her, was ending.117 Her popularity remained strong abroad, where her 
enduring American appeal was always connected to the figure of her dashing, 
energetic, but also aging husband.
In the 1920s, Fairbanks’s popularity and characterizations were changing too. In 
longer and ever more expensive productions, set in past fictional worlds without 
flapper-like female coprotagonists, his roles became less and less about social 
satire. Instead they promoted a proud, often juvenile display of all-American 
male leadership—even if the character was not American. Regularly set in a 
familiar literary past, his 1920s films cast him as a hero-leader whose ironic take 
on distant settings and cultures showed him off as morally and physically superior. 
In truth, his characters did not exactly emerge as champions of democratic and 
egalitarian values and were not really revolutionary figures. Instead they appeared 
to support a strong and legitimate authority, often in the name of a noble per-
sonal background fueling his courage, chivalry, and leadership. They may have 
been outlaws and rebels, but they were often aristocrats by heritage (Don Diego 
in Zorro and Robin of Huntingdon in Robin Hood) or had earned royal attach-
ment (d’Artagnan). In other words, his screen persona held an elitist allure, one 
that insisted on the nobility of birthright, character, and deeds. At the same time, 
while operating in distant lands and remote times, his characters turned a certain 
primitivism of manners into a primary, almost nostalgic, scene of governance. No 
matter the character or century, the larger-than-life Anglo-Saxon Fairbanks was 
always a leader to his socially inferior followers, including women. The commoners 
and citizens who inhabited his films’ exotic worlds appeared grateful to submit to 
his aristocratic and starlike authority and functioned as social décor in narratives 
in which justice was ultimately served and conflicts were neatly resolved—as in 
The Mark of Zorro, Robin Hood, and The Black Pirate.
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Fairbanks’s characterization had also a Wilsonian dimension that idealized fair 
governance against usurpers, illegitimate rulers, and just plain cruel tyrants. He 
was the recognizably American hero “working on behalf of ‘the people’ to support 
and restore the people’s regimes of Spanish governors in the two Zorro films [1920, 
1925], King Richard the Lion-Heart in Robin Hood [1922], and Louis XIII and 
XIV, respectively, in The Three Musketeers [1921] and The Iron Mask [1929].” With 
admirable leadership skills, “Fairbanks did similar deeds while deposing a wicked 
Mongol usurper in The Thief of Bagdad [1924] and a totalitarian South American 
dictator in The Gaucho [1928].”118
His characters did not intend to take over the world, only to return it to its right-
ful leaders. Their toppling of authoritarian and cruel regimes was set in a mythical 
and easily romanticized past, not in the present. For Siegfried Kracauer, that was 
a telling sign. “Douglas Fairbanks, the gallant champion of the oppressed,” the 
German critic remarked, “goes to battle in a previous century against a despotic 
power whose survival is of no consequences to any American today.”119
Rather than subvert unfriendly contemporary forms of governance, these 
nostalgic pageantries articulated a different kind of liberation. Fairbank’s celeb-
rity on-screen and off appeared to address a widely felt need for the revitaliza-
tion of American masculinity. By virtue of his characters’ superior moral vigor 
and athletic skills, his costume adventures sought to restore and perpetuate the 
wholesome virtues of the ideal American male. It is not surprising, then, that in 
film after film Fairbanks’s characters remained juvenile figures, both diegetically 
and iconically, and were shielded from emotional and narrative involvement with 
the new feminine types. In this regard, Fairbanks’s 1920s swashbucklers also paid 
peculiar homage to boys’ literary favorites of the time, from Dumas’s The Three 
Musketeers to Robin Hood and the Arabian Nights, or featured a son eager to please 
a father figure (i.e., The Mark of Zorro, Don Q, Son of Zorro, and The Black Pirate). 
In contrast to his films from the teens, his character- and leadership-building nar-
ratives showcased protagonists who walk a fine line between comedic playfulness 
and a marked desire for justice and paternal approval.120 In The Mark of Zorro, Don 
Diego Vega is both the effeminate young man, or mollycoddle, and the fearless and 
righteous hero who confronts and defeats the local despot and realizes his father’s 
most unlikely expectations. As such, Fairbanks’s 1920s films indulged in a patri-
archal past that, set in faraway places, oppose a virile, active masculinity against a 
passive femininity. “The star’s retreat into a fictional past,” as Studlar has acutely 
noted, “secured a place where his protagonists could continue their heroics without 
confronting those adult prerogatives and impurities made synonymous with the 
Roaring Twenties.”121 His characters’ exuberant male energy was thus safely rein-
scribed in reassuring narratives of male heroism and unambiguous sexual roles. 
Neither flappers, competent and erotically powerful women, nor deviant effemi-
nate males were anywhere to be seen in his films. His all-too-insulated film roles 
deflected any tension between his characters’ diegetic youth and his biographical 
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age.122 Instead, they joyfully took children and nostalgic adult spectators into a 
world “when life was life, and men were men,” as one of the intertitles of The Three 
Musketeers reads.
When Douglas Fairbanks and Mary Pickford were married in 1920, their love 
story had the whiff of a scandal, since both had divorced to be together, but also 
the enduring quality of a fairy tale. They were America’s royals after all.123 At the 
height of their fame, they were known as humble royalty, old-fashioned trend-
setters, and politically conservative. Their magnificent and exclusive residence of 
Pickfair, the “Buckingham Palace of Hollywood,” was the site of official indus-
try functions and entertainments, regularly covered by the press as a matter of 
course.124 Pickfair “became the nation’s second White House and the crossroads 
of the world for boldface names,” from Albert Einstein and Amelia Earhart to 
King Alfonso VIII of Spain and Babe Ruth, to name a few. The two royals “were, 
in all but name, unelected officials of the U.S. government, and they shirked none 
of it.”125 As iconic embodiments of health, sobriety, and good humor, they also 
became national and industry spokespeople, especially outside the United States. 
During their trips abroad, they were regarded, as Pickford herself acknowledged, 
as “ambassadors, not only of the motion picture industry, but of our own country.”126 
For a while, at least.
As the 1920s went on, the heroes of the Liberty Bond campaigns found them-
selves restricted to typecast roles that, though still popular at the box office, were 
increasingly seen as passé. The nation that had catapulted them to world fame and 
turned them into models of physical activity and innocent youth was grateful to 
the couple but was also intrigued by not-so-all-American ambassadors and public 
opinion leaders. The two stars’ meeting with Mussolini in Rome in 1926 seems 
to exemplify this delayed passing of the baton to a different kind of celebrity— 
surprisingly, a foreign one.
In theory, several phenomena should have countered Valentino and Mussolini’s 
degree of nationwide popularity in the political and cinematic affairs of 1920s 
America. The Great War’s aftermath led to the rise of isolationist and nativist 
sentiments. Politicians and intellectuals urged the end of what they deemed to 
be messy political entanglements in international affairs, and their articulation of 
hyperbolic nativist positions and eugenic hierarchies led Congress to pass unprece-
dented immigration restrictions.127 How then could two racially othered foreigners 
become leading figures in America? Further, how to explain their popularity 
vis-à-vis the nationalizing trajectory of wartime film stardom that had anointed 
Pickford and Fairbanks as the most popular icons of an all-American national 
spirit? And finally, how could two icons of chauvinist Latin masculinity become pub-
lic opinion leaders in a nation that was undergoing a major democratic expansion in 
terms of gender equality, social mobility, and political representation? In part 2, 
I address these questions with respect to Valentino’s career trajectory and reveal 
the critical role of mediators—namely, unofficial publicity agents and various 
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kinds of promoters—in the development and consolidation of his popularity. 
In part 3, I focus on Mussolini’s heavily mediated popularity in America during 
the same period. Both sections focus on two interrelated postwar dynamics 
pertaining to the internationalization of American film narratives and characters 
and the rising transnational appeal of foreign, racialized masculinities.
PART T WO





The Divo, New-Style Heavy
You know producers can’t make stars. The public makes stars. You can’t make 
a star by writing the name on a lot of advertising. [. . .] Nobody can make 
stars of nothing.
Adela Rogers St. Johns, Photoplay, 19221
TR ANSNATIONAL AMERICA
During the first years of the twentieth century, the American film industry was 
compelled to produce films of clear national significance capable of prevailing 
over foreign films’ competition. Richard Abel has described this process as the 
“Americanization of American cinema.”2 The outbreak of World War I furthered 
this phenomenon but also introduced, at least in highbrow intellectual circles, an 
opposing, post-melting-pot formulation of Americanism. As we saw in chapter 2, 
from the mid-1910s onward, progressive intellectuals like Kallen, Bourne, and 
James came to acknowledge America’s constitutive openness to transnational 
influences. This notion eventually moved from the lofty pages of highbrow 
periodicals to more popular ones. By the war’s end, film journals had begun to 
recognize the critical role that America’s national diversity played in U.S. films’ 
propaganda effectiveness. In 1918 Louella Parsons argued that America’s “cosmo-
politan population of mixed races” was what enabled Hollywood to “reach the 
very people Germany is struggling to get into its clutches.”3 Similarly, film peri-
odicals praised both the seamlessness with which foreign immigrants become 
American film spectators and American film culture’s inclusion of foreign charac-
ters and representations. In a 1921 Photoplay article entitled “Making Americans 
by Movies,” Max Watson argued that the Americanizing process did not start at 
Ellis Island, where educational films were shown, but abroad where would-be 
immigrants first learned about America before embarking on their long journey. 
“Wherever one goes the world over,” he wrote, “[the traveler] finds the American 
movie, for ninety per cent of the motion pictures of the world are American.”4 
The flip side of Watson’s proud statement was something that his own periodical 
had been covering for some time: the multinational openness of film culture. In 
an illustrated, full-page editorial in 1918 entitled “The Melting Pot” and devoted to 
84    The Governance of Romance
Isaac Zangwill’s famous play from a decade earlier, Photoplay published a remark-
able polemical plea:
Zangwill’s vision is to today’s actuality as an assayer’s flame to a blast furnace. In the 
roaring converter of war more than nations are fusing. [. . .] The Iowa lad is learning 
that the French aren’t frog-eaters, nor are the Italians “Ginnies.”5
Five years later, Motion Picture Classic identified American cinema’s fondness for 
foreign settings and characters, particularly European ones, as an index of a wide-
spread inclination unknown a few years earlier. The article compared the phenom-
enon to nothing less than a psychological fixation:
Hollywood is undergoing a European complex. Nearly every production now film-
ing, or in immediate prospect, has a foreign setting. Witness: “Ben Hur,” [. . .] “The 
Hunchback of Notre Dame,” “Scaramouche.” [. .  .] The scene of every one of these 
plays is laid abroad.6
While the discursive emergence of a transnational and cosmopolitan America did 
not defeat anti-immigration policies in Congress, it contributed to spreading a notion 
of cultural pluralism that permitted popular appreciation of foreign personalities. 
Still, how could two foreigners be made into national celebrities? How could any 
embrace of foreign masculinity be made not just possible but also desirable?
C OSMOPOLITAN MASCULINIT Y AND ITALIANNESS
In Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United 
States, 1880–1917, Gail Bederman offers one of the most articulate contributions 
to the history of turn-of-the-century American manhood. First, she clarifies the 
terms of the question. She names manliness as the idealized notion of male identi-
ty that since the early nineteenth century had pervaded American society. Its chief 
traits were “moral character, high-minded self-restraint, and virtuous self-mas-
tery.” For over a century, she argues, manliness represented the source of middle-
class men’s authority over women and the lower classes.7 By the 1890s, however, 
manliness and middle-class identity were noticeably faltering. The causes were 
diverse: economic crisis and a prolonged post-1893 depression, related to large-
scale capitalist competition; greater demand for urban clerical jobs in large, 
anonymous corporations; increased gender and racial diversity in the labor force; 
movements for women’s suffrage; immigrants’ left-leaning political engagement; 
and the expanded role of consumer culture in shaping class and gender identi-
ties.8 Different causes but, in Bederman’s analysis, a convergent result: ideas and 
practices of racial distinction were used to recast ideas and practices of manhood. 
“As white middle-class men actively worked to reinforce male power,” she argues, 
“their race became a factor which was crucial to their gender.”9 A novel attention 
to corporeal features, particularly regarding race, became pivotal to middle-class 
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white men’s attempt to remake manhood in order to sustain their cultural and 
political power. European immigrants and working-class men provided useful 
examples. The popularity of saloons and music halls, with their displays of plebe-
ian muscular virility, led to a reformulation of Victorian manliness through the 
adoption of a cult of strenuous life that translated into physical prowess, pugnacity, 
and sexuality. Taking decades to unfold, this trajectory from idealized to corporeal 
manhood, or masculinity, produced several iconic characters, popular practices, 
and institutions, including the widely admired Prussian muscleman Eugene Sandow, 
Theodore Roosevelt’s Rough Riders, and the growing popularity of college foot-
ball and YMCA. According to Bederman, this complex recasting was rooted in 
the invocation of a notion of civilization that while seeking to balance nature and 
culture, served to relegitimize hierarchies of race, gender, and class.
The broad tension between civilization and primitivism resulted in two different 
outcomes. The first relied on opposition: imperialists and nativists maintained that 
only civilized white men possessed the racial genius for self-government, a status that 
implied the subjugation of primitive races—both at home and abroad. The second 
was one of appropriation. Against the risks of overcivilization and “neurasthenia,” to 
use a contemporary term,10 the other option was to embrace the racially impure and 
plebeian notion of muscular physicality while simultaneously gentrifying it. Popular 
culture fostered this safe transformation and developed it on a grand scale.
Several major cultural events can be read in this light. The exceptional popularity 
of the 1910 fight between Jim Jeffries and Jack Johnson, which opposed “Protes-
tant virtue” (and whiteness) against “uncivilized [black] savagery,” managed to lift 
boxing to a defining arena of white men’s male identity. Not despite but because of 
Jeffries’s loss, the event signaled the embrace of physical force as a marker of new 
masculinity. Likewise, Edgar Rice Burroughs’s widely successful Tarzan of the Apes, 
serialized in 1912 and published as a book in 1914, combined the best of two worlds: 
as the scion of British aristocracy who was lost and raised by apes, Tarzan effort-
lessly masters the laws of the jungle and displays a double primacy: a noble and 
civilized morality in an exuberant, primitive body. The inclusion of forceful (and 
sexual) physicality into the definition of gender identity was not to be an exclusively 
male affair, however. In 1913 Burroughs also serialized the adventures of a sensual 
“cavegirl,” and the same cultural tenet reemerged in the 1922 best seller Caveman 
within Us. Primitivism came to hold a wide appeal for “civilized” white audiences.
Unleashing primal instincts could also be done with style. Growing attention to 
the body, in the context of the growing consumer culture, enhanced other forms 
of gendered identity that were rooted in physical strength or athletic ability as well 
as elegance, sexuality, and youth. This was a dynamic that brought together white 
men and women—the flapper and her lesser known boyfriend, the bachelor—
around insistent consumer fantasies that challenged Victorian ideals of diligence, 
thrift, and self-control (for him), domesticity (for her), and selflessness (for both).11 
If the flapper represented a new urban female figure, the bachelor had precedents 
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in the “dude” of the nineteenth century (who was marginal and often ridiculed), as 
well as in the iconic British dandy and the Continental flâneur. At a time of soaring 
college enrollment, greater job opportunities in the cities, and a flourishing con-
sumerism geared toward younger people with disposable income, unattached 
bachelors and uncommitted flappers fostered a peer-based, sensualized, and 
hedonistic youth culture. It centered on fashion and seduction strategies visible 
at dance halls, billiard parlors, and movie palaces. Even advertisements for men’s 
clothing contributed to broadcast a “sporty and virile image in ordinary life that 
guaranteed stylishness but not at the cost of effeminacy.”12
The heterosocial culture of this “flaming youth” came with new rules prompted 
by the development of exotic music and dances that were associated with different 
races and geographies. In nightclubs and public dance halls, jazz, the fox-trot, and 
especially the tango allowed for new casual rituals of courtship in an elegant atmo-
sphere of risqué displays of youthful desire and exotic sex appeal.13 While soon to 
be accepted in America, one need only think of the flaunting sexual primitivism 
of Josephine Baker’s famous banana dance that debuted in Paris in 1925. Not all 
primitivisms and not all alleged primitives, however, were acceptable. How would 
the new masculinity of the Divo and the Duce fare in relation to American racial 
dynamics of the 1920s? Their Italianness, after all, could have hindered as much as 
fostered their acceptance as American role models.
In American silent films, Italians had come to occupy a varied but not 
unlimited range of characterizations. Through the aesthetic and centuries-old 
prism of the picturesque, Italians’ cultural foreignness and alleged anthropological 
dissonance had unfolded into two main types of appealing but othering represen-
tations. The first one insisted on their backwardness and domesticated primitivism, 
mostly through love melodramas of passionate jealousy and heartbreaking loss. 
The second one relied on a notion of innate criminality, unfolding in stories of 
impossible-to-romanticize violence. From 1915 on, however, the American stage 
and film actor George Beban had become the master impersonator of tragic but 
sympathetic Italian subjects capable of undergoing moral domestication amidst 
heartbreaking circumstances. In such feature-length immigrant dramas as The 
Italian (1915) and The Sign of the Rose (1915 and 1922), his performances enabled 
American audiences to develop an intense emotional solidarity—although not 
necessarily an identification—with heavily racialized white, foreign characters.14
Meanwhile, other narratives about Italian immigrants had begun to appear 
after Behan’s rise to fame. Written by female screenwriters such as Sonya Levien, 
Anita Loos, Jeanie Macpherson, June Mathis, and Frances Marion, these dramas 
of transoceanic migration and tenement life did not reproduce Beban’s safe tra-
jectory of adaptation. They featured female protagonists, not male characters, 
engaged in passionate and controversial love stories that questioned conventional 
ideas of American morality and propriety. While presenting the departure from 
the Old World as a journey that severed oppressive traditional ties, titles like 
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A Woman’s Honor (1916), The Ordeal of Rosetta (1918), and Who Will Marry Me? 
(1919) explored questions of social freedom and personal sexual expression with-
out any of Beban’s noted moralism.15 Such daring narratives can be viewed as 
symptomatic of broader changes in American culture. At a minimum, though, 
they tell us about Hollywood as a powerful dynamo that created new character 
types and ideas of personal fulfillment that were not evident in the country’s social 
and cultural landscape. As film periodicals boasted, “Motion-Picture Land” was 
an ideal living space filled with independence-seeking women of different back-
grounds and uncommon talents. If the West had represented a virile space for 
many of Fairbanks’s Rooseveltian characters, “the modern West’s possession of 
Hollywood,” as Hilary Hallett showed, “created perhaps the most powerful genera-
tor and lure for a New Western Woman in full flight from feminine norms.”16 The 
trope of democratic access, informed by a new sense of self-reinvention, identified 
Hollywood as not just a center of national and world film production but also 
a capital capable of modeling spectatorial experience and consumption.17 It may 
have been a dream factory, but “women’s remarkable record of influence inside the 
movie colony of this era was no fantasy.”18
Against the stereotype of the “movie-struck girl,” the growth of women’s pres-
ence in early 1910s Hollywood corresponded to the film industry’s efforts to turn 
the boisterous and plebeian films into a profitable family-friendly entertainment. 
It was a move that enabled and then capitalized on the post–World War I emer-
gence of American film and fan culture as women-oriented, given the prevailing 
gender of both moviegoers and screen magazine readers. The results were, how-
ever, not just conventional morality tales of family reunion and romantic love but 
also stories that pushed the boundaries of traditional female roles.19 Consider the 
film heroines of such serials as The Adventures of Kathlyn (1914), The Perils of 
Pauline (1914), and The Exploits of Elaine (1914). Centered on plucky female char-
acters who prefer harrowing adventures to conventional family roles, the serial 
queen melodramas represented one of the first attempts by the film industry to 
cater to female patrons on a national scale.20 The culture of these films challenged 
the notion that increasing female film patronage went hand in hand with the 
 industry’s efforts to attain a higher moral respectability. “Serial content was anything 
but tame,” Shelley Stamp argues, “and reports of audience behavior suggest that 
fans conducted themselves in anything but a ‘respectable’ manner.”21
In the same period, women began to enter many areas of the film industry 
itself under the shared, though not enduring, assumption that women knew best 
how to cater to the female spectators.22 Even though women occupied several 
critical positions at the creative and management level, in no other field were 
women as powerful as in screenwriting.23 Women wrote “at least half of all  silent 
films,” were among the highest-paid and most-recognized screenwriters, and 
“were responsible for crafting many of the era’s landmark screen personalities 
(Mary Pickford, Rudolph Valentino, Douglas Fairbanks, Clara Bow, and Gloria 
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Swanson).”24 Women screenwriters made an impact on a number of genres, 
including the social-problem film and the historical epic, but they left their most rec-
ognizable mark in the creation of modern narratives about romance and marriage.
During and especially after the war, the expansion of work and consumption 
possibilities for young women created the material conditions that allowed many 
to envision equality in marriage and in romantic relationships. These changes did 
not exactly correspond to the aspirations of generations of suffragists culminating 
in the passing of the Nineteenth Amendment. As Frederick Lewis Allen perhaps 
too dismissively noted in his iconic Only Yesterday, “few of the younger women 
could rouse themselves to even a passing interest in politics.”25 Still, Hollywood 
screenwriters embraced the novel civic arrangements and wrote scripts that 
explored new secularized forms of gender relationships that distanced themselves 
from traditional religious prescriptions. In the postwar context of an expanded 
suffrage and corporatizing Hollywood, the film industry turned women’s search 
for emotional and sexual expression into a management strategy for consumer 
and ideological choices through, once again, the mediating power of the actor 
testimonial. Only this time, the daring reimagination of marriage and romance 
unfolded within a much tighter framework of promotion and consumption. Cecil 
B. DeMille’s films in the late 1910s and early 1920s starring Gloria Swanson and 
largely written by Jeanie Macpherson walked a fine line between the new demands 
for equality, self-expression, and the appeal of consumerism.26 While mostly adopt-
ing a female perspective, Old Wives for New (1918), Don’t Change Your Husband 
(1919), and Why Change Your Wife? (1920) commodified marriage by stressing the 
intrusion of trendsetting fashion and consumer taste into romantic relationships. 
In these star-centered films, to quote Lary May, “leisure became an egalitarian 
arena.”27 Through the exemplary mediation of the star, Hollywood studios sought 
to bypass film audiences’ segmentation by gender, class, and race (and their 
respective subcultures) by appealing to a broader, more democratic fascination for 
consumer goods. More accessible and less elitist, the democratization of aspira-
tional luxury turned Los Angeles into a daring and flashy adversary of Paris as the 
new arbiter of national and international fashion.
Multitudes of female (and male) spectators were made to see stars as models for 
the commodified democratization of their lives. The pervasiveness of the star sys-
tem, particularly through the promotional input of fan magazines, accompanied 
the same massive education and influence pursued by the advertising agencies. At 
the same time, the industry’s rhetorical positioning of moviegoing as a democratic 
practice cast audiences’ choice of favorite films or stars as a free and spontaneous 
exercise. Spectators’ preferences rewarded personalities who appeared to pos-
sess character, charm, and sex appeal. Nothing allegedly was supposed to stand 
between stars and audience according to a logic of unfiltered access, reception, and 
pleasure. In reality, the process by which audiences identified their favorite stars 
was hardly as spontaneous and democratic as film magazines made it out to be. 
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Populist and star-centered explanations helped to conceal the role of a whole host 
of intertextual mediators, including fan magazines, and public relations specialists 
who molded audiences’ reactions and directed their preferences to this or that 
figure according to both traditional, tried-and-true tactics and new tricks.
The case study of Valentino helps us understand that, by enabling the com-
modified democratization of American women spectators’ lives, stars did not have 
to be female themselves and did not have to be American. Still, they were required 
to be white. The Divo’s association with the celebrated, century-old myth of the 
romantic and sensual Latin lover not only shielded him from association with 
the vulgar hordes of Southern Italian immigrants but also made his performances 
function as an exploration of female desire that his all-American male peers could 
not themselves replicate.28 This may explain why Valentino, particularly after 
achieving nationwide notoriety in 1921, was never cast in the role of a contem-
porary immigrant landing and striving in America.29 He was a Hollywood Italian, 
after all, not a New York one.
NEW-ST YLE HEAVY
Because The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse is customarily identified as the first 
relevant item of Valentino filmography, scholars have paid scant attention to what 
he did or what was known about him before March 1921. On closer inspection, this 
may not be prudent. The reputation Valentino developed in New York, particu-
larly during a sensational high-society scandal, arguably functioned as a primacy 
intertext for the publicity discourse that informed both the design and reception 
of his early film characterizations. Usually mentioned only in passing, Valentino’s 
pre–Four Horsemen career allows us to reconstruct his trajectory toward main-
stream acceptability from his early characterizations as a slick, evil foreign deu-
teragonist, or “a new style heavy”—the category he used to describe himself 
under the name of Rodolfo Di Valentina in the 1918 Motion Picture Studio Directory 
(figure 8).30 Pre-1921 titles may help explain how the perception of a foreign actor 
who often impersonated charmingly exotic villains provided screenwriters the 
basis to design characters’ possible moral conversion and allowed publicists to 
harness his scandalous charm.
In fact, scandal is where we ought to start. After arriving in New York from Italy 
in December 1913, Valentino sought to make use of his background in agronomic 
sciences, but his first serious job as gardener on a Long Island estate did not last. 
Following Italy’s entry into the First World War in 1915, he even sought to enlist in 
the Italian army—an event that would appear in several of his (auto)biographical 
profiles—but was turned down for poor vision by the Italian Recruitment Bureau. 
Finally, he found a semblance of financial stability as a dancer for hire in New 
York’s musical clubs, where he was known by his given name, Rodolfo Guglielmi. 
Starting a career as a “taxi dancer” did not immediately translate into film roles, 
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save as a movie “dress extra” in New York film productions, but it gave him an 
opportunity to flaunt his talent as gifted dancer and seducer.31 Taxi dancing, in fact, 
was available for unchaperoned, well-off married women in search of a Continen-
tal-looking, fashionable young companion. Among the society women who gath-
ered at the so-called tango temples, “dreading that they were going to be shocked, 
and fearing they were not,” Valentino built a reputation as a typical “tango pirate.”32 
Yet, his life was not restricted to this potentially lurid trade. Hired by Broadway 
musical dancer Joan Sawyer in 1916 and touring with her on the Keith circuit, he 
even danced at a New York roadhouse for President Wilson. These gigs enabled 
him to meet actors who would later become friends and supporters, including 
Mae Murray and Norman Kerry.
In 1917, however, he hurriedly left New York following his turbulent involve-
ment in legal proceedings that had dominated the gossip press throughout the 
previous year. He had agreed to serve as witness in the divorce case of a New York 
socialite, Bianca de Saulles, with whom he had been allegedly involved. His testi-
mony attracted the vindictive ire of her powerful and soon-to-be former husband, 
Jack de Saulles. A friend of Wilson and cousin of a recent New York City mayor, 
Jack de Saulles was known to have strayed from the marriage much more often 
than his wife ever did. He arranged for Valentino to be arrested on the pretext of 
figure 8. Rodolfo Di Valentina playing a “new 
style heavy.” Motion Picture Studio Directory and 
Trade Annual (New York: Motion Picture News, 
1918), 193.
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a white-slavery investigation in the home of a notorious madam who had been 
accused of blackmailing wealthy New Yorkers. The vice charges were ultimately 
dropped, and Valentino was released. Still, what has recently been described with 
retrospective hyperbole as the “Valentino affair” and the “Jazz Age murder scandal 
that shocked New York society and gripped the world” was not a minor public 
event.33 As many commentators later recounted, the press published disturbing 
(but inaccurate) accounts of his confession. For instance, the New York Tribune 
reported that he admitted being “a bogus count or marquis” but also added Dis-
trict Attorney Swann’s description of Valentino as “a handsome man” who “wears 
corsets and a wristwatch” and “was often seen dancing in well-known hotels and 
tango parlors.”34 As a homophobic insinuation about his masculinity, this cover-
age constituted a prolepsis of the infamous Chicago Tribune “Pink Powder Puffs” 
editorial that a few years later would provoke Valentino’s fiery reaction. At the time 
Valentino did not yet have access to the powerful publicity enablers or friends who 
could have responded in kind to allegations against his masculinity or spun public 
opinion to his advantage. A minor figure on the fringes of polite society and mired 
in scandal, his best option was to leave town. Later that summer, Bianca de Saulles, 
unhappy about the custody agreement following her divorce, shot and killed her 
husband. The name Rodolfo Guglielmi resurfaced in the press. By then, he had 
fled to California.
The scandal followed him in ways that both threatened and shaped his career. 
His presumed association with white slavery, blackmail, and homosexuality left a 
persistent and unsavory mark on his reputation. Yet, even though several news-
papers eventually issued retractions, the initial coverage’s long-term impact was 
not entirely negative.35 Although it appears that the court records have remained 
sealed since 1917 and his arrest record mysteriously disappeared in the early 1920s, 
Valentino did not forget the infamy that the charges had brought him. “At the 
height of his fame, the world kissing his hand,” publicist Herbert Howe wrote in 
a posthumous article, “he could not forget the three days he spent at the Tombs 
prison of New York on a false charge. [. . .] The retraction was small compared to 
the headlines that had damned him.”36 If Valentino could not forget, neither did 
the publicity machine that ultimately surrounded him.
Initially, in order to escape from the coverage of the de Saulles scandal, 
Valentino moved to San Francisco. Mary Pickford was there for the production 
of The Little American, which had cast his friend Norman Kerry for a minor 
role. Encouraged by Kerry, Valentino made a few trips to Los Angeles to look for 
employment both in and out of the film business.37 His first Hollywood bit role was 
in Alimony (First National, 1917), written by Hayden Talbot, where he met another 
extra, Alice Terry, who would be his partner four years later in The Four Horsemen 
of the Apocalypse.
One of his earliest roles was that of a somewhat sympathetic character in The 
Married Virgin (Maxwell Productions, 1918), which was distributed only in 1920, 
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both with its original title and the alternate one, Frivolous Wives.38 Directed by 
Joe Maxwell, the film was adapted for the screen by Hayden Talbot, the screen-
writer of Alimony, from one of his own stories. While the original 1918 credits 
identify Valentino as “Rodolfo di Valentini” (with promotional material using “di 
Valentina” instead), later prints, including the restored one I examined, report 
his name as “Rudolph Valentino” in capital letters. The Married Virgin is a minor 
film, but the names of the conventional lovers, Doug and Mary, whose romance 
Valentino’s character briefly but successfully threatens, are an obvious reference 
to Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks. In 1918, while married to other spouses, 
they collaborated on several Liberty Bond drives, which fueled speculations of a 
destined affair. Valentino’s hard-to-resist and intrusive erotic appeal in the lives of 
the fictional Doug and Mary is an emblematic prolepsis of his soon-to-be much 
publicized threat to conventional romantic scripts.
In The Married Virgin, Valentino plays the role of Count Roberto di San Fraccini, 
“an Italian nobleman and soldier of fortune,” as one intertitle notes, who dress-
es impeccably in black, rides a black horse, and appears ambitious and morally 
unencumbered. His main occupation is as the illicit lover of a married woman, 
Mrs. Ethel McMillan. Obsessed with fashion, Count Roberto is a master of 
manners and seduction, as revealed by a lingering close-up of him gallantly kissing 
his older lover’s hand (figure 9).
Upon learning from Ethel that a man is blackmailing her husband, a wealthy 
political operator, Roberto plots a criminal and financial scheme. The blackmailer 
claims that he can produce a revolver that Mr. McMillan had used to kill an 
enemy many years back. The count first plans to interject himself in the deal by 
also blackmailing Ethel’s husband in exchange for the infamous gun (which 
he does not possess) and eloping with her. After the plan fails, he proposes an 
alternative to Ethel: he will marry her stepdaughter, Mary, to secure her dowry 
before escaping with Ethel to South America. The problem is that Mary is engaged 
to Douglas, a young lawyer, and the two of them form an apparently inseparable 
all-American couple. Roberto disrupts their idyllic love of romantic rides on 
their white horses with his sinister and opportunistic charm. He pays Mary a visit 
while she is spending time at a seaside resort without her fiancé. While the film 
should depict his scheming attempts at seducing Mary as utterly disagreeable, 
it instead lingers on his Old World gallantry and athletic skills. The unexpected 
intimacy between Roberto and Mary, evident in intense conversations and playful 
morning swims, grows intense, while his professional ambitions keep Douglas busy 
and distant. Although in her letters Mary reassures him about her loyalty, her prose 
notably does not hide her admiration for the mischievous Italian nobleman (“the 
most wonderful athlete I ever saw”). But soon Roberto reveals his calculating nature. 
He proposes marriage to a shocked Mary “with all the confidence a hundred con-
quests inspire” and later self-assuredly explains to her father that the “wedding is 
self-protection” and that “there shall be—a marriage settlement” (emphasis in the 
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intertitle). Mary succumbs to the plan only after learning from Ethel that unless she 
weds the “fortune hunter,” as Ethel describes him, her father will go to prison.
While the moral compass of the film’s overall narrative appears unambiguous, 
the depiction of the charming Roberto does not invite complete condemnation. 
Shortly after the wedding, Roberto reveals a surprisingly sympathetic side. After 
being reassured about the post-wedding check in exchange for the infamous 
revolver, he appears respectful of Mary’s body and emotions. He suggests the 
marital arrangement of two sleeping quarters: “We are a house divided. Your half is 
there—mine here.” But his charming and seductive temperament leaves the door 
open to change: the arrangement, he suggests, “shall continue so—until you come 
to me of your own free will.” These are not the suggestions of a wholly disagreeable 
character, and they are what allows Mary to remain the “married virgin” of the 
film’s title, even if precariously so. Insisting on his (partially) evil and scheming 
nature, the film sympathetically displays Roberto’s visible pain for this chaste 
arrangement that he has forced upon himself. Only after witnessing Ethel’s car 
accident and drinking himself into a stupor does he abandon all respectful manners, 
invade Mary’s space, and attempt to rape her. The maid’s successful display of a 
cross as a last resort to protect a horrified Mary prevents the inebriated Roberto 
figure 9. Valentino’s appealing gallantry in The Married Virgin (1918), frame enlargement. 
Courtesy of CINEMATEK, Brussels.
94    The Governance of Romance
from pursuing the vile action. The final scene, in which he confesses his love for 
Ethel, his indifference to Mary, and desire to return to South America sounds more 
like a convenient ideological closure. It excludes future interference in the happy 
life reserved for Mary, whose unconsummated marriage is quickly annulled, and 
her less-than-exciting Doug.
The few moments in which Roberto manages to charm Mary may have been a 
novelty for a motion picture but did not constitute a novelty tout court. American 
women’s fascination for the elegant and noble foreigner was a common cautionary 
tale, popular in newspaper accounts about tango teas. Such narratives had to 
convey the attractiveness of the refined and exotic “tango pirate,” while also show-
ing foreigners’ moral threat to the Anglo-Saxon race. Still, the role of the “slick 
foreigner, treacherous gangster, foul blackmailer, and disreputable gigolo” may 
have been hard to accept for an actor who had been branded with similarly infa-
mous charges in real life.39 His hunger for the admiration and praise he had usually 
received on the dance floor, however, might have matched the recognition—his 
own and that of those casting him—that these film roles embodied a widespread 
fantasy of fear and desire that the film’s fictional diegesis made safe for actors and 
spectators alike. It was the fantasy of surrendering to the expert seduction of a 
Latin foreigner, without sexual consummation, but with plentiful display of erotic 
desire.40 The Paramount promotion that appeared that year courted exactly such a 
salacious imaginary. It described Valentino as “the handsomest lounge lizard that 
ever infested a tea dansant,” while referring to Mary as “the girl who deliberately 
marries a man who she feared.”41
During this period, not every film that availed itself of Valentino’s presence 
cast him in this kind of role, and their publicity rarely exploited or enhanced his 
dangerous appeal. It probably did not help that, after dropping his last name, 
Guglielmi, as too hard to pronounce and too easy to associate with the de Saulles 
scandal, he kept changing his moniker. Initially, Valentino used variations that 
evoked or replicated the name of the saint associated with courtly love or Cesare 
Borgia’s noble title (Duca Valentino). This resulted in either a noble-sounding 
double name (De Valentino, di Valentino, De Valentina, di Valentini) or a single 
one (Valentine, Volantino, Valentino).42 Several unremarkable films typecast his 
Latin mannerisms into morally devious roles. Either alien or just exotic looking, 
he appeared prone to exploit either his attractiveness or brutality, or both. In 
1919, he was cast as a thug from the Bowery in Virtuous Sinners, an accomplice 
in a gang of thieves in The Homebreaker, a fatuous and cheating boyfriend in The 
Big Little Person, and a tough Montmartre apache dancer in A Rogue’s Romance. 
He was also a sinister figure bound to ruin the life of the female protagonist in 
Nobody Home / Out of Luck (August 1919), a scheming Frenchman in An Adven-
turess (1920), and a notorious criminal in The Wonderful Chance (1920).
While these films translated his exotic Mediterranean appearance into morally 
disagreeable roles, they did not systematically cast him as a foreigner. Consider The 
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Delicious Little Devil (Universal, 1919), in which he played the role of a wealthy and 
hypocritical young man named Jimmy Calhoun, who is afraid to propose marriage 
to a young dancer, played by Valentino’s friend and early advocate, Mae Murray. 
Sporting heavy makeup but no sign of racial otherness, his dancing skills are rarely 
exploited even though several scenes take place in a cabaret. His most common 
emotional state is one of shyness and demure restraint, interrupted only once by a 
sudden outburst of anger: the charming and passionate temperament that would 
characterize his early popular films is missing (figure 10). These roles indicate that 
studios and filmmakers did not yet know how best to cast him for productions 
designed for mass audiences. What was clear, however, was that Valentino’s 
charming appearance could not be confused with the kind of Beban-like characters 
that would have associated him with Italian immigrants. Even in the films in which 
he appeared more a victim than a creator of circumstances, his most constant 
characteristics were his personal elegance, proud bearing, and high social status.43
A turning point apparently occurred with Eyes of Youth (Garson Productions, 
October 1919). Adapted from the popular eponymous 1917 play by Max Marcin 
and Charles Guernon, the film explores the choice between true love and financial 
convenience faced by a young American opera singer, played by popular screen 
personality Clara Kimball Young. Valentino is cast not as an Italian but as 
“Clarence Morgan, a cabaret parasite,” as one intertitle introduces him. The protago-
nist, Gina Ashling, is married to a rich man who, after growing tired of her, has hired 
the young seducer Clarence to discredit her reputation so that he can get a divorce 
and remarry. Clarence invites Gina to his place and assaults her just before her 
husband and his lawyers burst into the apartment and pretend to witness a con-
jugal betrayal (figure 11). A married woman in the company of a young and dash-
ing Latin-looking man played by Valentino was a familiar scene. At the trial, she 
describes Clarence as “a man without honor—and without conscience.” The outcome 
of the legal proceedings matters greatly to Gina, but what is also at stake, as the 
film emphasizes, is her public reputation. An intriguingly animated intertitle first 
juxtaposes the court of law with that of public opinion: “Guiltless! Condemned by 
the merciless judge, Public Opinion—‘To hell for life and no parole!’ ” The same 
title card then shows a folded newspaper intruding into the printed text, revealing 
an article bearing the unforgiving headline “Financier Goring Charges Wife with 
Infidelity” placed above a close-up photo of her. The film was a success. Variety 
greeted it as “a knockout” and even avoided summarizing it, for “the story of the 
play is too well known.”44 In its twisted plot, in fact, the film’s insistence on news-
paper coverage of an adultery trial featuring a once-respectable couple and a slick 
and charming young gigolo likely evoked the de Saulles scandal and other similar 
ones. But not many people could have known that the film’s Rudolfo Valentino was 
Rodolpho Guglielmi. Taking part in a fictionalization of events reminiscent of the 
heavily reported New York affair could have been a career-killer move. Instead, it 
turned out to be the opportunity of a lifetime.
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According to several accounts, among the attentive spectators of Eyes of Youth 
was Metro’s top screenwriter and executive, June Mathis, who would later play a 
key role in casting Valentino in The Four Horsemen. It is fair to assume, however, 
that the links between Mathis and Valentino were less serendipitous than what this 
single film viewing might suggest. Mathis was commercially as well as artistically 
ambitious and had many connections in the world of the stage and motion pic-
tures. Some of those connections knew the Italian actor. Certainly, in the wake of 
his interpretation in Eyes of Youth, Mathis might have remembered his talent as a 
dancer, including his reputation as tango pirate, his physical traits, and perhaps his 
temperament on and off screen. It is also likely that Mathis, based in New York at 
the time, had become familiar with the scandal of the de Saulles family. Could she 
have connected the Rodolpho Guglielmi of the de Saulles scandal with the Rudolfo 
Valentino of Eyes of Youth?
The degrees of separation between the two were few and revolved around the 
Russian actress Alla Nazimova and Metro Pictures. In the late 1910s, Mathis had 
scripted a few pictures at Metro starring Nazimova, including Eye for Eye (1918) 
and Out of the Fog (1919), and possibly knew of her friends, famous parties, and 
occasional lovers.45 One of them was actress Jean Acker. In November 1919, a 
month after the release of Eyes of Youth, the fairly established Acker suddenly wed 
the less-known Valentino in what quickly turned out to be an ill-fated marriage. 
figure 10. Valentino as the sad and restrained Jimmy Calhoun in  
The Delicious Little Devil (1919), frame enlargement. Courtesy of EYE 
Filmmuseum, Amsterdam.
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The wedding received a singular, rarely discussed imprimatur from Mathis’s 
own company, Metro Pictures. The couple’s best man was Metro’s general man-
ager, Maxwell Karger, and the wedding celebration took place at the home of the 
company’s treasurer and in the presence of the company’s president, Richard 
Rowland.46 It is unlikely Mathis was absent; it is impossible that she was not 
aware of the ceremony and of who was Acker’s groom. More than just an 
actor who caught her eye in a screening of Eyes of Youth, Valentino was certainly 
an acquaintance connected to Mathis’s close circle of friends and coworkers and 
an individual whose liaisons with married women had made headlines in the 
press and had been used twice on film. Mathis might have recognized some-
thing original in his film performances, but her casting of Valentino in The Four 
Horsemen also depended on her personal and professional identity—gender, 
talent, and ambition—and on the film’s promising international appeal and resulting 
promotional campaign.
figure 11. Valentino stifling the cries of an innocent wife (Clara Kimball Young) to stage their 
consensual rendezvous in Eyes of Youth (1919), frame enlargement. Reproduced from the collec-
tions of the Library of Congress, Moving Image Section.
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A WOMAN’S (C OMMERCIAL)  VIEWPOINT
Mathis was much more than a scenario writer. She was a writing supervisor, an 
editorial director, and a film producer—a combination that “allowed her to control 
the writing ideas she guided onto the screen” and to be voted in 1926 the third 
most influential woman in the history of motion pictures.47 She wrote countless 
scripts, first as one of Metro Pictures’ scenarists then as its editor-in-chief. Between 
1921 and 1922 Mathis completed five scenarios for Valentino, beginning with The 
Four Horsemen, Camille, The Conquering Power and, in 1922, Blood and Sand and 
The Young Rajah. Her later writing credits included other major accomplishments 
such as Eric von Stroheim’s Greed (1924) and Ben Hur (1925). No matter how much 
recognition her work received, her name remained closely associated to that of the 
Italian actor whom she had allegedly discovered and launched to superstar fame. 
When she suddenly died in 1927, less than a year after Valentino’s passing, her New 
York Times front-page obituary read: “June Mathis, world-famous motion picture 
scenarist, who adapted ‘The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse’ for the movies and 
discovered Rudolph Valentino, died last night.”48
In recent years, the critical discourse about Mathis has tended to pair her superb 
talent with an artistic and (proto)feminist poetics. “Mathis was committed to ‘artis-
tic’ filmmaking as opposed to the formulaic films turned out by many women writ-
ers in Hollywood,” Donna Casella has argued, and she explored “sexual, racial and 
national themes in her films, with particular attention to woman as a social force.”49 
Her personal approach, critics agreed, was already visible in the subversive female 
roles she had designed during the war as well as in the scouting of her unconven-
tional leading men against the background of the patriarchal and nativist ethos of 
both Hollywood and America.50 Regarding her scripts for Valentino and in dialogue 
with Gaylyn Studlar and Miriam Hansen’s insights into his ambivalent masculinity, 
Thomas H. Slater has also argued that Mathis’s scripts construct a fragile, fatherless 
man who has to rely on the figure of a strong, spiritually sound and sexually mature 
woman to test his masculinity and either find himself or fail.51 In the wake of “the 
world war’s desecration of masculinity,” Mathis’s Valentinos “were not athletic action 
heroes unencumbered by family and social concerns as were Fairbanks’s characters” 
but “ ‘wounded’ figures who required an alternative to violence and adventure as 
a basis for identity.” In Slater’s view, Valentino “did not become as wildly popular 
among men and boys” because he was not attuned to the “boy culture” that Studlar 
has recognized in Fairbanks’s celebration of rugged masculinity.52 Instead, he argues, 
Mathis’s scripts designed Valentino as a character who views the future “with dread 
(Blood and Sand), hopefulness (The Conquering Power), or uncertainty (The Four 
Horsemen, Camille),” and for whom death is the ultimate horizon of personal actu-
alization or failure. The danger of war (or of bullfighting) served as the grounding 
moment of patriarchal failure and personal crisis. The risk of personal bereavement 
did not just imply the deconstruction of traditional masculinity, but also anticipated 
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its novel reconstruction (or “becoming,” in Slater’s analysis) in ways that were more 
agreeable to women’s imagination.53
Slater’s critical perspective is centered on an equation of personal expression 
with a feminist one, and an American one at that. In his analysis, Mathis’s scripts 
are a woman’s work in the sense that they express a feminist take on narratives 
and characters—as if other dimensions played little or no role in her work. Slater’s 
approach appears to downplay two significant professional dynamics: one pertain-
ing to authorship and one to promotion. The first involves the delicate balance 
in Mathis’s screenwriting poetics between the aforementioned ethics of gendered 
expression and her well-recognized domestic and international commercial 
aspirations. The second dynamic, which I will explain in the next section, involves 
the role of publicity in linking Mathis’s name to Valentino and in constructing a 
commercial exploratory space for his novel masculinity in ways not necessarily 
anticipated by her scripts.
Regarding the first issue, early 1920s profiles, as well as her own pronounce-
ments, were at pains to reconcile the apparent contradiction between her gender 
identity and her professional shrewdness. For instance, in The First One Hundred 
Noted Men and Women of the Screen (1920), author Carolyn Lowrey sought to 
reassure her readers that the author of the script of To Hell with the Kaiser, which 
Variety had praised as a “wonderfully effective propaganda film,” had not lost her 
femininity, despite her professional drive and success.54 In an effort that we may 
find trivial, Lowrey noted the presence of flowers in Mathis’s book-lined office and 
described the décor as “original [and] in many respects delightfully feminine.”55 
Here the reference to her femininity worked to correct and thus downplay her 
exceptional talent and dogged determination. Lowrey, however, added a critical 
qualification to her success that had great resonance at the time: she praised the 
professional quality of Mathis’s work by commending her ability to register a prev-
alent temperament and draw popular characters, rather than regarding her work 
as a form of mere artistic expression. To Lowrey, if scenarios constitute “the base 
from which the cinema makes its public appeal,” Mathis’s ones were what stood 
“behind the popularity of many stars.”56 
Mathis herself had stressed her sensibility for public opinion in a New York 
Times article from the spring of 1923. “Quite often I have picked out something that 
appealed to me as being wonderfully dramatic, but which has not made the same 
impression upon other readers,” she wrote about her process of adapting famous 
novels. To modulate and expand her positive first impressions into developed screen 
treatments, Mathis had a careful two-step method that first involved “noting down 
each point and the number of persons in favor of it” before deciding on the dramatic 
points of the scenario on the basis of at least seven favorable opinions out of ten.57 
Two years later, in a contribution to the Film Daily, she summarized this approach by 
linking a “female perspective” in moving pictures to questions not just of gendered 
expression but also of commercial viability and success—which may not have been 
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any less subversive. After noting that scenarios had to appeal to millions of specta-
tors and that women played a huge role in reaching that goal (“of those millions the 
hand that rocks the cradle is the ruling spirit”), she celebrated the significance of 
having female scenario writers, art directors and set dressers, for “they understand 
the decoration of the home, the setting of tables, the arrangement of flowers.”58 The 
most difficult thing for men to acknowledge is that “there is such a thing as a 
woman’s viewpoint that is possibly commercial” and that a “magic something” impo-
ssible to ignore had “made American films supreme in the world’s market.59 As her 
promotion of Valentino would show, women spectators could be won much more 
easily by an exotic leading man than through floral arrangements.
THE TANGO DANCER BEC OMES A STAR
The available evidence on the production of Valentino’s breakout film raises 
important questions about June Mathis’s actual contribution and specifically about 
the difference between the protagonist of her script and the lead character that the 
studio ended up promoting after the film’s release.
In early 1919, Metro had purchased the screen rights to the best-selling novel 
Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse. First published in 1916, the book by the Spanish 
writer Vicente Blasco Ibáñez (1867–1928) had reached about 170 editions world-
wide, including as a Photoplay movie tie-in edition (1918). An established version 
of the facts suggests that Mathis chose to adapt it against the opinion of the film 
industry’s top leaders. As the story goes, Hollywood producers mistakenly believed 
that the novel had a complicated plot and would require an expensive produc-
tion. Moreover, by the end of the 1910s war subjects were believed to be no longer 
appealing to an American public eager for lighter fare.60 Yet, the truth appears to 
be somewhat different: Mathis played a remarkable role, but the selection of the 
novel may not have been her idea.
In March 1919, the first coverage of Metro’s purchase of the rights does men-
tion her name in conjunction with the planned adaptation but also indicates that 
Metro president Rowland had secured the filming rights to the novel after per-
sonally meeting Ibáñez during the author’s brief stay in New York City.61 Only 
then, Rowland communicated his actions to Mathis and “hurriedly summoned” 
her to New York to meet the novelist and “undertake at once the screen adaptation 
and scenarioization of the novel.”62 As newly promoted head of Metro’s Scenario 
Department, she took full charge of the project. Together with the studio’s key 
figures, Loew, Rowland, and Maxwell Karger, Mathis met again with Ibáñez 
during his late February 1920 visit to Hollywood to discuss the project. Their meet-
ings were made part of the film’s promotion (figure 12).63
Coverage of the months leading up to the film’s shooting sheds some light on 
its commercial raison d’être. Right before the cameras rolled, a late December 1919 
issue of Moving Picture World (MPW) summarized a speech given by Rowland in 
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New York in which he described what he considered two incontrovertible facts. 
The first was “that American producers must make concessions to foreign distribu-
tors because of the present disparity in money exchange.” The second one was “the 
entry of so-called big business into the motion picture industry,” which he viewed 
as “an inevitable step which need cause no alarm especially to the independent 
exhibitor.”64 Rowland was quite familiar with the European market after a two-
month trip to Europe, where he had interviewed prominent film manufacturers 
and distributors. In the wake of the growth of the film business, which had finally 
turned into a “legitimate field for investment” and was becoming ever “stronger in 
the popular affections,” he reflected on the surge of “high-grade pictures.” It was in 
this very context of business corporatization and secured international appeal that 
Rowland mentioned in the MPW article Metro’s “latest coup”: the acquisition of 
“the sensational novel by Vicente Blasco Ibanez.”65
If Rowland was quick to stress the commercial prospects associated with the 
popular novel’s film adaptation, Mathis may have sensed a unique opportunity 
to combine high professional aspirations with her own poetics. “The bigger the 
subject, the bigger the inspiration,” she declared in an interview orchestrated to 
appear in the same issue.66 In order to grasp how Mathis set out to adapt the almost 
figure 12. Key figures at Metro Studios. From left: June Mathis, Marcus Loew, Vicente Blasco 
Ibáñez, Metro president Richard A. Rowland, and Metro treasurer Maxwell Karger. Moving 
Picture World, March 6, 1920, 1657. 
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five-hundred-page book into a film script, cast protagonists, and aim for the 
widest possible success, we must turn briefly to Ibáñez who, already in his early 
fifties, had authored very different kinds of novels and was an established figure in 
world literary circles.
The critical canon about his output tends to differentiate between the natural-
ism of the early works and the controversial psychological sensationalism of his 
subsequent output, of which Blood and Sand (1908) is the most famous work. 
Established Spanish critics viewed his later attention to the slum dwellers and 
lower classes in general as an attack against the church, the monarchy, and the 
army.67 Los cuatro jinetes del Apocalipsis belonged to a third phase, comprising 
war novels that feature a cosmopolitan sensibility that found great success in 
Hollywood.68 Los cuatro jinetes tells the story of an aging authoritarian 
Argentinian landowner whose grandsons, fathered by his French and German 
sons-in-law, return to Europe at the outbreak of the First World War and find 
themselves fighting on opposite sides. For Ibáñez, who was living in Southern 
France at the time and had befriended French political leaders, the novel was 
an opportunity to make a broad geopolitical statement. The nation’s president, 
Raymond Poincaré, had invited him to visit the site of the Battle of the Marne 
with the hope that Ibáñez would use it in one of his novels and thus support 
the French cause. In Los cuatro jinetes, the novelist gave a remarkably realistic 
account of the battle, together with an exposé of one of the most controversial 
aspects of German Kultur: its militarism. The resulting novel, as critics later 
noted, was “an impressive feat of propaganda.”69
History provided help. The book’s translator, Charlotte Brewster Jordan, bought 
the book’s U.S. publishing rights for only $300 shortly after its 1916 publication. 
Yet, few could imagine the impact of America’s April 1917 declaration of war on 
the book’s release nearly a year later. In the first ninety days after its publication, 
the volume sold about ninety thousand copies and, within a few more months, it 
reached twenty editions for a total of more than two hundred thousand copies. 
What is rarely acknowledged is that Ibáñez was a master self-promoter who did 
not hesitate to merge conventional literary promotion with mass commercial 
advertisement. “There are silks, cigarettes, soaps, toys, whose brands include the 
same image of The Four Horsemen that is on the cover of my novel,” he told the 
Spanish press in 1919.70 A year later he traveled to North America for a series of 
conferences in New York, Chicago, and Toronto, among other cities.71 In late 1921, 
in the wake of the novel’s tremendous success, Ibáñez proudly described himself 
as a “universal film novelist” (novelista universal cinematográfico).72 It is reasonable 
to assume that Mathis (and Rowland before her) found Ibáñez’s wartime fame and 
notorious ability to connect to a mass readership quite appealing. Mathis likely 
met with him several times, and, while she must have had great respect for his 
literary inventiveness and popularity, she also had clear ideas about his novel’s 
cinematic adaptation.73
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As an efficient manager, Mathis was to take control of cast and crew. Her choice 
for director fell on Rex Ingram, who had a notoriously difficult temperament but 
with whom she had collaborated quite well a year before on the now-lost Hearts 
Are Trumps.74 For her leading man, she needed an exotic actor flexible enough to 
play a privileged young Argentine, a Montmartre artist and poseur, a gifted tango 
dancer, and a fantastic lover who ends up sacrificing his life to win the approval 
of the woman he loves. Some commentators at the time and later critics have 
described Valentino as “raw material” who could be transformed from a “thick-
set young Italian peasant into an elegant Argentinian nobleman.” One may argue 
instead that his scandalous previous roles in life and on film as slick tango dancer 
and seducer of married women, in addition to being part of Mathis’s circle, made 
him more a sound choice than a long shot.75
While the extent to which Mathis expected that Valentino would become a run-
away star after the film’s release is unclear, her changes to the ways Julio enters 
and exits the story reveal her ideas about his role. In the novel, Julio is neither 
the protagonist nor the main hero. Those roles are reserved for Julio’s father, the 
old Desnoyers, and the Russian mystic, Tchernoff, who promotes Christianity as 
true revolution and whose centrality explains the novel’s title. In Mathis’s surviving 
script, title sheet, and the finished film, which she closely supervised, however, Julio 
Desnoyers is a leading figure, deserving a grand introduction and undergoing a 
sympathy-inducing transformation, indeed a conversion, from spoiled womanizer 
to romantic and patriotic martyr.76 In the film, Mathis introduces Julio as a leading 
man with the famous tango scene set in Buenos Aires (figure 13) and thus early in 
the narrative and not, as the novel does, later in Paris after the beginning of the war 
(figure 14). Secondly, she purifies Julio’s reasons for his transformation by linking 
them to a noble search for romantic approval. In the novel, Julio’s motivations for 
his apparent change are merely utilitarian, linked to a selfish desire to maintain 
admiration from his beloved and the world around him. Finally, Mathis’s construc-
tion of the character of Julio did not exactly coincide with how the studio set up the 
film’s promotion, which followed the novel’s plot, not Mathis’s own rewriting.
Thus, the film’s most memorable scene, set in a working-class Buenos Aires 
café with Valentino leading a tango dance before a variety of admiring characters, 
is, strictly speaking, absent from the novel. A comparable scene is set in Paris and 
thus unfolds much later in the story. Moving the tango scene to the Argentinian 
capital was apparently Mathis’s idea and helped to establish Julio as leading man 
and set up his development and transformation from early on. In Buenos Aires, 
Julio can appear in full gaucho regalia and can display an exotic authenticity that 
the film spectators can project onto the Parisian tango when, wearing a splendid 
tuxedo, he can impress his married companion with the dance learned in his boy-
hood. But by then he is already undergoing a personal transformation. The initial 
publicity did not distinguish between the two tango scenes; instead it confused 
them. It advertised illustrations from the Buenos Aires film sequence, with Julio 
figures 13 and 14. Pure exoticism versus charming elegance in The Four Horsemen of the 
Apocalypse (1921): the tango scenes in Buenos Aires and in Paris. Courtesy of Museum of 
Modern Art Film Stills Archive. 
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in Argentinian costumes, by attributing it to a Paris setting and thus following 
readers’ expectations.
Still, the famous scene was not entirely Mathis’s invention. She had reworked 
information from Ibáñez’s novel that conveyed, about seventy pages in, Julio’s dis-
sipated lifestyle, made of “imprudent borrowings” that the patriarchal Madariaga 
had encouraged.77 Ibáñez had also stressed Julio’s leadership by depicting him as 
“ringleader of a band of toughs in the Capital” who liked to recount his “nightly 
escapades” of “gay, wild life” to his eager grandfather.78
In both texts, Julio’s life of vice, debauchery, and vulgar romance—and their 
representation—does not last long, but the difference is that in the film, he displays 
signs of authentic change before moving to Europe. In Mathis’s film treatment, 
for instance, when Madariaga gives unmistakable signs of failing health, Julio’s 
self-confidence diminishes dramatically. Further, the film scene showing Julio’s 
desperate reaction to the reading of Madariaga’s will, in which the old man did not 
single him out as a special heir, constitutes an original addition; it is absent from 
the novel. In Ibañez’s work, Julio apparently undergoes some change between 
Argentina and Paris, but it is more a superficial makeover than a conversion. In 
Paris, Ibáñez’s Julio continues to attract and enjoy public admiration as a tango 
dancer, displaying a thirst for attention and praise that grows subdued and almost 
disappears in Mathis’s character. Since the novel casts Julio as a remarkable char-
acter but not as protagonist, its author can delay the description of the tango’s tan-
talizing appeal until well into the story. When Ibáñez writes that the Argentinian 
dance was “in full swing in Paris” and that it had become “a new pleasure for the 
delight of humanity,” he is detailing the exotic appeal with which Mathis charged 
her new leading man from the film’s opening and which in her script set the stage 
for his conversion.79 Ibáñez’s description of the tango unfolds in pure physical, 
caveman-like terms, and centers on the Euro-American’s co-optation of subversive 
and racially different scripts of romance.
The tango had taken possession of the world. It was the heroic hymn of a humanity 
that was suddenly concentrating its aspirations on the harmonious rhythm of the 
thigh joints, measuring its intelligence by the agility of its feet. An incoherent and 
monotonous music of African inspiration was satisfying the artistic ideals of a soci-
ety that required nothing better. The world was dancing . . . dancing . . . dancing.80
The tango fever crowned Ibáñez’s Julio as the ruler over the Parisian tango teas and 
champion in the art of romance. While “appraising his slender elegance, medium 
stature, and muscular springs,” ladies hoped to be seen being held “in the arms 
of the master.”81 In the film, by contrast, the Parisian Julio is bound to differ from 
his earlier, frivolous days. While he seems to remain dependent on his mother for 
financial support, he regains some measure of control over his destiny and his iden-
tity as a painter—a picture-maker, that is. Further, his falling in love with a married 
woman, Marguerite Laurier (Alice Terry), challenges his emotional immaturity: 
she is wiser and more sensitive than he is, particularly regarding the tragedy of war. 
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While she is initially delighted that the mandatory conscription of all able-bodied 
French men has spared her Argentine lover, she is soon overwhelmed by feelings 
of guilt and remorse for her adulterous affair. Deciding to nurse her husband, who 
has just returned blind and disabled from the front, Marguerite separates herself 
from Julio. In a combination of admiration for her sacrifice and desire to please his 
father, who many years earlier had escaped conscription by moving to Argentina, 
Mathis’s Julio undergoes a spiritual transformation (figure 15). He volunteers for 
the French army and becomes a selfless man driven by romantic abnegation and 
ultimately patriotic self-sacrifice.
In the novel, his motivation is less honorable. Julio is drawn to Marguerite 
because her combination of “confident advances” and “capricious outbursts of mod-
esty” represents “a new type for him.”82 After the war starts, Marguerite’s complex 
new emotions divide them. Revealingly, her inconsolable reaction to her brother’s 
death in battle “did not please his amorous egoism.”83 Julio notices that the times 
are changing, as admiration for selfish individuality is giving away to “a new love—
a love for the man who is suffering, desire for abnegation, for sacrifice.” Rather 
than being inspired by the new idealism, he cynically registers the change as a new 
form of popular taste and not as a spiritual transformation.84 When his female fans 
ask him why he is not wearing a uniform or going to the front, Julio realizes that he 
is “no longer fashionable” and that the age of the “tango is dead.”85 Similarly, when 
toward the end of the novel Julio reaches Bordeaux, where Marguerite is caring for 
her wounded husband, he realizes that she considers her older spouse to be a man 
far superior to her younger lover. This realization provokes his decision to enlist 
immediately, out of a “hasty heroism” though not out of a spiritual or patriotic 
élan. Even the ensuing internal dialogue, in which he imagines himself a soldier, 
reveals a fatuous and narcissistic nature still driven to attain personal glory: “Soon 
she would hear him well spoken of,” for he would either die right away or “astound 
the world by his bravery.”86 Once enlisted, however, Ibáñez’s Julio practically dis-
appears. He dies in battle, but no details are given regarding the circumstances. 
When his father visits his “rustic grave” in a vast burial site, he considers building 
a mausoleum for his son before realizing the uselessness of it all. Likewise, Julio’s 
sister cannot even keep him in her mind for more than few moments. And there 
the book ends.87
The Spanish writer bestowed upon the young man the ability to act differently, 
to take new actions, but not to feel differently and grow intimately. By contrast, the 
film’s narrative division between Argentina and France is startling not just because 
the tango’s wild otherness is confined to Buenos Aires and downplayed in Paris, 
but also because it showcases Julio’s transformation from self-centered playboy to 
spiritual lover, sensitive to the call of duty and to Tchernoff ’s teaching.88 Mathis’s 
presumed interest in constructing a more sympathetic male character, one whose 
virile leadership eventually gives way to selfless sacrifice, bestowed upon the role 
of Julio more narrative and emotional weight and found fertile ground in the film’s 
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attendant promotion. Still, what The Four Horsemen’s publicity achieved was to 
launch Valentino as a Latin-lover star who was rather different from the sensitive 
Julio with which Mathis had ended her script and much closer to the tango dancer 
of the film’s beginning. The primacy effect of the tango scene prevailed over the 
film’s narrative trajectory and resolution.
L AUNCHING THE APO CALYPSE
In line with the epic status of the production, the publicity for The Four 
Horsemen was most effective. During the film’s production, Moving Picture World 
publicized the historical accuracy of the war scenes, for which “army officers, war 
correspondents and other experts have been consulted,” as well as their scale—
an “entire French village had been built to be destroyed.”89 The company also 
created pseudo-events, including a “poster drawing contest,”90 and filled the pages 
of trade journals with images of Valentino in a tango outfit and of gauchos riding 
through Argentina’s open spaces.91 The film’s New York premiere, held on March 6, 
1921, was a public celebration of cinema’s geopolitical relevance. The film’s link to 
figure 15. Valentino’s spiritual conversion in The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (1921), leading 
to voluntary military service and, ultimately, personal sacrifice. Courtesy of Museum of Modern 
Art Film Stills Archive. 
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World War I brought together a heterogeneous assemblage of film celebrities, poli-
ticians, and powerful individuals. In attendance were the Spanish and Argentine 
ambassadors from Washington in addition to Nicholas Murray Butler, president 
of Columbia University, Winston Churchill, Adolph Zukor, Anita Loos, John 
Emerson, Lee Shubert, and David Belasco, among others.92
The initial publicity around the premiere reveals an element that the critical 
discourse on the film has often overlooked: the massive community of the nov-
el’s readers. MPW insisted that the novel “had passed its 161st edition” and “its 
legion of readers throughout the United States alone [was] estimated at more 
than 10,000,000 persons.”93 A month later, when the film opened at the Astor 
Theatre, MPW boasted that the number of readers had doubled.94 By then, Metro 
had pulled off what MPW labeled “an outstanding achievement in the publicity 
for this film.” Armed with posters that promoted both the book and the film, it 
had gained virtual possession of the biggest store windows in New York, from 
booksellers (McDewitt & Wilson) to department stores (Lord & Taylor, Gimbel 
Brothers, Macy’s, Abraham & Straus). The trade press described it as “one the best 
window campaigns ever worked anywhere.”95
After the film’s launch, reactions shifted from the celebrated links with the novel 
and the memory of the war (which the novel had powerfully reignited) to the 
picture’s multiclass appeal. In a Motion Picture News issue that appeared the day 
before the film’s premiere, an anonymous reviewer argued that Ingram’s film could 
not “be called a war picture,” since it was “more a study in racial traits with adven-
ture, romance and the effects of war used to give it color.”96 The same reviewer then 
detailed the features he admired the most: Valentino, “the Argentine,” and with 
him “the natives and their national dance, the primitive white heat of passion [. . .] 
all caught and presented in kaleidoscopic proportions.”97 What years earlier would 
have been reason for racial and cultural separation became a motif for aesthetic 
delectation in this most charming of film characters. The studio’s publicity mate-
rial helped a great deal.
A thirty-two-page booklet containing advertising and publicity suggestions for 
the film, edited by J. E. D. Meader, Metro’s New York–based director of advertising 
and publicity, aided the effort. In addition to information about the costly filming, 
the booklet included suggestions for several catchphrases (“In which a youthful 
libertine, useless as a drone and as dangerous, finds that he owes God a death”) 
and two kinds of printed lobby displays—all centered on Valentino’s presence. The 
first suggested display, called “The Argentine,” “represents one of the most flash-
ing scenes in the preliminary part of the story: the tango scene where Julio, the 
spoiled young South American, takes away the dancing partner of another man.” 
The second one, “Paris by Night,” depicted “the revels of the hero, Julio, in the days 
after he went to Paris.”98
For months following its release, The Four Horsemen remained a blockbuster. 
MPW reported than more than one hundred road companies were exhibiting it—a 
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practice that was reserved for special or uniquely successful productions.99 At the 
same time Metro began receiving “unsolicited tributes” from numerous cities and 
“from all classes of people.”100 Further, the public discourse about the film began 
to insist less on the merits of the adaptation itself and more on what the industry 
valued the most: stardom. A few contemporary reviews, from the New York World 
to the Literary Digest, began to single out Valentino. “The characters used primar-
ily to give color to the picture—South-American natives, Spanish, French, and 
German specimens,” wrote the Literary Digest reviewer, “are all strikingly indi-
vidualized, and those who have the more extensive roles not only look their parts, 
but act them intelligibly, especially Rudolph Valentino as the young Julio.”101 Even 
Motion Picture Play critic Frederick James Smith, who loudly criticized Mathis’s 
script and Ingram’s direction for missing Ibáñez’s antiwar message, identified the 
“early episode of the Argentine café” as the film’s “highest point.” There, he noted, 
“Julio flashed with life, passion, vibrated across the screen, and the atmosphere 
radiated with reality.”102 
Mathis may have not necessarily recognized the charming and exotic Valentino 
that pervaded the emerging publicity discourse, but that image was there to stay. 
Between The Four Horsemen and his next blockbuster, The Sheik, released in 
November, a distinct fan discourse began to emerge. In June, for instance, in an 
article entitled “A Latin Lover,” Photoplay boasted the unexpected and fortunate 
discovery of a star: “Rudolph Valentino played Julio in The Four Horsemen—and 
immediately the film world knew it had the continental hero, the polished foreigner, 
the modern Don Juan in its unsuspecting midst.”103 The trope of exceptional and 
exotic sensuality soon dominated his highly individualized early reception and 
found expression in a classic publicity vehicle, the biographical profile—part per-
sonal story, part publicity device. Already established for Pickford and Fairbanks 
and for a wide range of actors who never became big stars, this journalistic genre 
boosted Valentino’s fame and generated a fascination that it would be erroneous to 
describe as unmediated or spontaneous.
PROFILING
One of the earliest of a long list of biographical profiles that would not stop 
even after his death appeared in Motion Picture Magazine. Penned by film critic 
Gordon Gassaway and entitled the “The Erstwhile Landscape Gardener,” the profile 
sought to legitimize Valentino’s status as a star. It portrays him as a talented Italian 
actor whose life and manners defy the negative stereotypes associated with Italian 
immigrants and appeal to American and world audiences alike. Accompanied by 
two photographs, where Valentino appears in modern clothes and in the typical 
Argentinian outfit, the profile walks a fine line between immigrant story and 
narrative of an effortless Americanization. It begins by reminding readers that 
Valentino had tried his luck as uninspired landscape gardener and as dancing 
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partner for the famous Bonnie Glass and Joan Sawyer. But in this account even his 
setbacks acquire a mantle of heroism. During World War I, as Gassaway recounts, 
Valentino “was trying frantically to enlist in the Italian service,” but his rejection 
due to a serious eye defect “was a hard blow for the young Italian, son of a cavalry 
captain and offspring of generations of military leaders.”104 To further stress his 
difference from the average Italian immigrant, Gassaway aestheticizes Valentino’s 
real-life appearance as noble, timelessly Italian. His appearance could easily 
remind one of “little peak-eared marble satyrs you see in Italian gardens” and even 
though, in preparation for the interview, a studio’s makeup artists had thickly cov-
ered with pink paint “Rudy’s olive complexion” and applied blue-black penciled 
shadows to further emphasize “the blackness of his eyes,” “the finely-chiseled lines 
of his patrician nose and mouth were au naturel.”105 In Gassaway’s prose, Valentino’s 
racial and national otherness, including his accent, are transmuted into a noble 
and purely exotic charm.
In his responses to Gassaway’s questions, the Italian actor himself took pains 
to make his diversity appear acceptable by distinguishing it from that of African 
Americans. He refers to the danger of spending too much time in the sun at the 
beach since he is “very dark in complexion” and “the sun it burn me too black for 
pictures. I become like a neegroe [sic].”106 Such a demeaning kind of racial distanc-
ing proved useful for casting Valentino as an ultimately acceptable Arab-looking 
lover in The Sheik. Another way in which Gassaway seeks to tame, without erasing, 
Valentino’s otherness is to combine it with several recognizably American traits 
that Valentino had quickly learned to showcase—including self-control, reserve, 
and constant physical activity. The sustained references to his new habits and 
controlled manners makes Gassaway predict that “the stars seem very favorable 
toward this young, very Americanized foreigner.”107 Ultimately, and in conjunction 
with shorter reviews and biographical pieces, this profile was the first to suggest 
that the Four Horsemen’s impressive success was due to Valentino’s emergent star-
dom. In 1926 Terry Ramsaye voiced this opinion quite explicitly when he reported 
that although “the gross earnings up to the end of 1925 on the picture were about 
$4,000,000 [.  .  .] it was not, after all, a triumph of a war picture.” Instead, he 
insisted, “it was a triumph of a new Don Juan of the screen, a victory for Latin love 
and suppressed desire among the movie millions.”108 
The rhetorical emphasis of these profiles was spontaneity, as if Valentino’s star-
dom was effortless and inevitable. Gassaway’s 1921 profile, however, attached a dis-
tinct name to the prediction of Valentino’s rise to fame—that of Herbert Howe. 
In praising the Italian actor’s talent and describing his bright future, Gassaway 
felt he was usurping “Howe’s prerogative [. . .] in predicting that [Valentino] will 
achieve his most notable successes in manly, bandolined roles.”109 Howe was an 
influential contributor to fan periodicals, as well as a publicist, often a secretive 
one, yet known for his ability to manage stars’ public reputations. The frequency of 
his editorials and range of his collaborations amount to a significant contribution 
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to the emergence of Hollywood star discourse. He was possibly one of the first of 
a list of ballyhoo experts who shaped Valentino’s career and reception in America. 
Like many other early film writers and journalists, he has remained marginalized 
in traditional film histories.
Information about Howe is limited. Born Herbert Riley Howe in South Dakota 
in 1893, Howe “began working as a film publicist in New York in the early 1910s,” 
served in the U.S. Tank Corps during World War I, returned to New York as a 
New York Telegraph reporter and started writing for fan magazines, including 
Photo-Play Journal, Motion Picture Classic, and Photoplay.110 Under contract as a 
publicist in 1921 with both Brewster Publications and the Vitagraph Company, he 
was by then a recognized star scout, effective interviewer, and so-called ethnog-
rapher of the Hollywood colony’s peculiar mores. Due to his sophistication and 
intellectual preparation, he was known as a “Hollywood boulevardier,” which was 
also the name of his column, first for Motion Picture Classic and later for the New 
Movie Magazine. He was also a most consummate publicist, unabashedly willing 
to use his columns and reputation to launch and support stars’ career. At the time 
of the Four Horsemen’s success, Howe was writing a popular column for Picture 
Play Magazine, entitled “Right Off the Grill,” which was devoted to “unrestrained 
comment on picture players, and correspondents.” In August 1921, four and a half 
months after Valentino appeared on screen as Julio, Howe devoted a remark-
able profile to the Italian actor not to celebrate his “screen glamour,” but to study 
him “as a subject for success.”111 It was the first of many publicity pieces. Argu-
ably, Howe’s overall contribution to Valentino’s fame was as significant as Mathis’s. 
The Metro chief screenwriter capitalized on the public interest that Valentino had 
spurred first as a private citizen and then as a minor actor and translated his 
appeal into a daring but sympathetic role that brought him an unprecedented level 
of fame. Howe also took advantage of her creative work and translated Valentino’s 
notable screen performance into an alleged real-life personality that fueled other 
performances and a lifetime of coverage.112
Howe’s 1921 profile articulates the acceptability of Valentino’s otherness for the 
film industry—censors and spectators alike. Against the intentions and plans of 
the “fanatical evangels,” Howe notes, Valentino’s screen presence “suggests a devil 
within the law, liable to break through without notice. That’s why the ladies are 
going to like him.” By depicting him as a romantic creature from another time, 
Howe had clear ideas about the new space that Valentino came to occupy in America’s 
film imagery. “Most of us still have a sort of moonshine love for the outlawry,” he 
argues, pointing to Valentino as someone who “suggests romance with a crimson 
thrill.”113 Howe predicates the actor’s acceptable otherness as a mixture of succes-
ful immigrant narrative—from rags to riches, elitist personal background, and 
Orientalist racial traits.
While Valentino had migrated to America like millions of immigrants, his 
alleged social background separated him from them. Because of his personal 
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ancestry (a “cavalry officer” for a father and “a lady of gentility and lineage” for a 
mother), Howe argues, the economic hardship and the solitude initially experi-
enced in New York were harder on him than on other, lower-class migrants. “The 
peasant of Europe can get work digging in the sewers,” Valentino observes. “I had 
nothing to offer, and even if I had I couldn’t tell them about it.” What Valentino 
had, however, were “all the forms of gallantry known to the Continental cava-
lier.” As a result, “Women were enamored of his manner, his beauty, his grace, his 
low-murmuring Latin tones.”114 Still, his humbling experience of landing in New 
York with the other immigrants was a healthy antidote against arrogance. When 
success came, Howe remarks, he was not “reshaped by the arch-sycophant, 
Mademoiselle Fame.” Instead he remained grounded and always mindful of “those 
days in New York when I didn’t know where I could get food.” Howe’s interview 
does not shy away from the actor’s scandalous past (“People thought of me only as 
a dancer—a lounge lizard”) but uses it to attract sympathy for an idol profoundly 
misunderstood, terribly lonely, but much wiser for all that. And yet national dif-
ference (“A jug of wine, a plate of spaghetti, a pack of cigarettes, and Valentino is 
a success most anywhere”) had to be combined with an appealing exoticism. In 
Howe’s article Valentino explains his “wanderlust” in terms of his possibly Orien-
talist physicality (“His narrow, lotus-lidded eyes are enigmatic. Another reason for 
the interest of the curious sex. They are the eyes of the Orient”) and outlook on life 
(“The Orient fascinates me. There seems to be some secret wisdom in it”).115 Ulti-
mately, the actor emerges from the profile as “an introspective Bedouin, a youthful 
Omar searching the Mystery, a pagan lover of the spirit,” who admirers intimately 
related to as “Rudie.”
Between The Four Horsemen and his next blockbuster, The Sheik, three pro-
ductions failed to catalyze a comparable fan discourse. For instance, Uncharted 
Seas (April 1921) and The Conquering Power (July 1921), also produced by Metro, 
did not contribute to Valentino’s stardom as exotic Latin Lover—whether 
unapologetically daring or contritely sensitive. In the former, he played the role of 
a courageous ship commander Frank Underwood, active in the Arctic Seas. But 
as Variety noted, the film’s plot appeared “unconvincing and conventional,” and all 
the characters, including his, were “so unnaturally drawn” that it was “impossible 
to associate them with ordinary human beings.”116 In the latter, he was a wealthy 
young dandy named Charles Grandet, and his interpretation was singled out as 
charming for its “youthful appeal, vivacity and cleverness” but nothing more.117 
The same can be said for Camille (September 1921), an Alla Nazimova vehicle, 
also produced by Metro, adapted by Mathis from La Dame aux camélias by 
Alexandre Dumas fils and featuring art direction by Valentino’s second wife, 
film costume and set designer Natacha Rambova.118 Valentino played the role of 
Armand Duval, a young and unsophisticated law student, who falls in love with the 
Nazimova character, but at no point in the film, which critics labeled artificial and 
unrelatable, did he appear as other than a victim of passion and circumstances.119 
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The publicity leading up to the film placed him in the “supporting company” even 
though the role in The Four Horsemen had “won him celebrity.”120 
Unsurprisingly, these films do not figure prominently in the established dis-
course about Valentino’s different masculinity because the fan discourse still 
looked at his interpretation in The Four Horsemen as his primary role. By the fall 
of 1921, months after its release, critics and editorialists still described its freshness 
and originality in terms of the racial and cultural novelty of its leading man, for 
whom Photoplay eventually abandoned its long-standing front-page policy. “If we 
ever decide to have men on the covers,” the editors wrote in October, “[Valentino] 
will be the first man.”121 The plan came to fruition with the February 1922 issue of 
Photoplay, which sported an image of the Italian actor in attire suitable to the sheik 




The Ballyhooed Art of Governing 
Romance 
Interest in The Sheik continued to build and a studio press agent was  
assigned as a buffer between Valentino and the press.
Irving Shulman, Valentino, 19671
One of the striking characteristics of the era of Coolidge Prosperity was the 
unparalleled rapidity and unanimity with which millions of men and women 
turned their attention, their talk, and their emotional interests upon a series 
of tremendous trifles—a heavyweight boxing-match, a murder trial, a new 
automobile model, a transatlantic flight.
Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday, 19312
A “POISONOUSLY SAL ACIOUS” BEST SELLER
The year 1921 turned out to be magical for Valentino even though the aftermath 
of the success of The Four Horsemen was anything but rosy. After Camille, he and 
Mathis left Metro Pictures to join Famous Players–Lasky. It was an ambitious move 
for both of them, but Valentino was also motivated by his frustrations with Metro’s 
unwillingness to raise his salary and public profile substantially despite the success 
of The Four Horsemen. Upon learning that Metro underappreciated Valentino’s 
star potential, Jesse Lasky hired him and then paired him with Mathis, whom he 
had just lured away from the same company, to work on The Sheik. Before their 
move, Lasky had acquired the filming rights to the eponymous British best-selling 
novel and for a while remained unsure whether to turn it into a film. The Sheik had 
first become a smashing success in the United Kingdom, eventually going through 
108 printings between its release in 1919 and 1923, but as overwhelming as the 
novel’s British popularity was, it “could not compare with its bedazzling success in 
the United States.”3 
The novel had something mysterious about it: the gender of the unknown 
author, E.  M. [Edith Maude] Hull, remained long unclear until it was revealed 
that she was a first-time female writer. The book was also quite controversial in 
America not just because it described the repeated rape of a white Englishwoman 
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by a man who for much of the novel seems to be an Arab, but also and most signifi-
cantly because it portrayed the result as a passionate love affair. Although the Liter-
ary Review described it as “poisonously salacious in conception” and the New York 
Times found its story “preposterous,” the novel struck a chord among thousands 
of female readers—which greatly intrigued Lasky.4 Still, publishing the book and 
adapting it for the screen were obviously two different commercial enterprises. At 
the height of nativist propaganda and a Ku Klux Klan revival in America, the fear 
of showing and thereby endorsing miscegenation was real and profound.5
Hull’s The Sheik could circulate freely because it had successful precedents: 
it belonged to a tradition of romantic novels that had become popular since the 
beginning of the century and that included Robert Hitchens’s Garden of Allah 
(1904) and Kathlyn Rhodes’s The Lure of the Desert (1916).6 After her most famous 
novel, Hull went on to publish other works in the same vein, including The Shadow 
of the East (1921) and Son of the Sheik (1925), which was adapted into Valentino’s 
last film. Critically speaking, the film and its surrounding literary tradition raises 
questions about historical female readers’ (and spectators’) attraction for “desert 
Arabs, portrayed as barbaric, sensual, dangerous and unpredictable.”7 At issue is 
the ostensible discrepancy between the early-twentieth-century scripted “fanta-
sies of opulence, barbarism and sensuality,” centered on the notion of the Orient 
as the West’s feminized other, and new postwar discourses about gender equal-
ity and female identities.8 The discrepancy was only superficial. Because of read-
ers’ familiarity with the genre, the sheik’s dangerous demeanor as kidnapper and 
sexual predator is never purely shocking. It is mitigated by the narrative tradition 
within which he operates and which relies on a number of recognizable motifs—
the abduction, the sandstorm, the desert ride, and the heroine’s futile attempt to 
escape. This distant but familiar universe ensures that apparently alien characters 
are “carefully pre-packaged into familiar narrative parcels, which can be enjoyed 
without undue anxiety.”9 The exciting barbarism of the story’s othered, yet highly 
aestheticized protagonist operates on familiar terrain. At the level of narrative, the 
stereotypical ideological rivalry between East and West could be both excitingly 
and safely projected onto Western women’s attraction to the sensual and barbaric 
Oriental man not only because it was a familiar script, but also because its 
characters engage in masquerades. In both the novel and the film, as we shall see, 
the two protagonists undergo and display significant transformations that grant 
ideological legitimacy to their romantic entanglement and enable spectatorial 
pleasure without erasing the story’s racy and dangerous atmosphere.
Famous Players–Lasky purchased the film rights because it apparently appreci-
ated the novel’s success among female readers, who constituted cinema’s most loyal 
patrons. Still, visualizing a white woman’s dangerous and illicit romance with a 
racially othered man posed challenges that had to be addressed at the levels of 
casting, narrative, and promotion. As Lasky recounted in his memoir, he remained 
uncertain about whom to choose for the leading part of the passionate desert 
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savage. He had excluded Wallace Reid because he “was too much the good- 
natured, big-brother type” and Thomas Meighan for being “too wholesome and 
casual.” After watching Four Horsemen, he was struck by its unknown male lead 
who displayed “the lithe grace of a panther” and whose “sheer animal magnetism” 
made women go to the movie theaters “to swoon.”10 Because he believed that the 
newly popular Italian actor could play Ahmed Ben Hassan’s performative racial 
otherness and turn it into a subject of sensual desire, Lasky signed him away from 
Metro. Although Valentino was quickly on board, June Mathis refused to work on 
the script because, according to Joan Vale, she “disapproved [of] the sexist theme 
which focused on physical humiliation, in part desired by the helpless female cap-
tive of the desert warrior.”11 By contrast, American producers feared that Diana 
Mayo’s falling in love with an Arab and being indifferent about the consequences—
“she did not care what he was, he was the man she loved,” says the novel—would 
have led to major problems with the censors and a sure commercial disaster.12 
Mathis’s refusal to reprise her collaboration with Valentino tells us about the 
challenge that the adaptation posed (as well as about the opportunities it opened). 
First, Ibáñez had an artistic reputation that Hull lacked. Second, as the story was 
written, Ahmed did not appear to be as credibly capable of the kind of conversion 
that Julio underwent from spoiled young heir to sensitive and irresistible lover. 
Given how talented Mathis had been in responding to public taste, the film’s suc-
cess vis-à-vis her refusal to collaborate on the project calls attention not just to 
the differences between novel and film but also to the continuity of the Valentino 
type first noticed in the promotion of Four Horsemen. Directed by the established 
George Melford and written by the company’s screenwriter Monte M. Katterjohn, 
The Sheik ended up solidifying the Divo’s popular image for years to come.
The film’s adaptation was far from a literal adherence to the book. It presented 
narrative additions and reworkings that affected the construction of the charac-
ters and the film’s overall ideological register. Since the novel had received wide 
recognition in America, the film’s production, distribution, and publicity largely, 
although not exclusively relied on audience familiarity with Hull’s work. By January 
1922 the fan magazines frequently referred to the novel’s racy appeal to publicize 
the film. “Here is romance. Red-hot,” promised Photoplay. “If you read the story 
you will go to see the filmization. If you haven’t, you will go anyway.” Even though 
highbrow critics had scoffed at the novel for its sensationalist style and sexually 
provocative content, the article insisted that it was “read and re-read by two-thirds 
of the women in this country.”13 While stressing that the film amounted to sure 
entertainment, however, the most important fan magazine of its time went on to 
describe the movie with two apparently contradictory terms: “a very exciting, very 
old-fashioned photoplay.”14
The coexistence of these attributes should be surprising. Less than two years 
after the passage and ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment (June 4, 1919, and 
August 18, 1920), how could a film that celebrated its dependence on a novel that 
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contains rapes and the most controversial form of interracial romance (featuring 
a white woman, that is) be deemed both “exciting” and “old-fashioned”? Had not 
years of campaigning for gender equality pushed storytelling to more equitable 
forms that made sexual violence toward women utterly unacceptable, even as 
fantasy? Let us consider the circumstances of the film’s production and specifically 
the narrative changes wrought in the novel’s story line to assess how the studio 
released a film that despite its source’s controversial plot defied censorship restric-
tions and was marketed to female fans as most alluring.
(SAFE)  DESERT LOVE
Largely dependent on Hull’s narrative arc, the film tells the story of a rich tribal 
prince, Sheik Ahmed Ben Hassan, who meets a British tourist, the independent 
Lady Diana Mayo, visiting the Saharan town of Biskra. When she ventures into 
the desert, Ahmed kidnaps her, takes her to his tent, and tries to seduce her. To his 
dismay, she rejects him and tries to shame him. Captive and forced to wear tra-
ditional Arab garb, Diana is embarrassed to meet one of Ahmed’s closest friends, 
a French novelist named Raoul, who assumes the worst. Fortunately, the novel-
ist and Diana become friends, and Raoul encourages Ahmed to release her. The 
proud Ahmed keeps her prisoner but, moved by her prayers, no longer tries to 
assault her. Meanwhile, during an escorted horseback ride outside the camp, Diana 
scribbles “Ahmed, I love you” on the sand before falling into the hands of Omair 
the bandit, a character who sports a much darker complexion than Ahmed does 
and who does not have any of the hero’s style and eventual restraint. Ultimately, 
Ahmed saves her from captivity, but he is injured during the battle. While 
attending his wounds, Diana learns from Raoul that Ahmed is the orphaned son 
of an English father and a Spanish mother. As she prays for his recovery, Ahmed 
awakens and the two lovers finally recognize each other.
In contrast to the novel, Melford’s The Sheik developed new ways to turn 
Ahmed and Diana into acceptable characters and legitimate lovers and subjects 
of desire and identification for film audiences. Notwithstanding its debts to the 
novel, the film includes two complementary sequences that reveal Ahmed and 
Diana as masquerading characters. The scenes show that, despite the exoticism of 
settings, costumes, and story, Ahmed and Diana are much more conventional, or 
“old-fashioned,” than they first appear to be. The two sequences strengthen the 
protagonists’ characterizations as individuals devoted to romantic love, and both 
additions resonate with scenes that were in the novel—particularly one from the 
beginning that depicts Ahmed’s repeated singing and Diana’s reactions to it.
The film opens with a set piece, the “bride market” scene in which Ahmed takes 
part in the “ancient custom by which wives are secured for the wealthy sons of 
Allah,” as one intertitle reads. After noticing how the traditional custom would 
end up separating two true lovers, he exercises his authority in favor of authentic 
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romance. The importance of the scene is proleptic: “It makes clear that his erotic 
imagination,” observes Stephen Caton, “can warm to the concept of romantic love, 
by means of which he is subsequently subdued and won over by Diana.”15 Ahmed 
appears to be an Arab sheik, a creature who is allegedly foreign to Western notions 
of romance. In truth, he is only masquerading as an Arab sheik and the coupling of 
the scene with audiences’ knowledge of his true diegetic (and extradiegetic) identity 
as a European man introduces a double layer in his reception. We may see him as 
an Arab male chauvinist, but the story constitutes a safe fantasy with a conventional 
outcome—a foreseeable and familiar romance ending in marriage.
This initial scene frames the film’s narrative and the spectatorial experience on 
two interrelated levels. It provides the original sign of Ahmed’s inner nature and 
as such anticipates his transformation into a character devoted to romance—a 
change that will also extend to Diana. The scene also trains the spectator in appre-
ciating the visual and dramaturgic solution of the self-exoticizing masquerade that 
enables the two protagonists to engage in the practices of racial cross-dressing that 
are consequential for their romance. While this may seem obvious for Ahmed, it 
is truer for Diana. Initially, she “is a prototypical desert romance heroine,” who 
“flaunts her independence,” has a penchant for “boyish clothing,” and appears 
“uninterested in traditionally feminine pursuits.”16 Despite these characteristics, 
Diana is not exactly equivalent to the American flapper, who was known for being 
sexually active and appreciative of constant courtship. Diana has never kissed a 
man, does not understand the attraction of physical contact, and lacks the content-
ment with her femininity that Arab women seem to display. Being in the desert 
and knowing Ahmed will change that. 
Their first direct encounter is an exchange of gazes that reveals his impenitent 
desire and her fear. But the next morning, Ahmed’s passionate singing from afar 
of “The Kashmiri Song” (“Pale hands I loved beside the Shalimar. Where are you 
now? Who lies beneath your spell?”) stirs a profoundly sensual feeling in Diana.17 
She remains utterly enchanted, ignoring that her captor is the performer. While 
describing her reaction, the novel defines his charming and passionate baritone 
as “strangely un-English.” By contrast, the romanticism of the film’s first scene of 
the bride market compels the spectator to register her listening enthrallment as an 
aural sign of the two protagonists’ inevitable romance. His singing reveals a 
romantic passion that is utterly absent in her brother and her peers. Diana recognizes 
the song, names it, and is pleasurably reminded of India, and thus of a context of 
both racial difference and interracial attraction.18 
Along the same lines, the filmmakers added another scene not included in 
the novel that fits with Diana’s transformation from self-righteous interloper to 
caring wonderer and finally lover. While in Biskra, Diana intentionally practices 
racial cross-dressing. She persuades an Arab woman to lend her clothes so that 
she can masquerade as an Arab wife-to-be and access the casino’s inner cham-
bers where local chieftains gamble for brides. Once there, she becomes both a 
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horrified witness to the barbaric ritual she so despises and a participant in it, 
while briefly hidden in plain sight as a native woman willing to accept a sexual 
sacrifice. Yet, in “her disapproval of these Eastern injustices, she sets up criteria 
against which the sheik is measured.”19 The film’s initial scene, in which Ahmed 
authoritatively rejects the Arab custom in favor of true love, sets up Valentino as 
capable of shifting from primitive sheik to fully acceptable romantic partner. It is a 
transformation that has both moral and racial implications: its unfolding exposes 
the civilized nobility of Ahmed’s whiteness. Similarly, once Diana’s masquerade is 
revealed by her different skin color, she can escape the primitive ritual for exactly 
the same reason, thanks to her race. But the cross-dressing has touched her. Only 
after wearing the costumes of a culture that she judges as primitive can she attain 
the power to immerse herself in what she considers one of its most barbaric rituals 
and eventually exit it. Karen Chow notes that female spectators “who identified 
with her participated, by proxy, in the crossing of gender and racial boundaries as 
Diana’s changes of clothing give her the power of transgression through masquer-
ade.”20 It is an exciting but safe journey. The scene reveals that racial masquerad-
ing is not just an opportunity for Diana to trespass in an alien culture but also a 
chance to “try on” an alien dimension of her own life, that of wife-to-be, ready for 
the kind of full sexual experience in which she had long expressed no interest.
At the center of these racial masquerades, at once exoticizing and domesticating, 
is the Arab desert. More than a geographic location, the desert was the projection 
of rich and long-standing Orientalist visual and literary imageries that had turned 
it into a site of daring sexual license.21 Since the beginning of the century, the 
so-called desert romance contributed to such imagery in a remarkable way: it 
“proved a particularly rich genre for popular engagement with fantasies of sexual 
identity.”22 Specifically, in the imaginary desert, women could find freedom from the 
ideological boundaries of prescribed gender roles through their identification with 
the sensual Orientalist fantasy that featured unprecedented degrees of explicitness 
and even violence. In both novel and film, the character of the desert sheik Ahmed 
animates these fantasies of sexual license. He daringly sexualizes Diana’s persona 
by recognizing her masquerade as a modern woman who refuses to acknowledge 
her true womanhood. Immediately after kidnapping her, he recognizes her desert 
clothes as deceptively manly (“You make a very charming boy, but it was not a boy 
I saw two nights ago in Biskra”) and forces her to display her full figure by com-
manding her to wear Arab garments which accentuate bodily contours.23 Even more 
strikingly, he interpellates her sexual knowledge in an all too explicit fashion, but he 
does so by advancing a very modern notion of womanhood. After a scared and hor-
rified Diana asks him, “Why have you brought me here?” Ahmed replies with the 
famous line “Are you not woman enough to know?” which addresses her as a woman 
who is familiar with erotic desire and is not just drawn to romantic entanglements.
These exchanges invite a consideration of the film’s mysogyny in a broader 
diegetic and cultural context. On the one hand, it is striking to note that through 
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Ahmed’s brutal conquest (and in the novel through explicit and repeated rape), 
Diana attains a degree of sexual maturity and emotional self-knowledge that she 
had lacked. On the other hand, as Karen Chow maintains, the shift from initial 
asexuality to full-bodied erotic knowledge gave both her and women in general 
“a new sexual freedom as desiring subjects.”24 In other words, both novel and film 
must train their consumers to look past the sexual violence toward its transfor-
mative effects—diegetic and extradiegetic. The challenge is to develop strategies 
to dedramatize Ahmed’s barbaric violence and highlight Diana’s power to affect 
change in his heart. Both his racial and gender masquerades must be obvious in 
order to ensure the feasibility and authenticity of his later conversion. By 
displaying both the appearance of an outward racial difference and its own perfor-
mative quality, the film, much more than the novel, enhances the acceptability of 
its star actor’s diegetic conversion. Caton has noted that “the sheik, not Diana, is at 
the heart of the cinematic melodrama,” and he appears “much more ‘feminine’ to 
begin with than his novelistic counterpart.”25 His long flowing robes, his fastidious 
sophistication, and his visible makeup undermine the threat of his darker, 
racialized masculinity by revealing a sort of refined and androgynous character. 
Valentino-as-Ahmed is always impeccably dressed, appears clean and urbane, even 
in his display of primitive desire. Overdetermined as a seeker of scopic pleasure, he 
also lends himself to erotic contemplation on the part of other characters and, of 
course, the film’s spectators. He is also quite learned and fluent in many languages, 
has studied in Paris, and is acquainted with established writers, including Raoul 
de Saint Hubert. What sets him apart from all the Arabs around him is that he is at 
home both in the desert and among cosmopolitan (Western) individuals. The true 
villains, as the film makes clear in the second part, are the “real” and much darker 
Arabs, who cannot cross-dress culturally, let alone racially, in the way he can. To 
return to Bederman’s framework, an apparent display of racial and national other-
ness was needed to rework conventional manhood into a romantic and passionate 
masculinity capable of taming Diana’s novel and independent female type. At the 
same time, the film also uses Ahmed’s feminizing features as indexes of personal 
sensibility and probity to tame his alleged racial otherness and to signal his covert 
racial nobility.26
The person who catalyzes Ahmed’s rediscovery of his personal moral sensibility 
is Diana. Her personal faith enhances and validates his transformation from 
abusive kidnapper to conflicted, melancholic, and respectful companion. If we ask 
what keeps Ahmed from further violating Diana after the kidnapping—at least 
to the degree that the film reveals—we find the repeated scene of Diana praying, 
which awakens his compassion and remorse.27 “It is she [.  .  .] who tames and 
redeems him,” Caton has noted, “largely through her Christian faith.”28 Even before 
the unveiling of the racial/national masquerade, it is his respect for her Christian 
devotion and thus to Western civilization that informs his change of behavior and 
ultimately abates the horror of miscegenation. That horror is instead conveniently 
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displaced onto the darker and morally unrepentant Sheik Omair, representative of 
Christianity’s “arch adversary, Islam.”29
As the spectator may surmise at the end of the film, Ahmed’s inner whiteness 
and Christian nobility justify Diana’s attraction to him. It is not a total discovery, 
of course, on either fictional or biographical grounds. Having read the novel, film 
spectators recognized the film adaptation’s narrative twists. Further, while Hull 
simply invented the fictional Ahmed, Lasky’s casting of Valentino made filmgoers 
unfailingly aware of the character’s underlying whiteness. Thus, the realization that 
Ahmed is not really an Arab but a European, with English and Spanish blue blood in 
his veins, provides a much more surprising and ultimately reassuring closure in the 
novel than in the film. Readers of the novel were also exposed to a much more daring 
and unconventional version of Diana’s desire than viewers of the film. Without the 
aforementioned added scenes, the novel’s racial distance between Ahmed and Diana 
remained far more deep-rooted than in the film. What remains true for both novel 
and film is that “for the desert romance heroine, marriage with the sheik provides the 
best of both worlds: a domestic life and [. . .] exotic presence in her life.”30 The thrill of 
a dangerous relationship had found a most reassuring last-minute resolution.
Famous Players–Lasky knew very well that the success of The Sheik depended 
on shrewd and glamorous publicity. In October 1921, a month before the film’s 
release, the director of Paramount publicity, Jerome Beatty, asked his London 
representative to interview Mrs. Hull. The assembled information was incorpo-
rated in a publicity campaign that Paramount described as “one of the biggest ever 
put behind a motion picture.”31 The studio and Chalmers Publishing Company 
played what we may call the audience-pleasing game by linking the book and film. 
Book editions carried a special jacket designed to tie “directly with the picture 
through the printed line, ‘A Paramount Picture with Agnes Ayres and Rudolph 
Valentino—a George Melford Production.’ ” That jacket sported a color reproduc-
tion of a painting by popular illustrator Marshall Frantz that had been used in 
the twenty-four-sheet posters and other advertising illustrations (figure 16).32 The 
publisher meanwhile was “20,000 volumes behind in orders” and had “planned 
to use the twenty-fifth edition simultaneously with the release of the Paramount 
picture [. . .] to advertise the double event in a manner befitting the occasion.”33 The 
studio’s promotional tie-in squarely stressed the theme of interracial love on and 
off screen and offered a titillating homage to an Oriental style of courtship that was 
unapologetically passionate and even despotic. What is more, the promotion justi-
fied itself as merely an attempt “to satisfy the public’s expectations,” Lasky boasted 
to Moving Picture World.34 “A photoplay of tempestuous love between a madcap 
English Beauty and a bronzed Arab chief ” read a double-spread advertisement in 
MPW. It included a line from the novel that was used in the film: “When an Arab 
sees a woman he wants, he takes her” (figure 17).35
The star-centered promotion worked. The film was a box-office success. On 
November 10, a Wid’s news item reported that the picture, with almost 54,000 
figures 16 and 17. Advertisements for The Sheik (1921). Moving Picture World, October 15, 1921, 
713; and Moving Picture World, October 22, 1921, 830–31.
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paying spectators, had “smashed all attendance records at the Rivoli and Rialto 
theatres” in New York during the first three days and was on track to establish 
“a new record in Broadway entertainment history”.36 After its release, a number of 
articles sought to brand the film as a Valentino-style romance. With pages filled with 
images and only a few lines of text, Motion Picture Classic, for instance, promoted 
the film as a unique opportunity to learn about the type of romance that Diana 
experienced—“desert love.”37 But another dimension emerged as linked to 
Valentino’s diegetic and extradiegetic public authority, one pertaining to a novel 
model of leadership. It was still intertwined with notions of romantic entanglement, 
but it was also easily readable in political terms. After all, The Sheik had started as 
a story about the whims and desire of a charming Oriental despot.
WHITE LEADERSHIP AND THE ART OF PLEBISCITE
The Sheik, Ahmed Ben Hassan, upon whose shoulders has fallen the heritage 
of leadership.
Growing to manhood as an Arab, he was sent to Paris to be educated and 
[. . .] returned to the desert to assume leadership of the tribe.
The Sheik (1921), intertitles from the opening and closing 
scenes
With Bederman, we learned that in the early twentieth century, the older 
formulation of manhood as moral character was eclipsed by an understanding of 
masculinity that relied on the bodily traits of prowess and sensual appeal and not 
solely on the moral values of probity and self-control. The legitimation of such 
elementary traits, often romantically narrativized through racial masquerade, went 
hand in hand with praise for leadership. Consider the Argentinian tango: in gener-
al, it provides a sanctioned acting out of a primitive form of male dominance that 
relies on the collaboration of a subjugated partner. The recognition of Valentino’s 
tango expertise signified both the actor’s embodiment of a primeval appeal and his 
partner’s devoted consent. Similarly, consider Edgar Rice Burroughs’s Tarzan of the 
Apes, featuring an aristocratic British child, John Clayton, raised by apes who call 
him “Tarzan” (White Skin); he is at once at home in the jungle and instinctively 
noble. Or consider the British diplomat and officer T. E. Lawrence who, dressed 
as a Bedouin, managed to lead an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire in the 
context of Britain’s African front in World War I.38 Tarzan, Lawrence of Arabia, 
and The Sheik (both novel and film) relied on the expedient of racial masquerade 
to exhibit a new form of white masculinity that exercised effective leadership over 
nonwhite crowds—or apes.
Since what keeps these figures from going fully primitive are the sensibility and 
restraint that allegedly are proper to the white Anglo-Saxon man, the problem with 
this racial profile is that the Italian Valentino is not one. How was it possible that, 
given his racial status, he was placed in a position usually occupied by eugenics’ 
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top-ranked individuals? Ahmed’s progressive acceptability and the revelation of 
what lies beneath his racial masquerade, in fact, calls attention not just to the racial 
status of the character but also to that of the actor playing it. Thus, for Valentino, 
there were questions regarding his adequacy not just as a romantic partner for 
a white woman but also as a leading subject of American audiences’ apprecia-
tion and desire on and off screen. Taming the feminization of his character and 
persona and recuperating his otherness as acceptable leadership relied on three 
dynamics: his differentiation from other characters within The Sheik, his juxta-
position to Italian immigrants’ cultural and racial makeup, and a talent to secure 
plebiscitarian consensus.
Diegetically, The Sheik juxtaposes Valentino against characters who appear to 
be chromatically and thus racially different. Valentino’s leadership is exercised over 
figures who are clearly darker, including, close to him, a Nubian house servant 
played by an uncredited African American actor. By the same token, the rival sheik 
is an unmistakably darker Arab (a white man in blackface), whose even darker 
bodyguard safeguards Valentino’s racial otherness from any possible diegetic or 
ideological confusion with nonwhite characters or darker-appearing crowds.
In the racial framework of the period, Italians as Europeans enjoyed legal, 
political, socioeconomic, and social advantages of whiteness that were unavailable 
to Latino, Native, Asian, and African Americans.39 Still, Italians were not exempt 
from charges of radical racial difference and anthropological inadequacy. Racial-
ization was thus the terrain on which narratives of adaptation could be denied or 
allowed. As a native Italian, Valentino was heavily racialized, but his status had to 
be differentiated from that of his fellow Southern Italian immigrants. It is within 
this framework that one can understand the strategy at work in the phrenological 
profile that appeared in a March 1922 issue of Photoplay. In it, Valentino emerged 
as “the Physical-Romantic type,” who “is fond of romantic and dangerous action.” 
It was a characterization that, both in its nomenclature and explanations, sought 
to turn the inevitable identification of racial difference into a set of appealing 
features, the most remarkable of which were unapologetic individualism, sexual 
desire, and leadership:
His strong, heavy chin and jaw indicate aggressiveness combined with an accentuated  
ego and a marked self-esteem. His features (especially his eyes and mouth) show 
that he is strongly attracted by the opposite sex [. . . .] The vertical structure of his 
back-head does not permit of his being influenced or taking on impressions easily.40
As an exceptional migrant of semiaristocratic background, Valentino had to be 
positioned above the fray, as a leading man capable of eliciting reactions that were 
stronger than mere acceptability. Beyond his screen presence, publicity coverage 
translated the distinct, original, and un-American novelty of the Italian divo into 
captivating, anticonformist individuality. At the center of editorial-like articles, 
interviews, and promotional news was the columnist and secret publicity agent 
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Herbert Howe. Possibly more than anybody in the 1920s, Howe displayed a pecu-
liar fondness for writing about film stardom through the language of institutional 
politics and by comparing Hollywood stars to celebrated political leaders—from 
Napoleon to Mussolini. During the brief but productive collaboration between 
Howe and Valentino, which lasted until early 1923, the Divo signed off on rare 
but studied pronouncements that merged film stardom with politics. Howe likely 
ghostwrote these and inserted them in his profiles of the Italian actor. In these, 
Howe walked a fine line between highlighting Valentino’s charming and sophisti-
cated foreignness and underscoring the agreeable character of his forceful ideas. 
Recent criticism, while productively engaged in reading Valentino’s ambivalent 
gender image and mode of address, has largely overlooked this political dimen-
sion, which first surfaced in coincidence with The Sheik’s release.
In the December 1921 issue of Motion Picture Classic, Howe published an exten-
sive profile-interview of Valentino entitled “Hitting the Hookah with Rudie.” The 
actor contributed to it with a wealth of biographical details.41 As a way of introduc-
ing his subject, Howe first sought to overcome the obstacle of national prejudice. 
While showing intimate knowledge of his subject, Howe depicts Valentino’s arrival 
in the United States as the result of glamorous, cosmopolitan meandering. “His life 
has been tempestuous melodrama,” he writes admiringly, “commencing in a noble 
family of Taranto, Italy, passing thru escapades in Paris, curious and sensational 
adventures in New York, on up to the present moment of screen idolatry.”42 Then 
Howe makes sure that the actor’s temperament, and not just his life circumstances, 
can in no way be associated with the culture of the familiar “alien-intruders”—Italian 
immigrants. For Howe, Valentino displays only good Italian qualities, such as 
“emotional warmth,” but “none of the volubility that we have come to expect as 
an Italian characteristic thru commerce with push-cart financiers.” Instead, the 
actor has the “dreamy melancholy of the stoic” and although “he has more the 
facial appearance of the Bedouin than the Roman,” he displays “the sturdy muscled 
physique of the Roman gladiator.” The celebration of Valentino’s membership in 
European aristocracy on his mother’s side was utterly fictitious: she was not aristo-
cratic, only French. But it resonated well with the appreciation of his cosmopolitan 
sophistication that further separated him from Italian immigrants.43
In the same profile-interview, Valentino effortlessly combines discussions of 
marriage and women’s rights with his take on democracy and the meaning of 
leadership in both political and romantic affairs. First, he blames divorce on what 
Howe calls the “democratic delusion,” then he moves “from the dangerous subject 
of woman’s rights to the theories of government.” For Valentino, democracy was as 
bad a word as anarchy, whether in a person’s private or public affairs:
In America democracy has been carried even to the home and you see the con-
sequences. There must be a leader for a nation, for a state, for a home. There is no 
such thing as equality. The woman is not the equal of the man, intellectually or any 
other way.44
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Valentino’s celebration of male authority did not actually match some key events 
in his personal life that had become public knowledge. Shortly after the success of 
The Four Horsemen, in fact, his life had began publicly unraveling. In May 1921, 
his first wife, Jean Acker, with whom he did not spend a single night, had accused 
him of desertion. Shortly after, his domestic affairs were “aired in a Los Angeles 
courtroom,” as Photoplay noted.45 The public coverage of his marital fiasco in 1921 
and subsequent divorce from Acker (January 1922) shaped a public perception of 
Valentino as weak, dependent, and exploitable by strong women.
It was this context that gave Valentino and Howe’s public celebration of male 
authority more than a whiff of overcompensation. It was meant to recast Valentino’s 
image and position him as an idealized romantic partner with the personal standing 
to display effective self-governance and forceful authority over women. Vocally 
against women’s right to vote, he critiques the self-repressive and excessively com-
pliant male American temperament. He takes pride in his Italian origin, but he 
does so in a recognizably American manner. Valentino stresses the key tenet of 
individualism a short ten months before Mussolini’s March on Rome (October 
1922) made the Duce an admirable model of effective autocracy. He thus presents 
the old-fashioned (yet never passé) Italian individualistic ethos as traditionally 
American, as if twentieth-century progress had brought decadence and corruption 
to the New World. He repeatedly praises personal freedom and authority as values 
lost in the American political system but alive and well in the Italian monarchy:
Not because I am Italian do I say it, but I do believe the Italian form of government—
and the English—gives more individual freedom than the republic [.  .  .]. Here in 
America they attempt to dictate what you shall see on the screen, what you shall put 
in your mouth—even what you shall do on the day the Lord gave you. Bolshevism is 
just another democratic theory and it will fail.46
In Howe’s striking prose, Valentino conflates types of political governance with 
forms of individual freedom. He judges the modern phenomena of mass consen-
sus and persuasion as conformist perversions and, as such, most un-American. 
Within a rhetorical framework constantly centered on gender difference, he rec-
ognizes the most glaring effects of what he describes as a Bolshevik democratiza-
tion at the intimate level of romantic relationships. American women’s sense of 
independence and initiative, in his view, result from men’s failure to exercise close 
supervision and authority over their partners. When he returns to the issue a few 
months later in a comparable article-interview, he advances a familiar autocratic 
solution: “There must be a leader, one sex or the other, and women in America 
have found that the men are not leading them. Commercially, the initiative of the 
American man is supreme on earth. Socially, domestically, he is subordinate.”47 
Beyond gender differences, Valentino also comments on the issue of individuals’ 
sovereignty or control over their lives. Despite the “finest educational system in the 
world,” Americans puzzle him. “You do not think, except in masses,” he charges, 
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“You hide your individuality. You accept. That is the sum of it. The newspapers 
propound and you accept.” In Europe, he claims, even without a comparable level 
of mass literacy, “the so-called reforms established here” would never be accepted. 
There, “education or no education, each person is an individual.”48
As Valentino’s criticism of the limits of American manhood bled beyond the 
domain of romantic relationships into the political domain of forms of govern-
ment and responsible citizenship, Howe too deployed political references—elec-
toral ones, specifically—to read the phenomenon of stars’ popular consensus. His 
columns presented a wealth of political metaphors that equated spectators to “elec-
toral constituents.” His views about who is a film star, who makes stars, and who 
approves them relied on an apparently obvious analogy between stardom and the 
electoral process and depended on two poles: a star’s personality and the public’s 
ability to celebrate it.49 Conveniently, he ignored the idea that a studio’s publicity 
efforts played any determining role in the process. The notion of audiences’ spon-
taneous consensus was obviously a trope the industry cultivated in its continuous 
aspiration to bypass censorship restrictions. It was also an argument that gossip 
writers like Adela Rogers St. Johns presented somewhat ironically to their readers 
with such slogans as “Nobody can make stars of nothing.”50 Free choice helped 
frame Hollywood as an industry that catered to the desires of the audiences and 
thus ultimately served American democracy, against the arbitrary actions of state 
and local censorship boards. This was also the very serviceable rationale deployed 
by fan magazines, directors, and individual critics.51
Officially, Howe’s ideal model was that of a direct democracy that celebrated 
fans’ unprompted agency in the choice of their favorite stars. In truth, he knew 
that such a democratic model was a fiction. After Valentino’s fame emerged, Howe 
contended, “the critics and the public pronounced him a ‘find,’ but of course the 
critics and the public know nothing about pictures. They only patronize ’em; they 
don’t make ’em.”52 In other words, the public expresses a free and direct opinion 
about a candidate only by way of accepting or refusing a proposal that it did not 
frame or articulate in the first place. Howe also believed in the inevitability of a star 
when endowed with a novel, appealing personality. Valentino easily embodied an 
exoticism of manners that young Americans could appreciate as a relief from the 
“cleanliness [that] makes them believe in their godliness.”53 Howe’s favorite way to 
reconcile these two positions—the public’s mere power of ratification and the star’s 
inevitability—was to make a comparison with the plebiscite. The fan community, 
just like an entire electorate, is simply invited to ratify or reject an appointment 
that, in case of a successful outcome, allows stars to behave according to unconven-
tional rules and exercise a unique authority over their base. In politics, plebiscites 
or decrees by the people turn elected leaders into imperial figures who are virtu-
ally unaccountable except during new elections or impeachment. It is not difficult 
to understand why such plebiscitary logic soon encouraged Howe to associate 
film stars with authoritarian political leaders—particularly Mussolini. Even more 
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importantly, it is also possible to recognize arguments in Howe’s political views 
that do not necessarily involve dictatorships or antidemocratic leaders. As a refer-
ence point, I would suggest returning to Woodrow Wilson’s pre-twentieth-century 
writings on political sovereignty.
In his 1893 volume An Old Master, and Other Political Essays, Wilson called for 
an expansion of executive power in light of his diagnosis about the “nature and 
lodgment of sovereignty.” Distinguishing between government and the process of 
governing, Wilson questioned the rhetorical and routine identification of sover-
eignty with the will of the people. He first defined sovereignty “as the highest politi-
cal power in the state, lodged in active organs, for the purpose of governing.” Then 
he distinguished between sovereignty and control: if “sovereign power is a positive 
thing; control [is] a negative thing.” He concluded that if “power belongs to govern-
ment[, .  .  .] control belongs to the community,” and if power “is lodged in organs 
of initiative,” control “is lodged with the voters.”54 To read Howe through the lens 
of Wilson’s political writings, one may restate the former’s argument by positing 
that film audiences, like regular voters, may think they are exercising their conse-
crated sovereignty when casting their ballots for their favorite stars. In reality, their 
preferences are, to quote Wilson, “exercised by way of approval or disapproval, 
acquiescence or resistance; they are not agencies of initial choice,”55 or, to quote Howe 
again, spectators “only patronize [stars]; they don’t make ’em.” Wilson’s argument in 
that volume may further illuminate Howe’s less-than-forthcoming position regarding 
the “true organs of initiative.” Decades before establishing the CPI, Wilson had 
expressed his deep concern about the arbitrary and aggressive power of the press, 
which he recognized as uniquely capable of “assuming the leadership in opin-
ion.”56 Unlike Wilson, Howe was in convenient denial about the power that he, film 
periodicals, and studios’ promotional campaigns exerted on whom to celebrate as a 
star—or, to put it differently, on whom to include on voters’ ballots.
Howe wrote repeatedly on the unmediated relationship between a star’s person-
ality and voters’ preferences. In a contribution to Photoplay entitled “They Can’t 
Fool the Public,” he praised American spectators for recognizing the novelty of 
Valentino’s exotic personality and casting their votes accordingly, for “the regular 
motion picture public is infallible in its election of stellar favorites.”57 In response 
to the widespread view that the studios’ promotional activities played an important 
role, Howe described filmgoing as the only model of actual popular sovereignty:
Fortunes have been expended in publicity and in lavish production to force a player 
into favor—but to no avail. You can stuff a ballot box, but you can’t stuff a box office. 
Here is one democratic institution where the public will prevails.58
Finally, the collaboration between Howe and Valentino was also evident in the 
actor’s serialized autobiography, which Howe likely ghostwrote.59 Entitled “My 
Life Story,” it ran in three Photoplay issues from February to April 1923. Earlier 
that year, a one-page announcement in Photoplay repeated the familiar notion of 
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a direct, semiconfessional autobiographical tale: “This is his story. Not his press 
agent’s; he hasn’t a press agent. It is the first authentic record of his life, related 
by himself.”60 This was also the register allegedly adopted by Valentino himself in 
an “open letter to the American Public” that appeared in the same January 1923 
issue right as the actor was engaged in a legal battle with Famous Players over his 
salary. In it, Valentino sought to explain his refusal to make “cut-and-dried pro-
gram features” in favor of more artistic projects. His motivation for writing the 
letter in appeal to the American public was the familiar tenet that the audience 
holds all the cards. “You discovered me and created me,” he wrote with rhetorical 
gratitude. “You made theater managers know me and you caused film magazines 
and newspapers to be conscious of me.”61
The appeal to unmediated democratic consensus allowed Howe to draw com-
parisons between film stars and Prime Minister Benito Mussolini. Like that of a 
film star, Mussolini’s personality, Americans understood, engendered a direct rap-
port with the Italian public. After the March on Rome, references to Valentino’s 
autocratic public persona began to assume new political attributes. Writing from 
Europe in early 1923, Howe commented on the two celebrities in terms of the 
undivided enthusiasm each received. “The most applauded men in the current 
world are Valentino and Mussolini,” Howe proclaimed. He went on to equate the 
establishment of a new form of government with the release of a film: “In Rome we 
witnessed the Fascisti revolution and cheered for Mussolini and Vittorio Emanuele. 
In London we witnessed Blood and Sand and cheered for Valentino.”62 In the same 
issue, he also wrote an article entitled “What Europe Thinks of American Stars.” 
In it Howe wondered “what reception Italy [would] give to [Valentino]” since his 
films had not yet been released there, and he sought to compare Italian and 
American audiences on the basis of their shared attraction to exotic figures.63 
However, the cartoon that Photoplay’s editors paired with Howe’s piece made a 
much more interesting comparison (figure 18). Drawn by the renowned illustra-
tor Herb Roth, the cartoon and its accompanying caption imagined the Roman social 
and architectural landscape for a hero’s welcome. Tied across the columns of ancient 
ruins is a giant poster carrying Valentino’s name (in its latest form) above an 
image of the star attacking a bull—clearly an homage to Blood and Sand (1922)—
amidst colorful individuals of all classes happily dancing, greeting their hero, 
and congratulating each other. Even a carabiniere, or police officer, visible in the 
lower right corner, cannot help but join what appears to be a harmony of passions, 
a communion of interests that the celebrity has catalyzed. Given the historical 
moment, the caption alerts the reader: “This is not the Fascisti revolution celebrat-
ing the victory of Mussolini, but merely the Roman welcome to the all-conquering 
Valentino.”64 It is a legitimate, albeit ironic, notification. The sight of a crowd of 
excited Italian supporters gathered under the same banner amidst architectural 
ruins may point more to a spirited plebiscite for the Duce than to the gathering of 
a throng of film fans.
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Howe’s comparisons to Mussolini centered on overt admiration of the Italian 
prime minister’s forceful manners and his mastery of public performances and 
promotional strategies. Howe felt that comparisons to the Italian dictator consti-
tuted an appropriate reference not just for Valentino but also for another major 
Hollywood star of the time, Mary Pickford. In a 1924 Photoplay interview with 
America’s sweetheart about her favorite stars and her own career, Howe first 
reported how Pickford sympathized with Valentino’s decision to quit Famous 
Players in opposition to the commercial demands put on him. When talking about 
her own future and expressing her willingness to become a producer if she was 
ever asked to retire, Pickford assumed a tone that Howe compared to an “ultimatum 
hurled with the force and the curtness of a Mussolini from under a flowery girlish 
hat.” Further, while praising her talent as a strong-willed business leader, Howe 
labeled her “Premier Pickford” and insisted on the comparison with the Italian 
politician despite obvious physical differences: “She hasn’t as big a jaw as Benito, 
but it’s just as firm and determined.”65
Howe viewed a comparison between a Hollywood star and an iconic authori-
tarian figure as perfectly legitimate because of his competence “as a critic of screen 
personalities.”66 Unsurprisingly, he used this very self-description to justify his 
prediction about the front-runner of the 1924 U.S. presidential elections. He may 
have been facetious and self-deprecating when he observed, “As a critic of high 
integrity, who heralded the discovery of Valentino[, .  .  . ] I realize what I say is 
figure 18. Herb Roth’s illustration for Herbert Howe’s “What Europe Thinks of American Stars,” 
Photoplay, February 1923, 97.
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going to carry considerable weight at the presidential election.” But his ironic judg-
ment calls about the effectiveness of media and political communication relied 
on readers’ immediate understanding of their equivalence. “As everyone knows,” 
he remarked, “the chief duty of our executive today is to film and radio well. 
Mr. Coolidge does not.”67 A successful model instead was the Duce, whose role 
as himself in the newly released Hollywood production The Eternal City (1924) 
provided an enviable alternative.
This month I give three vivas for George Fitzmaurice, who made “The Eternal City” 
with Barbara La Marr and Benito Mussolini. With Babbie and Benito in the cast the 
picture certainly should not be lacking in action.68
When in 1923 Howe moved on to work as publicity agent for Ramon Novarro, his 
name remained associated with those of Valentino and Mussolini, both through 
reports commenting on his activities and through his own writing. Fan magazines 
knew quite well of Howe’s “masquerading” as Valentino. Reporting on Howe’s 
presence as Novarro’s lover and publicity agent on the Tunisian set of Rex Ingram’s 
The Arabian, Photoplay sarcastically hinted at the extent to which the writer-pro-
moter had been involved in manufacturing Valentino’s public image. An imagi-
nary cable inquiry from the “Lost and Found Department” had located “Mr. Howe 
in Tunis operating under the name of Rudolph Valentino. He had opened a cor-
respondence school of sheiking and was coining money.”69 Howe never denied his 
demiurgic contribution. Instead he took pride in his prescience as a talent scout 
and agent. In early 1925, in one of his regular Photoplay columns, he sought to 
single out those stars who had shown the “sterner” requirements of stardom over 
the years.70 Howe recognized that the early craze about Valentino, in particular, had 
to abate eventually, but because of his talent and ambition, he would reemerge a 
better star. After fighting a “Napoleonic battle” against the studios, he was destined 
to find a “more stable popularity [.  .  .] as a creator of pictures, thus evading the 
fate that lurked like a serpent amid the roses on the path of sex attraction.”71 It was 
the same combination of personal charisma and show business acumen that had 
made Howe a vocal admirer of Mussolini. His appreciation only increased after an 
alleged personal meeting with the Duce in Rome, where Howe had gone to visit 
Novarro on the set of Ben Hur. Following the meeting, Howe described Mussolini 
as his “favorite star in the current world movie,” governing over “the most 
courteous, ingratiating and genuinely democratic of peoples.”72
In mid-1925 Howe continued identifying himself with both Valentino and 
Mussolini. In a tongue-in-cheek article that he prefaced and possibly also wrote 
about the lives of Photoplay’s staff writers, including James R. Quirk, Adela 
Rogers St. Johns, and himself, he claimed that his real name was “Romeo Galahad 
Mussolini Leadpipe Howe, Duc de Jambon et des Oeufs” and “in private life” he 
was “Natacha Rambova’s husband.”73 As these facetious sketches reveal, Howe was 
identifying himself with the publicity strategies that had enabled Valentino and 
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Mussolini to become extraordinary stars. In the case of Valentino, Howe’s identi-
fication was confessional and self-congratulatory. In the case of the Duce, it was a 
form of distant admiration for the efficiency of the Fascist public relations machine. 
Howe’s decision to place a politician and a film star side by side attests to his under-
standing of moviegoing as a form of democratic voting, and thus of star appeal 
(or film fandom, as we might say today) as a form of plebiscitary consensus (figure 19).74
When the close relationship between Howe and Valentino came to an end, 
other figures came to legitimate Valentino’s public rapport with the press—and 
ultimately with the studios. In the 1922–1924 period, two figures in particular had 
an impact on his career: writer and publicity expert Elinor Glyn, very publicly 
albeit quite briefly, and Natacha Rambova, Valentino’s second wife. In both cases, 
Valentino’s image on and off screen underwent changes that were not, commer-
cially speaking, fruitful. The ensuing crisis, however, sheds light on the resilience 
of popular appreciation, and over time even nostalgia, for the daring, unapolo-
getic sheik as attempts to tame that original publicity imprint ran into problems.
THE TAMING OF THE SHEIK
The Four Horsemen and The Sheik represented twin peaks in Valentino’s popularity 
because of the films’ narratives, which informed the actor’s characterizations and 
figure 19. Box office as ballot box. Herbert Howe, “Here Are the Real Box Office Stars,” 
Photoplay, June 1926, 29.
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their postrelease publicity. The two productions showcased the same dramaturgic 
trajectory: Julio and Ahmed initially exhibit a raw, primitive, and even dangerous 
erotic passion before metamorphosing into heroically caring lovers. At the conclu-
sion of the two films, Valentino’s characters are either dead or physically wounded, 
but their personal destinies signal the triumph of romance. Yet, the Divo’s press 
promotion (and self-promotion) mainly insisted on his forceful erotic prowess. 
Rather than touching equally on the two poles of erotic charge and tenderness, 
and specifically as a fictional conversion from one to the other, the initial publicity 
insisted on the dominance of the first, aggressive trait, which imprinted his key 
mainstream appeal. Still some corrections were needed.
Many in the industry, in fact, felt that the promotion of Valentino’s decadent 
and unremorseful erotic desire had to be balanced by traits and habits that 
American male spectators could recognize as familiar: professional ambition and 
physical fitness. That women adored him was as obvious as the fact that men had 
suspicions about his exotic and threatening foreignness. Men could be brought 
on board if only they could recognize something conventional in him. That’s 
why Valentino himself, through ghostwritten interviews and direct appeals, took 
part in a novel publicity discourse that stressed both his suitability for romantic 
involvement and a distinct, but relatable masculinity. At the same time, the more 
balanced combination of European and American personal traits had to emerge 
as a direct, unmediated expression and not as the result of calculated publicity 
pitches and adjustments. The risk was that his sheik characterizations could appear 
passé, performative, and inauthentic, and, as such, subject to sarcastic critique and 
lampooning.
Enter fifty-year-old Elinor Glyn, a consummate expert in selling the glamour 
and sexual daring of Continental artistry. Her appeal, as her employer Jesse Lasky 
admitted, derived from her keen understanding of publicity.75 Glyn already had 
used editorials, lectures, advice manuals, and even novels to position herself as a 
champion of female sensual appeal and a shrewd promoter of exotic encounters, 
primitive desires, and personal fulfillment. Lasky’s decision to invite Glyn to 
Hollywood to script the next Valentino vehicle, Beyond the Rocks (May 1922), from 
her own 1906 novel speaks to his desire to exploit the Orientalist glamour that had 
in both Glyn and the Italian actor two widely recognized testimonials. Beyond 
the eccentric taste that led her to redecorate her hotel room like a “Persian tent,”76 
Glyn had creative and efficient ideas about how to promote herself, her films, and 
cosmopolitan romance in general.
Today Glyn is mostly linked to a famous publicity stunt, the identification of the 
erotically charged “It” girl that informed the 1927 film of that title starring Clara 
Bow. Before that episode, however, Glyn had articulated her own “philosophy of 
love” centered on women’s physical and emotional satisfaction. “Glyn’s touch” 
was virtually antithetical to the ways the It phenomenon linked economic and 
sexual freedom with consumer culture. Fond of sensationalism more than cultural 
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daring, Glyn endorsed women’s physical and imaginary gratification through 
“role plays of dominance and submission” and not through “the cheapening of 
sexual relations under commodity capitalism.”77 She claimed that American men 
“could simply not make love” since they treated their leading ladies like “aunts or 
sisters.”78 Generally advocating “eugenic progress through racial hybridity,” Glyn 
was known for her statements that Latin men’s glamorous and Continental model 
respected, nurtured, and sparked women’s different desires more effectively than 
their Anglo-Saxon rivals did. At the same time, this apparent openness to racial 
diversity was always conjugated with social elitism and persistent promotion of 
herself as a master of posh erotic ceremonies. Ultimately, Glyn’s infatuation with 
men of exotic and aristocratic extraction well suited Valentino’s public image, 
including his consistent distance from fellow Italian Americans.
On the surface, Lasky’s casting of Valentino in Glyn’s Beyond the Rocks appeared 
most promising. And so did the actor’s pairing with Gloria Swanson, who had 
become a star in her own right as a pioneer of new forms of relationships in the 
so-called marriage and divorce pictures directed by Cecil B. DeMille between 
1919 and 1921. Her lavish personal life and erotically alluring roles could appear 
cosmopolitan rather than damningly decadent and sinful. Together, Valentino and 
Swanson could normalize new gender and sexual norms through a strategy of 
consumer capitalism centered on glamour that made them international fashion 
trendsetters. As Hilary Hallett rightly points out, “As promise of fulfillment, 
glamour naturalized, for certain subjects, their sensuality not as a perversion, but 
a natural, and positive, expression.”79 In theory, Valentino and Swanson’s transna-
tional glitz added a cosmopolitan cachet to their stardom that deprovincialized 
both American film culture and its aura in international film markets.
The promotional work showcases the collaboration between Glyn and Valentino 
as media synergy—from page to screen and back to page. In 1922, Glyn’s novel 
Beyond the Rocks: A Love Story appeared “with illustrations from the Paramount 
photo-play.” One of its pages featured a photograph of Glyn and Valentino, pre-
sumably taken on the film’s set (figure 20). Two months prior to the film’s release, 
Glyn allegedly ghostwrote Valentino’s first extensive contribution to Photoplay. 
Published in March 1922, it squarely addressed the issue of male leadership in 
romantic affairs. Entitled “Woman and Love,” the article was meant to draw atten-
tion to Valentino’s style of romance and show that it was fully compatible with that 
of Swanson ahead of the release of their (and Glyn’s) film.80 It was not a reprise 
of the swaggering leadership that Howe had written into Valentino’s pronounce-
ments. It was much closer to the narrative trajectory of his earlier successful films, 
which had portrayed him as an earnest romantic lover, but that contrasted with 
those films’ publicity, which instead had celebrated him as a daring, primitive 
seducer. In the article, Valentino spoke about passionate romance and openly 
abhorred the use of sheer physical force. In place of what he termed “the caveman 
method,” he endorsed the more effective “mental caveman” strategy, which would 
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still produce the kind of highly physical romance that he described as “caveman 
love.” “By cleverness, by diplomacy, by superior mental force, by skill,” he con-
tended, “that is the way to win a woman.”81 For the Valentino that Glyn scripted, 
effective romantic leadership had to be combined with “tenderness,” which the 
actor described as “absolutely the strongest, most lasting, most trustworthy emo-
tion that a woman can arouse in a man.”82 The two heart-shaped images—one 
from The Sheik (1921), the other from Beyond the Rocks (May 1922)—introducing 
“Woman and Love” exemplify this double strategy, which is summarized in their 
caption (figure 21). This approach advocated none of the indomitable erotic gov-
ernance that Howe had woven into Valentino’s earlier statements. Unsurprisingly, 
the public response to the film did not meet expectations.
The move away from Howe’s autocratic characterization of Valentino to Glyn’s 
softer version continued in Blood and Sand, which brought the Divo and June 
Mathis together again. Released in September 1922, the film was based on Ibáñez’s 
best-selling novel and featured Valentino’s old daring and primitive characteriza-
tion for only a few scenes. In its place was a different character, one who is utterly 
at the mercy of a Spanish vamp, played by Nita Naldi, even though the promo-
tional illustrations stressed the Divo’s power of romantic subjugation.83 Paramount 
figure 20. Valentino and Elinor Glyn as 
collaborators. Elinor Glyn, Beyond the Rocks: 
A Love Story (New York: Macaulay, 1922), 3.
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believed that the film was “destined to eclipse the sensational success” of The Sheik 
because of the volume of its prerelease engagements in New York, Los Angeles, and 
Chicago.84 Directed by the Lasky-appointed Fred Niblo, Blood and Sand initially 
broke “all records for attendance and receipts at the New York Rivoli during the 
first week of its runs in the metropolis.”85 Some reviewers, aware of Mathis’s role in 
once again adapting an Ibáñez work, saw admirable continuity in Valentino’s acting 
as well. They claimed he had “never shown such facility and variety of expression 
since his work in ‘The Four Horsemen.’ ” Still, they found uniquely praiseworthy 
“the delightful episodes of romance and the fiery scenes of passion, smouldering 
and flaming.”86 Other critics however, found a fatal flaw in Blood and Sand, as they 
had in Beyond the Rocks. These productions continued the restrained characteriza-
tion of much of Four Horsemen but disrupted the continuity with the more origi-
nal and daring sheik character. Commenting on spectators’ reactions to Blood of 
Sand, Variety noted: “It was the struggles of the hero to resist the temptation of the 
siren widow that made them chuckle. The spectacle of the erstwhile sheik holding a 
beautiful woman at arm’s length was too much.” While getting Hull’s name wrong, 
the review had it right when it explained audiences’ disappointment:
Valentino’s performance of Mrs. Hutchinson’s [sic] “Sheik” fixed his status among 
the fans as a super-heated love maker and the sudden switch to a St. Anthony type 
comes as a shock.87
Mathis and Glyn were not the only enablers who sought to distance Valentino from 
earlier publicity strategies. An even more daring taming of the Sheik came from his 
figure 21. Valentino as “caveman” and as tender lover. “Woman and Love,” Photoplay, March 
1922, 41.
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wife, the ambitious Natacha Rambova. As Glyn had done, she too sought to advise 
Valentino on his artistic and professional decisions. Over the years Rambova had 
grown discontented with Valentino’s popular role as the sensual Oriental despot. 
She deemed it a form of surrender to commercial exploitation and contrary to 
the artistic ambitions she projected onto his star persona. She wanted him to be 
her “ultimate work of art”; thinking of herself as the new Sergei Diaghilev, she 
hoped Rudy “would be her Nijinsky.”88 When she became costume designer for the 
mystical drama The Young Rajah (November 1922), which Mathis had written for 
Valentino, Rambova drew on Nijinsky’s choreography for Debussy’s L’Après-midi 
d’une faune. Wearing the costume his wife had designed and posing as a languid 
Hindu prince dressed as a fawn, Valentino was unrecognizable to many. The film’s 
story, together with his costumes and poses, contributed to its abysmal commer-
cial failure. They conveyed a disturbing version of masculinity, ambivalent and 
heterodependent (even on Rambova’s elitist artistic ambitions), that proved too 
much a departure from his daring Sheik heroings.89
The last film Valentino made before the breakup with Famous Players and 
his self-inflicted hiatus presents a narrative trajectory diametrically opposed to 
that of The Sheik. Released as Moran of the Lady Letty (December 1922), the film 
was adapted for the screen by Mathis from Frank Norris’s eponymous novel. 
The story’s starting point is comparable to that of The Sheik: Moran, the tomboy 
female protagonist, is a superb sailor who “has never been in love” and who despises 
men’s penchant to command.90 Her coprotagonist, played by Valentino, is the San 
Francisco socialite Ramon Laredo, who is bored with his life until he gets shang-
haied onto a pirate ship and finally experiences “reality, savage reality.”91 Derided 
and forced to work, he reveals an unexpected strength and dexterity, which gains 
him respect and a leading role on the ship.92 When the crew captures another ship, 
Laredo rescues the only surviving sailor, Moran. Upon learning Moran is a woman, 
the captain wants her for himself. Defending her means that Laredo has to kill, 
but nothing deters him from doing just that because “the blood of the primeval 
tiger man leaped through him.”93 Laredo’s heroism saves Moran and transforms 
both. Before his newfound combination of physical violence and tenderness, an 
awakening Moran acquiesces to love: “You win, mate,” Moran said, “And I love 
you for it.”
Unsurprisingly, critics very much appreciated this combination of eroticism 
and sheer violence. “The handsome Rodolph Valentino showed he could wield 
a wicked fist with as much art as he can make love,” wrote Maude Cheatham of 
Motion Picture Classic.94 But the trajectory of his character was more a conciliation 
of “caveman love and tenderness” (actually, tenderness and caveman love) than 
a daring display of Sheik-like desire. It once again confirmed the importance of 
the Sheik’s first imprint which, like a picture in everybody’s head, could even lend 
itself to lampooning. For instance, a month after the “Woman and Love” article, 
in an April 1922 contribution to Photoplay, writer-cartoonist Richard W. “Dick” 
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Dorgan satirized the Italian actor’s most famous film role. Dorgan described 
Valentino’s gazing at Diana as the “ ‘I gotcha look’ à la Ben Turpin” (anticipating 
by a year Turpin’s own lampooning of the actor’s role in the short The Shriek of 
Araby).95 In what Emily Leider described as Dorgan’s “slang review” of The Sheik, 
in which he never mentions Valentino by name, Dorgan questions the actor’s 
contribution to the construction of his own character. He even “outs” Valentino’s 
close publicity collaboration with Glyn, although Glyn had not exactly endorsed 
the Sheik performative style.96 “He must have been reading Elinor Glyn closely 
or else be stealing Theda Bara’s stuff,” Dorgan wrote before ironically alluding to 
the rigid prescriptions that Wilson had prepared for the Versailles Peace Con-
ference, “ ’cause he had all the fourteen points down great, with a couple of the 
amendments tacked on.”97 Similarly, in 1923 and 1924, populist and politically 
vocal vaudeville star Will Rogers caricatured several stars, including Valentino’s 
stylized and histrionic acting style, first in the two-reel Uncensored Movies and 
later in Big Moments from Little Pictures, both produced by Hal Roach.98
Others took the primary scene of the Sheik-like unrepentant lover seriously, 
often by insisting on a theme that the industry held as essential: a star’s personal, 
direct, and extraordinary appeal to American audiences. A most indicative example 
of these contributions appeared with the title “The Vogue of Valentino” in Motion 
Picture Magazine in February 1923. Months into Valentino’s self-induced exile from 
the screen due to his refusal to abide by Famous Players’ contract, “one of American’s 
most eminent psychologists” sought to explain “the sex psychology underlying the 
tremendous popularity of Rodolph Valentino.”99 The actor successfully inflamed 
“the feminine imagination of an entire country,” the anonymous psychologist 
claimed, because he “epitomizes the lure of romantic passion[, .  .  .] the brigand 
of love.”100 To make sense of his popularity, this expert argued that Valentino was 
“at once graceful and aggressively masculine” and that his expression suggested 
“a suspicion of cruelty” even though “he appears capable of salving whatever cardiac 
wounds he might inflict.”101 The psychologist described the actor’s exotic charm as 
more Latin than Italian, saying he was accustomed to clothing himself “with spec-
tacular elegance,” which did not threaten his masculinity, “for the modern feminine 
sense of beauty contains that heritage from ancient times which delighted in the 
gorgeousness of male attire.” Finally, the unnamed psychologist asked the critical 
question: “What condition of affairs in America has brought about Valentino’s 
present status?” He answered with an indictment echoing Valentino’s 1921 self-pro-
motion and Glyn’s ghostwritten contribution. According to the expert, the Divo’s 
success revealed that “American men are not lovers! [. . .] The American business 
man has little or no imagination for aesthetic activities and sentimental pastimes. 
All his imagination has been focused and expended on commercial enterprise. 
[. . .] The result is, the American woman is starving for romantic love.”102
A year later, Adela Rogers St. Johns adopted the same perspective of a direct rela-
tionship between star and film audiences by seeking to explain both what had made 
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Valentino so attractive and why men despised him. She deemed it “manifestly silly” 
that most women “will deny flatly that they are ever attracted by anything in men 
but grand and noble character.” In reality, she argued, “the first essential element 
of love being flattery, a woman’s vanity is most vitally touched by a man’s desire 
for her.” Valentino is women’s idol, she wrote, because his lure “is wholly, entirely, 
obviously the lure of the flesh.”103 Along with women’s favorable reactions, St. Johns 
also explained that men “resented Rudolph’s popularity [. . .] because they believe 
he appeals to the worst side of women.”104 What St. Johns clearly had in mind was 
Dorgan’s notorious 1922 “A Song of Hate,” in which the famous writer-illustrator 
expressed his distaste for Valentino’s physical appearance, acting style, and success 
and presumed he was speaking on behalf of all American men. Dorgan used such 
explicitly racist tones that one might even assume an ironic hyperbole:
I hate Valentino! All men hate Valentino. I hate his oriental optics; I hate his classic 
nose; I hate his Roman face [. . .] . I hate him because he dances too well; I hate him 
because he’s a slicker; I hate him because he’s the great lover of the screen; I hate him  
because he’s an embezzler of hearts [. . .] . What! Me jealous?—Oh, no—I just Hate Him.105
What Dorgan’s piece, St. Johns’s comments, and the anonymous psychologist’s 
praises all point to is the novelty of Valentino’s dominating style of governance of 
romance that had inaugurated his popularity in late 1921 and had framed women’s 
expectations and men’s frustrations ever since. Yet, given the dominance of female 
spectators among American film audiences, what tamed the Sheik was not the 
displeasure he provoked in male moviegoers, but the abandonment of roles and 
publicity coverage that rested on such “celluloid naughtiness.”106 During the next 
four years, he either chose roles that, like the pre-Sheik Camille, presented him 
more as a romantic follower or victim of a woman’s love, or he just disappeared 
from the screen, as he did throughout 1923 until early 1924 due to his rift with 
Famous Players. During this hiatus, Photoplay even wondered “whether or not 
Rudolph Valentino’s long absence from the screen would affect his drawing power 
on his return.” The answer was often in the negative.107 If coverage of his divorce 
from Famous Players–Lasky did not abate, neither did his screen presence dimin-
ish. But it was now a nostalgic visibility. Film distributors started rereleasing and 
retitling his older films, including The Married Virgin (1918) as Frivolous Wives, 
and gave him new prominence in the credits.
Meanwhile, Valentino and a coterie of promoters launched a series of publicity 
initiatives that were meant to keep his name in the press during his diminished 
screen visibility. The unintended consequence, however, was that they muted the 
excitement of his most daring characterizations. For instance, Valentino contrib-
uted to his own publicity by collaborating with the publisher Bernarr Macfadden 
on several projects aimed at smoothing his rougher edges and Americanizing his 
masculinity.108 In 1922, Macfadden published a two-part autobiography of the ac-
tor, entitled “The Romance of Rudolf Valentino’s Adventurous Life (By Himself),” 
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and in 1923 he increased the Italian actor’s print exposure.109 First came a book of 
poetry, entitled Day Dreams. Next was a series of articles on Valentino’s bodybuild-
ing habits that appeared in Physical Culture and Movie Weekly and were aimed at 
showcasing how fully attuned the actor was to the American male values of sports-
manship and endurance. These were followed by a manual of physical culture, 
How You Can Keep Fit, allegedly authored by Valentino himself. This eighty-
page volume featured dozens of photographs of the bare-chested Hollywood star 
engaged in physical exercises (figure 22).110 In 1925, after he had resumed his acting 
career, Valentino also multiplied his written contributions to Photoplay.
Perhaps the most peculiar initiative was the lucrative, but also unflattering, 
decision to accept the business proposal of an unknown lawyer, George Ullman, 
when Valentino was not receiving a salary from Hollywood and needed money to 
support his lavish lifestyle. Ullman, who would play a key role in the last years of 
Valentino’s life and beyond, devised this publicity stunt for his employer, the beauty 
firm Mineralava.111 The idea was a well-promoted national tour in which Valentino 
and his wife, clad in Argentinian costumes, would repeat the tango routines of the 
Four Horsemen, praise Mineralava beauty products, and judge dancing and beau-
ty contests (figure 23). While a Famous Players’ injunction prevented him from 
appearing on a legitimate stage as an actor, nothing prevented him from dancing 
with his wife in public in other locations. The three-month tour, from mid-March 
to mid-June 1923, touched eighty-eight cities in the United States and Canada. 
Valentino and his wife earned $7,000 a week. The winners of the local beauty contests 
participated in a highly publicized event in New York City, where Valentino was 
crowned the winner of the national competition.112 The final Mineralava perfor-
mances took place just as bookstores began selling Valentino’s volume of poetry.
The tableau of the Divo and his wife inspired affectionate mockery, but it was 
also the subject of serious discussion about the commercial appeal of an actor who 
had followed his wife’s career advice to his ruin.113 When Valentino reappeared on 
screen in Monsieur Beaucaire (August 1924) and then in A Sainted Devil (November 
1924), the reviews anticipated a familiar argument. Monsieur Beaucaire exhibited 
a lavish and artistic quality, but “something has happened to the Valentino of ‘The 
Sheik,’ ” wrote Photoplay editor James R. Quirk. “Rudy,” he explained, “is trying 
to be an actor at the expense of the personality that made him a sensation.” Even 
though he played the part of a French prince, “he doesn’t look a bit dangerous to 
women.” Quirk opined. “The fact of the matter is that they like their Rudy a little 
wicked. He had what is known in pictures as ‘menace’ to a higher degree than 
any actor on the screen.”114 A few pages earlier, the editors made the same point 
with regard to A Sainted Devil. A caption for one of the photographs depicting an 
all-too-romantic love scene referred to the film as “The Taming of the Sheik.”115
Quirk explicitly linked the flops of Valentino’s films to his wife. He blamed her 
for the professional breakup between Valentino and J. D. Williams of Ritz-Carlton 
Pictures apparently over commercial results and future plans. “Mrs. Valentino’s 
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strict management of her husband is not consistent with the career of a screen sheik,” 
Quirk noted, and “the picture of a devil-may-care Latin lover with a wife-manager 
is rather inconsistent.” Referring to whether Valentino had control over his career, 
he concluded: “The illusion must be maintained.”116 The cartoon accompanying 
his article made the same point about Valentino’s ill-advised commercial path. 
The syndicated artist-humorist and cartoonist Reuben Lucius Goldberg, widely 
known as the inventor Rube Goldberg, created the two-page cartoon (figure 24). 
On the left, it features a crowd of thousands of spectators in line to enter a movie 
theater to watch films starring Ramon Novarro and Antonio Moreno, as the two 
posters indicate. On the right, it features Valentino and Rambova on a pedestal 
inscribed with “The Valentinos.” While uttering slogans associated with their 
anti-studio stance, they find themselves without an audience, except for a single 
disheveled spectator, whose cry “Atta boy, Rudy!” captures ironically the actor’s 
disastrous dependency on his wife’s beliefs.
figure 22. Frontispiece in Valentino’s How You 
Can Keep Fit (New York: Macfadden, 1923).
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While Rambova was advising Valentino on his professional choices and 
intervening directly on scripts and art direction, the newly hired George Ullman 
was taking care of the actor’s finances, contractual obligations, and publicity. 
Ultimately Rambova and Ullman came to have very different views about 
Valentino’s post-Mineralava-tour film career. Initially, as Evelyn Zumaya has argued, 
Ullman “crafted his press releases with the intention of transforming the public’s 
perception of Rudy from that of marauding, sex-obsessed Sheik to the courtly 
Monsieur Beaucaire.”117 He successfully negotiated Valentino’s contractual closure 
with Famous Players–Lasky, resulting in Monsieur Beaucaire and A Sainted Devil, 
and began shepherding a collaboration with J. D. Williams. Rambova meanwhile 
began working on the screenplay for a film entitled The Hooded Falcon, adapting 
it from the story of El Cid, but her dismissal of June Mathis, initially co-opted 
for the script, confirmed Hollywood’s perception of her disastrous understanding 
of the film business. When Williams realized that the Valentinos had no sense 
of budgetary limits, he walked back from promises and agreements and made 
Ullman inform them that the project was shelved. Eventually, unbeknownst to 
the Valentinos (but not to Ullman), Williams sold the distribution rights of The 
figure 23. Valentino and Rambova as tango dancers on the Mineralava tour. Rudolph Valentino, 
no. 49, Core Collection Biography Photos, Academy of Motion Pictures Arts and Sciences. By 
permission of AMPAS.
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Hooded Falcon to Paramount, which later also distributed Cobra (Ritz-Carlton; 
November 30, 1925)—a contemporary drama featuring Valentino in the role of 
a rather un-Sheik-like Italian count. When Ullman informed the Valentinos that 
he had started negotiations with United Artists on possible future productions, 
Rambova was quite happy about the prospect until she read the contract. There 
was no executive or creative role for her. The Italian actor signed it anyway on 
March 30, 1925.118
Valentino’s signature on the contract led to an insurmountable rift between 
the pair and eventually led to the end of their relationship. They were divorced 
by mid-January 1926, although news of the split did not leak until much later.119 
United Artists had clear ideas about what to do with Valentino. It was sufficient 
to pay attention to how editorials and letters to the editors, public commentators, 
and private individuals alike had long argued that Valentino’s popularity waned 
the moment he stopped being a ruthless and fascinating leader in love affairs. 
A letter published in Photoplay in June 1926 and written by a lady fan in California 
made the best case. In The Four Horsemen and The Sheik, she wrote, “Rudolph 
showed us the gay, passionate Latin lover—a juggler of women’s hearts. A bit ruth-
less, perhaps, but oh, how fascinating!” Since then, she claimed, nothing had ever 
been the same:
Now, only Rudolph’s perfect manners save him from being completely Americanized. 
[. . .] We do not want to see Rudolph enslaved by Dagmar Gogowsky or even Nita 
Naldi [both had played opposite Valentino in The Sainted Devil]: we want to see  
Nita and Dagmar enslaved by Rudolph.120
figure 24. Rube Goldberg’s cartoons about Valentino. James R. Quirk, “Presto Chango 
Valentino!” Photoplay, May 1925, 36–37.
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By early 1926, fan magazines were covering his “marriage suspension” from 
Rambova, his affairs with Pola Negri and Vilma Banky, and the shooting of The 
Son of the Sheik with Agnes Ayres and Banky. The industry had been welcoming 
Valentino’s return to the fold of expert playmakers with open arms.121 Already in 
late 1925, the New York World had anticipated the shift in an article eloquently 
subtitled “Advisers of the Film Star Would Make Him a Real He-Man,” which 
insisted that “the pastels will go [and] virile oil paintings [would] take their 
place.”122 The exploitation agents knew how to shape his image back to an exciting 
one, on and off screen, and even took advantage of his unexpected hospitalization 




A VALENTINE TO VALENTINO
The promotional work that Howe, Glyn, and Ullman performed for Valentino in 
fan magazines and trade journals expectedly informed how the country’s syndicated 
press covered the actor’s success and tribulations. The least chronicled promotional 
initiatives about Valentino were the publicity stunts, which critically accompanied 
the final months of his short professional life. One of Hollywood’s most inventive 
and best-paid publicity men, Harry Reichenbach, had pulled off an earlier and rath-
er small-scale one, which nonetheless anticipated more significant tricks. In the fall 
of 1924, Reichenbach was working for Famous Players–Lasky, which was about to 
release A Sainted Devil. He asked Valentino to grow a goatee for his forthcoming 
role during the ill-fated European preproduction of The Hooded Falcon. Upon 
returning to the United States in mid-November 1924, Valentino surprised everybody 
by sporting never-before-seen whiskers. Shortly afterward, Reichenbach went to the 
annual convention of the Associated Master Barbers of America in Chicago where 
he found a way to address the convention. Once on stage, he announced in alarm 
that Valentino had returned from Europe with unwelcome new facial hair: if it were 
to become popular in America, it would threaten the members’ livelihood. Reichen-
bach then lobbied for a resolution “that called for nothing less than a boycott on all 
Valentino pictures until Rudy shaved off his beard.”1
In its coverage of Valentino’s sudden change of appearance, Photoplay also pub-
lished a sonnet and a drawing condemning the Divo’s decision and insisting that 
he return to his old image. Its author, Margaret Caroline Wells, first revealed her 
shock before wishing for a complete return to normalcy: “He’d better see a barber 
and be the same old sheik. [. . .] We want our Valentino just as he used to be.”2 The 
accompanying drawing illustrated the whiskers’ unnatural appearance by showing 
how Fairbanks, Chaplin, Keaton, Harold Lloyd, William S. Hart, and an unspecified 
flapper would look with them (figure 25). While news of his beard continued to be 
printed for months in American newspapers, by December 21, 1924, Valentino had 
shaved it off.3 This stunt did not remain a well-kept secret. As a Photoplay profile 
revealed a year later, Reichenbach had persuaded Valentino to grow a beard “to 
cause a bad reaction that was followed by a good one when he ‘agreed’ to shave it.”4
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The most important stunt, however, occurred, during the days preceding the 
premiere of The Son of the Sheik. United Artists chairman Joseph M. Schenck faced 
a marketing challenge. For Valentino to regain his unique popularity, the actor 
had to appear different from other Latin lovers, including Ramon Novarro and 
Antonio Moreno. Schenck viewed the adaptation of Hull’s sequel, The Son of the 
Sheik (1925), as a great opportunity to do just that. In the film, Valentino played 
both father and son, and the cast included Agnes Ayres, who returned in the role 
of Diana, Ahmed’s wife. The figure of the son, described “Young Chief ” and “dis-
playing a firm, obstinate chin and a straight, somewhat cruel mouth,” brought 
back the untamed wildness of the original Sheik.5 Beyond the promotional oppor-
tunities of the narrative, the film had to be sold to distributors who were skeptical 
of the Divo’s enduring commercial appeal.
Before the mid-1920s, Valentino’s sophisticated manners, not to mention his 
history of dependence on strong women, had met with some criticism, even 
indignation, but always with a good dose of irony—as if these reactions were a ruse. 
Miriam Hansen recognized the performative dimension of these denunciations 
figure 25. Illustration inspired by Valentino’s new goatee. Margaret 
Caroline Wells, “What!!! Valentino???,” Photoplay, February 1925, 72.
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of deviance and suggested that they “were part of the ritual,” perhaps “self-ironic,” 
certainly “performing a rhetorical role” in a discourse “presumed to speak for all 
men.”6 At the time, however, there had been serious reactions to printed rumors 
aimed at minimizing the actor’s difference from mainstream American mascu-
linity. “There is nothing repellent, nothing unmasculine about Valentino,” Willis 
Goldbeck of Motion Picture Magazine had written in the spring of 1922, “merely a 
heavy exoticism, compelling, fascinating, perhaps a little disturbing, as might be 
asphalt to the average cobbler.”7 Still, as Mark Lynn Anderson has compellingly 
discussed, “Valentino’s star presentation and his appearance within a mass cultural 
context [. . .] helped establish a queer space for the reception of mass culture.”8 For 
Anderson, it was not just that his diversity encouraged “investigating the relations 
between sexuality and gender,” but also that “stardom provided a rather startling 
number of points of similarity with the visible aspects of contemporary gay male 
culture in America’s largest cities.” 
Anderson is quite right in positing that “the question of Valentino’s queerness 
considered within the context of America mass culture is not [. . .] about his indi-
vidual sexual identity, but about the types of sexualities his stardom made possible, 
gratified, or otherwise indulged.”9 However, his argument that the actor’s queer-
ness (“radically queer star”) was akin to the prebourgeois sexual culture of work-
ing-class New York—especially its immigrant quarters—deserves close scrutiny. 
In his attempt to show how it was possible that Valentino’s indeterminate sexuality 
stood out for “its utter indifference to American middle-class culture,” Anderson 
appears to reify both bourgeois and immigrant working-class cultures and project 
contemporary critical tropes of heteronormative sexuality onto the latter.10 While 
he is careful to point out that he is not idealizing working-class neighborhoods as 
if they were “immune from homophobia,” he relies on George Chauncey’s work 
on middle-class homosexuals’ social and sexual interactions with the less prudish 
immigrants of the Lower East Side to posit that in New York’s ethnic neighbor-
hoods, there was a “relative lack of stigma” for a “ ‘masculine’ man who had sex 
with fairies or accompanied them on dates.”11
This argument should be measured against two counterfacts: first, New York’s 
urban working-class culture in the 1920s was not homogeneous but consisted of 
many immigrant subcultures with different views of sexuality and individual con-
duct. Secondly, Valentino and the promotional discourse about him, particularly 
regarding his alleged nobility and timeless Italianness, had consistently endeav-
ored to distance the actor from Italian immigrants’ largely unappealing bodies and 
culture. Unsurprisingly, his reception in Italian neighborhoods largely depended 
on generational differences. Young men were attracted to him not necessarily 
because their culture gravitated to a “queer space,” but because he presented an 
admirable Italian path to Americanization that radically differed from Enrico 
Caruso’s—who was the idol of the old guard. In his 1924 urban travelogue Around 
the World in New York, Konrad Bercovici noted:
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Since the advent of Valentino all the youth of Little Italy try to look as much as possible  
like the moving-picture hero, and to haunt the moving-picture studios of the city, 
having in their Americanization somewhat abandoned the desire to become grand 
opera singers.12
The older generations, particularly those who controlled the ethnic press, pushed 
back against the untraditional masculinity of the Italian star. Only after his death 
did they express pride in his Horatio Alger trajectory—a narrative that was barely 
mentioned by that press during his lifetime.13
It is in a framework nonetheless imbued with often-veiled references to 
queerness that historians have largely read the famous Chicago Tribune editorial 
published on July 18, 1926, as an index of both the actor’s sexually ambivalent 
image and the anxieties he produced in 1920s America.14 One of the most-repeated 
passages blamed Valentino for the installation of a face-powder dispenser in one 
of the city’s new public men’s room:
A powder vending machine! In a men’s washroom! Homo Americanus! Why didn’t 
someone quietly drown Rudolph Guglielmo [sic], alias Valentino, years ago? [.  .  .] 
Do women like the type of “man” who pats pink powder on his face in a public 
washroom and arranges his coiffure in a public elevator? .  .  . Hollywood is the  
national school of masculinity. Rudy, the beautiful gardener’s boy, is the prototype of 
the American male. Hell’s bells. Oh, sugar.
Valentino responded twice to the editorial, both times from the pages of the 
Tribune’s rival, The Chicago Herald-Examiner. The day after the “Pink Powder 
Puffs” editorial came out, he called the anonymous author “a contemptible coward” 
and challenged him to a boxing match:
You slur my Italian ancestry; you cast ridicule upon my Italian name; you cast doubt 
upon my masculinity. I call you, in return, a contemptible coward and to prove which 
of us is a better man, I challenge you [. . .] to meet me in the boxing or wrestling arena 
to prove, in typically American fashion (for I am an American citizen), which of us is 
more a man. [. . .] I do not know who you are or how big you are, but this challenge 
stands if you are as big as Jack Dempsey.15
In his second response, after his return to the Windy City from New York, he 
shamed the anonymous editorialist again and declared victory because the slan-
derer dared not reveal his or her identity. The fact that Valentino immediately 
issued “a public challenge to the cowardly writer to reveal himself,” as Anderson 
acutely points out, has prompted “the public to understand the nature of the edi-
torial in precisely this manner”—as a personal assault on the actor’s virility and 
national origin.16 
The identity of the editorial’s writer has never been determined with any mea-
sure of certainty, and this authorial mystery has seemingly encouraged the same, 
recurring kind of culturalist interpretation, either as a display of homophobic hate 
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or, in Anderson’s analysis, as an index of an emerging queer space in American 
culture.17 Anderson in fact has perceptively rejected a reading of the editorial as 
a straightforward homophobic and racist attack and has instead identified in it 
a “playful sarcasm” and a certain “self-consciousness about its own overstate-
ments.” Namely, in a climate that was already pervaded by rhetorics of public 
scandal, Anderson has questioned whether the piece, despite its pretense of aver-
sion, was actually scorning “those who were threatened by the actor’s deviant 
masculinity.” Or whether it was “a public ‘outing’ of Valentino by and for those 
who identified themselves as queers, or by and for those who participated in 
and were supportive of gay culture generally.”18 While the editorial’s tone cer-
tainly exudes a feigned sense of scandal and not clear-cut hatred, the contempo-
rary critical principle that reads “gossip [as] often an act of resistance” does not 
completely explain its raison d’être.19 The archival record, in fact, tells a different 
story—the story of a successful stunt that exploited the scandalous queerness of 
Valentino’s popular image to pretend to scandalize Valentino himself, his fans, 
and, most importantly, those who found him effeminate and indecent.
At the story’s center is one of the industry’s most talented publicity men, Victor 
Mansfield Shapiro, who, in 1916, had founded the Associated Motion Picture 
Advertisers (also known as the Association of Motion Picture Advertisers).20 
Shapiro’s papers, held in the UCLA Library’s Special Collections, consist of public 
relations and promotional materials relating to the motion picture industry and 
include questionnaires, his own biography, scrapbooks, photographs, and tapes 
and transcripts of interviews. Shapiro had a major career as an independent pub-
licity man for the Hollywood film industry and even met Valentino on the set 
of The Eagle (1925). In May 1926, he was hired by United Artists (UA) managing 
director Hiram Abrams to work on publicity for The Son of the Sheik.21 As UA’s 
publicity man for Valentino, he seemingly ghostwrote many of the actor’s articles 
published during his final months.
In his transcribed recollections, Shapiro at first expressed the sort of conven-
tional thinking that emerged out of brainstorming sessions in UA’s Publicity and 
Still Photography Departments. The sessions centered on “how to make Rudolph 
Valentino more acceptable to the men customers.” Predictable tactics included the 
use of photographs of Valentino “sparring with Jack Dempsey,” “horseback riding,” 
and “playing polo with Doug Fairbanks.” A more daring publicity idea was to 
“photograph him nude from the waist up” and then “invite lady reporters to 
interview him thusly during his athletic diversions.”22 The punch line of these play-
the-Sheik-card strategies was quite straightforward: “Use the catch line ‘Men, why 
be jealous of Rudy Valentino?’ You too can make love like he does. See ‘Son of 
the Sheik.’ ” The obvious question, however, was whether these ideas would have 
garnered the “front page splash” that was needed to revive Valentino’s career.23
As expected of a loyal Hollywood professional, Shapiro underplays the role 
of publicity. In several instances, he claims that publicity could not manufacture 
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a star out of nothing. “The dramatic impact Rudolph Valentino had on woman-
hood was not created by a press agent. [. . .] Press agentry did not manufacture 
Valentino’s extraordinary attributes. Publicity merely called attention to them.”24 
Notwithstanding these disclaimers, Valentino offered inventive publicity poten-
tial. Still, Shapiro recalls that at first he followed conventional methods. From 
his New York base, he began collecting biographic profiles, which insisted on 
Valentino as “sensual with animal grace,” requested photographic poses, and 
planned “also to make a film trailer of these activities with the title, quote, ‘The 
Physique of the Sheik.’ ”25 He sent all this material to the press, first-run theaters, 
and pictorial outlets. “They only caused a ripple with the males.”26 Then he 
recounted the episode of the “Pink Powder Puffs” article, which fell outside the 
scope of conventional thinking and achieved the ultimate goal of any publicity 
campaign: “get the opening.”27 He called it “a Valentine to Valentino.”28
The impetus came from his boss, Abrams, who had started negotiating the dis-
tribution of The Son of the Sheik with Balaban and Katz, the largest theater chain 
in Chicago. It had rebuffed his offer of exhibiting rights, bargaining down the 
price since, it claimed, “Valentino didn’t mean a thing in Chicago.” This response 
prompted Abrams to ask Shapiro to devise a “publicity campaign unmatched in 
[Valentino’s] career.”29 “On July 10th, 1926,” Shapiro recounted, “Abrams suggest-
ed I send him the livest wire on my staff to do something about Valentino when 
he stopped over between trains in Chicago.” Shapiro chose Jimmy Ashcroft, 
“a veteran skilled in necromancy of press relations and exhibitor convolutions,” 
who was charged to leave New York for Chicago within two days and secure 
“something on the front page, something—anything, provocative and entertain-
ing.” On July 12, at Grand Central Station, Shapiro met Ashcroft for last-minute 
instructions. The two veteran publicists, Shapiro later noted, thought alike.
On July 19, when Valentino arrived in Chicago from Los Angeles, the Chicago 
Tribune had just published the infamous “Pink Powder Puffs” piece—which in 
Shapiro’s papers is identified as “A,” as in Exhibit A.30 Ashcroft showed it to the 
actor and began “stoking up [his] indignation.” Then he handed Valentino’s pre-
written reply, (or “B,” as in Exhibit B) to Hearst’s Herald Examiner, the Tribune’s 
archrival.31 Anderson has noted that the quickness of the response helped others 
take the editorial seriously and thus effaced its ironic tone. Within a few hours, 
Hearst was putting Valentino’s prepared response “over the wires, the wire service, 
to all twenty-six [of his] papers and his other outlets.”32 Shapiro recounts that Ash-
croft then wired him copies of both the editorial and Valentino’s response. Shapiro 
responded by asking Ashcroft to “keep [Valentino] fired up” on the way to New 
York since Shapiro’s assistant, Warren Knowland, was about to hop on the train in 
Harlem and brief him on what to do next before arriving at Grand Central Station.
Give him some printable catch lines, have him carry a copy of the novel Cellini, his 
next picture. We’ll have, we’ll have photos at the station, press conference at the hotel, 
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with Prohibition’s best handing out copies of, of Chicago editorial and Rudy’s answer. 
Then it’s up to ye gods, and ye gods it was [laughter].33
Part of Shapiro’s choreography was a dramatic police escort for Valentino from 
Grand Central to the Ambassador Hotel on Park Avenue and 51st Street, inevitably 
followed by dozens of journalists. On the morning of July 20, Shapiro updated his 
friend Lloyd “Red” Stratton of the Associated Press on the latest news and told him 
where Valentino was staying—a veiled promise of first, if not exclusive, access. At 
the station “the crowd surged but the station guards managed to wedge Rudy to his 
auto without having his clothes ripped off.” Everything was prepared in advance. 
The police motorcycle escort “was arranged through Frank Sennett,” a college pal. 
In the car, Shapiro finally met Ullman, and while they seemed to agree as to who 
was handling what (Shapiro, the “picture end of the publicity”; Ullman, “the per-
sonal matters”), in reality Shapiro was handling it all. At least that’s how he tells it. 
It was his idea that “Rudy was to receive the press in his blue and green silk robe 
and purple pajama, for the benefit of the lady reporters [laughter].”34 By early 
afternoon the Associated Press and the Hearst syndicated newspapers were carrying 
the story. “From that moment the telephone rang incessantly. Every news outlet 
in town, fan and general magazines, foreign press, film critics, males and females, 
sport writers, called for and received personal interviews. More than a hundred 
correspondents by actual count paraded in and out of Rudy’s hotel suite.”35
Shapiro has recounted the circumstances of Valentino fighting the sportswriter 
and boxing expert Franck “Buck” O’Neal on the hotel’s terrace in front of a Pathé 
News cameraman. It was the promotional equivalent, as staged event, of Valentino’s 
prepared response to the press. The 167-pound Rudy fought the 200-pound, six-
foot-one former fullback O’Neal and won. But if that was not enough, the news 
was what O’Neal repeated to the press: “Make no mistake. That guy throws a punch 
like a mule’s back.” “Why not print that,” said Shapiro to his 1966 interviewer. That 
very line was included in an article, “Powder Puff? Wham!,” that recounted the 
match.36 The news that Valentino wanted to challenge the anonymous editorial 
writer in staged fights that were nothing other than public relations stunts was the 
subject of satirical cartoons (figure 26). To close the circle, when Shapiro’s man in 
Chicago, John Ashcroft, called him again, he reported that “stories were breaking 
front page there, that the Balaban and Katz crowd never, never again would say 
Valentino doesn’t mean a thing there.”37 Ashcroft also told Shapiro that Valentino, 
upon his imminent return to Chicago, would issue another statement to the anon-
ymous “editor” of the Chicago Tribune.
In his reminiscences, Shapiro notes that eventually Ashcroft told him that 
“the writer who penned the Pink Powderpuff [sic] editorial was named John 
Glasscock”—a name that may well have been fictitious.38 What is certain is that 
the whole initiative amounted, in Shapiro’s words, to “the most extensive and 
intensive publicity break in Rudy’s short life.”39 Shapiro’s description of himself and 
figure 26. Cartoon depicting the prospect of a boxing match featuring Valentino as a major 
public relations event. Harry Haenigsen, “Isn’t Life Complicated,” Evening World, July 21, 1926, 16.
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Valentino as “more than passable actors” and his admission that Rudy indeed had 
a sense of humor and “was acting his resentment” appear to support the notion 
that the actor was a willing participant in the scheme.40
The result was an artful scandal. Mobs of spectators filled the Strand on Broad-
way for the film’s opening. A few days later the same occurred in Chicago, where 
Valentino had returned as promised after presiding at the New York premiere. 
In front of a “cheering crowd swirling around the station,” the actor, who was 
clearly on board with the stunt, exclaimed what Shapiro defined as his “Lafayette, 
I am here” statement. Before the crowd, he addressed the author of the offensive 
editorial, shouting: “Mr. Editor, I am here. I am ready. Where are you?” Thanks 
to the wires, his challenge went national in a few hours.41 At this point, Shapiro 
refers to “C” (as in Exhibit C), which was Valentino’s second prepared statement 
to the press.
The heroic silence of the writer who chose to attack me without any provocation in 
the Chicago Tribune leaves no doubt as to the total absence of manliness in his whole 
makeup. I feel that I have been vindicated.42
In Chicago, Valentino also posed with several boxers while renewing his challenge, 
surrounded by a new kind of fan. The “continuous pink Powderpuff imbroglio,” as 
Shapiro described it, “brought out what one writer said was ‘a sporting audience 
known for its literary, dramatic, social and artistic distinction, a cross-section of 
Chicago’s most cosmopolitan.’ ”43 After recounting similar triumphant processions 
occurring in Atlantic City, Shapiro mentioned that “leading trade papers pub-
lishers” Martin Quigley of Exhibitors Herald and Sam (a transcription error for 
“Sime,” short for Simon) Silverman of Variety calculated the financial impact of 
this scheme. They allegedly told Shapiro that the Valentino campaign “must have 
garnered millions of lines of free space all over the world, which if purchased at 
regular advertising rates would exceed millions of dollars,” not to mention adding 
a million dollars “to the box office gross on The Son of the Sheik.”44
After almost two weeks of front-page coverage, the “sensational Pink Powder-
puff hullabaloo” had gained a strength of its own that even affected its architects. 
When on August 16 Shapiro, out of town, read in the papers of the actor’s sudden 
hospitalization in New York, he thought it another ploy. “As a press agent some-
what immune to shock,” he recalled, “I didn’t believe it. Nonsense!” So he called his 
assistant, Knowland, fearing that he had been “pulling a stunt without [his] know-
ledge.”45 Valentino’s sickness, however, was no stunt. Although Shapiro, Ullman, 
and UA hoped it would quickly pass, in the meantime they saw it as another 
publicity opportunity. Shapiro and Knowland went to the “press room at the hos-
pital” and, even though Ullman was in charge of “personal publicity,” the crisis 
called once again for a breach of contractual protocol: “Biographies and pictures 
of Valentino were passed out by Knowland.” United Artists sought to install a 
press room in the hospital.46 Instead of recuperating, Valentino’s condition only 
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worsened after developing peritonitis and septic endocarditis following an opera-
tion for perforated ulcers. He died on August 23, 1926, to the apparent surprise of 
everyone—his fans, the studio, and his publicists. The latter group was the quickest 
to react to it in ways that would frame both his passing and afterlife.
DEATH AND BALLYHO O
Ullman and Shapiro and his men were not the only publicity people who followed 
Valentino’s deteriorating health and sought to construct posthumous narratives 
that would exploit his story. Their efforts challenge the conventional opening of 
countless volumes and articles about Valentino, which regularly insist on fans’ 
spontaneous and authentic display of mass grief, visible in some newsreel foot-
age, following the actor’s unexpected death.47 To contemporary Italian papers such 
popular displays amounted to a plebiscito di dolore (plebiscite of pain). In truth, 
the coverage of the actor’s hospitalization, infirmity, and death was infused with 
publicity ploys aimed to spur fans to emotional displays, apparently out of control 
yet well choreographed, and present their affection for the Divo as unprompted.
Valentino’s hospitalization, death, and New York funeral were a bonanza for all 
the city’s papers from the Journal to the Evening World and The Telegram. During 
this time, the publicity stunts became also photographic. At the center of these 
efforts was the New York Evening Graphic, commonly known as the Graphic, a 
tabloid newspaper published from 1924 to 1932 by Bernarr Macfadden, which spe-
cialized in scandals and made-up news about celebrities. Beyond its mendacious 
stories, the Graphic managed to outsell competitors through a “brazen staging and 
manipulation of photographs” known as a “composograph.”48 In late August, the 
Graphic published a composograph, made from twelve photographs, of Valentino 
being lovingly assisted by nurses while in the operating room that caused the 
Graphic’s circulation to soar. It was just the beginning.
The Graphic’s picture editor Frank Mallen recounts in his celebratory and often 
imaginative memoir, Sauce for the Gander, that when Wallace Reid and Olive 
Thomas died, “their pictures died with them” as “there was strong public senti-
ment and general disapproval of the exhibition of pictures after death.”49 Not so for 
Valentino. “[Frank E.] Campbell had made a deal with officials of United Artists,” 
Mallen reports, referring to the prominent New York funeral director. “He told 
them that if they would let him handle the funeral, in the event of death, he would 
make Valentino’s pictures more popular and profitable than ever.” After United 
Artists accepted, Campbell solicited the Graphic’s help. While Valentino’s body 
was still at the Polyclinic Hospital, a composograph was being made of it as if it 
had already arrived at Campbell’s funeral home.50 To the surprise of its editors, the 
Graphic was breaking records. 
According to Mallen, the tabloid had negotiated a special relationship with 
Campbell’s publicity aide, former reporter Harry C. Klemfuss. A “pioneer in the 
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field of public relations and a master of the publicity stunt,” Klemfuss assisted the 
press “by advance distribution of photographs and material regarding the chamber 
where the screen star’s body would lie.”51 The role of this New York publicity man 
is confirmed by Silas Bent in a chapter on free publicity in his 1927 book Ballyhoo. 
Bent notes that “around the undertaker’s place of business were rioting mobs” 
and “the crowd stretched through eleven blocks of streets.”52 Mallen recounts that 
Campbell and Klemfuss, “old hands at handling crowds,” had a system in place 
to make sure that the crowds were kept at mob size and agitated: “The funeral 
church doors would be locked for twenty minutes out of the hour. This gave time 
for replacements to arrive at the rate of twelve for each one permitted to view the 
remains.”53 Although a plate-glass window was smashed and several were injured, 
generally speaking the “mobs were photogenic and obliging, whether in formation 
or as individuals” (figure 27). They gladly became part of the show and “would 
turn in any direction and strike any pose as long as a camera lens was in front of 
them.”54 As Bent saw it, Klemfuss viewed the result as “a minor triumph. The name 
of his client appeared four days successively on the first page of one newspaper, in 
addition to many tabloids, in ‘fourteen-point type,’ and when he had noted a mil-
lion lines of free publicity he quit counting.”55 Both Bent and Mallen reported that, 
during the procession of Valentino from the funeral home to St. Malachy’s Church 
on 49th Street, the Graphic managed to sell thousands of copies of a special edition 
featuring a front-page photograph of the very same procession! Mallen quoted 
Paul Gallico, from True magazine, describing the photograph as “the journalistic 
miracle of the ages.” It was instead a composite photograph prepared a day ahead 
with mock pallbearers, a rose-bedecked coffin, and hired mobs.56
In the months following the funeral, the Graphic wanted to match its out-
standing August 1926 circulation. When its editors heard of spiritual mediums 
contacting Valentino, who told them that he was “happy ‘up there with the angels,’ ” 
the periodical resumed the Valentino composographs. Two, in particular, are 
worth mentioning. One shows Valentino upon his arrival in heaven; the other in 
the company of Enrico Caruso, who had passed away in 1921 (figure 28). They were 
constructed from, respectively, five and eight photographs.57 The latter scene had 
allegedly been described by a psychic, and the resultant Graphic story was sold for 
serial publication in early 1927 to the Doubleday Page Syndicate. It appeared on 
the frontispiece of Silas Bent’s Ballyhoo. These two images solidified the perception 
of a close association between Valentino and the spiritualist tradition of séances 
that the actor frequently engaged in with his second wife.58 More significantly, the 
miraculous new images prolonged his exploitation posthumously.59
Shapiro does not mention these publicity feats. Instead, to safeguard the star’s 
direct appeal, he contended that Valentino’s popularity needed “little propulsion or 
fanfare.” After all, the actor’s “screen portrayals, so real to so many, were his most 
potent press agent” and, Shapiro argued, “no press agent, no front-page publicity 
gave Valentino this indefinable something. He had what no other screen star ever 
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had.”60 One could argue that in light of the aforementioned queer overtones in the 
actor’s public image, which the powder puff stunt had so effectively exploited, 
Shapiro’s rhetoric conveniently divested studios and publicity agents from any 
moral responsibility over Valentino’s reception. Following the many damaging 
scandals that characterized 1920s Hollywood, the studios had every interest in 
insisting that their stars’ private lives constituted a domain over which they had no 
control. That way they could allege that Valentino’s public image simply mirrored 
the alchemy of who he was and what his fans expected and desired.
Still, the “indefinable something” was more than just fame; it was also a form of 
authority over the masses, which in Shapiro’s recounting justified the use of politi-
cal attributes: “the newspapers covered the proceedings,” he noted, “as they would 
in obsequies of president, prime minister or potentate.” “No king in any realm was 
more revered or honored,” Shapiro concluded rather bombastically.61 In doing so, 
he placed Valentino’s widely publicized wake and memorial in relationship with 
another celebrated Italian figure in America, Benito Mussolini. Specifically, he 
referred to the clash outside Campbell’s between New York–based Italian Black-
shirts and Valentino’s friends, who knew of his anti-Mussolini stance. The former 
claimed that they were paying homage to the actor by standing guard around his 
bier, allegedly on the Duce’s orders. This incident requires a brief explanation.
figure 27. Crowd gathered outside the Frank E. Campbell Funeral Chapel, August 1926. 
Photograph by International News Photos, a division of W. R. Hearst’s International News Service.
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After becoming a star, Valentino attracted little interest on the part of Fascist 
and anti-Fascist groups in both the United States and in Italy. In America, he had 
little contact with Italian American groups even after Mussolini’s March on Rome 
in October 1922, about eighteen months after his breakout film, The Four Horse-
men. In the old country, his films were for years invisible except in major cities. 
For a while, the Divo and the Duce coexisted peacefully in mutual indifference. 
In 1923, during Valentino’s first trip back home, he stopped in Rome but he and 
Mussolini failed to meet. Mario Quargnolo has suggested that Valentino was close 
to collaborating with producer Arturo Ambrosio in 1924 on the film adaptation of 
Mussolini’s 1909 novel L’amante del cardinale (The Cardinal’s Lover). It would have 
been a publicity dream to sell a film written by the Duce and starring the Divo.62
But in late 1925, a public rift occurred. On November 10, while in New York for 
the opening of The Eagle, Valentino applied for U.S. citizenship, which the New York 
figure 28. Valentino and Caruso in heaven. New York Evening Graphic, 
March 17, 1927, composograph.
158    The Governance of Romance
Times reported.63 At the time double citizenship was not an option: acquiring 
U.S. citizenship meant the relinquishing of Italian citizenship. The response of the 
Fascist regime was quick and negative. Castigated as a traitor, Valentino saw his 
films first boycotted and then banned in Italy between late November and early 
December 1925.64 Pressured by Paramount and United Artists, he wrote (or sim-
ply signed) a letter directed to his Italian critics, and thus Mussolini, in which he 
sought to explain his reasons. Entitled “Una lettera di Rodolfo Valentino, attore 
italianissimo,” the letter was published on February 15, 1926, in the pro-Fascist Italian 
American newspaper Il Corriere d’America. A month later it also appeared in Italy 
in the Fascist newspaper L’Impero (March 12, 1926). His letter conveyed his gratitude 
to the United States for the outstanding personal and professional opportunities 
that he enjoyed but also vehemently maintained that “no one has felt and continues 
to feel more than I do the sacrosanct pride and privilege of being born Italian.”65 In the 
summer of 1926, news of the Italian ban kept making headlines in America where, 
possibly because it was a repeated initiative, it was promoted as “persecution.”66 The 
controversy was still in many people’s minds when, after news of his death, news-
papers began reporting that his films were being exhibited again in Rome following 
the Duce’s decision to end the boycott after reading Valentino’s public letter.67
In America, Valentino’s sudden death had an even more radical impact, par-
ticularly among Fascist authorities and in the patriotic Italian American press. 
From the very day of his passing, nationalist newspapers such as Il Progresso Italo 
Americano and Il Corriere d’America emphatically praised the Italian actor.68 The 
most patriotic of the ethnic press filled its front pages with daily reports on the 
number of people crowding outside Campbell’s or on the Hollywood personalities 
paying homage to the Italian divo and participating in his funeral.69 Ex post facto 
patriotism was to be expected, but the quick about-face of the New York–based 
Fascists was also impressive. Had Mussolini actually ordered his loyal Blackshirts 
to pay homage to Valentino and do so publicly?
First the facts: In the evening of August 23, a group of Italian American Fascists 
set out to post an honor guard around the film star’s flowered bier at Campbell’s 
funeral home. They gained access to the funeral home by declaring that Mussolini 
himself had given such instructions—a claim that the Italian authorities soon 
denied. Italian American members of the Anti-Fascist League, who claimed to 
know the thirty-one-year-old Divo’s personal opposition to the regime, tried to 
prevent the Blackshirts’ physical and ideological appropriation of his body and 
fame.70 A fight erupted. Eventually, Fascist representatives were able to stand guard 
in an official, military fashion over his corpse and lay a wreath at his side with 
the inscription “From Benito Mussolini,” thus saluting Valentino as one of them 
(figure 29). At midnight they were asked to leave. The morning papers spread 
 images of the startling display.71
The archival evidence sheds evidence on this issue.72 On August 26, 1926, 
three days after Valentino’s death, several things happened. In the morning, the 
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front page of the New York Times reported on the clash between Fascists and 
anti-Fascists at Campbell’s. Quite alarmingly for Italian government officials, 
the New York Times quoted Pietro Allegra, secretary of the Anti-Fascist Alliance, 
denying the Fascists the right to post guard at the actor’s bier. The article included 
a long excerpt of Allegra’s telegram to Ullman in which he denounced the behavior 
of the American Fascists as an “insult to the memory of the great artist, who in 
life manifested his opposition to the anti-democratic policies of Mussolini.”73 Pos-
sibly even more distressing was the contradiction captured by the New York Times 
between the American Fascists’ claim that they were operating “on instructions 
from Mussolini” and an Associated Press dispatch from Rome that suggested that 
Mussolini had not given any such order.
figure 29. New York Blackshirts pose with the Duce’s wreath for Rodolfo 
Valentino’s coffin. Il Grido della Stirpe [The Roar of the Race], August 28, 
1926, 1.
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Then the Italian embassy got involved. In a letter to Ambassador Giacomo 
De Martino on the same day, the consul informed him that he had just sent a tele-
gram to Mussolini upon the request of Count Paolo Ignazio Maria Thaon di Revel, 
a noble figure and naval commander who in the fall 1924 had been sent to New 
York on a difficult mission. His job was to organize the politically dangerous Fasci 
Italiani all’estero, or Fascists abroad, into the more disciplined and reliable Fascist 
League of North America (FLNA). Thaon di Revel had told the consul that he was 
the person responsible for the Fascist guard at Valentino’s funeral home. He had 
taken the initiative of asking a few individuals to wear their Blackshirt uniforms 
and place a wreath by Valentino’s casket with the inscription, “From Benito 
Mussolini.” His intention was to highlight the “nationality and Italian sentiment” 
of the fallen actor. In his communication to the consul, Count Revel acknowl-
edged that he had not received any authorization by or on behalf of Mussolini. 
Since the anti-Fascists were accusing him of having acted alone, Revel feared that 
the issue was becoming a political one and that, if Mussolini were to deny that he 
had ever given the order, the count’s own authority and that of the regime would 
be discredited. Revel asked that his action not be retracted.74 Two days later, the 
consul informed the ambassador that Mussolini had responded. “Please inform 
Count Revel that I approve gesture of sympathy toward Rodolfo Valentino. It is 
appropriate,” Mussolini wrote in a telegraph, but added, “in the future my name 
ought not be used without my prior authorization.”75
PLEBISCITE OF PAIN
Such postmortem reconciliatory gestures, including the end of any boycott of 
Valentino films, should not obscure the Divo’s and the Duce’s ideological differ-
ences. In Italy, the dictator’s antiegalitarian manliness and ideological viriliza-
tion—molded on the political and discursive repression of the feminine—was 
hardly compatible with Valentino’s sexually transgressive and ambiguous mascu-
linity. The latter resembled the androgynous decadence of another contemporary 
male political icon, the by-then-passé poet and writer Gabriele D’Annunzio. Still, 
in the American context, the two figures presented striking affinities. Emphasizing 
their differences should not discourage our efforts to identify the function of their 
commonalities within American culture. To look at Valentino as a celebrity, for 
instance, his impact on the movie public and fan culture turned out to be one of 
regimentation, the opposite of the conventional narrative of out-of-control crowds 
of young women attending his funeral. As such, his untimely death dovetailed 
with the earlier promotion of his mesmerizing romantic power as well as with his 
overt antidemocratic stance. For years, Valentino made young American women 
(and men) stand in line at the box office, buy movie magazines, and return to the 
movie houses for comparable romantic stories. The coverage of his death and the 
allegedly spontaneous hysteria it provoked does not reveal the well-regimented 
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political economy and publicity of his cinematic celebrity. Instead, it conceals 
it. When examined closely, we discover that the hysteria was manipulated and 
the coverage of the funeral often aimed to produce an interclass universality of 
response—ranging from grief to mere curiosity—evident in images of continu-
ous orderly lines of visitors outside Campbell’s. Il Progresso Italo-Americano and 
Il Corriere d’America captured this (staged) unanimity in terms of a “plebiscite 
of pain” (plebiscito di dolore) or “universal plebiscite of grief for Valentino” 
(plebiscito universale di cordoglio per Valentino).76
Even in the end, the transnational star Valentino, through his exotic screen 
image and the rational and affective activities of publicity men, was capable of 
turning America’s threatening masses into discreet and generally well-behaved 
film audiences. The public record does not include reports of out-of-control mobs 
invading the movie theaters that throughout his career exhibited his films; and 
if they elbowed their way in, once inside, “for one hour and a half they sat spell-
bound applauding” him.77 His spectators were actually identifiable and reliable 
targets for consumer and political agendas during his life and after.78
If the plot of The Sheik and The Son of the Sheik is any indication of his 
reception, the final destiny of the devoted female protagonist, Diana Majo, is not 
that of an independent flapper but of the loyal, domesticated partner destined for 
marriage. With “cave-man love and tenderness,” Valentino may have empowered 
flappers or new women sexually and romantically. American film audiences’ 
unprecedented display of sensual attraction to a foreigner became a familiar trope 
of reviews and reports. Yet, his iconic popularity did not open up radically subver-
sive possibilities for gender equality (or democracy), on or off screen. Conform-
ing to Hollywood’s business and cultural prerogatives, instead, his groundbreak-
ing stardom had a very familiar and conservative ring to it. It remains to be seen 
whether, when positioned side by side with Mussolini’s celebrity, what emerges 
in both cases is the fungibility of a foreign individual for the growth of domestic 
institutions of crowd management.

PART THREE





Promoting a Romantic Biography
The public man is born “public”—he bears the stigma from his birth. [. . .] He 
can never escape it. [. . .] I am perfectly resigned to my lot as a public man.  
In fact, I am enthusiastic about it.
Mussolini, 19251
The rise of Benito Mussolini on the world stage is conventionally associated with 
the March on Rome of late October 1922, which forced the Italian king to appoint 
the Fascist leader to the post of prime minister. The American media coverage of 
the events was extensive: interest in his striking rise to power, original personality, 
and leadership pervaded daily reports and editorials. Soon periodicals devoted 
commentary and illustrations to the iconic Fascist leader, and within a few short 
years newsreels began to feature him as an alluring celebrity. Economic and geo-
political factors explain the interest that American financial and political centers 
had in his anti-Communist leadership but do not clarify his status as an iconic 
public personality, which resulted from a host of public relations efforts informing 
an intense media coverage.
In truth, Mussolini had already attracted the attention of a very limited but 
not inconsequential group of individuals years before the March on Rome. After 
the United States joined the hostilities, American officials found themselves ben-
efitting from this pro-war socialist’s remarkable ability of stirring public opinion 
to accept Italy’s participation in the conflict and alliance with the United States. 
In the late 1910s and early 1920s, he positioned himself as an invaluable anti-Bolshevik 
interlocutor and a loyal ally to financial centers seeking to invest in a strike-free 
nation. In this section, I tell the story of how mainstream media support for the 
Duce consistently intertwined geopolitical rationales and alleged individual traits 
according to a personalizing strategy that Mussolini himself, a longtime journalist, 
skillfully exploited. Even though several reporters, editors, and writers of leftist 
and liberal bents condemned what they recognized as a coup d’état, a number of 
American and Italian mediators enabled his rise to fame by fostering a personality 
cult that largely deterred any serious questioning of his antidemocratic regime. 
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They did so at least until the mid-1930s, when his American fortunes shifted for 
worse following the Duce’s decision to emulate other colonial powers and start his 
imperialistic campaign in Africa.
WARTIME PUBLIC INFORMATION
As discussed in chapter 1, the Committee for Public Information had branches all 
over Western Europe, including in Rome. Between April and October 1918, the 
head of the Italian CPI was the eminent political science professor Charles Edward 
Merriam, whom many regarded as “the most important political scientist of the 
interwar years.”2 As the American high commissioner for public information in 
Italy, Merriam’s mission was to encourage the Italian public to have faith in the 
country’s military alliance with the United States, support pro-war socialist lead-
ers, and undermine anti-war socialist and communist groups.3 Despite his short 
tenure, Merriam was perhaps one of the truest interpreters of Wilson’s propagan-
da-based diplomacy. In his role, he came into contact with the most important 
men influencing Italian public opinion. Possibly among them was Mussolini who, 
after being expelled from the Socialist Party in late 1914 due to his sudden pro-war 
stance, embraced a rhetoric of militaristic nationalism and broadcast it through 
his new interventionist newspaper Il Popolo d’Italia.4 Diplomatic historian Louis 
John Nigro Jr. has suggested that it was quite likely that in 1918 Merriam offered 
financial support to Mussolini’s newspaper to increase its circulation and subsidize 
a Rome edition. Funneled through the Rockefeller Foundation, Merriam’s sup-
port compensated the future Duce for his influential support of the American war 
intervention and contributed to his public ascendancy.5 This occurred just as the 
CPI was endeavoring to advertise President Wilson in Italy as the personifica-
tion of a nonpartisan moral authority and idealistic champion of democracy and 
world peace. Merriam was in Italy when Mussolini celebrated Wilson’s popular 
authority with a six-column front-page headline in Il Popolo d’Italia that hailed 
the American president as “the supreme duce of the free peoples” (figure 30). 
Mussolini would soon adopt for himself the same rhetoric (and lexicon).
Upon his return to the United States in late 1918, Merriam wrote an official 
account of his Italian experience for the American Political Science Review. It read 
like a manifesto of realpolitik, pleading for better-funded and -organized propa-
ganda efforts not just to strengthen patriotic idealism but to serve geopolitical 
interests. “International misunderstandings,” Merriam noted, “menace our indus-
trial, political, social and national ideals and progress.”6 The selling of Wilson’s 
America—and with it, American interests—to Italy was premised on the notion 
that, as he wrote to George Creel in June 1918, “Italy needs the influence of some 
great international personality.”7 
Merriam did not name anyone in particular, but his close office colleague 
in Rome, Gino Speranza, used the same argument to identify an Italian, not a 
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foreign, figure. Speranza was an Italian American lawyer who was serving as 
personal aide and advisor to the American ambassador to Italy. On July 1918, 
he reported to Washington about “a man of vision,” whom he identified as “the 
fighting leader of the Reform Socialists,” whose popularity was winning approval 
among “members of all parties.”8 Given his public profile, this person could only 
have been Mussolini. Against the fear that Italy could have been next after Russia 
to succumb to a communist revolution, Speranza’s reassuring reports provided 
indications of a possible and very welcome counter-strategy. Beyond the political 
influence of any “great international personality,” what was needed for Italy was the 
emergence of a strong, anti-Bolshevik Italian leader. This remained the American 
view for years to come.
After the war, President Wilson experienced a dramatic drop in popularity 
in Italy because of his intransigence regarding the destiny of the Adriatic city of 
Fiume. Concomitantly, Mussolini replaced the dogmatic “poet-soldier” Gabriele 
D’Annunzio, the defeated leader of the occupation of Fiume, as Italy’s nationalist 
icon.9 The Duce’s early-1920s rise to domestic and international fame was part of a 
script that unfolded against an ideological landscape of growing misgivings about 
the stability of Italian democracy and fears of a Bolshevik drift. In this context, 
Mussolini became of great geopolitical interest to the United States because of his 
relationship to America’s immediate economic and political goals. The novelty of 
his authoritarian style also mattered to American political scientists and observ-
ers because of what it could teach about future governmental arrangements in 
America. In Merriam’s 1931 analysis, Italy represented a “striking experiment,” one 
“full of meaning for the student of civic training.”10 It was an experiment that had 
started at least officially and certainly with great promotional efficacy with the 
March on Rome, to which I now turn.
figure 30. Woodrow Wilson headlined as “the supreme duce of the free peoples.” Il Popolo d’Italia, 
October 10, 1918, 1. Courtesy of Biblioteca Nazionale, Rome.
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NEWS OF THE MARCH ON ROME
Almost a century later, the abrupt and dramatic effectiveness of Fascism’s power 
seizure is still compelling, but it also has the whiff of a colorfully choreographed 
performance that was taken all too seriously. As a combination of a staged threat 
of insurrection and actual violence between Blackshirts and Communist activists 
throughout the country during the week of October 22–29, the March on Rome 
succeeded in forcing the king to give Mussolini the reins of the country. In theory 
it was a perfectly constitutional and legal power transition. In practice, as sev-
eral observers recognized, it was a usurpation by an autocrat who had plotted the 
whole initiative away from Rome. Few expected it to be followed by even more 
dramatic moves. Twenty-six months later, Mussolini erased the authority of the 
Parliament and inaugurated a full-fledged dictatorship.
Italy’s most politically gifted minds did not necessarily see it coming. Initially, 
notable anti-Fascists like Gaetano Salvemini deemed Mussolini a “clown [. . .] sur-
rounded by young thugs,” who was bound to “defeat himself.”11 Eventually, Salvemini 
explained the march as a “coup d’état, staged as a spontaneous rising of ‘Blackshirts,’ 
but in reality carried out by a military ‘Black Hand.’ ”12 While the confrontations 
between the Fascist militia and socialist groups resulted in dozens of deaths and hun-
dreds of injuries, the human cost of the march went largely unreported. Journalists 
regularly insisted that there had been virtually no clashes between the police or 
the army on the one side and Mussolini’s Blackshirts on the other. For instance, 
on October 31, 1922, the St. Paul Pioneer Press described the March as a coup d’état 
“accomplished with extraordinary skill,” and a few months later the Wall Street 
Journal was still praising Mussolini for taking “Italy without shedding a drop of 
blood.”13 To outsiders, the march was a coup d’état sans coup. Several commentators 
read this as a sign of widespread consensus. Others diagnosed it in a bleaker fashion, 
as an undemocratic abuse of power resulting in unreported violent acts.
Over the decades, historians of Italian fascism have studied the March on 
Rome by seeking to move past reductive and ritualistic celebrations or condem-
nations. Despite marked methodological differences, they have shared the view 
that the name March on Rome is misleading on multiple levels because it refers 
to a single event unfolding in a single geographic site.14 What they have agreed 
upon is that the atmosphere of confusion and the collapse of state power led to the 
choreographically effective Roman scene as the watershed moment for Mussolini’s 
political stature.
Though it has enlarged its focus from the city of Rome to an Italian theater, 
mainstream scholarship on the early days of the Fascist government has largely 
operated within an intranational framework. The context and theater of the March 
on Rome consisted of a broader, international scene that prominently featured the 
geographically distant United States.15 The mediating role of American journalists 
and, especially, governmental officials reveals that they quickly recognized the 
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importance of the events of late October 1922, before, during, and immediately 
after their unfolding: America’s key political and financial players were not passive 
spectators of Mussolini’s rise to power. While they did not aid Mussolini’s ascen-
dancy in situ, they fostered American public opinion’s positive reaction to, and 
thus legitimatization of, his quick seizure of power.
Despite a few cautious responses (and fewer denunciations) to the Blackshirts’ 
violent methods, several first responses to the march were celebratory, in fact. 
It was not just that notable individuals and organizations that expressed high 
expectations for Mussolini’s appointment as Italian leader. What was remarkable 
was the swiftness with which the American press published positive responses to 
the Duce, within days or just a few weeks of his ascent to power. The tempting 
explanation for this rapid approval is that Mussolini met American aspirations for 
a leader who could not only counter the strikes and disorder that was disrupting 
the country’s political and economic life, but who could do so with wide popular 
support. The lack of substantial reports about the human costs of the March on 
Rome provided the much-desired proof of Mussolini’s popularity. Still, more pre-
cise questions ought to be asked. Where did these papers get their news?
Beyond the power interests at stake in the published stories, of notable his-
torical importance was the infrastructure of the coverage—that is, the network 
of journalists working for wire services and major newspapers. In the early 1920s, 
120 members of the foreign press worked in Rome, and “of these, perhaps 40 to 50 
were genuine correspondents, the rest were police spies or hacks in the pay of the 
regime.” Most American newspapers received their foreign dispatches from the 
few Rome-based news bureaus (i.e., Associated Press, United Press, and Interna-
tional News Service), which were largely friendly to the regime.16 There were also 
newspapers that could afford direct reports from Italy, including the New York 
Times and the Christian Science Monitor, as well as the Chicago Daily News and 
the Chicago Tribune. They too, with notable exceptions, were not inimical to the 
regime. The New York Times counted on several correspondents who generally 
tended to report favorably or with measured distance on Mussolini, as did the 
Christian Science Monitor. The coverage from Chicago was polarized. For most of 
the initial Fascist period, the Chicago Daily News correspondent was the Fascist 
sympathizer Hiram K. Motherwell, who in 1928 would even translate Mussolini’s 
1908 novel, The Cardinal’s Mistress.17 The Tribune’s George Seldes, instead, wrote 
such extremely critical articles about the regime that they eventually cost him his 
job.18 Another fierce critic was the South African British writer William Bolitho, 
who wrote for both Walter Lippmann’s World and the Manchester Guardian. His 
1926 volume Italy under Mussolini called Mussolini’s rule “tyranny” and labeled it 
a “slave state.”19 Other outlets debated whether Fascism truly represented the will 
of the Italian masses or whether Mussolini was just the leader of a violent mob.
The coverage of the events in Rome did not always focus on Mussolini. A few iso-
lated articles focused more on Fascism as a novel ideology and a mode of governance. 
170    The Romance of Undemocratic Governing
In early October 1922, Current Opinion described the Fascist movement as fundamen-
tally a “challenge,” not aristocratic but highly popular, to the weakness of traditional 
governments.20 The New Republic included articles by journalist and writer Giuseppe 
Prezzolini, an old friend of the Duce. In November 1922 he praised Fascism as an 
“utterly new movement” that “had become particularly ‘popular.’ ”21 The same month, 
the former military attaché of the U.S. embassy in Italy, Gino Speranza, argued that, 
despite its violence, the Fascist movement was the revolt of the middle class against 
the “sinister spell of an exotic Marxism.”22 A few months later, he described Fascism 
in Outlook as a “spiritual national reconstruction.”23 In a few rare instances, publica-
tions that primarily focused on the Blackshirts took a more worried stance due to 
these Fascist adherents’ overt use of violence. Newspapers and periodicals like the 
New York Tribune and Literary Digest published dystopian descriptions and cartoons 
that painted the Blackshirts as a backward and violent movement, comparable and 
related to America’s Ku Klux Klan (figure 31). Other outlets instead openly defended 
the authoritarian modus operandi of the Blackshirts, arguing that their youthful 
antidemocratic force was the right medicine for Italian democracy’s sick and aging 
body. They appeared to rehash the forgiving rhetoric that in 1921, Anne O’Hare 
McCormick, then a young freelance contributor to the Book Review and Magazine 
of the New York Times, had deployed when covering the Fascists’ violence in Rome. 
Through her romantic view of Italy as a land of artworks, she hailed the socialists’ 
riotous protests and staining walls of medieval churches with Soviet slogans as the 
very epitome of brazen disorder and demagogic tyranny. Fascism, instead, was for 
her the middle class’s “healthy and necessary reaction,” perhaps “a ruthless move-
ment, as youth is ruthless,” but capable of substituting “swift and decisive action for 
the slow processes of legislation and experiment.”24
By and large, however, Fascism and the Blackshirts were intertwined with the 
figure of the Duce and consequently deserving positive consideration as a worthy 
political movement and method. Just a few days after the March on Rome, the 
New York Tribune described Mussolini as “A Black-Shirted Garibaldi,” referring to 
the celebrated military commander that led the 1860–1861 state formation. With 
Mussolini, the paper continued, Fascism was “rough in its methods,” but it had 
“tonic” aims “against degeneration through Socialist internationalism.” Ultimately, 
if “Garibaldi won freedom in a red shirt, Mussolini is fighting for normalcy and 
Italianism in a black one.”25 The New York Times intertwined its description of 
Mussolini as a de facto “dictator of Italy” with a celebration of the Fascist revolu-
tion as a “relatively harmless Italian type” of political upheaval.26 On November 3, 
the New York Herald praised the forty-year-old Mussolini as the “regenerator of the 
Italian nation.”27 It was a flattering compliment, though one still within the domain 
of conventional political rhetoric. On the same day, however, the Birmingham Age-
Herald wrote that Mussolini looked “like a movie star,” which was clearly a move 
away from traditional political assessments and even from the most enthusiastic 
forms of praise.28 Instead, this comparison signaled unprecedented attention to 
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and celebration of a new, personalizing set of characteristics for a contemporary 
leader: political power, physical presence, and personal appeal. As other similar 
comments reveal, the Duce’s masculinity exuded an old-fashioned charm, but it 
also expressed the irrepressible energy of modern youth.
As the newly appointed New York Times Rome correspondent, McCormick con-
tributed to a view of Fascism as a governmental style that matched its histrionic and 
hypermasculine leader. She celebrated the new premier as “swashbuckling 
Mussolini,” using a term usually applied to Fairbanks.29 McCormick repeatedly 
deployed a pragmatic rhetoric and medical metaphors in defense of Mussolini’s 
antidemocratic methods. Assuming “one-man power to be less dangerous than 
the powerlessness of many men,” she wondered whether he was not the remedy to 
“the disease of politics that infects civilization.” Most interestingly, she argued that 
Mussolini’s autocratic methods were justified by his popularity. “The people were 
already yearning for a dictatorship when Mussolini appointed himself a dictator,” 
she charged. “His march on Rome was like an answer to a prayer.”30 What fueled 
his popularity was not necessarily an ideology, about which McCormick never had 
figure 31. The Blackshirts compared to the KKK. Literary Digest, 
November 11, 1922, 13.
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much to say, but governance through the crowd-pleasing showmanship that domi-
nated the press coverage at home and abroad. Nobody had ever seen anything like 
it in Italy before—or elsewhere, for that matter. “The new government cultivates the 
spectacular,” she observed before claiming that “one of the reasons for its popularity 
among a people” that was usually undervalued was that Mussolini gave “them at 
last a leader who is a headliner, so to speak, able to command public attention and 
keep Italy on the front page.” More than a politician, he was a celebrity, even though 
McCormick never used this term: “He makes politics a kind of noble show and 
keeps enlivened and interested the audience, so bored by his predecessors.”31
As a political celebrity, Mussolini could be compared to non-Italian political 
superstars, which heralded the recognition of a fame that stretched beyond the 
limited domain of politics—as he well knew. In mid-1923, in the pages of the New 
York Times Book Review and Magazine, McCormick compared Mussolini to Theo-
dore Roosevelt: “A nation that thrilled to the Vigilantes and Rough Riders rises to 
Mussolini and his Black Shirt Army.”32 By 1923, books in English about Fascism 
and Mussolini were regularly featured on the shelves of American bookstores, 
sold as comparable to the celebratory profiles of American business and politi-
cal heroes. This literature was often characterized by a description of Mussolini’s 
authoritarian stewardship as a reaction to inanity and incompetence, with some 
reservations about his use of violence.33
His leadership and popular consensus thrilled the business community, which 
had been discontented with the feebleness of postwar Italian governments. Writing 
in the pages of the Nation’s Business, Basil Miles, the Paris-based American represen-
tative of the International Chamber of Commerce, praised “Mussolini’s Blackshirts 
as a potent factor for better business” and deemed their actions a “bloodless revolu-
tion against a wasteful government.” Miles’s article included a detailed account of 
Mussolini’s economic program, based on the “abolition of the law compelling the 
registration of all securities,” which had discouraged investors and delayed the “flow 
of capital into industry.” The program also included radical tax reform, privatization 
of telephone services and railways, reduction of state expenses, and balancing the 
national budget.34 Unsurprisingly, the U.S. business press (i.e., Barron’s Commerce 
and Finance, the Nation’s Business, and the Wall Street Journal) was overall quite 
optimistic about Italy’s economic prospects under Mussolini.35
Praise of the Duce’s undemocratic authority often impinged upon a misogynist 
rhetoric. As a self-made patriarch, the son of a blacksmith, and someone tirelessly 
engaged in continuous self-improvement, Mussolini was the virile new leader 
domesticating a stereotypically unruly nation gendered as feminine. In 1923, Time 
magazine put him on its cover for the first time with a caption that referred to 
castor oil, which Fascists forced their opponents to drink and which became, 
together with the bludgeon, a symbol of Fascist discipline and obedience. A few 
years later, another Time magazine cover showed him courageously behind bars 
with a lioness that he had tamed. Her name was Italia.36
Promoting a Romantic Biography    173
Even critical reports, such as those that often appeared in Literary Digest, 
referred to and popularized Mussolini’s Caesarism, especially when granting him 
space in direct or indirect quotes from interviews. The Duce’s political novelty, in 
fact, came with an outspoken rejection of democracy (“mass cannot govern mass”) 
and liberty (“civilization is the inversion of personal liberty”).37 The same articles 
also popularized his direct, acclamatory definition of Fascism as the change “from 
parliamentary government [. . .] to a government in which the prime minister is 
directly bound to the multitude.”38 Emboldened by the space granted to it in the 
press, Mussolini used his celebrity status to justify his regime’s methods. When 
rumors spread regarding fascism’s antidemocratic policies, the Saturday Evening 
Post adopted medical metaphors to argue that “desperate diseases need desperate 
remedies. Italy was a surgical case that called for a major operation.”39 In her 1924 
overview of world’s dictators, McCormick praised Fascism as “the triumphant 
example of popular and successful dictatorship” and found the Duce’s style of ple-
biscitarian governance (“Mussolini glories in autocracy”) utterly acceptable and 
even better than the American system. “The people may not be freer than they 
were under a weaker and more representative government, but they are certainly 
freer from trouble,” she opined. She went on to claim that “under Mussolini [Italy] 
has changed from an enfeebled and divided kingdom into one of the most [. . .] 
prospering powers of Europe,” where Italians enjoy “a personal liberty unknown 
in an indefatigably regulated commonwealth like ours.”40
In the early years after taking power, Mussolini sought to exercise a measure of 
control over the promotion of his leadership. While keen on nurturing personal 
relationships, he soon benefitted from more institutional forms of publicity medi-
ation that would articulate and sustain his positive reception in America for years, 
through the near fatal delegitimization of his regime in the aftermath of the 1924 
Fascist murder of Socialist congressman Giacomo Matteotti.41 Mussolini’s assump-
tion of personal responsibility in a January 3, 1925, speech to the Parliament is often 
regarded as the official beginning of Mussolini’s dictatorship. Before, during, and 
after the Matteotti crisis, Mussolini, as both prime minister and minister of foreign 
affairs, relied on a network of mediators, consisting of the entire Italian diplomatic 
corps in the United States, beginning with the embassy and the consul general of 
New York. The diplomatic force made a critical alliance with the Italy America 
Society (IAS), a key lobbying association with links to the State Department and 
Wall Street, as well as to powerful individuals such as U.S. ambassador William 
Washburn Child and the chief executive at J. P. Morgan & Co., banker-diplomat 
Thomas W. Lamont. Often advised by IAS’s president, corporate lawyer Paul 
Cravath (who had ties to J. P. Morgan), the Italian embassy put American journalists 
and editors in direct contact with Mussolini. Through a system of patronage that 
guaranteed access and sumptuous receptions in Italy, the Duce befriended a whole 
host of journalists and writers, including Isaac F. Marcosson of the Saturday Eve-
ning Post; public relations experts and periodical contributors, including Ivy Lee; 
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and bankers and businessmen, including John Morron, a director of the First 
National Bank of New York, and financier Charles Torrey. These relationships 
proved quite effective. Even when periodicals sought to publish critical reports—
as, for instance, the Atlantic Monthly, Harper’s Magazine, and Literary Digest did—
their coverage still amounted to publicity. It is to these most formidable mediators 
that we shall now turn.
A CLOSED SO CIET Y:  THE JOURNALIST,  THE BANKER , 
THE AMBASSAD OR
Dear Dad, we are having a fine revolution here. No danger. Plenty of enthu-
siasm and color. We all enjoy it.
Richard Washburn Child, U.S. ambassador to Italy, to his fa-
ther, the day after the March on Rome42
The most reliable network of publicity mediators that Mussolini depended on 
for his swift and favorable emergence in American public opinion was the Italy 
American Society (IAS). Since its establishment in March 1918, IAS had the goal 
of fostering “between the United States and Italy an international friendship based 
upon mutual understanding of their national ideals,” which essentially meant, 
as the masthead of its News Bulletin boasted, a “co-operative effort to develop 
international trade.”43 To accomplish this, IAS intertwined the interests of both the 
State Department and Wall Street on the American side with those of the Italian 
embassy on the Italian side.
With some pretense of cultural engagement with a nation that was rich in 
art but poor in infrastructure and foreign investments, IAS sought to open up a 
political space for new financial and economic relations between the two coun-
tries. Although nominally private, the IAS relied on a broad network of powerful 
interests: the American and Italian American financial community, the Italian and 
U.S. governments, and Italian American leaders.44 Through the press influence of 
these interests in the two countries, IAS contributed—directly and indirectly—to 
manage Mussolini’s reputation within the broader U.S. financial, governmental, 
and popular spheres.45
On the economic side, IAS’s reach was ambitious. Like the bankers and corpo-
rate lawyers who constituted its membership, the most prominent of whom were 
linked to J. P. Morgan & Co., IAS was favorably disposed toward Italy, whoever 
its leader, even before the March on Rome.46 Morgan’s “purchasing organization 
had executed large orders on behalf of the Italian military during the war” and, 
after the end of the conflict, sought to do “a substantial underwriting business 
in Italian securities.”47 In many respects, IAS considered Mussolini just the next 
leader, the one it had to deal with after the failure of the previous liberal govern-
ments. In other respects, Mussolini was such a peculiar politician that arguments 
for promoting investments in Italy could not be merely economic. In this regard, 
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IAS provided a highly placed public relations platform for Mussolini’s political 
legitimacy, which was a key condition for American investments in Italy. A quick 
rebuttal against the argument that his government was autocratic—a word that 
the war propaganda had taught Americans to condemn—was a priority. In its first 
Trade Bulletin (October 1922), published after the March on Rome, Irene di Robilant, 
an Italian aristocrat living in New York who was to become IAS’s organizing facto-
tum, quenched any anxiety about the Blackshirts’ quick and seemingly authoritar-
ian rise to power. In a three-page editorial, she described the Fascisti as the heirs of 
Garibaldi’s Red Shirts and “the power and the law of ancient Rome” and referred to 
Mussolini as a genius organizer who “personifies their power in action.”48
On the political side, the IAS’s reach was equally impressive. Reproducing Wall 
Street’s financial giants’ intertwined approach to finance and world politics, IAS 
cultivated powerful ties with many parts of the U.S. government, particularly 
the State Department. In the spring of 1920, Thomas Nelson Page, who had been 
ambassador to Italy from 1913 to mid-1919, was elected an honorary vice president 
of IAS.49 The same annual elections appointed a forty-year-old Harvard-educated 
lawyer, writer, journalist named Richard Washburn Child to the IAS executive 
committee.50 A year later President Harding nominated him U.S. ambassador to 
Italy (figure 32). Child represents one of the most interesting contributors to the 
convergence of political and cultural characterization that informed Mussolini’s 
public image.
Unlike Page, whose clashes with Merriam revealed his opposition to overt pro-
paganda tactics, Child had no diplomatic background.51 Instead, in the 1910s while 
working in a New York law office, he had started his public career as a writer, publish-
ing short stories and a few novels.52 A lifelong Roosevelt supporter, he had also writ-
ten a few influential political pieces for Century Magazine and McClure’s Magazine 
that consistently stressed vigorous citizenry and strong leadership.53 His horizons 
widened when, before the U.S. involvement in the European war, he took up assign-
ments first as a foreign correspondent in Europe and Russia and then as a publicity 
man for the U.S. Treasury. In 1916 he published Potential Russia, a book that called 
for U.S. investments in the tsarist nation.54 The Soviet Revolution scrapped any such 
plan. Still, known as a writer conversant in foreign affairs and a policy promoter, he 
worked during the war for the CPI’s Division of Features, “which enlisted the volun-
teer services of the leading novelists, essayists and short-story writers of America.”55 
Writing in 1919 about Wilson’s centralization of war powers, he justified the presi-
dent’s “one-man leadership” as “the only emergency action we know” despite his 
long-standing opposition to the former New Jersey governor.56 At war’s end, Child 
worked briefly as the editor of Collier’s Weekly, covered the Paris Peace Conference, 
and attacked Wilson’s League of Nations for what he feared was America’s unneces-
sary involvement with foreign nations. He promoted a Progressive social politics and 
a pragmatic isolationism that supported economic interests with minimum political 
involvement. He continued to denounce the demise of representative democracy 
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and leadership that perniciously advantaged financial and industrial elites. In 1920, 
possibly thanks to his connections among the New York City’s lawyers, he joined 
IAS’s executive committee, which, as Child had viewed Russia in 1916, looked at 
postwar Italy as a favorable investment destination.57 In the same year, he wrote 
effective speeches for Warren G. Harding, contributing to his election. On May 26, 
1921, the president awarded Child the ambassadorship to Italy. Child probably did 
not know the first thing about being a diplomat. Rather than limiting his role, how-
ever, his background in creative writing and political advocacy was going to provide 
the skills he needed to promote Mussolini in America. The New York Times reported 
that Child was “the first of the ‘younger generation’ of American writers to achieve 
ambassadorial distinction.”58
During Child’s first months in Rome, the context of the relationship between 
the United States and Italy was dominated by two intertwining elements: the threat 
figure 32. Richard Washburn Child in Washington, DC, 1924. 
Photograph (digital file from original). Library of Congress, Prints & 
Photographs Division, LC-DIG-npcc-10526.
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of Bolshevism and the question of war reparations. Italy had experienced two 
years of massive disorder and strikes that had revealed the government’s inability 
to control the violent clashes between Socialist forces and a rising Fascist mili-
tia, and, in the process, weakened the national economy. The U.S. government’s 
fears about the instability of the Italian administration, subject to continuous 
reshuffling and changes of coalitions, prevented any long-term American politi-
cal and economic commitment.59 The American embassy and consulates in Italy 
kept the State Department well-informed on the country’s climate of violence and 
instability.60 For instance, Child informed Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes 
that Mussolini was emerging as a leader firmly in control of the most violent ele-
ments of the Fascist political movement. In early October, Child apprised Hughes 
that Mussolini was willing to start a revolution and become Italy’s dictator. “People 
like the Italians hunger for strong leadership,” he wrote, seemingly with approval, 
“and enjoy [. . .] being dramatically governed.”61 
Child’s communications were not merely the result of an impersonal political 
assessment. Apparently Mussolini, who had a profound appreciation for America’s 
political support, had befriended him. A few days before the March on Rome, 
in fact, the Duce visited the American embassy and informed Child of his plan! 
The ambassador immediately notified Hughes. “A few days ago,” Child wrote on 
October 26, “Mussolini came to see me and addressed to me inquiries as to the 
attitude of the American public toward Fascisti.”62 There is no record of Hughes’s 
answer, but it is not difficult to guess what it was. Given Child’s previous cables and 
given any lack of an agitated response from the State Department, the response 
must have been cautious but positive.63 Even with the intense domestic negotia-
tions about Mussolini’s seizure of power, he apparently remained quite attuned to 
the American response. A few hours after being nominated prime minister, one 
of his first public acts was to cable Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes cor-
dial good wishes and “express confidence in the friendly, economic and spiritual 
collaboration of our two countries.”64 Hughes duly responded shortly afterward, 
congratulating Mussolini on his new position and assuring him that the collabora-
tion between Italy and the United States would continue to promote their mutual 
interests.65
Mussolini went out of his way to show that his relationship with American 
officials was quite special and unique. In early November, Child approached the 
premier’s office to ask for the customary meeting with the new head of government. 
The opposite happened. Child made this report to the State Department:
In response to my request to be received by the new minister [. . .] Mussolini instead 
of making an appointment called upon me this morning for an extended interview 
explaining his departure from the usual custom on the basis of personal friendship 
and his desire to emphasize his belief that while Italy should maintain friendly 
relations with all nations, an understanding of the new Italy and its young and 
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progressive spirit by the American government and particularly by the  American 
people was of primary importance. He said that American cooperation was vital for 
the plans he had in mind.66
What Mussolini had in mind was the opening up, through the State Department, 
of special channels of communication with the business and financial world and, 
in turn, with American public opinion. The terrain of such possible future eco-
nomic cooperation—and the bait—was economic progress, which all parties un-
derstood to be vital for reparations payments. This promoted policy amounted 
to privatizing public utilities, especially railways, and opening them up to U.S. 
investments. “Americans would be given all the opportunities this policy might 
yield,” Child reported Mussolini telling him. As for the public image of Fascism, 
Mussolini insisted on a politics of alliance between capital and labor, as opposed 
to the “false hopes and vaporous expectations” that had been instilled previously 
by the Socialists upon the population.67 Child registered all these arguments and 
ended his communication in formal diplomatic terms: “Mussolini indicates that 
he would appreciate it if the Department were to inform the American press that 
he had made to me ‘hearty expression of friendship for America and of faith in 
mutual frankness in all exchange of views [between] the two nations.’ ” Finally, he 
summarized Mussolini’s plan: “In brief, I believe he hopes that the Department 
will find a way to give him a little American publicity.”68 Child would take 
Mussolini’s request to heart.
For the American government, the dramatic, but apparently orderly regime 
change in Italy was good news: there would not be any further risk of a Bolshevik 
revolution in Italy and reparations repayments would have been made on a regu-
lar basis. Still, from the American perspective, how could the country that had 
justified its war participation as a battle of democracy against autocracy now go 
on supporting Mussolini’s authoritarian and overtly antidemocratic regime? The 
best way Washington and, with it, Wall Street could justify support of Fascism to 
American public opinion was by broadcasting the new Italian regime’s unwaver-
ing commitment to a capitalist economy and openness to foreign investments. 
Such important preconditions, however, could not sufficiently build Mussolini’s 
celebrity status in the United States. His full American acceptance depended on 
narratives that could script his personal and political biography in more relatable 
ways. What diplomatic communications, press briefings, and newspaper editorials 
seemed to share was a focus on his widespread attractiveness and recognition—at 
home and abroad. In his dispatches from Rome, Child was quick to character-
ize Mussolini as widely popular and uniquely capable of bringing the country to 
normalcy. And, in the post-Wilson era, normalcy was the precondition for inter-
national alliances.69 Against “weak and halting ministers, who for four years have 
been unable to lead,” Child wrote, “Italians prefer a determined Mussolini,” who 
has a “magnetic character” and a “stern deportment and convincing oratory.”70 
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In these colorful descriptions, Child-the-diplomat was handing the baton to 
Child-the-fiction-writer, a practice he was keen on repeating.
A little more than a year after the March on Rome, for instance, Child was the 
guest of honor at an IAS dinner held in New York on November 27, 1923. Child’s 
speech had nothing of diplomatic reportage. Instead, it combined political ad-
vocacy (or partisanship) with a heavily personalized rhetoric that, to the ears of 
the businessmen in the room, helped legitimize investment opportunities in Italy. 
Child spoke about Italy and U.S. foreign policy and announced the dawning of a 
new political season, not solely for Italy but for America and world politics in gen-
eral. The rhetorical impetus for his argument centered on the figure of the Duce:
The tide has turned. The word democracy attached to drifting mobs no longer de-
ceives us. We have come back to the realization that often the great hunger in the 
human heart is for strong leadership. We have come back to a decent appreciation 
that no matter how much we may desire to pat the heads of the weak and the wail-
ing, no matter how great our pity and our charity, the hands worthy of our clasp of 
friendship are the strong and honest hands.71
In other writings and public speeches, while holding office and afterward, Child 
consistently articulated the same narrative about Mussolini, one centered on his 
daring and iconic leadership vis-à-vis the lack of efficacy of democratic govern-
ments.72 
In assessing Child’s effectiveness as a public relations operative, or as “Mussolini’s 
mouthpiece in America,” it is important to recognize the long-standing role 
of banker-ambassador Thomas W. Lamont, J.  P. Morgan’s exceptionally gifted 
and influential executive. During and after World War I, J. P. Morgan & Co. had 
already played a key role in financing the Italian military effort and postwar recon-
struction. After the March on Rome, the American firm led by Lamont was ready 
to endorse Mussolini as Italy’s preferred banking agent for all international finan-
cial institutions interested in investing in the peninsula.73 Further, the Morgan 
firm eventually turned out to be the regime’s U.S. bank, capable of extending 
loans to Mussolini’s regime.74 The banking giant was a fairly constant presence in 
Child’s Italian affairs, having been for a while a close observer of the nation’s finan-
cial health.75 If Child was an activist and perhaps heterodox ambassador, so too 
was Lamont.
Lamont’s active relationship with European affairs started after the end of World 
War I. Invited by Wilson to attend the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Lamont was 
aptly named the “Ambassador from Wall Street” due to his ability to intertwine 
Morgan’s financial plans with U.S. policy. An inveterate Italophile, he was inter-
ested in extending his financial skills to a nation he viewed as uniquely “touched 
with poetry and romance.”76 To this end, in Paris Lamont networked heavily with 
members of the Italian delegation. In particular, he befriended Giovanni Fummi, a 
former stockbroker who was to become Morgan’s Rome agent and enable Lamont 
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to enter Italy’s top financial and political circles. Back in New York, Lamont’s 
involvement with IAS, first as a trustee and treasurer (and in 1925 as president), 
was widely advertised and often reported in the press. After the March on Rome, 
Lamont kept up a close relationship with the Italian ambassador Gelasio Caetani 
by often reporting on criticisms of and negative rumors about Mussolini. At times, 
he even sought advice on how best to respond to criticism against the Duce.77 
Six months after the premier had taken office, Lamont met Mussolini  to discuss 
restoring Italy’s financial credit, and their relationship would only strengthen in 
both direct and indirect ways over the next few years.78 In the summer of 1924, in 
the critical aftermath of the Fascist murder of Congressman Giacomo Matteotti, 
Lamont’s reaction was steadfast. He managed to organize a lunch with the editors 
of all the major New York papers in order to give Ambassador Caetani a platform 
“for explaining his version of events to the editors and commentators.”79
In post–World War I America, references to international leaders were becom-
ing more common to newspaper readers than ever before. Fascism could be sold 
to Americans, but it all depended on how it was presented. The regime’s violent 
nature had to be masked through national and racial distancing—that is, by stress-
ing that different countries had different political cultures. One of the most direct 
examples of this rhetoric appears in a letter sent by Lamont to J. P. Morgan’s Rome 
agent, Fummi. The context was the very delicate one of late 1925. Lamont was “con-
sidering a loan request for $100 million” from Italy, but knew that Secretary of State 
Frank Kellogg would have vetoed it unless the question of Italy’s $2-billion debt 
was settled.80 Lamont played the role of the skillful mediator. It helped that earlier 
that year, he had been elected, by unanimous vote, IAS president. 81 Champion of a 
style of “relationship banking” in which banker-client rapport went beyond shared 
financial interests, Lamont, through his Roman representative, offered remarkable 
advice to Mussolini on how to market his regime in America:
If Mr. Mussolini declares that parliamentary government is at an end in Italy, such 
a declaration comes as a shock to Anglo-Saxons. If, on the contrary, Mr. Mussolini 
had explained that the old forms of parliamentary government in Italy had proved 
futile and had led to inefficient government and chaos, therefore they had to be tem-
porarily suspended and generally reformed, then Anglo-Saxons would understand.82
The Morgan executive was relying on a familiar argument. Carleton Beals had writ-
ten in Current History a few months earlier that historically, Italy was much more 
familiar with forms of “enlightened despotism,” insisting that “the cloak of popular 
democracy and representative government does not fit comfortably or gracefully 
upon the body politic.”83 In the end, Lamont was successful both in advancing the 
negotiations over Italy’s war debt with the United States and securing the loan to 
the regime. These successes “proved to be a catalyst for further American invest-
ment.”84 Lamont’s mediating lesson went on to be applied to other public contexts. 
It would, for instance, find a profitable application in the unexpected collaboration 
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and personal amity between Mussolini and William Randolph Hearst, whose syn-
dicated newspapers and newsreel services would feature the Duce’s weekly col-
umns and speeches from October 1927 to May 1935. Overall, Lamont’s reputation 
never suffered from his closeness to Mussolini. In the days after the crash of 1929, 
he even earned the cover of Time magazine as the “right hand of John Pierpont 
Morgan [. . .] who steered the ship of U.S. prosperity through the storm.”85
Another prominent financial operator like Lamont who helped legitimize 
Mussolini in America and was also a member of the IAS executive committee was 
the aforementioned banker Otto Kahn. In the mid-1920s, Kahn publicly endorsed 
Mussolini as a reliable business partner and a guarantor of public order. His elo-
quent speeches were widely appreciated in the city’s financial world and, at times, 
were even published. One in particular stood out. Kahn gave it to the Foreign 
Policy Association on January 3, 1926, at the Hotel Astor in New York. The Italian 
American Fascist periodical Il Carroccio published it in Italian as “Otto Kahn e il 
Fascismo.” In the speech, Kahn defended Italians’ political self-determination, but 
he also argued that in contexts other than the American, democracy and freedom 
were not necessarily overlapping notions, particularly when the popularity of a 
leader could productively disentangle them. It is worth reporting the speech’s criti-
cal passages:
To judge Fascism with fairness we must remember two things. Italy belongs to the 
Italians, not to the British or the Americans. [. . .] Secondly, and this is true for every 
nation, before freedom [. . .] is the public order and the protection of the idea and 
life of the nation. True freedom is impossible where there is no order and where a 
government does not work properly. [. . .] [Mussolini] is not a dictator in the usual 
meaning of the word, because he exercises his power with the explicit and over-
whelming consensus of the people and by will of the King, the State’s constitutional 
ruler.86
Lamont, Kahn, and the New York press could support a favorable reception for 
Mussolini, but what they all needed was a direct contact with the premier. Such 
contact was guaranteed by the very gifted Italian ambassador to the United States, 
Gelasio Caetani (figure 33). For about four years, between 1922 and 1925, and in 
collaboration with the Italian consuls in America, Caetani mediated between the 
Duce and American power centers by maintaining direct, personal relationships 
with Lamont, the U.S. State Department, the Italy American Society, and even Will 
H. Hays, the chairman of the Motion Picture Association of America. Of noble 
background, Caetani was a war hero and fervent nationalist. He had taken part in 
the March on Rome, at the end of which, in November 1922, he was named Italian 
ambassador to the United States directly by Mussolini. Personally and ideologically 
loyal to the Duce, he was also right for the job: a prince, a decorated officer, and 
an engineer trained in Italy and the United States, Caetani was already familiar 
with American cultural and economic life, and he had a mediating temperament.87 
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Celebrated by the New York Times at the time of his nomination, Caetani exuded 
the charm of old and new Italy.88 In early 1923, IAS organized a banquet in his 
honor as the newly appointed Italian ambassador. The event, which was also under 
Morgan’s patronage, put him in contact with the city and the country’s political 
and financial elite.89 In his address, Caetani defended Mussolini’s authoritarian 
actions as both urgent and audacious. “It is not a dictatorial government,” he 
insisted, “but one of unflinching determination to put through those reforms that 
everybody had been advocating for years but nobody so far had had the courage 
of applying for fear of unpopularity.”90
Even though the embassy had already engaged in publicity initiatives before 
Mussolini took power, under Caetani’s leadership it came to operate like a public 
relations agency for the Duce. In early November 1922, just a few days after the 
March on Rome, the ambassador solicited press clippings about the Duce or Fas-
cism from all consular authorities, made summaries, and sent them to the Duce. In 
one of these cables, the embassy clarified its institutional role: to shed light on the 
aspects of recent events that Americans might have found otherwise confusing. 
The government change, for instance, deserved to be explained as resulting from 
constitutional rules and as being “nothing other than the effect of Italian popular 
will.”91 As we saw earlier, this was a message that effectively informed much of the 
coverage of the March on Rome.
In his dual role as prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, Mussolini used 
Caetani to relay and publicize his new Italian policies through the “diplomatic, 
political, financial, and journalistic circles,” as Mussolini’s short cables insisted.92 
Caetani’s ability to get things done was impressive, whether it meant promoting a 
new institutional accord between the Fascist Government and the unions (August 
1923);93 or arranging for a personal meeting between Mussolini and Ivy Lee follow-
ing Lee’s Time Magazine article appreciative of Mussolini’s communicative style.94 
Caetani also introduced Isaac Frederick Marcosson, the European correspondent 
of the Saturday Evening Post, to the Duce: the relationship with the most impor-
tant U.S. periodical was to last more than a decade.95 Caetani seems to have known 
or met everybody in Washington, New York, and even Rome. It was in Rome in 
mid-1923 that he met with Ambassador Child.96 Caetani was there overseeing the 
production of a film featuring Mussolini that he had promoted, as we shall see in 
the next chapter.
Officially, the embassy’s political agenda had to address two main questions: 
the negotiations of the war debt between Italy and the United States, for which 
favorable economic news about Italy was always helpful, and the dangerous issue 
of the American Fascists’ loyalty to Italy. Their activism was an issue for Rome 
because their unrestrained violence represented a dangerous form of interference 
in American affairs and affected the American reputation of Fascism in general.97 
Despite the importance of these political matters, a significant portion of the com-
munications between the embassy and consuls related to Mussolini’s reputation 
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and image in America. The term image included not just Mussolini’s general pub-
lic reception, but also his very likeness. “Every time American newspapers publish 
a portrait of Mussolini,” Caetani wrote to the Italian consuls in the United States, 
“they mostly rely on an awful photograph that represents him with a menacing 
expression and often a wild one. That gives American readers a bad impression.” 
To address this problem, in Rome Caetani acquired a large number of photo-
graphs that in his view more faithfully and attractively presented the Duce. He 
then invited all the consuls to submit said photographs to the newspapers. But 
he prudently advised the consuls that their distribution “was not to appear as an 
institutional gesture, but as a special gift to a friend.” Obviously, the photographs 
were to find their place in the newspapers’ archives, ready to be used.98
Caetani left office in 1925 following the positive public relations resolution of 
the Matteotti assassination: a few commentators believed that the crisis could 
have meant the end of Fascism but were sure it would not have meant the end 
of Mussolini. Comparing the Duce to Roosevelt in terms of leadership skills, 
Frederick Collins of Collier’s rationalized this outcome as follows: “Fascism is not a 
world factor. Mussolini is.”99 While certain sectors of the American press launched 
a full attack against Mussolini,100 Child’s articles for the Saturday Evening Post, 
which began to appear a few months after he had left his Italian post on February 
1924, greatly helped the Duce.101 Caetani acknowledged the former ambassador’s 
positive impact on American public opinion toward both Mussolini and Child 
figure 33. Prince Gelasio Caetani, December 
12, 1922. Photograph (digital file from original). 
Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs 
Division, LC-DIG-npcc-07583.
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himself.102 Since they came from an independent voice, Child’s counternarra-
tives were even more effective than Caetani’s efforts during the crisis. These had 
included an interview granted to the Associated Press and a well-publicized and 
reassuring meeting with President Harding.103
In both his diplomatic memoir and published essays, Child returned often to 
Mussolini’s personal stature as a kind of Übermensch.104 By the mid-1920s, the 
Duce’s reputation in American public culture was of someone who was more 
than a forceful foreign politician. To many, his unconventional approach to 
governance appeared to transcend Italy’s borders and traditions and, as such, to 
produce results both exceptional and exemplary. Fascism was an experimental 
political system that could inspire other nations, including democratic America. 
For instance, anti-immigration novelist Kenneth L. Roberts viewed Mussolini’s 
Fascism as a welcome antidote to the radical demagogy and corruption endemic 
to mass democracy.105 Through but also beyond his noteworthy accomplishments, 
Mussolini became a public personality whose entire life was worth telling and 
retelling to U.S. readers, particularly if writers knew how to combine exotic Italian 
elements with recognizably American features. As a former journalist and novel-
ist, Child knew that. After leaving the ambassadorship, he continued to write for 
years about and on behalf of Mussolini. In his work, he began to weave together 
narratives about the Duce as both a foreign leader and an American one. His 
contribution paralleled other hagiographic endeavors.
HAGIO GR APHIES
The graduating class [. . .] at Yale selected Kipling as the favorite poet. Will 
Rogers was the favorite world figure, with Al Capone and Mussolini tied for 
second honors.
Chicago Daily Tribune, 1931106
The key genre for the promotion of the Duce was the celebratory biography, 
whether in short or long format. Since the March on Rome, the American pub-
lic had become used to reading short biographical profiles of the Duce. Forum, 
Literary Digest, and Living Age had published them as early as 1923.107 By the mid-
1920s, the literature on Fascism and Mussolini began to include serialized auto-
biographies, such as those published by the very influential United Press news 
agency (UP) and the popular Saturday Evening Post. Consisting of ten installments 
each, they bore the name of Mussolini as their sole author but actually depended 
on the ghostwriting of Child and other remarkable mediators.108 As we saw with 
Valentino, the serialized autobiography enabled promotional agents to play a very 
effective role, particularly when revealing previously unknown personal details 
about their subject’s life. Overtly or covertly, Mussolini’s biographers sought to 
position the Duce as a most likeable figure who had effortlessly adopted American 
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traits, especially love of order and efficiency, but who had also maintained defining 
Italian ones, including authoritarian leadership.109
Child adopted this approach to Mussolini’s composite character in his mem-
oir A Diplomat Looks at Europe. Three of the memoir’s eleven chapters reworked, 
with only minor changes, Child’s SEP articles on Mussolini.110 In this volume, he 
unabashedly praised the Italian dictator as the architect of a new, postdemocratic 
nation. Child touched upon the familiar picturesque imagery of Naples before 
announcing the dawn of a new nation. “When I sailed up the magnificent Bay 
of Naples in July 1921,” he wrote, “I was the American ambassador to old Italy. 
When, after nearly three years, I looked back at the Italian Alps on my way home, 
I was still the ambassador to Italy, but it was a new Italy.”111 Child’s account then 
intertwined personal and political considerations, Italy’s alleged desperate need 
for a radical change, even a dictatorial one, and the unique fitness of Mussolini’s 
temperament for the job:
When a people faces an intolerable situation, the real ravenous hunger is not for a 
program, but for a man. In modern Italy they have the tradition that when a man is 
really needed he will rise up from the crowd. [. . .] Benito Mussolini was the strong 
leader of the expression of national spirit.112
For Child, the Italian situation was not at all a foreign one. Even though Italians’ 
recent strike-ridden history required the intervention of a strong hand, Mussolini’s 
rise could teach something to America. In this vein, he argued:
The real story, from which Americans and our own statesmen can draw useful les-
sons for the future, is a story not of an armed attack upon a flabby democracy which 
was wheedling and coddling everyone, but a story of leadership and discipline and 
national unity in the labor of erecting a new government.113
The former ambassador also maintained that Fascism constituted a model antidote 
to the political impasse he associated with the excesses of democratic machinery, 
including the demands for minority rights, which in his view had led to the decline 
of patriotic spirit. Fascism could reverse this worldwide political and constitutional 
gridlock by insisting on individual responsibility and civic obligations.
Fascismo is a philosophy and an emotion running counter to the recent stream of 
thought, which centers mankind’s attention on rights. Mussolini, without distin-
guishing between classes, is the first conspicuous leader since Roosevelt that has  
organized political unity not around rights but around duties.114
In other words, when approaching Fascism in terms of a disciplined regime, Child 
stressed what he considered Mussolini’s exhibition of the very American (albeit 
traditional) traits of self-control, order, and governmental effectiveness. As a 
result, comparisons with American presidents were easily conceivable. “The two 
preeminent rulers of the world today are not difficult to name,” he wrote in 1926. 
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“They are Mussolini and Coolidge. Each represents in his particular power of 
personality the revolt of peoples against unreality and their weariness of parlia-
mentary government—government by talk.”115
In addition to Child’s hagiographic work, Mussolini’s American fame was also 
indebted to the work of a cultured Venetian woman of Jewish background, the 
writer and art critic Margherita Sarfatti. A publicly loyal supporter, the polyglot 
Sarfatti remained one of the Duce’s closer advisors and nonexclusive lovers from 
late 1912 until the mid-1930s. She greatly influenced his theorization of the Fas-
cist mission, particularly regarding the relationships between the Italian state and 
the country’s artistic culture.116 Before her ghostwriting work on the serialized UP 
autobiography and her uncredited collaboration on what became Mussolini’s 
My Autobiography (1928), Sarfatti wrote, under her own name, the authorized 
biography The Life of Benito Mussolini (1925). With a preface by Mussolini himself, 
published both in English and in a handwritten facsimile Italian version meant to 
convey authenticity, the volume appeared both in the United Kingdom and the 
United States with said title (preferred by the publisher) and in Italy a year later 
with the title Sarfatti had wanted for all editions, Dux.117 Between 1926 and 1928, 
the American edition went through eighteen printings (five in 1926 alone). In the 
same two-year period, the book was translated into eighteen languages.118
Unlike Child’s political approach in his profile of the Duce, Sarfatti’s book-
length portrait focused more on Mussolini as a great man, specifically drawing 
out his character and personality as a young “Italian [.  .  .] par excellence.”119 In 
describing Mussolini as an exceptional individual and a predestined leader who 
achieved greatness by virtue of his own willpower, Sarfatti made it clear that she 
refused to follow “a pedantic chronological unity.” Instead, she adopted a “more 
genuine unity which is inherent in the character” of her hero, proceeding “as life 
has done with him and he with life—by leaps and bounds, by rapid advances and 
sudden retreats.”120 Sarfatti’s book intended to show how Mussolini’s charismatic 
leadership and attractive personality, not just his politics, would appeal to the 
Anglo-American reader. Possibly following the lead of established biographies of 
the giants of the American financial and industrial world, from Andrew Carnegie to 
Henry Ford, she told a story that most readers must have found familiar. Mussolini 
was a self-made man who had managed to rise from the anonymity of the crowd, 
effect change in the world of politics and journalism, and modernize Italy. His 
remarkable character and modern personality were his weapons. He combined 
the very traditional trait of exceptional personal discipline with the modern traits 
of charming personality, determined self-improvement, and committed self-care. 
Unsurprisingly, a significant section of The Life of Benito Mussolini was devoted to 
the Duce’s bodily activities and healthy diet.
Sarfatti showcased the Duce’s character by summarizing his life’s trajectory as 
a movement from humble origins to powerful positions that skillfully deployed 
such personal qualities as bravery and determination. In her tale, several episodes 
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attested that even in his early years he had displayed the qualities of “the true 
leader he already was.”121 Sarfatti presented the young man’s uncompromising 
stance against his old party and in favor of Italy’s intervention in the war, broad-
cast from the newspaper he had founded, as the mark of a true national hero and 
leader. Following what was already a hagiographic cliché, Sarfatti stressed how his 
participation in World War I and his injury were the turning points of his life. He 
overcame his painful near-death experience, during which he bore pain without 
medications, with superhuman willpower. In Sarfatti’s estimate, the Italian dic-
tator, just like Oliver Cromwell, George Washington, and Napoleon before him, 
had found his heroic calling during dramatic battlefield events.122 Beyond personal 
courage, what further launched him toward the country’s modern leadership was 
his political vision and communicative talent.
The volume, in fact, ended with a chapter titled “Mussolini the Man” in which 
Sarfatti insisted on not just the strength of his personal temperament but also on 
his talent as a successful journalist and communicator. In passages that were remi-
niscent of Anne O’Hare McCormick and Ivy Lee’s characterizations, Sarfatti sin-
gled out Mussolini’s exceptional oratorical skills, whose “frank, sensible, brusque” 
methods resulted in a directness unprecedented in Italian politics.123
His eloquence, resembling the bulletins of Napoleon, is not that of a man of letters, 
accustomed to seek at his writing-table the nuances of expression. He is a true man of 
action, living through in his own experience the experiences of history and touching 
the heart of a people through its imagination.124
Illustrated with eleven never-before-seen photographs of the Duce (Child’s vol-
ume had only two), The Life of Benito Mussolini paraded the special intimacy be-
tween author and subject. Instead of familiar poses of the Duce giving speeches 
or utterly still, the volume included two rarely seen photographs, one of Mussolini 
riding his horse and one in the company of his lioness, named Italia, which Time 
magazine used a year later on its second cover dedicated to the Italian leader.
The reviews of Sarfatti’s account were enthusiastic. The Illustrated London News 
greeted it as “likely to rank with the classic biographies.” It also admiringly mar-
veled at Mussolini’s preface, in which the Italian dictator did not necessarily articu-
late an ultimate political goal beyond his desire to “make a mark on [his] era with 
[his] will, like a lion with the claws.” The British paper found the way Mussolini 
described himself vis-à-vis his fame astonishing. Rather than defining himself as a 
political visionary, his self-assessment focused on his transformation under the me-
dia spotlight. The dramatic expansion of Mussolini’s public self through an intense 
and incessant degree of interest had produced a sort of anthropological change in 
his persona that went far beyond political merits and goals. Mussolini wrote:
The public man is born “public.” [. . .] The public man, like the poet, is born to his 
doom. He can never escape it. [.  .  .] I am perfectly resigned to my lot as a public 
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man. In fact, I am enthusiastic about it. Not just on account of my publicity which it 
entails. [. . .] No, it is the thought, the realization, that I no longer belong merely to 
myself, that I belong to all—loved by all, hated by all—that I am an essential element 
in the lives of theirs: this feeling has on me a kind of intoxicating effect.125
Quite similarly, in his review of the Italian dictator’s first authorized biography, 
John Carter of the New York Times wrote that “its principal interest lies in the 
currency it gives to the Mussolinic Legend.” In other words, the degree of public 
interest—his celebrity quota, so to speak—was for the reviewers the true and only 
criterion on which to assess him politically. “Sarfatti’s book,” Carter added, “is 
important for making us realize that it is impossible to appraise a statesman on 
any other basis than mythopoeia.”126 Carter attributed the Duce’s proud leadership 
to his Latin masculinity by sexualizing his relationship with Italians and with Italy 
as a whole:
Latin races appreciate virility in a statesman far more than do the Anglo-Saxon, 
whose politicians are expected to have distinguished themselves by their conspicu-
ous chastity at least before seeking office. Mussolini’s grasp on Italy is susceptible to 
the analysis of the psychology of sex.127
Possibly because written by someone who many knew to have been, and who 
perhaps still was, intimate with the Duce, Sarfatti’s The Life of Benito Mussolini 
appeared to reviewers open to consideration about the Duce’s virility. At the same 
time, however, Sarfatti’s work also represented a very modern way to read the per-
sonal dimension of political leaders. The virtues of public men—as the Venetian 
author implied and as her reviewers recognized—could not be limited to ques-
tions of morality, policy, and political talent but had to include insights into a 
person’s physical traits and inclinations.
In the following years, Sarfatti continued to weave biographical narratives 
about the Duce, but this time not under her own name. She apparently contrib-
uted to two serialized biographies of Mussolini, published by the UP news agency 
and the Saturday Evening Post. They exhibited her daring stylistic approach but 
were also in tune with the modern American notion of personality as “mastery 
and development of the self,” which entailed an explicit discussion of bodily tal-
ents and dispositions. These biographies focused on such celebrated and uplifting 
traits as work efficiency but also gave large space in praise of Mussolini’s magnetic 
voice, rhetorical ability, and physical self-care. The first of these serialized biog-
raphies, entitled Mussolini’s Own Story of His Busy Life, was syndicated between 
January 5 and January 15, 1927, by UP, which at the time served over a thousand 
newspapers across the United States and in another thirty-five countries.128 Appar-
ently, the authors of this series were Sarfatti and UP’s Rome manager, Thomas B. 
Morgan.129 In “one of the outstanding newspaper exploits of recent years,” boasted 
the promotional material as if it were referring to a film celebrity, “Mussolini tells 
the intimate, personal story of his daily life.”130 
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Over ten articles, the series deploys the theme of efficiency to an exceptional 
degree, as its title’s use of the word busy foreshadows. In the introduction to the 
first article, the editor presents the dictator as someone who “works intensively 
fourteen to sixteen hours a day” and who regards “personal efficiency [as] his 
fetish” to the point that “every minute of each day is scheduled in advance.”131 
Mussolini’s opening words read like a Macfadden self-help manual of personal 
productivity: “It has been my rule of life to employ the body and mind to render 
the maximum output.” To guarantee such efficiency, Mussolini notes, he has to fol-
low a series of strict rules and personal daily routines, including eating and drink-
ing habits (i.e., milk instead of alcohol).132 The link between control of his own 
body and that of his country was an obvious rhetorical isomorphism linking body 
politics with body economics. It also held a proud nationalist dimension. By trans-
ferring the concept of efficiency from American business culture to himself and his 
own administration, Mussolini sought to contrast the stigmatizing characteristics 
usually attributed to Italians—such as disorganization, ineptitude, and sentimen-
talism—with the image of a new Italian man who was efficient, pragmatic, and, 
most importantly, disciplined.133 At the same time, he acknowledges the American 
imprint of the vaunted notion of work efficiency. “The United States [. . .] created 
smooth-running organizations of human units,” he writes in the fourth article of the 
series. “It is just such business efficiency on a larger scale we have tried to work into 
the government machine of Italy. We are succeeding.”134 Ultimately, Mussolini’s work 
efficiency was associated with his effort to change, renew, and improve Italy and the 
Italians effectively, but it was also well attuned to the businesslike American attitude 
that emphasized achieving results no matter the personal costs.
Shortly after, another series much richer in tone and content appeared in 
the Saturday Evening Post. Published from May 5 to October 27, 1928, in one of 
America’s most popular periodicals, this series did not have single, overarching 
title and was later republished in a volume under the title of My Autobiography.135 
Allegedly written by Mussolini himself, both the SEP installments and the resulting 
volume in fact had multiple authors. Mussolini’s brother Arnaldo, possibly with 
Sarfatti, wrote the Italian text. Child translated this into English in collaboration 
with the Corriere della Sera correspondent Luigi Barzini Jr.136 Child also wrote the 
volume’s eight-page foreword, finalizing it probably during a late 1927 trip to Rome.137 
In the foreword, Child described Mussolini’s political leadership as “celebrity” 
and adopted a cinematic term of comparison (“his own size on the screen of 
history”) to emphasize the modernity of his public image.As in other accounts, 
Mussolini emerges in My Autobiography as a leader who was born in a great 
nation but personally came from nothing. Even though he had a strong father 
figure, in his early life he was often aimless. The Great War marked his path and 
made him see the “the death struggle of a worn-out democracy,” to quote one 
of the chapters, found Fascism, and take Rome. The book also includes chap-
ters on the “five years of government,” the future of the Fascist state, and the 
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“political and social doctrine of fascism.” But Child’s foreword provides the lens 
with which all the narrative can profitably be read as the profile of a larger-than-
life politician.
The virilized physical newness of Mussolini’s energetic political leadership, 
visible to Child in the dictator’s “firm jaws” or audible in “a sentence suddenly 
ejaculated,” glorified rather than tamed any reference to the dictatorial nature of 
his regime.138 In an American context that could safely imagine from afar what 
it would be like to witness the demise of democratic institutions, Child did not 
see any reason to downplay the autocratic measures that Fascist government had 
taken:
In our time it may be shrewdly forecast that no man will exhibit dimensions of per-
manent greatness equal to those of Mussolini. [. . .] It is one thing to administer a 
state. The one who does this well is called statesman. It is quite another thing to make 
a state. Mussolini has made a state. That is superstatemanship.139
As he did in his IAS speech and elsewhere, in the foreword Child transitions from 
an emphasis on Mussolini’s domestic political leadership, which had resulted in 
an infusion of vigor into Italy’s new generations (“youth itself, appears as if born 
with a new spirit, a new virility bred in the bones”), to comparisons with his politi-
cal idol. “Mussolini, like Roosevelt,” he notes, “gives the impression of an energy 
which cannot be bottled, which bubbles up and over like an eternally effervescent, 
irrepressible fluid.”140
My Autobiography, like other biographical profiles of the Duce, also seeks to 
stress the extent to which Mussolini’s Latin masculinity made him quite differ-
ent from his American counterparts. While describing his work discipline and 
political aspirations, for instance, Mussolini often advised against the presence 
of women in the workplace. “I have given imperative orders that [.  .  . ] where 
I work [. . .] no woman shall be admitted,” he noted in an installment of the UP 
autobiographical series, since women “interfere with the efficient procedure of the 
work.”141 He did not hesitate repeating such misogynist and backward views on 
other occasions, even when a woman was interviewing him. Still, his prejudice did 
not prevent women journalists from expressing admiration for his charming Latin 
personality—a contradictory phenomenon that paralleled Valentino’s potentially 
damaging, but regularly forgiven, public statements against gender equality.
“MUSSOLINI  A SHEIK”
I began all over again to meditate upon this extraordinary man whose atti-
tude toward women is so disdainful and yet who has so undeniable a charm. 
Psychoanalysis cast aside, I found myself reflecting before the Chigi Palace 
entrance was reached: “No wonder women are crazy about him.”
Alice Rohe, Liberty Magazine, 1927142
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In different ways, Child and Lamont emphasized Mussolini’s leadership and po-
litical ingeniousness as well as the regime’s suitability to the Italian people. A few 
American female journalists stressed the same political angle in their reports. Yet 
the mere fact of their gender seems to have pushed them, either by their own will 
or by the insistence of their editors, to combine political analysis with insights into 
Mussolini’s personal temperament.143 If the emphasis on leadership constituted 
the shared political domain between the Divo and the Duce, personal charisma 
and Latin sensuality provided the erotic one. A few women writers performed this 
double public relations service. In addition to the already mentioned Anne O’Hare 
McCormick, we should also include UP writer and photojournalist Alice Rohe, 
who translated the Fascist regime’s political novelty into a masculine model and for 
more than ten years penned a positive account of the chauvinist Mussolini.
As already discussed, the Great War was a seismic event for communication 
and journalism. More female reporters than ever before joined male colleagues 
on European soil to cover the war. Kansas-born Alice Rohe was one of them. 
A few jobs as a reporter for newspapers in Kansas and Colorado enabled her to 
cross paths with George Creel. After she joined the CPI, she soon became a national 
figure.144 Already in Rome in 1914 as a correspondent for UP and the Exchange 
Telegraph of London, she remained in the Italian capital until 1919. By then she had 
become the first woman to manage the Rome office of UP’s international bureau.145
A few days after the March on Rome, Rohe interviewed Mussolini for the New 
York Times. At the end of the long, four-column piece, after offering praise for his 
youth, outstanding culture, and visionary leadership talent, Rohe focused on what 
today we might refer to as his gender politics. A committed defender of women’s 
equal rights, Rohe asked Mussolini whether he thought that “the mind of a woman, 
given the same opportunity for development, the same education, doesn’t func-
tion as well as that of a man.” “Certainly not—it is impossible,” he replied.146 Rohe 
voiced her disappointment at the Duce’s unapologetic display of male chauvinism 
but was not wholly discouraged. She gently reprimanded him, but closed the piece 
with a surprisingly affectionate tone: Mussolini “laughed good-naturedly, but with 
that fine superiority with which the Latin male regards woman.”147 An article Rohe 
published five years later in Liberty Magazine on the Duce as “idol of women” best 
captured this contradictory reaction in its subtitle—“He Pours Contempt on the 
Softer Sex—And It Adores Him!” (figure 34).148
That article begins by reporting how the women of Rome, “titled beauties of 
ancient Italian lineage, look upon the Fascist Dictator.”149 They adore what he has 
done for Italy, but most surprisingly they adore him. Rohe describes one of them 
as behaving “like a schoolgirl over her favorite movie hero.” By her own admission, 
the comparison with the film world led her to a recently published article in the 
search for a successor to Valentino in Italy. Rohe then combines the two domains, 
film and political stardom, in a way that surprises even her:
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Suddenly I began to think of Mussolini in a new light. Why search further? I strug-
gled to suppress the boldly intrusive idea. Mussolini a sheik—perish the thought! Yet 
this dominant, indomitable Dictator, whose contempt for women is proverbial, not 
only has Italy in the hollow of his hand, but he has Italy’s women at his feet.150
The equation of the real Mussolini with a Hollywood archetype require articula-
tion: on what grounds is it based? The author’s visits to Mussolini’s rallies reveal to 
her the outstanding appeal he enjoyed among Italian women, to the point that she 
herself does not feel immune from it. “Everywhere adoration illuminated the faces 
of the women,” she observes. “Young and old, they kept creeping nearer and nearer 
to where he was speaking. Before I realized it, I, too, was among them, drawn 
forward by the magnetism of the black-shirted premier.” While the general enthu-
siasm of the masses for the Duce may find an explanation in a broad discussion 
figure 34. Mussolini’s perplexing appeal. Alice Rohe, “Mussolini: Idol of 
Women,” Liberty Magazine, September 17, 1927, 9.
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about leaders’ power over mobs and masses (“To see Mussolini before his cohorts 
is to understand the power of the individual over the mass mind”), for Rohe, there 
is something else worth exploring. Given the Duce’s public disdain for any role for 
women beyond biological service to the nation, Rohe wonders how to explain “this 
feminine phenomenon” and whether it proves “conclusively that women prefer 
the dominant, patronizing, arrogantly indifferent male.” At first, Rohe attributes 
such a self-defeating attitude to an Italian cultural trait. “Italian women worship 
a dominant male. They revel in submission to super contempt,” she charges, and 
she identifies such misplaced “feminine idolatry” for a man who mainly regards 
women as servants as evidence of “a somewhat primal force in modern, Fascist 
Italy.” And yet, she notices, “I have seen too many of my own countrywomen com-
pletely enthralled [by him].” They are a diverse lot: “sophisticated cosmopolites, 
‘hard-boiled flappers,’ placid wives of prominent U.S. citizens, skeptical newspaper 
women, 100-percent feminists.” But no matter their backgrounds, when they have 
the chance to meet “Italy’s man of destiny,” they reemerge “as utter vassals.”151
How could Rohe explain women’s tolerance for the Duce’s misogynist attitude, 
which had not changed over the years? To her dismay, the explanation lies in their 
experience of his irresistible personal appeal, a “great magnetism” which she her-
self has experienced. In a combination of psychoanalytic reading and cinematic 
reviewing, Rohe states, “The plain answer is sex appeal,” and “Dr. Freud could 
give the most illuminating explanation [by suggesting that] this element is at all 
times extremely vital in Italy.”152 Rather than describing sex appeal as resulting 
from a direct relationship between the Duce and his admirers, her exploration of 
this cinematic quality leads her identify a photographic mediation that is close to 
her reporting practice: the close-up view. “The very strength of the face, with its 
uncompromising, sensual mouth, the compelling domination of the prominent 
eyes, the brutal tenacity of the head,” she admits, “radiated sex appeal” because 
a photographic camera captured it at close range before countless reproductions 
multiplied it ad infinitum. “When you study a personal close-up of this domi-
nant, domineering, imperial, and imperious face, the spell which he exerts over 
women is not surprising.”153 Ultimately, his mass-reproduced captivating charm 
easily lends itself to comparisons with stars’ appeal. A few months earlier Elinor 
Glyn had even included Mussolini (and the Prince of Wales) among those who 
“have IT.”154
Rohe did not change her view or tone over the years. In 1937 she could still write: 
“There are certain types of women who are even attracted by his contempt.”155 This 
time she provides a fresh insight: “I have known Mussolini for fifteen years. I have 
watched his power over the mass mind, but more significant because of the public-
ity given him in the Great Lover role, I have witnessed his power over women.”156 
It was not just “that he has ‘It’ and ‘Sex Appeal.’ ” More cogently, it was the fact that 
something of the private dimension of this Italian political leader had been made 
to become his defining trait.
194    The Romance of Undemocratic Governing
The sudden introduction of the love element into the macabre drama which 
Mussolini is enacting on the world stage calls attention to an important phase of  
Il Duce’s life. This is his power over women, a power which has played no small part 
in his success.157
The public exposure of a person’s private personality, unprecedented for someone 
playing such a demiurgic political role, was for Rohe part and parcel of his cin-
ematic allure. A few articles that appeared in Liberty Magazine were even more 
explicit with cinematic metaphors and terms of comparison. In a spring 1927 
piece on screen tests, the method of determining actors’ cinematic suitability and 
appeal beyond mere physical appearance, the staff writer and editor Brenda Ueland 
points out that passing a screen test is just a first step toward success. “To become a 
star you must have something else. Some call it ‘charm;’ some ‘personality;’ some, 
‘sex appeal.’ ” She inevitably quotes Elinor Glyn, “who calls it ‘it.’ ” The rest of the 
article constitutes a series of insights on the subject shared by a Hollywood film-
maker, A. Edward “Eddie” Sutherland. After referring to famous actors, Suther-
land argues that history’s greatest statesmen had cinematic magnetism:
When Napoleon walked toward a squad of men whose rifles were pointed at him, 
they couldn’t fire. [. . .] Now, Napoleon and Caesar, if they had gone into the movies, 
would have become great stars. So would Mussolini, Bernard Shaw, Nell Gwyn,  
Henry IV, Abélard and Héloïse, Lord Nelson, Diane de Poitiers, and many others.
And that is about the best way I can explain it.158
The ease with which the Hollywood director moved from discussing stars’ success-
ful screen tests to the charm of great statesmen impinges upon two intersecting 
domains. Film culture does not just pertain to leisure time; political leadership 
does not just pertain to policy positions, ideological convictions, or (traditional) 
personal character. True, political adversaries deployed a combination of alarm 
and sarcasm in their emphasis on Mussolini’s performative talent. Anti-Fascist 
historian Gaetano Salvemini labeled him a “clown,” while expatriate anarchist 
Camillo Bernieri went so far in 1934 as to call the Duce “the Rodolfo Valentino 
of politics.”159 But the intersection of the two domains produced comparisons 
between the Divo and the Duce, in a speech or a cartoon, that were not motivated 
solely by political antagonism. In an interview, the Hollywood actress Nita Naldi, 
who had played the femme fatale in Valentino’s Blood and Sand (1923) and was a 
close friend of the actor, confessed her preferred type of male companion. “I like 
very dark handsome men with slick hair who wear evening clothes like ambas-
sadors,” Naldi confessed to the reporter that she liked men who look like Rudolph 
Valentino. But she went on: “Also I like them to be fierce and quarrelsome. Sol-
diers I adore! Mussolini! Cave men!”160 In her terms, “Valentino” was a person, 
whereas “Mussolini” was an attribute, a popular, and thus mass-mediated, type of 
masculinity that was “fierce and quarrelsome”—and as such akin to a “sheik.” For 
the Duce’s masculinity to become “typical,” it had to be publicly associated with 
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the personal style of his political governance rather than with its substance. And 
it could achieve this level of cultural amplification mainly through references to 
motion pictures. Cinema, in fact, provided the terrain of comparison as well as of 
competition with Valentino.
An illustration that appeared in the January 1926 Liberty Magazine captures 
exactly that (figure 35).161 Created by the famous New Yorker cartoonist Ralph Barton, 
the drawing pairs the Divo and the Duce under the fresh, personalized terms of 
a public confrontation that obviously stresses both their differences and similari-
ties.162 Graphically, the two figures are in parallel positions, with the back and top 
of their heads radiating the same white reflections out of well-oiled hair or a formal 
hat (or topper).163 Calvino would have recognized in the image the “first Mussolini,” 
the emblem of respectability and restored order who at official ceremonies habitu-
ally sported a morning coat and a tie.164 The cartoon’s implied context is Valentino 
and Mussolini’s widely publicized rift over the former’s decision to acquire U.S. 
citizenship and the latter’s response of having his films banned in Italy. In the 
drawing, however, the actual terrain of their confrontation is not legal citizenship 
but cinematic visibility. Underneath the cartoon is a long caption that begins in 
capital letters. It goes on to explain the drawing in terms that certainly refer to the 
issue of citizenship but qualify the two figures in cinematic terms:
Benito Mussolini, Italy’s Premier and leading news-reel actor, caught off his guard 
by our camera man as he views a poster announcing Rudolph Valentino in a motion 
picture. A boycott was shortly afterwards proclaimed on Valentino pictures.165
The cartoon’s raison d’être (and its design) was the fact that Mussolini and 
Valentino were both public popular figures, subjects of countless publicity initia-
tives. While in the mid-1920s this may have appeared obvious for a film star, it was 
still a novelty for a politician. In a 1928 NYT article, UP publicity director Warren 
Nolan, who had handled publicity for Chaplin, Pickford, Fairbanks, and even for 
Valentino’s funeral, praised Mussolini as a masterful “space-grabber.”
Benito Mussolini is the world’s champion space-getter, because in five years he has 
press-agented Italy into a front-line position as a world power and himself into Julius 
Caesar’s mighty sandals. Il Duce is even more famous than that countryman of his, 
Rudolph Valentino, whose illness and death sent more verbiage over press wires than 
did the illness and death of an ex-president.166
Further, the basis for the cartoon’s comparison between Valentino and Mussolini 
was the fact that they were both film stars—one of fiction films, the other of news-
reels. The recognition that Mussolini, too, was a film celebrity had been made 
explicit and literal by the news and by the release of films starring the Italian 
leader. These began with The Eternal City (1924) and continued with The Man of 
the Hour (1927) and several hard-to-find American newsreels, as we shall see in the 
next chapter.167 Yet, as we saw at the beginning of this chapter, the identification 
figure 35. Mussolini versus Valentino. Ralph Barton, “News of the 
World,” Liberty Magazine, January 16, 1926, 53.
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of Mussolini as “movie star” had inaugurated his popular hagiography in early 
November 1922, when no films about him were known to be in the making.168 The 
fact that Mussolini was considered “cinematic” in American press discourse before 
being screened in the New World supports the methodological postulate of this 
work that the cinema effect extended beyond the domain of movie theaters.169 It is 
time now to look closely at how American and Italian films exhibited in the United 
States sought to tell stories about Mussolini as Fascist leader by showcasing his role 
as political leader through romanticized transfigurations.
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I have a picture of Mussolini in a scene in which I am directing him how  
to act.
George Fitzmaurice, director of The Eternal City, 19241
Italy’s pet fire eater is the star of the newsreel sections.
Picture-Play Magazine, 19242
The literature on Mussolini’s relationship to motion pictures within the Italian 
context has been extremely rich, particularly since the late 1970s. It has generally 
focused on the extent to which the Fascist government, through various ministers, 
programs, and talented individuals, sought to exercise an effective control over 
film production, distribution, and exhibition. The creation of the newsreel agen-
cy Istituto LUCE (L’Unione per la Cinematografia Educativa) in 1924, the spon-
sor of the Venice Film Festival in 1931, the creation of the ENIC (Ente Nazionale 
dell’Industria Cinematografica [General Directorate of Cinematography]) in 1935, 
and the building of Cinecittà Studios in 1937 are just some of the milestones of the 
regime’s efforts to control most aspects of Italian film culture.3 A growing literature 
has focused on the ways in which Mussolini’s actions and images came to domi-
nate several aspects of this culture—from newsreels to film stardom.4 Finally, more 
recent scholarly attention has been given to the cult of Mussolini within Italian 
film culture and in other forms of mass communications.5
The Fascist government, however, could only indirectly control Mussolini’s 
screen presence and circulation in the United States, in terms of both Italian and 
American productions. The regime had to enter into partnerships with Hollywood 
studios, newsreel companies, and distribution firms; to negotiate directly with the 
MPPDA to ensure what it deemed a fair national representation; and sometimes 
to establish agreements with private distributors and individual theaters (which 
often ended in disappointment). What kind of stories about itself could the regime 
sell to Americans? The conventional distinction between Fascism as movement 
and as regime, articulated by Renzo De Felice in his monumental biography of the 
Duce and his study of Fascism’s institutionalization, does not apply to its American 
representation.6 Fascism as either a violent movement, a complex historical 
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phenomenon, or an autocratic ideology was not commercially viable in demo-
cratic America. Instead, Fascism could be sold as a triumphant administrative 
solution to the challenges that every government faces. Yet even a well-organized 
regime could not easily be translated into a popular narrative: a national ar-
rangement centered on a single public personality, bigger than any movement or 
regime, was preferable. This possibility rested on a caveat that concerned Mussolini’s 
American middlemen. Casting the Duce as the Fascist regime’s celebrity-performer 
meant inserting him in fictional or nonfictional narratives that were familiar to 
the American public but that were not of his own making or under his control.7 
Early fictional productions from Italy, especially when set in Roman times and 
thus aligned with the regime’s celebration of Rome’s political history, were no lon-
ger appealing to American audiences. The case of Messalina (1924), a passé histori-
cal epic by Enrico Guazzoni, who ten years earlier had directed Quo Vadis? (1913), 
is symptomatic. American trade papers maintained that costly Italian historical 
productions relied on financial backing from Mussolini’s regime and served his 
interests.8 The film struggled to find distributors who did not prefer the superior 
production values of Fox’s colossal Dante’s Inferno (1924).9
The distinction between productions from Italy and from the United States is 
a productive one, but it is also complicated by the fact that several key American 
productions were shot in Italy and as such were not divorced from the regime’s 
tentative reach. The case of The Eternal City (1924), a modern political melodrama 
produced by a Hollywood studio and filmed in Rome, is extremely illuminating 
of the kind of intense negotiations that Hollywood and the regime’s middlemen 
engaged in not long after the March on Rome.
THE ETERNAL CIT Y
As we have all come to realize, even the most important of “international 
relations” have to be carried on by individuals.
Will H. Hays, 195510
With the possible exception of a few brief newsreel sequences, the first opportu-
nity for Mussolini to be screened across America was through the Goldwyn pro-
duction The Eternal City. Besides granting cinematic visibility to a dictator that 
some in the press had been raving about for almost two years, the film is important 
for two other reasons. On a production level, it identifies the various institutional 
and commercial parties interested in the propagation of Fascism and its leader in 
America. On the level of reception, it shows what Mussolini and his American 
representatives came to learn about political propaganda.
Directed by George Fitzmaurice and written by his wife, Ouida Bergère, 
The Eternal City was filmed in Rome in the summer of 1923 just a few months 
after the March on Rome.11 Italy was not an uncommon destination for several 
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Hollywood companies at the time. Fitzmaurice, who would direct The Son of the 
Sheik in 1926, had already filmed The Man from Home (Famous Players–Lasky, 
May 1922) in Sorrento.12 According to Goldwyn’s biographer A. Scott Berg, it was 
Fitzmaurice who had “recommended a play Paramount had filmed in 1915, Sir 
Hall Caine’s ‘The Eternal City’ ” and it was Ouida Bergère who had “suggested 
updating this love story, set against post-Risorgimento Rome, to Mussolini’s 
Italy.”13 At the turn of the century, the British writer Hall Caine (1853–1931) was 
extraordinarily popular. He had originally conceived The Eternal City as a play 
but published it as a novel in 1901. It became his most successful work. It would be 
translated into thirteen languages and sold more than a million copies in English 
alone. The stage version was also a success in both the United Kingdom and the 
United States.14
The story is a political romance in which the hero, David Rossi (Bert Lytell), 
is accused of plotting to murder the Italian king. The screen adaptation changed 
the story’s political color from a celebration of socialist heroism to one of Fascist 
victory. In this updated film version, the hero is now Mussolini’s right-hand man, 
whose beloved Donna Roma (Barbara La Marr) first appears to be on the wrong 
political side due to her close rapport with a Communist villain, Baron Bonelli 
(Lionel Barrymore), before she reveals her loyalty to her man. After scenes of mass 
gatherings of Fascist sympathizers at the Coliseum and clashes with the Commu-
nist rivals, the film climaxes in an actual view of a victorious Mussolini on the bal-
cony of the royal palace, beside the Italian king, and David and Donna’s romantic 
reunion (figures 36 and 37).
figure 36. Fascist leader David Rossi (Bert Lytell) rallying his supporters 
inside the Coliseum, before clashes with Socialist adversaries in The Eter-
nal City (1924). Courtesy of Museum of Modern Art Film Stills Archive.
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The extent to which the Fascists contributed financially and logistically to the 
filming of The Eternal City has long remained unclear. Berg suggests that “when 
the Fascists caught wind of the film and demanded its confiscation, Fitzmaurice 
and his crew quickly left the country,” and the cinematographer “smuggled the 
negative safely out of Italy.”15 The archival evidence tells a slightly different story. 
The embassy’s press clipping service and the correspondence of the Italian ambas-
sador Gelasio Caetani with several individuals, from Fitzmaurice and MPPDA 
head Will H. Hays to various Italian ministers and even Mussolini himself, shed 
light on the circumstances of the film’s production, final version, and commer-
cial distribution. They also reveal how American producers and Italian authorities 
sought to work together to promote the film.
figure 37. The Eternal City (1924), full-page advertisement, Photoplay, 
January 1924, 3.
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This is not a story of a well-planned and direct public relations campaign in 
favor of Mussolini but of a series of collaborative attempts between Hollywood 
filmmakers and Italian authorities to enable the production and distribution 
of a supportive and profitable film. The Eternal City also constituted a learning 
curve for the Italian officials involved: while they quickly regarded it as a unique 
opportunity for effective propaganda, they were initially unaware of the commercial 
imperatives of American film culture. The archival record does not include docu-
ments that reveal who approached whom, but they suggest that upon Goldwyn’s 
request, Hays first contacted Ambassador Caetani to assess whether the Italian 
government was in favor of the production and was willing to support it.
Caetani’s initial support of the film was likely due to the Fascist regime’s new 
directive about the importance of motion pictures for political communication. 
That directive had come down as a ministerial circular (no. 16) from Mussolini 
himself in his role as minister of foreign affairs and was widely distributed on 
March 1, 1923. Devoted to propaganda abroad, the Duce’s directive centered on 
the cinematic medium. For Mussolini, films were to illustrate “in an attracting and 
interesting way the wealth and power of our industries, the unmatched natural 
and artistic beauty of Italy [. . .] while always culminating with glorifying visions of 
our army and military forces.” The circular informed all interested parties—mostly 
diplomats, ambassadors, and consuls—that Mussolini had created a commission 
of experts who were to curate the publication of literary works that would faithfully 
reproduce in words what films showed on screen.16 Considering how carefully 
Caetani would always approach the issue of Fascist propaganda in America, being 
aware of the obvious risks of meddling with American politics, the opportunity 
to support an American production by established Hollywood filmmakers that 
featured the Duce must have seemed more than intriguing.
Before Mussolini’s circular reached his desk, Caetani had already understood the 
importance of motion pictures for broadcasting a positive image of Italy in America. 
Earlier that year, he had contacted the MPPDA about past and recent anti-Italian 
productions. On January 26, 1923, the vice president and secretary of the MPPDA, 
Courtland Smith, reassured Caetani that “Mr. Hays again desires to assure you that 
it is our most sacred duty and greatest pleasure to assist in developing international 
good will and friendly relations with each country, and that our members would 
not do consciously that which in a broad sense would give offense to any nation.”17 
Caetani immediately copied the letter and conveyed its content to both Mussolini 
and to the head of the League for the Protection of National Interest, Oscar 
Sinigaglia. The ambassador added that he had notified the consular offices to collect 
and submit to him information about anti-Italian productions in order to pressure 
the MPPDA to secure appropriate measures according to its own promises.18 Yet, 
this rather defensive approach soon gave way to a more assertive one.
One day in April 1923 Caetani phoned Hays, asking for a meeting. He knew that 
the first American fiction film about Fascism could be, as he wrote to a high Fascist 
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official, “most important for our American propaganda.”19 But he needed assur-
ances that the production and the final result would turn out to be in accordance 
with what he considered the story and essence of Fascism.20 Hays scheduled 
the meeting for May 4 and informed Caetani that Sam Goldwyn and George 
Fitzmaurice, The Eternal City’s producer and director, would also be present.21 
Further, Hays confirmed to the Italian ambassador the MPPDA’s policy regarding 
representations of foreign nations that in terms of diplomatic strategy aligned with 
the U.S. State Department.
As [Undersecretary of State William] Phillips explained to you[, . . .] it is the earnest 
purpose of the producer and the Association that the production may square exactly 
with all of the proprieties and that the picture may be a definite contribution to the 
progress of international amity.22
The meeting took place and apparently went well. Still, as Mussolini’s key repre-
sentative in America, Caetani wanted written assurance about the film’s treatment 
of Fascism. In a letter to Hays, he used the MPPDA chief ’s own words: “I shall 
highly appreciate if, as you suggested, this production will give a correct picture 
of my country and will be a definite contribution to the progress of international 
amity.” Only upon receipt of such written confirmation could Caetani offer all 
possible help in the form of “letters recommending to the authorities in Italy that 
all possible facilities be given.”23 To reassure the ambassador, Hays sent him letters 
that the MPPDA chief had received from Sam Goldwyn, whose prose was so for-
mal that it was likely written with the explicit goal of sounding like “a very definite 
commitment,” as Hays later described them to Caetani.24 The ambassador found 
these exchanges “quite definite and satisfactory.”25 He was further reassured follow-
ing meetings with the director, Fitzmaurice, and his wife, Ouida Bergère, who was 
working on adapting Caine’s novel to the Fascist context.
Through these exchanges, the practice of a Fascist official mediating between 
Hollywood and the Italian government started to take hold. In his letter to Hays, 
Caetani suggested that it was Mrs. Fitzmaurice who had come up with the idea of 
securing a trusted representative of the ambassador (and the Fascist government) 
assist them in Rome and correct any historical inaccuracies to avoid subsequent 
embarrassment. In a June cable to Mussolini, however, Caetani claimed that he was 
the one who had the idea of inserting a trusted representative to assist, advise, and 
report about the filming in Rome. That person turned out to be none other than 
Countess Irene di Robilant, IAS’s factotum secretary and Caetani’s close collabora-
tor on this and other propaganda initiatives. Both the studio and Hays himself were 
enthusiastic about her presence, whose power in Italian government circles and 
knowledge of American and Italian cultures would well serve all the parties involved.
On June 8 Caetani informed Mussolini about The Eternal City’s production, 
mentioning Hays as “the chief of American cinematography,” and describing the 
film as a grandiose $600,000 production destined to circulate widely throughout 
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the United States.26 Caetani told the Duce that he “immediately saw the importance 
of such an instrument of propaganda.” Still, in order to avoid any misunderstand-
ing about “the nature and the spirit of the fascist movement,” he informed the Duce 
that he had managed to secure the presence of di Robilant, whom he described as 
“secretary and soul of the Italy American Society,” to serve as chief location adviser 
in Italy. He also reassured him that the producers had made every effort to change 
the plot, avoid mistakes, and return “a correct vision of fascism from its latent state 
during the early days of the war to the triumph of the March on Rome.” Caetani 
concluded his communication to Mussolini by mentioning that if screened in 
America’s “twenty-five thousand movie theaters,” the history of Fascism was bound 
to be watched by millions of people.27 Meanwhile the ambassador had already 
requested assistance from several key figures in politics, film, and journalism who 
would support the shooting in terms of logistics (i.e., permits) and publicity.
Instead of overseeing the production from the Italian embassy in Washington, 
Caetani eventually took matters into his own hands and spent part of that sum-
mer in Rome. His goal was to assist his intermediaries, particularly di Robilant, 
not just with logistics, particularly for the large scenes featuring army and cavalry 
soldiers, but also and more significantly in securing the film’s ideological integ-
rity and controlling the publicity narrative.28 Caetani wanted to have his name 
associated with a production that stressed the political novelty of the regime. On 
July 25, 1923, Il Giornale d’Italia described a production supervised by the “tireless 
Prince Caetani,” that promised to offer “a clear and synthetic view of the fascist 
movement, in its ethical essence and in its patriotic and political goals.” The pro-
motional article highlighted the same figures that the ambassador had used in 
his communication with Mussolini: millions of spectators attending the country’s 
“twenty-five thousand movie theaters” were bound to enjoy this most “efficacious 
propaganda of Italianness.”29
Filming did not go smoothly. In mid-July the Italian chief of police, Emilio De 
Bono, informed Caetani that he was concerned about scenes showing wretched 
returning soldiers, widespread poverty, and communists spitting on the Italian 
flag.30 Caetani must have shared his own concern with the filmmakers. In late July, 
Fitzmaurice reassured him by offering him the chance to “view the picture in New 
York upon its completion.” The director also granted the ambassador the opportu-
nity of correcting any error “to insure that our picture will be a true representation 
of your great movement.”31 The publicity machine was already active in America 
too, but here it was out of Caetani’s direct control.
On August 28, 1923, a long article appeared in the White Plains Reporter; it 
included an interview with Fitzmaurice about filming The Eternal City in Fascist 
Italy. Variously edited, sections of the interview eventually made their way into the 
trade press. The director certainly said a few of the right things, including the fact 
that the filmmakers “received a great deal of help from the Government and were 
permitted to go everywhere.” In a few instances, however, Fitzmaurice’s answers 
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were problematic, particularly when he revealed that Fascism had many detractors 
in Italy. “When we reached Rome,” he noted, “some of the people were glad that we 
were to make a Fascist production, while others were opposed to the idea.” Fur-
ther, Caetani feared that the director’s public insistence that the film did not con-
stitute “good propaganda” was going to exert the opposite effect and hurt the film’s 
commercial potential. His more disturbing statements pertained to Mussolini’s 
participation. “I even photographed Mussolini in the picture,” he boasted, “and 
in a sort of prologue, which we call a trailer, I have a picture of Mussolini in a 
scene in which I am directing him how to act.”32 In effect, Fitzmaurice’s statement 
reduced Mussolini to an actor working for a Hollywood director, a mere perform-
er in a story that the Italian leader had not supervised and over which he exercised 
only indirect influence through his subordinates. This statement ran against all the 
publicity narratives that had made the Duce the cognizant and in-charge protago-
nist of a historical event.
In addition, The Eternal City itself did not match the Fascist officials’ expecta-
tions. Caetani returned to Washington in late September and, upon Goldwyn’s 
invitation, watched the film in New York on November 15.33 Di Robilant had seen 
it a week before and had shared her disappointment with the ambassador. While 
she did not find much objectionable about the production—except for an intertitle 
that read “in a country famous for its vagabonds”—she nonetheless found it over-
all “dull.” In her view “the whole [Fascist] movement appears entirely to have been 
censored as a strike-breaking organization.” She added:
Nothing of the history of spirituality of the movement itself appears, and this is all 
the more astonishing, when we remember how hard we all worked, exactly on that 
part. I have written pages and pages of history, we arranged for patriotic visions, and 
some of that material was actually photographed. For commercial reasons it has not 
been included in the picture.34
Her final impression was that The Eternal City “would not even be a financial suc-
cess. There is no thrill, and the story is not exciting. The end falls entirely flat.” 
Disappointed, she feared that upon seeing the film, Fascist officials would criticize 
her and the ambassador. She had expected much more “after having disturbed the 
Duce, the Army, the Police.”35
Di Robilant’s impression influenced Caetani’s. After watching the film, he did 
not hesitate to convey his disappointment to Goldwyn. Caetani had many reserva-
tions about missing or incomplete intertitles that he felt were needed to explain 
the historical context. He also did not appreciate the scarcity of iconic images, 
whether related to World War I or “the fascists saluting with extended arms dur-
ing the march on Rome.” Revealing an unexpected understanding of film editing, 
he told di Robilant about his advice to Fitzmaurice that the Duce’s “pictures would 
not be inserted in the play, but would either precede or follow the film.”36 Eloquently 
emphasizing the political stakes, Caetani declared that he could not agree that 
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Mussolini should appear as “one of the actors of the Goldwyn Company.”37 This 
was also sensitive promotional issue that affected the Duce’s standing in relation-
ship to the film’s narrative. Mussolini was the demiurge of the Fascist movement, 
after all, and his relevance could not be portrayed as secondary. The Duce was 
certainly an actor and a performer—as the anti-Fascist literature recognized early 
on and would continue to do for years—but in his own show, not someone’s else’s.
Caetani had ideas. “The picture of Mussolini at his desk,” he wrote to di 
Robilant, “should be placed immediately after that of the King standing at the bal-
cony. It could be preceded by a caption saying: ‘This is Mussolini the man who 
organized the whole Fascisti movement and is now head of the Government.’ ”38 
The surviving copy of the film features the image of the Duce at his desk following 
that of the king, but not the suggested additional intertitle.39 Secondly, to address 
the problem of “authorship,” Caetani and the studio agreed to insert a statement 
from Mussolini that would have framed the entire film as overseen and approved 
by the Duce. The Eternal City premiered on January 20, 1924,40 but four days later 
the ambassador was still working on tweaking the film’s intertitles. On January 24, 
he informed Fitzmaurice that Mussolini had completed the “message to be used in 
connection with the exhibition” of the film. It read:
Italy, by means of her gallant and strenuous fascisti youth has established order 
throughout towns and country; by a noble will effort she has gained civic peace 
which allows her to work and progress.
Fascismo, in the history of Modern Europe, will remain an unparalleled example of 
moral energy and of spontaneous self-sacrifice devoted to the cause of civilization 
which is essentially the cause of order, of work and of national and social discipline. 
[Signed] Mussolini41
By then, the film had been distributed by First National and had premiered at the 
Strand Theater in New York City. It was an impressive production, with the the-
ater’s symphony orchestra playing Pietro Mascagni’s popular Cavalleria rusticana. 
Naturally, Caetani was unnerved, fearing that a propaganda film qua propaganda 
would not work. He asked the consul general of Italy, Temistocle Filippo Bernardi, 
to have someone whom he trusted visit movie theaters where the film was being 
shown and report back to him.42 He wanted to know whether the film’s nonpoliti-
cal advertisements were having any impact on the film’s reception in New York 
City. In early February, the consul communicated to the ambassador that The 
Eternal City was having some success with audiences, particularly when Mussolini 
and Fascist actions were on the screen. He also noted that early scenes featuring 
beggars and a robber would not help Italy’s reputation. His short, lukewarm report 
did not bode well.43
Caetani seemed to have anticipated the film’s reception: positive for the 
exposure of its key celebrity—the Duce—but negative for the film’s obvious propa-
ganda import.44 On February 4, he wrote again to Mussolini repeating what he had 
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written a few days earlier: distributors had asked that all the scenes in The Eternal 
City that had an obvious propaganda aspect be removed. He sought to reassure 
the Duce that the film maintained its ideological integrity and that it was doing 
well in the United States. But the message was clear to those who wanted to hear 
it: overt propaganda was not the proper way to broadcast the value of the regime 
in America.45
Meanwhile, the trade and general press published their reviews. Known for its 
coziness with the Mussolini regime, the Saturday Evening Post published a brief, 
celebratory review of the film, enriched by a few illustrations. “Sir Hall Caine 
modernized ‘The Eternal City’ for the screen,” it reported, before adding that the 
film’s “unforgettable characters are people of today. Fascists triumph where Cae-
sars fell.”46 Other reviews, some laudatory and some critical, did not consider the 
recent historical context of Fascism’s rise but, like the SEP, viewed Mussolini cin-
ematically, so to speak, as a seasoned performer and a celebrity film actor. Photo-
play began by describing The Eternal City as “one of the most beautiful pictures 
ever filmed” for its “views of Rome, taken from one of the hills; the shots in the 
Coliseum; the views along the beautiful roads shaded by Lombardy poplars.”47 
Some reviewers who were dismissive of the film’s value singled out the Duce’s 
presence. In the February 1924 issue of Life magazine, Robert E. Sherwood 
described the film as “nonsense on a heroic scale,” lacking “a credible story.” Still, 
although carried by “tidal waves of sonorous propaganda,” the film showed the 
“Fascist Napoleon” exhibiting a “deportment on the screen [that] lends weight 
to the theory that this is just where he belongs.”48 While a few newspapers had 
branded Mussolini as an actor as early as November 1922, by 1924 this was an 
established trope, one that even Valentino’s first unofficial publicity agent, 
Herbert Howe, could not resist. In one of his columns for Photoplay, he congratu-
lated Fitzmaurice, “who made ‘The Eternal City’ with Barbara La Marr and Benito 
Mussolini. With Babbie and Benito in the cast the picture certainly should not be 
lacking in action.”49 Similarly, Agnes Smith of Picture-Play Magazine found that 
the film looked “like a news reel plus a fashion show,” but even in her sarcastic 
tone she acknowledged that while “Barbara La Marr acts as the fashion model,” 
Mussolini, as “Italy’s pet fire eater, is the star of the newsreel sections.”50
The reviews that emphasized the film’s celebrity value appeared side by side 
with those that trashed its nationwide commercial potential due to its overt pro-
pagandistic content. “Pouf, pouf and a barrel of wind. Samuel Goldwyn (not now 
connected with Goldwyn Pictures) has a flop in ‘The Eternal City,’ ” wrote an 
anonymous Billboard reviewer. “High-salaried actors, fares to Italy and expenses 
while there, $100,000 worth of publicity [. . .] subordinated into an outright plug 
for Mussolini.” The result was that “because of its Roman flavor and the frequent 
references to Italy’s new hero, ‘The Eternal City’ will find much favor with Italians. 
It is extremely doubtful if the general public will enjoy it, however.”51 Similarly, 
“Rush” (Alfredo R. Greason), the Variety reviewer, complained that the Goldwyn 
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production sought “to tie up present day interest in the political upheaval of 
Italy [rather] than to develop the human interest of the story itself.” As a result, 
the film was going to be “a special interest only to the Italian colony. Whether the 
rest of the United States will manifest enthusiasm over the alien political situa-
tion is something else again.” The presence of Mussolini and the king at the film’s 
end, concluded the review, killed the lovers’ narrative climax, giving the “picture 
historic rather than romantic coloring.”52 Other reviewers complained that 
Hollywood had converted the original story, with its religious themes, into 
something completely different: “propaganda for the black-shirted forces of 
Mussolini.”53 Some even joked ironically that the new collaborative atmosphere 
between Hollywood and Rome would soon result in Mussolini playing Ben Hur.54
Beyond the reviewers’ and exhibitors’ lack of enthusiasm, the geopolitically sen-
sitive quarters of the film industry deeply appreciated The Eternal City because it 
marked the first collaboration between Hollywood and a foreign country. In April 
1924, in an article in the New York Times, Will Hays argued that “the first purpose 
of the producers is to make pictures that entertain, films in which costumes and 
customs of people are correctly portrayed, whether they deal with American, Eng-
lish or French life.” He repeated his usual formula that films had to make a “contri-
bution to international amity,” and to support his case, he used the example of The 
Eternal City. Specifically, he referred to Caetani’s role. “The Ambassador took the 
trouble to go over the scenario,” he noted, “and satisfied himself that it would be a 
picture that would reflect Italy in a true light.” Hays said that he hoped this would 
bode well for future productions. “This is perhaps the first instance of an Ambas-
sador accredited to this country taking an interest in an American production to 
be produced in his own land.”55
Caetani had different feelings. Following his disappointment over The Eternal 
City, he wondered whether the Italian embassy could further the Duce’s cinematic 
exposure in a more controlled fashion. Mussolini himself wanted to play a more 
direct role and manage his image directly from Rome. Yet, once again, other 
mediators intervened and creatively reworked the Duce’s image and message in 
the United States.
THE MAN OF THE HOUR
The speech in Italian should last three and a half minutes and the one in 
English the same so that the result would be of greatest impact.
Instructions for Mussolini’s speech for The Man of the Hour 
(trans.)56
In Genoa, on May 11, 1927, a trusted officer of the Biancamano ocean liner received 
a box with seven film rolls and was asked to deliver it to Cortland Smith, president 
of Fox Newsreels, at the company’s office on West 54th Street in New York City. The 
day after, an Italian government official in Rome reassured Mussolini’s personal 
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secretary Alessandro Chiavolini that the package was on its way to its American 
destination. Ten days later, on May 21, a telegram sent from New York arrived 
at the Plaza Hotel in Rome, addressed to Edgar L. Kaw, a Fox-Case film sound-
man. It was from Smith, complimenting Kaw and his colleagues in Fox’s outfit 
no. 1, Ben Miggins and D. F. Whiting, on a job superbly done. “First test from can 
number 5 shows magnificent picture and perfect sound reproduction. Nothing 
better has ever been done in either pictures or sound. Will now develop balance 
and cable you results. Heartiest congratulations to you Miggins and Whiting = 
Courtsmith.”57
In the spring of 1927, speaking of “picture” and “sound” together was not cus-
tomary. The Fox-Case Corporation had pioneered a process by which sound 
could be physically recorded onto photographic film by adding a sound score 
along the strip of film frames. The sound-on-film process was a radical improve-
ment over sound-on-disc technology, which required perfect synchronization 
between a phonograph and a movie projector during exhibition and inevitably led 
to embarrassing mistakes. With its Movietone sound system, the newly formed 
Fox-Case Corporation was declaring all-out war against its main competitor, 
Warner’s Vitaphone system. “The kind of motion picture attraction chosen by 
the new company to introduce its system,” Raymond Fielding has noted, “was the 
sound newsreel,” or, we would specify, the celebrity newsreel.58 The first Moviet-
one sound film was presented on January 21, 1927, in New York City, eight months 
before the premiere of The Jazz Singer. But the first commercially significant Fox 
Movietone film premiered in New York on May 27, 1927, and it showed the most 
newsworthy person and event of the day: Charles Lindbergh’s May 20 takeoff 
from Long Island for his historic transatlantic flight. While this sound film had no 
spoken parts, it was a cinematic event that opened the way for more. That was a 
period in which, to return to Frederic Lewis Allen, “every record for mass excite-
ment and mass enthusiasm in the age of ballyhoo was smashed. Nothing seemed 
to matter, either to the newspaper or the people who read them, but Lindbergh 
and his story.”59
To match the Lindbergh craze, the Fox-Case Corporation had already made 
plans for similar  productions, all to be distributed by Fox. A few weeks before, it 
had allowed Jack Connolly and several technicians to leave for Europe with a mis-
sion: record the faces and voices of the most important celebrities of the day.60 One 
of their first stops was Rome, where they had managed to film something unique 
that had to be kept secret so as not to ruin any promotional plan. Upon receiving 
the mysterious can no. 5, Fox’s New York headquarters were quite pleased because 
they now had footage that offered a double novelty: for the first time it combined 
the image and the voice of Benito Mussolini making a speech in both Italian and 
English. Confidentiality had to be maintained. Kaw immediately telegrammed his 
mediator with the Italian government, J. P. Spanier, the Western Union Telegraph 
Company representative for Southern Europe, who was in Rome. In turn, Spanier 
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immediately relayed the message directly to the Duce’s secretary, Chiavolini. The 
Duce’s immediate circle had high hopes for this recorded speech that was directed 
at both American and Italian American audiences and could reach millions of 
people.
A few days earlier, on May 6, two weeks before the first Lindbergh recording, Fox 
Newsreels producer Jack Connolly, Ben Miggins (cameraman), and Edgar L. Kaw 
and D. F. Whiting (soundmen) had recorded Mussolini’s speech in two languages at 
Villa Torlonia, the Duce’s private residence in Rome (figures 38 and 39). The filming 
figure 39. The operators of Fox-Case outfit no.1 filming Man of the Hour. Subfolder Fox Film: 
Pellicola di propaganda italiana, folder P.S.E. Varia 148, box 221, ACS, SPD-CO. Courtesy of 
Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
figure 38. On the set of Man of the Hour (Movietone News, 1927), Villa Torlonia, May 6, 1927. 
From left: Prince Ludovico Spada Veralli Potenziani, governor of Rome; Augusto Turati, general 
secretary of the Fascist Party; Cornelio Di Marzio, secretary of the Fascists Abroad; Benito 
Mussolini; and U.S. ambassador to Italy, Henry P. Fletcher.
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also included the U.S. ambassador to Italy, Henry P. Fletcher, whose role was to 
introduce the Duce to American audiences. In the footage, Mussolini sports riding 
breeches, and he was made to walk toward the camera and deliver his talk straight 
into it.61 On the improvised set was also the former ambassador, Richard Washburn 
Child. Connolly allegedly helped Mussolini with his verbal delivery in English, and 
he and Child held a large card with the speech written on it for the Duce to read. 
The press later reported how Mussolini was willing to do multiple takes. During this 
same assignment, the crew also filmed images of Italian army soldiers on horseback, 
military bands, parading sailors, and a performance of the Vatican Choir, the latter 
in place of an interview with the Pope, who had declined their request.62
In addition to the challenge of speaking in English, Mussolini had to operate 
within another constraint—the limited length of his speech. He and his aides went 
through several drafts in Italian and English to abide by the specific instructions 
he had been given: “The speech in either in Italian or English could not last more 
than three and a half minutes.” The Italian State Archive in Rome includes both 
Mussolini’s initial, very long, typewritten versions—marked on the first page with 
what appears to be his penciled note “Ridurre del 50 per %” [Reduce by 50%]—and 
the final, shortened translation by J. P. Spanier, that best fit the newsreel format 
(figures 40 and 41). The final version reads:
figures 40 and 41. One of the initial drafts of Mussolini’s speech, in Italian, to be reduced by 
50%, and its final English version. Subfolder Discorso di S.P. per il “Movietone” della Fox Film, 
16 August 1927 V, folder P.S.E. Varia 148, box 221, ACS-SPD-CO. Courtesy of Archivio Centrale 
dello Stato, Rome.
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 I am glad to be able to express once more my friendly feelings toward the 
American Nation.
 The friendship, with which Italy looks at the 120 millions of citizens, who from 
Alaska to Florida and from the Pacific to the Atlantic live in the U.S. is today 
deeply rooted in our hearts. This feeling, strengthened by mutual interests, and 
by a war fought and won together shall contribute to the preparation of an ever 
brighter era in the life of both Nations.
 While I greet the wonderful energy of the American People, I see and recognize 
among you, some of your land as well as ours, my fellow citizens, who are work-
ing to make America greater.
 I salute therefore the great American people, that are all initiative, activity and 
strength; I salute their worthy and Noble Government; I salute the Italians of 
America, who unite in a single love our two Nations and honour both with 
their work!63
The Fox Movietone newsreel of Mussolini was in and of itself a special event. Even 
though William Fox paired it with another major attraction, the New York premiere 
of  F. W. Murnau’s first American picture, Sunrise, the filming of Mussolini’s direct 
address was not going to be marginalized. Fox promoted it as “the first showing of 
the Mussolini Movietone, in which the Italian premiere will be seen and heard in 
a speech, the text of which has been copyrighted by the Fox Film Corporation.”64 
The combination of art and political publicity may strike us for its “incongruous-
ness” and seem “jarring and surprising,” to use Bergstrom’s words, but it was not a 
complete novelty for Fox.65 According to Fielding, the exceptional footage of 
Lindbergh’s takeoff had been paired four months earlier, on May 27, 1927, with Frank 
Borzage’s masterpiece Seventh Heaven as part of an all-Movietone program.66 Since 
evidence of Fox’s in-house documentation about strategies and correspondence is 
largely absent for this period, one is left speculating about possible explanations. 
Fox had its own precedents to learn from. In March 1926, Ettore Villani, the Fox 
Newsreels Rome-based camera operator, had filmed the Fascist Party’s seventh 
anniversary celebration. In the short memo he sent to New York with the footage, he 
transcribed part of Mussolini’s speech and added the note “DUCE: leading captain.” 
Pierluigi Erbaggio has argued that the fact that Villani volunteered this English 
translation of Mussolini’s preferred attribute demonstrates that he knew how much 
his employer and, by extension, the Fox Newsreels audience obsessed about pow-
erful leaders as worthy film subjects and how little they cared about Fascism as an 
undemocratic political movement.67 It is thus possible to argue that Fox advertised 
the unusual combination of Murnau with Mussolini (and the other Italian foot-
age) ultimately to promote the novelty of its wide-ranging offerings. Prior to the 
premiere, in fact, the company advertised the event as having three attractions:
3 Tremendous Features Combined in a Monumental Programme! [. . .] Sunrise, with 
Symphonic Movietone Accompaniment [.  .  .] the Vatican Choir, seventy voices of 
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sublime power and beauty on the Movietone! [. . .] See and Hear “The Man of the 
Hour,” His Excellency Benito Mussolini, Premier of Italy. He speaks to you and lives 
before your eyes on the Movietone! Text copyrighted by Fox Film Corp.68
A preview was organized by Fox vice president and general manager Winfield 
Sheenan. Variety’s founding editor Sime Silverman covered it on the front page, 
with a banner headline: “Mussolini’s Hope in Screen.” In his long review, Silver-
man did not just celebrate Mussolini’s on-screen declaration of amity with the 
United States as a major political advancement but also praised the Duce for pub-
licly recognizing the impact of the Movietone novelty on news communication. 
Allegedly, Mussolini had described Movietone as the medium that “can bring the 
world together, it can settle the differences; it can become the international medi-
um, educator and adjuster; it can prevent war.”69 From the standpoint of the trade 
it represented, Variety appreciated that such an international figure had publicly 
celebrated the new frontier of cinematic news-making as it expanded its reach 
from mere coverage of exceptional events (i.e., Lindbergh’s accomplishment) to 
more regular reporting on “politics, entertainment, propaganda, or any purpose 
that may be made appealing.” The case of Mussolini was singular, even for Movi-
etone—the “first demonstration of Fox’s Movietone with a celebrity”—but it was 
also emblematic of the general power of the medium to communicate “directness 
and sincerity.” His appearance on screen had the potential of changing people’s 
minds about the dictator (figure 42). “If Movietone carries Mussolini to every 
incorporated village of this country[, . . .] millions of Americans will suffer altered 
opinions on Mussolini,” Silverman argued. After all, thanks to the new medium, “a 
forceful character like Mussolini can go around the universe carrying conviction 
for whatever he may be discussing.”70
For the New York premiere, Fox chose the Times Square Theatre on 42nd Street 
and Broadway. The studio also prepared a two-page, double-sided program that 
described the evening’s attractions and sought to drum up excitement over the 
unprecedented deployment of prerecorded sound scores—a “Symphonic Movietone 
Accompaniment” for Murnau’s film and Mussolini’s actual voice for the Movietone 
News. In the Duce’s case, the new technology allowed the premier to address film 
spectators directly: “He speaks to you, expressing, with his characteristic gestures, his 
sentiments toward the United States and the Italian-Americans in this country.” The 
result, the program breathlessly claimed, was an unprecedented supply of liveliness 
and directness: Mussolini “lives before your eyes through movietone.” (figure 43).
The reception was more than positive. The Movietone News featured a nota-
ble performance of the Vatican Choir, but the New York Times argued that “the 
subject that gave one of the most vivid conceptions of the potentialities of the 
sound and shadow features is that of Benito Mussolini making a speech.”71 Moving 
Picture World agreed. According to its reviewer, what mostly impressed the audi-
ence of the dual program “was the Movietone accompaniment for the picture and 
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the Movietone scenes, taken in Italy [through which] the audience saw and heard 
[. .  .] the great Premier, himself, speaking in English and Italian, exactly as if he 
was actually in the theater.”72 The equally enthusiastic Motion Picture News found 
that “Movietone brings Mussolini face to face with Americans. [.  .  .] Lifelike it 
is: amazingly lifelike. A set speech, of course, but the illusion brings the Dictator 
right into the theatre.”73 What many found striking, as Screenland put it, was the 
“enormous close-up of the face of Mussolini. A most remarkable face.”74 The same 
magazine insisted a month later that such a film helps “us know our neighbors 
figure 42. Published frames of Mussolini from The Man of the Hour 
(1927). “The Talking Pictures,” Screenland, January 1928, 15.
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on this earth better” and turns distant leaders into “human beings [. . .] whom we 
better understand.” This article celebrated the new medium with a photographic 
summary of its recent exploits. It featured frame enlargements from Movietone’s 
footage of President Coolidge welcoming Charles Lindbergh, a close-up of the 
American aviator, and two medium close-ups of Mussolini, who, the caption read, 
“speaks to you through the marvel of Movietone.”75
The pairing of Murnau with Mussolini lasted three months: by December 12, 
“the display ads for Sunrise no longer mention any Italian features.”76 When the 
program opened in Los Angeles on November 29, The Man of the Hour was not 
included. Bergstrom explains the absence of the Mussolini footage by pointing out 
that Los Angeles, unlike New York, did not have a large Italian immigrant popula-
tion.77 Another possible explanation is that the New York experience taught Fox 
that the combination of the two attractions was not working since they did not 
attract the same crowd. Fox’s Sheenan seemed to have known that it was not possible 
to advertise both features at once properly. As Bergstrom acknowledges, his “press 
review a few days before the release of Sunrise directed all the attention to Mussolini 
and to Movietone.” What could be more different than “a charismatic demagogue, 
speaking forcefully to the audience amid more than 20 minutes of Italian sound and 
fury” vis-à-vis “a film without dialogue and with an introverted, restrained acting 
figure 43. Program for double bill of The Man of the Hour, starring Benito Mussolini, and 
Sunrise, pages 2–3. Folder P.S.E. Varia 148, box 221, ACS-SPD-CO. Courtesy of Archivio 
Centrale dello Stato, Rome.
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style”?78 Further, although popular culture had legitimized Mussolini on a grand 
scale, a few articles in the business press had been questioning Mussolini’s notable 
experiments in governance on cultural grounds with their praise for the American 
values of individuality and freedom from state policies.79
Making the film happen had not been easy. On the Italian side, the archival 
record shows evidence of repeated requests to film the Duce by international 
companies and repeated denials or delayed permissions, a process that may be 
reminiscent of Wilson’s situation before and during World War I. If Mussolini did 
not trust many of the Hollywood studios’ Italian representatives, he had full confi-
dence in his proven mediators, beginning with Child, who had been instrumental 
in coordinating contacts between the Fox Film Corporation and Mussolini. Not 
only was Child present during the filming in May at Villa Torlonia, but that 
summer he also promoted Mussolini’s film performance for the readers of the 
New York Times.80
On the American side, the Variety review emphasized that the initiative to 
film notable Europe personalities with the new technology has been “Connolly’s 
mission.”81 As Variety and other papers mentioned, Jack S. Connolly had been the 
MPPDA’s Washington representative, a position that he had held until four months 
before, when he left to become European director of the Fox Movietone organi-
zation. A year after the premiere, he gave an interview to the New York Times on 
Movietone celebrities.82 After the anonymous reporter praised Connolly for hav-
ing persuaded George Bernard Shaw to be on camera, the conversation inevitably 
moved to the Duce. “When one first meets Mussolini,” Connolly noted, “one is 
impressed with his vitality, his aggressiveness, his forcefulness and his power.” The 
Fox executive described how Mussolini was willing to rehearse and correct his 
English pronunciation, demonstrating he was eager to improve himself. Connolly’s 
conclusion about the Italian leader’s modern personality shunned any political 
considerations and remained solidly in the Hollywood domain, primarily due to 
the Duce’s personal style and cinematic appeal:
In my opinion Mussolini is the best dressed man in Italy. His clothes look as if they 
had been molded on him. No motion picture actor in Hollywood is more careful 
about his appearance, and I would venture to say that if he ever decided to give up his 
present position which, incidentally, he likes very much, a dozen picture producers 
would be after him.83
Without referring to the newsreel, but still reverberating in its import, a few 
months later the New York monthly The Mentor dedicated one of its special issues 
to Mussolini, the “Man of Italy.” Its main article did not hesitate to profile the Duce 
in the most celebratory manner as the leader of a popular plebiscite:
Superficially Benito Mussolini, the outstanding figure in Europe today, appears to take 
the ancient Romans for his model. In point of fact, however, the extraordinary career 
of this modern man of Destiny is far more in the Napoleonic tradition.84
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Similarly, other film periodicals underscored how the Movietone News show of 
Mussolini impacted both his standing and the future of news making and news 
reporting.85 Screenland contended that “to introduce us to Mussolini, Calvin 
Coolidge, Bernard Shaw and Charles Lindbergh and at the same time hear their 
voices, is, so far, the most successful marriage of silence and sound.”86 Picture-Play 
Magazine noted that “Fox Movietone News quickly became a three-issue-a-week 
feature” for its ability to reveal “the vocal images” of famous personages, including 
Mussolini. More than depicting “their likeness,” it was a matter of preserving “their 
living voices, their very personalities, for posterity.”87 For others, the Movietone 
News managed to reveal a novel dimension in its coverage of celebrities. “The 
sound cameras reflect unerringly the dynamic force of Mussolini,” declaimed New 
Movie Magazine, “the quiet force of Henry Ford; the rugged conservatism of the 
good Calvin [Coolidge].”88
If the energy of the Duce’s performance fueled widespread praise, it also fueled 
mockery. The British writer George Bernard Shaw had been an early admirer of 
Mussolini. In 1922 he had welcomed the Duce’s rise to power in Italy, observ-
ing that amid the “indiscipline and muddle and Parliamentary deadlock,” the 
Italian leader was “the right kind of tyrant.”89 In contrast, when on June 25, 1928 
Fox released George Bernard Shaw Talks to Movietone News, the British writer 
gently made fun of Mussolini’s performative oratory. Shaw posed with his arms 
around his waist to show what he called the “Mussolini stance,” and he included 
the Fascisti salute. After expressing admiration for Mussolini’s hair and brow, 
he ironically noted that while he could stop assuming the “terrifying Mussolini 
look” (“I can put it on, take it off, and do all sorts of things”), Mussolini could 
not. Instead, the Italian leader was “condemned to go through life with that 
terrible and imposing expression.” Interviewed the same year by Motion Picture 
Classic, Shaw doubled down in irony, adding that “my imitation of Mussolini 
should have assured you of my ability at character roles.” Indicating some of the 
cracks in the popularity of the Duce, the caption to one of the six film frames 
illustrating the article reads: “It has been said that there is but one thing funnier 
than George Bernard Shaw’s imitation of Mussolini’s expression, and that is 
Mussolini’s expression.”90
These commentaries reveal that if Bernard Shaw could appear as a great char-
acter actor, it was because Mussolini had become a character in the Olympus of 
Hollywood’s celebrity-personalities and, as such, he was worthy of praise and 
ridicule. A December 1928 poster of the Movietone series prominently featured 
the Duce among the new cinematic format’s exemplary subjects, together with 
Lindbergh and Shaw (figure 44). Similarly, a few months later Fox released a 
six-reel travelogue, Chasing through Europe (1929), which was devoted not to 
sites or historical monuments but to the Old World’s modern personalities. 
Mussolini was obviously among them, together with another regular, the Prince 
of Wales. Reporting on the travelogue, Screenland conceivably reproduced Fox’s 
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promotional slogan: “You will see a dozen celebrities on the screen[: . . .] two kings, 
two dictators, one royal prince, and one Sultan!”91 The same year, in a celebratory 
volume on the history of motion pictures, Will Hays praised the Fox Movietone 
initiative for “bringing the world’s personalities to the world’s people” and thus 
offering “a very real contribution to the world’s welfare.”92
The bonds among cinema, news-making, and celebrities—no matter their 
domain of excellence—seemed to have reached a level of natural completion, with 
Mussolini as a fitting part in it. In truth, behind and before these celebrations were 
several modest, botched, and rarely successful initiatives by Italian companies, 
which sought to contribute to the promotion of Fascism and Mussolini’s repute in 
the United States without fully understanding the American cultural marketplace.
figure 44. Fox Movietone ad featuring celebrities. Picture Play 
Magazine, December 1928, 3.
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CENSORING AND DISTRIBUTING
Throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, Italian officials in Washington, DC, were 
busy mediating between the MPPDA and Italian institutions or even private 
citizens, who often shared their concerns about negative film representations of 
Italians in Italian or American productions whether these were exhibited in the 
United States or elsewhere. This was a concern that had been central to the Italian 
government even before the days of the March on Rome.
One of the earliest documentable occurrences dates back to August 30, 1922, 
when Andrea Geisser Celesia di Vegliasco, secretary of the embassy of Italy, com-
plained to Hays about a few films that had depicted Italians “in a very unflattering 
light” and about Hollywood’s “regrettable habit of using the Italian type in film-
making as an element of villainy, ferocity or grotesque vulgarity.” The “belittling of 
our people,” Geisser Celesia added, was “harmful to the bonds of friendship and 
esteem existing between our two countries.”93 Hays’s response that MPPDA mem-
bers generally did not intend to negatively portray the “life and character” of non-
Americans and were instead interested in developing “the most cordial interna-
tional relationship[s]” was prompt but general.94 Two months after the March on 
Rome in late October 1922, an emboldened embassy wrote again to Hays request-
ing a resolution explicitly tailored to Italy.95 The exchanges between the embassy 
and MPPDA about anti-Italian films continued for years, reaching an apex in the 
early 1930s, when the Italian diplomatic authorities were alerted about a group of 
Los Angeles–based Fascists who called themselves “legionaries” and were keen 
on protesting directly to the studios about the release of films perceived to be de-
meaning to Italy.96 One of these films was The Life of Giuseppe Musolino, the Italian 
Bandit, which was devoted to the famous Calabrian brigand.97 Others included 
A Farewell to Arms, The Romance of a Dictator, This Is the Night, and The Guilty 
Generation.98 The complaints focused on these films’ demeaning association of 
Italians with crime, laziness, and general ineptitude.99 The film that received the most 
attention, at least according to the volume of the correspondence among diplo-
matic institutions, private individuals, and Italian American organizations, was 
Howard Hawks’s Scarface (1932).100 A case study of Scarface exceeds the framework 
of this study, but suffice it to say that the embassy’s most explicit response con-
sisted of two strategies: put pressure on the MPPDA, even when the producers of 
said offensive films were not its members, and mobilize Italian American commu-
nities at the local level. The second strategy posed the most challenges: the Italian 
embassy, in fact, was not only engaged in protesting negative representations of 
Italians in America but also in promoting positive ones.
As it had done before the March on Rome, throughout the 1920s and into the 
1930s, the ambassador’s office continued to serve as a sort of distribution center 
for educational productions about Italy to be exhibited in noncommercial outlets 
(i.e., cultural associations and aid societies). The obvious impetus was to promote 
220    The Romance of Undemocratic Governing
a positive representation of the country, but another reason for the embassy’s 
involvement was to avoid past mistakes that had occurred when private citizens 
had been allowed to make direct arrangements with the Italian government to 
legitimize their dubious commercial plans.101 After October 1922, however, the 
new nationalistic ethos complicated the embassy’s mission. Its distribution role 
faced a constant tension. One the one side were the productions that celebrated 
the safe image of old, touristic Italy, rich in historical and picturesque attractions 
but increasingly dated and unappealing. On the other were those that promoted 
an exciting image of a modern country, whose novel regime and protagonists, 
however, often attracted harsh criticism and were thus commercially risky.102 
For instance, after 1922 the Italian officials’ attempts to distribute old educational 
shorts, mostly about Italian customs or the Italians’ life during the Great War, were 
both unsuccessful and the cause of great concern. The new context made these 
productions appear dangerously propagandistic.103
Even after Caetani’s tenure ended on February 7, 1925, the embassy’s cautious 
position regarding the value of targeted propaganda, especially about Italian 
Americans, did not change. The embassy had to counter the misplaced ambitions 
of Italian-based Fascist officials and journalists who expected that the regime’s 
“visual propaganda,” as they labeled it, could overcome language barriers and 
reach the widest possible audiences.104 The embassy felt that it also needed to curb 
the excesses of Fascist sympathizers in America. Since the Great War, Italy’s most 
prominent citizens in America—the so-called prominenti—had largely become 
nationalistic, and a few of them had been quite receptive to the ethos of Fascism. 
The emergence in the United States even before the March on Rome of different 
nationalist groups, the so-called Fasci di combattimento (Italian Fasci of Combat), 
the Fascist League of North America, and the Sons of Italy, continued to pose strik-
ing challenges to the Fascist government’s foreign policy due to the sensitive issue 
of Italy’s war debt. As Caetani once wrote to Mussolini, the Fasci (just like the 
other groups) “will serve as an example with which to judge Italian Fascism.” 
Caetani had then recommended that in the United States, Fascism “must limit itself 
to the ideological, philanthropic, and sports arena,” arguing that “it cannot assume 
the character of an activist organization.”105 Americans were very sensitive to the 
“threat of political divisiveness among ethnic groups,” as Philip V. Cannistraro put 
it, and Fascist militancy ran the risk of being perceived as meddling with American 
politics. Any perception of domestic interference by a foreign power would harm 
the Fascist regime’s aspirations for a positive conclusion to the diplomatic nego-
tiations about war debts.106 Questions of diplomatic calculations and tact affected 
Mussolini’s response to the new immigrations laws of 1924, which inspired him to 
consider immigrants as “vectors of Italianità in foreign lands,” and to the 
remarkable press coverage of the Sacco and Vanzetti trial.107
The 1926 nationalization of Istituto LUCE complicated the embassy’s mission.108 
In 1925, in fact, LUCE had made private, direct arrangements with the general 
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secretary of the Italian Fasci Abroad (Fasci italiani all’estero) for the American 
distribution of Italian newsreels.109 Now the embassy had to intervene to help 
control and centralize this flow of production by facilitating distribution and 
exchange agreements between the LUCE and American newsreel companies. 
These official operations were meant to curb the chaos of roles and distribution 
deals that the LUCE had contributed to.
By the early 1920s, American newsreel production companies competed for the 
approximately 16,500 American theatres that exhibited newsreels on a biweekly 
basis.110 To enter this market, LUCE exchanged footage with American newsreel 
companies, especially with Fox Movietone and Hearst Metrotone, which had 
offices in Rome.111 In turn, these companies broadcast Mussolini’s image and 
biography in the United States, showcased his private and public life, and thus 
contributed to his standing as political and popular icon.112
LUCE IN AMERICA
Il Duce’s facial expressions alone are worth the price of admission.
Photoplay, 1933113 
Between April 1925 and August 1936, Fox’s and Hearst’s theatrically distributed 
newsreels featured Mussolini at least once a month as either a primary or second-
ary attraction.114 Throughout that decade, the two companies’ collaborations with 
the LUCE did not overlap exactly, at least according to the official documentation. 
In Erbaggio’s careful research, “Mussolini is present in eighty-four Fox records 
between April 8, 1925, and October 22, 1935,” while Hearst distribution listings 
refer to “the dictator in ninety-one newsreels issued between September 28, 1929, 
and August 31, 1936.”115 The archival record, as Erbaggio warns, is far from accu-
rate: there is footage that is not referenced therein or that falls outside these dates. 
For instance, Fox’s first related newsreel story, Black Shirts, dates back to February 
28, 1923. It shows young and adult Fascist followers marching through the streets 
of Rome and convening at the monument to the Unknown Soldier on the steps 
of the Altare della Patria.116 Similarly, Hearst released an International Newsreel 
devoted to the Duce before 1929, the brief 1926 Mussolini Smiles!, which presents 
the Duce as “Italy’s strong man,” who managed to survive assassination attempts—
three in 1926 alone!—and maintain his good humor.117 His titular smile indexed 
his strength in the face of adversity, and his intact charisma was made even more 
apparent when juxtaposed against the king’s generally austere expression.
These assassination attempts were international knowledge, especially the first 
one, in which an Irish woman managed to nick the Duce’s nose.118 Hollywood 
was obviously intrigued by this incident since it offered one more opportunity 
to gossip about his popular biography and temperament. When Mussolini met 
with Fairbanks and Pickford in Rome in May 1926 and asked them to reassure 
the entire world that he was doing fine, he was referring to this episode. Film 
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comedies, too, capitalized on this widespread knowledge to sustain their jokes. 
For instance, in Leo McCarey’s 1926 Mighty like a Moose, starring the popular 
comedian Charley Chase, a married couple seeks the aid of plastic surgery to cor-
rect their unattractive physical traits. The husband (Chase) has protruding front 
teeth; the wife (Vivien Oakland), a large nose. To be effective, comedic routines 
and lines rely on social conventions and shared knowledge. After introducing 
Chase as a man who has been “secretly saving money for months—to take the 
detour out of his teeth,” the film presents Oakland with an amusing parallel intertitle: 
“If Mussolini had had a nose like hers, his wound would have been fatal.”
Even though Erbaggio could not examine the entirety of this newsreel produc-
tion due to the lack of available footage, he was able to draw a few comprehensive 
and persuasive conclusions.119 American newsreels tended to stress Mussolini’s 
close relationship with symbols of modernity and technological progress and with 
the novelty of his political communication. Besides his known popular appeal, 
Fox’s decision to make him the first “Movietoned” international political figure 
in 1927 was due to his image as a leader easily adaptable to the modern sound 
medium. Unsurprisingly, Fox experimented with this multilingual practice for two 
other sound newsreels, both released in 1931 and titled Mussolini Promises Peace. 
They recorded Mussolini speaking in English and French. The dictator affirmed 
Italy’s willingness to pursue peace, “the chief problem which interests the whole 
humankind,” and reinforced this idealistic message by praising the very cinematic 
technology that was recording him.120 Mussolini defined cinema as “the most mag-
nificent discovery of modern times,” superior in his view even to the radio, even 
though, as Fox’s synopsis sheet explained, his political statement was also broad-
cast over radio waves.121 Shot while standing behind his desk in his office at Palazzo 
Venezia in Rome, the dictator was meant to exude, despite his difficulties with the 
English language, the calm competence of a charismatic modern leader, enamored 
of the modern film medium. This version of Mussolini looked very different from 
the man who gave frenzied speeches in front of massive crowds that other films 
had shown. As such, it was much closer to the image found in another source 
of visibility that Mussolini embraced mostly in the 1930s, and thus beyond the 
scope of this study—the eighty-two editorials that Sarfatti ghostwrote for him for 
Hearst’s syndicated newspapers between 1928 and 1935.122 Both Mussolini’s sound 
films and editorials were meant to convey an image of a player in world politics 
and a national leader engaged with modernizing plans. Specifically, his press visi-
bility was peppered with medical terminology, economic references, and concrete, 
but eloquent examples. Whatever the interests associated with the financial groups 
who were supporting investments in Italy, Mussolini was a topic of widespread 
appeal in the popular culture industry.123
The swan song of Mussolini’s cinematic visibility before his dramatic 
decline in popularity was Mussolini Speaks (1933), which resulted from years of 
exchanges between the Istituto LUCE and American newsreel companies and thus 
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constitutes a summation of his 1920s cinematic visibility. Produced by Harry Cohn 
of Columbia Pictures, the film revealed the longevity of the Duce’s appeal and 
newsworthiness before his popularity declined following his imperialistic cam-
paign in Ethiopia. The title of this seven-reel production resonates both with the 
previous Mussolini Smiles and with the sensational expectation of hearing Greta 
Garbo’s voice as promised by the promotional slogan “Garbo Talks!” for her first 
sound film, Anna Christie (1930). Harry’s brother Jack had assembled and edited 
footage of Mussolini and Italian life from different LUCE films.124 Harry’s idea 
for the film did not originate from an ideological affinity but from his interest in 
what one of his biographers calls “the trappings of monarchy.”125 Cohn’s produc-
tion was designed to be highly enjoyable: it sported a familiarly sensational screen 
introduction and voiceover by none other than famed radio commentator Lowell 
Thomas, the creator and promoter of Lawrence of Arabia and for years the voice 
of countless Fox Movietone newsreels.126
The film, which premiered on March 10 at the RKO Palace in New York and on 
August 11 at the Filmarte Theater in Los Angeles, tells the story of the Fascist leader 
through his public performances and historical achievements. It opens with 
the speech, translated in voiceover, that he gave in Naples to celebrate the tenth 
anniversary of the Fascists’ March on Rome in 1922. To illustrate his speech but 
also to convey the modernity of his arrival on the Italian scene, the film intercuts 
his words and face with scenes of Italian life such as harvests, sporting events, and 
engineering projects and with views of typical landscapes, including an erupting 
volcano (figures 45 and 46). On the military side, there are also scenes of the Duce 
reviewing troops in North Africa and as he interacts with the Italian people.
The studio’s promotional material praised how the film intertwined its dynamic 
rhythm with the Duce’s rapid accomplishments. The film’s style dovetailed per-
fectly with Mussolini’s charismatic personality through strategic shot selection, 
fast editing, and celebratory sound commentary. The studio’s own promotional 
weekly, the Columbia Beacon, opened its February 4, 1933, issue with a long hom-
age to the film, calling it “an exclusive and authentic film autobiography” as if 
Mussolini had edited the movie himself.127 The studio celebrated Mussolini Speaks 
as “a striking innovation in screen entertainment” with a simple but most eloquent 
rationale: “Never before has one of the leading figures in world affairs enacted his 
life’s role on celluloid.”128 While this was an exaggeration, the film helped celebrate 
cinema itself. “Here, for the first time,” the Columbia Beacon insisted, “are the true 
scope and power of the camera and microphone strikingly revealed.”129 Thus it was 
not just that Mussolini was so “cinematic” that a film about his life promised to be 
a success, but also that cinema, as a private enterprise, had become so relevant in 
public life that a film about Mussolini could play an important role in civic and 
political discourse.
The reviews followed the promotional tune. They praised the film as “more 
than a glorified newsreel” for its synthesis of sound and images. “Clever editing 
figures 45 and 46. Title screen and close-up of Mussolini in Mussolini Speaks (Columbia 
Pictures Corp. © 1933, renewed 1960 Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc.). All rights reserved. 
Courtesy of Columbia Pictures. Frame enlargements reproduced from the collections of the 
Library of Congress, Moving Image Section.
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cuts in on his speech at short intervals,” the Film Daily noted, “and shows in actual 
motion picture views the things that he discusses.”130 The most eloquent review 
came out in the Motion Picture Herald, which gave credit to Cohn for producing 
a “pictorial compilation” about “that genius of personality and leadership who 
was born Benito Mussolini, son of a laborer, and has become Il Duce, the leader.” 
Interestingly, the review maintained that the political quality of his celebrity 
status made him worthy of promotional initiatives. Mussolini “is a phenomenon 
of modern governmental history, and as such is deserving, along those lines, of 
extensive ballyhoo.”131
The RKO promotional material insisted on the isomorphism between 
Mussolini’s life and his “moving picture autobiography,” even suggesting the 
dramatic inadequacy of the latter. As a result, “no actor, no matter how gifted, is 
to be trusted with the gestures, actions, and speech of this international figure.”132 
Similarly, the New York American praised Mussolini’s performance for displaying 
“dramatic quality in speech and action that would be a credit to any motion picture 
star.”133 There were also negative reviews that focused on the film’s quality rather 
than on the choice of the subject matter. “The picture lacks the cumulative power 
and sweep of an epic,” cried the New York Evening Post.134 Similarly, the New York 
Herald Tribune found the intercut scenes so “unintelligible and worthless” that the 
result was “entertainment and instruction not even bordering on the mediocre.”135
Within a year, the tide was turning. The Duce’s political novelty was expiring 
and so was the appealing originality of his personality. G. E. W. Johnson in the 
North American Review commented on the surprising accord between France 
and Italy by criticizing Mussolini as a bundle of contradictions. He thought that 
Mussolini was simultaneously a blustering warmonger and a skilled diplomat, “a 
bombastic pseudo-Caesar who is forever reenacting the crossing of the Rubicon, 
without having quite made up his mind what do after getting to the other side”136 
By the time American newspaper correspondent and journalism professor Edwin 
Ware Hullinger directed another biopic, The Private Life of Mussolini (1938), the 
interest in the Duce had faded.137 A capable self-promoter, Hullinger wrote a long 
account for Photoplay in which he described the film as “the first screen biogra-
phy, I believe, ever made of a living world statesman,” but he could not but recycle 
the old slogans of Mussolini as a “star” and “marquee attraction” since these, by 
the late 1930s, had all but lost their weight.138 The last Time magazine cover to 
feature Mussolini titled the drawing of his older, once gloriously young face, with 
a funeral-like epigraph, “Aging Dictator.”139
Still, throughout the 1920s, many influential reporters, film critics, and even 
intellectuals condoned Fascism’s un-American governance perversions, including 
the limitation of individual liberties, the one-party state’s bureaucratic takeover, 
and the novel syndicalist and corporatist practices. Long believed to be popular in 
Italy, Mussolini’s mode of mass-mediated plebiscitary governance had, at least for 
a while, appeared new, daring, and efficient. Many of those praising his leadership 
would have concurred with the view of Percy Winner, the former Rome-based 
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AP correspondent who in a 1928 Current History article argued that “Fascism 
succeeds not as a theory, a system, a regime or a government, but as a corporeal 
projection of a successful personality.”140 Critics and admirers could only agree, 




The public culture of a society is a forum where power in its various forms, 
including meaning and aesthetics, is elaborated and made authoritative.
Thomas Bender1
Politics is the Entertainment Branch of Industry
Frank Zappa2
I opened this study with a photograph of Mary Pickford and Douglas Fairbanks 
giving the Fascisti salute while reminiscing about their May 1926 meeting with the 
Duce and the memory of his exemplary personal authority. After the discussions 
in later chapters about the many hagiographic profiles devoted to Mussolini, we 
can now recognize just how familiar with such views the two stars must have been. 
Even before meeting the Duce, Pickford praised his personality much more than 
his political successes. “He must be a true artist,” she told a reporter that April, 
describing Mussolini’s broad appeal. “You can tell that from his preface to the biog-
raphy by Margaret [sic] Sarfatti, wherein he says he ‘enjoys the feeling of universality 
that he belongs to all, and yet belongs to none.’ ”3 The Hollywood couple never 
again met the Duce, but Pickford must have continued to appreciate other celebra-
tory profiles of him. As late as 1934, she addressed a rally of Fascist sympathizers 
held in New York City on the anniversary of the March on Rome by reiterating her 
praise: “Italy has always produced great men,” she declared, “and when she needed 
one most Mussolini was there. Viva Fascismo! Viva Il Duce!”4
In this work, I have argued that the two Hollywood icons’ public encounter 
with Mussolini was more than an anecdotal occurrence. It signified, instead, the 
American public’s growing fascination for authoritative popular and political 
actors. In past chapters, I have drawn the contours of this phenomenon by inter-
lacing two 1920s case studies. I have researched and compared the ways in which 
the Italian dictator became seen as a charming and romanticized master of anti-
Bolshevik governance in America with the ways in which, in the very same years, 
Hollywood actor Rudolph Valentino rose to fame as an exemplar of forceful and 
romantic leadership.
I initially availed myself mostly of press sources and films. American newspa-
pers and periodicals, as well as film trade journals, extensively covered both men’s 
meteoric rise to fame. Several Valentino films and a significant volume of newsreel 
footage of Mussolini were easily available. When venturing into the secondary 
228    Conclusions
literature directly related to the actor and the dictator, however, I looked in vain for 
passages that offered a substantial discussion of both figures. The duo’s popularity 
has traditionally been explored by two separate disciplines, film history and politi-
cal history, that have rarely engaged in a sustained or systematic dialogue about 
popular culture’s relationship with dictators and autocrats—and vice versa. Spe-
cifically, existing studies of film stars and dictators have rarely taken a comparative 
approach, preferring instead to extract metaphors and anecdotes from the mines 
of film scenes, sober or sensationalized biographies, and all kinds of press reports.5 
The scarcity of such works is unsurprising. Historically, dictators do not appreci-
ate sharing the spotlight in their own country, and they tend to discourage any 
competition, as the literature on film stardom in Fascist Italy reveals. More com-
parative in nature, a few studies have focused on different stars in a single national 
film culture,6 or on two, or even three, dictators (or national leaders).7 A wealth of 
studies in different languages has also become available on the “cinemas of dicta-
tors”—that is, on film productions under totalitarian regimes. These are typically 
classified by each individual nation’s most dominant personality.8 The literature on 
film stardom in autocratic regimes, however, may not appear entirely appropriate 
to the U.S. situation even though the abundance of authoritarian public figures 
who emerged in interwar America (e.g., Father Charles Coughlin, Huey Long) 
may suggest otherwise. In fact, the American popularity of Mussolini, observed 
vis-à-vis the rise of film stardom as a key instrument of public opinion manage-
ment, prompted me to consider the extensive positive response to figures of char-
ismatic authority in a democratic context.
Over the course of this work, I sought to document the historical intersections 
between the Divo and the Duce in pivotal moments, including their public con-
frontation over Valentino’s plan to acquire American citizenship and the Fascists’ 
belated attempt to attach themselves to Valentino’s revered memory. No matter 
how telling such individual instances were, however, my most compelling finding 
was that attributes of political and romantic leadership extensively overlapped and 
even constituted each other. Discovered in articles, biographical profiles, inter-
views, and cartoons, these intersections reveal a commonality of personal traits 
that revolve around the notion of seductive authority. In spite of their antidemo-
cratic and misogynistic pronouncements, or rather by virtue of them, both the 
film star and the dictator aspired to a degree of mass approbation that bordered 
on the plebiscitary.9 
Even more remarkably, my research has revealed that the two men’s appeal to 
American public opinion was a heavily mediated one. Valentino and Mussolini’s 
American images were built up by scores of individuals operating on both sides 
of the Atlantic. These publicists came from a variety of institutional and personal 
backgrounds and worked, sometimes overtly and sometimes clandestinely, in 
the service of a diverse set of interests. They often operated across purposes. As 
a result, rather than describing as inevitable and systematic the emergence of a 
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relationship of plebiscitarian approval between the Divo and the Duce on the one 
side and American moviegoers and citizens on the other, I found it more fitting 
and compelling to detail the accomplishments and missteps made by producers, 
publicists, journalists, financiers, and diplomats in advancing their popularity. 
While on screen, Valentino rarely played the role of the impenitent Sheik, but the 
imprint of his most commercially successful film turned out to be what made pub-
licity campaigns either succeed or fail, even after his death. Similarly, when the 
regime’s Italian and American handlers focused their promotion of Fascism on 
the Duce’s bodily feats and personal leadership instead of his politics, they suc-
ceeded—at least for about a decade—in constructing an appealingly masculine 
model for American audiences. 
This comparative lens has helped identify an instructive, if necessarily unsys-
tematic, initial convergence of publicity practices involving mass cultural indus-
tries—film, publishing, and press—with financial and political institutions. The 
cultural and political promotion of Valentino and Mussolini’s plebiscitarian con-
sensus, in fact, achieved significant results. While their foreignness might have 
constituted, in theory, an impediment to the marketing of their charismatic and 
authoritarian personae, it created, in fact, unique promotional opportunities. The 
Divo’s and the Duce’s forceful personalities, made to convey Latin bluntness and 
the gravitas of ancient Roman history, facilitated a cosmopolitan and authoritarian 
reimagining of American male leadership. The simultaneous politicization of the 
Hollywood star and the aestheticization of the Italian dictator on American soil 
revealed the appeal that authoritarian leader-celebrities held over a diverse mass 
citizenry that was adjusting to the changes wrought by the war, by the extension of 
suffrage, and the advent of mass culture.
By bringing film and political history into close dialogue through the lens of 
publicity and public opinion management, the conclusions of this study pertain 
not only to either film or political history. Instead, they address both disciplinary 
camps within the domain of American public culture. The Divo and the Duce ulti-
mately argues that celebrity culture in modern democracy grew out of the tension 
between expanded mass access to consumption, information, and civil rights and 
the well-promoted personal appeal of (male) leadership figures. The resonances 
between the two men’s carefully crafted public personae have underscored the 
paradox that a public with expanded civic and consumer opportunities is also a 
public primed to embrace a celebrity’s iconic authority.
Applied to the world’s most exemplary democracy, this statement may sound 
disturbing. Celebrity studies has often linked celebrities’ “distinctive discursive 
quality” to “the twinned discourses of modernity: democracy and capitalism.”10 
But even though “the celebrity as public individual” and “as a marketable com-
modity” “serves as a powerful type of legitimation of the political economic model 
of exchange and value,” the political economy of celebrity culture also rests on 
models of civic identity.11 Stressing the link between celebrity and commodity in 
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a liberal economy, in other words, does not exhaust celebrities’ political dimen-
sion, though it may well end up masking it. Mussolini and Valentino, in their 
outspoken endorsement of nondemocratic governmentality, show that the authority 
that commercial society grants a celebrity affects much more than the dynamics 
of free economic exchange. It also affects public discourse about authority and 
citizenship.
Key civic consequences of such mass mobilization of film and political authority 
in American public culture included the insertion of private interests in public 
affairs and, attached to it, the spectacularization of political discourse. In Liberty 
and the News (1920), Walter Lippmann critiqued the emergence of a new balance 
of constitutional power in which the influence of the press on public opinion and, 
consequently, on the executive, resulted in a “plebiscite autocracy, or government 
by newspapers.”12 Since public opinion is collected and even manufactured by 
“special groups which act as extra-legal organs of government,” the government 
is shaped far more by the pressure of these groups than by the elected representa-
tives of the American people.13 The result is a “shift in the locus of sovereignty” 
or, in other words, the effective marginalization of the public from government 
authority.14
Lippmann was articulating in eloquent form what others had been hinting 
at for some time. In the spring of 1906, the young journalist Richard Washburn 
Child, future U.S. ambassador to Italy, had discussed the same dramatic outcome 
in an Atlantic Monthly article. None other than Edward Bernays, in Crystallizing 
Public Opinion (1923), would refer to Child’s insights appreciatively while wonder-
ing “whether the acts of men in commercial activity may ever become [. . .] so far 
reaching in their effect that they compel a universal public interest.” “It may be 
said,” Bernays continued, “that at no time have private industries become of such 
startling interest to the community at large as at present in the United States.”15 The 
pioneer of public relations practices closed the paragraph by noting, rhetorically, 
“How far present-day tendencies have born out Mr. Child’s expectations of a grow-
ing and accepted public interest in important industrial enterprises, the reader can 
judge for himself.”16
Bernays’s currency was high in the 1920s, a decade of laissez-faire policies that 
under Presidents Harding and Coolidge were extremely favorable to American busi-
nesses. In applying the lessons learned from prewar Progressive muckraking, U.S. 
corporations sought a great deal of public acceptance by showcasing their espousal 
of public service and responsibility in their advertisements and public relations 
activities.17 Talent moved around accordingly. The decade saw the consolidation of 
a revolving-door custom whereby public servants found lucrative positions in the 
corporate world, primarily as lobbyists. Will H. Hays’s career move from the Hard-
ing administration to the chairmanship of the MPPDA—as Hollywood’s master lob-
byist and publicist—was one of the most visible of such transitions. Washington’s 
strengthened alliance with the film industry also affected the degree of political 
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leaders’ modes of public presentation. Demand for publicity expertise grew in all 
domains. President Coolidge, despite his notorious aloofness, made himself repeat-
edly available for newsreels. His successor, Herbert Hoover, possibly outdid him 
through several stunts, including a celebrity-packed re-creation of the invention of 
the light bulb, starring Thomas Edison himself, which was broadcast live throughout 
the country and devised by none other than Bernays.
In the following years, the partnership between Hollywood persuasion and 
Washington power intensified. Through his contact with the Hoover admin-
istration, Louis B. Mayer had become by 1932, according to Variety, not just an 
“international statesman” but also “the only American holding that dual honor” 
of being “a national figure, of politics and the show business.”18 Mayer was not 
alone. Jack Warner competed with him on the same terrain, if on the opposite 
side, of presidential politics.19 The mobilization of the vote for Franklin Roosevelt 
(Warner’s candidate) and his subsequent victory turned studio executives’ formerly 
rare practice of political advocacy into a rule. It was a New Deal in both government 
and business, with overlapping and cross-fertilizing public relations campaigns.20 
Once Roosevelt realized that Hollywood could sell his political agenda, show-
manship became an essential quality of his government. Americans came to see 
Roosevelt as a celebrity, particularly through his starring role in newsreels and 
radio programs. Conversely, Roosevelt began to see Americans as movie audi-
ences and radio listeners.21 
At the same time, the migration to Los Angeles of New York cultural radicals, 
together with the arrival of European Jews, infused the movie capital with a leftist 
political culture that led to the unionization of the film industry, the creation of 
the Screen Actors Guild by the likes of Will Rogers and Joan Crawford, and the 
emergence of celebrity civic activism.22 In 1934, California’s hard-fought guberna-
torial contest saw the conservative candidate Frank Merriam best former Social-
ist Party member (and MGM scenarist!) Upton Sinclair. Merriam’s victory was 
helped by conservative-thinking studio heads like Mayer who led a most effective 
film campaign that helped build a decisive margin against their enthusiastic but 
less organized leftist opponents.23 
In the fray of show business politics, one also encounters the familiar, eclectic 
profile of newspaper magnate, film producer, and gubernatorial hopeful William 
Randolph Hearst and the equally eclectic newcomer Joseph P. Kennedy. Hearst’s 
background in filmmaking and yellow journalism made him appreciate “the the-
atricality of politics and the potential for political communication inherent in 
motion pictures.” With equal showmanship, he used his press influence first to 
support the New Deal and eventually to do an about-face and oppose Roosevelt’s 
domestic and internationalist policies. Similarly, Kennedy, the Irish banker with 
Harvard and Wall Street credentials, crossed many corridors of power from New 
York to Hollywood, where he shaped the trajectories of companies, actors, and 
executives while also enriching himself. It was in Hollywood that he “learned to 
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perform as a public personality,” something that his family members treasured as 
they entered public life.24
By the 1930s, the marriage of politics and showmanship provided a context in 
which the authoritarian style of governance and Mussolini’s performative leader-
ship could no longer appear to be utterly alien. The emergency of the Depression 
introduced Americans to a new level of emboldened executive power as shown in 
Roosevelt’s famous inaugural address delivered on March 4, 1933. Only a shared 
sense of civic sacrifice and discipline could lead to effective leadership, he warned 
the crowd. And if Congress was unwilling to support his plan of action, he 
promised that
I shall not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the 
Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis—broad executive  
power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.25
Not paying any mind to the speech’s commitment to democracy, the press wel-
comed it and described it accurately as a call for dictatorial powers. As Benjamin 
Alpers has shown, such general acceptance of exceptional authority lasted only a 
few months, but “the idea that America might need some kind of dictator appeared 
in a wide variety of places, including a pair of unusual Hollywood films”: the afore-
mentioned Mussolini Speaks (1933) and Gabriel over the White House (1934).26 The 
period was also characterized by the public visibility of demagogic politicians and 
forceful radio personalities, including Father Coughlin and Huey Long (a regular 
in newsreels). Coughlin and Long feuded with many celebrities and moved from 
being strong supporters to vehement detractors of FDR and eventually became 
anti-Communist witch hunters. Neither man hesitated to express public admira-
tion for the Fascist style of mass and personality-centered governance.27
While the 1930s is an obvious field of inquiry for the intersection of politics and 
mass media, we may also look beyond this decade, toward more contemporary 
challenges to the notion of popular sovereignty. Recent writings on the contem-
porary crisis of democracy brought about by the hegemony of mass media might 
be illuminating. As sociologist and political scientist Colin Crouch wrote in Post- 
Democracy (2004), although elections remain fundamental tools of political change, 
the staging of “public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by 
rival teams of professional experts in the techniques of persuasion” and focused on 
a small and selective range of issues. While citizens play a passive role in the spec-
tacle of the electoral competition, “politics is really shaped in private by interaction 
between elected governments and elites that overwhelmingly represent business 
interests.”28 Reduced to sound bites, empty rhetorical slogans, and growing person-
alization, political communication, for Crouch, does not enhance “true political 
discussion” but “is designed to be beyond the reach of scrutiny” by common voters. 
For years, Crouch adds, “only manipulative demagogues like Hitler, Mussolini, and 
Stalin” seemed to know “the secret of power through mass communication.” 
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Not any longer: Lippmann’s worst fears have become a daily reality. Today dem-
ocratic politicians, especially in the United States, conduct their “personality-based 
election campaigning” by relying on a “persuasion business” that reaches from the 
advertising industry and commercial television to social media.29 “Promotion of 
the claimed charismatic qualities of a party leader,” Crouch remarks, “increasingly 
takes the place of debate over issues and conflicting interests.”30 In this climate, 
the news-making business reproduces the personalization of the candidate’s politi-
cal message with its “rapid, eye-catching banality.” Echoing Lippmann’s dystopian 
Liberty in the News, Crouch concludes that the “control over politically relevant 
news and information,” is in the hands of “a very small number of extremely 
wealthy individuals.”31 In Paradoxes of Democracy (1999), sociologist Shmuel Noah 
Eisenstadt similarly remarked that the concentration of power over “the central 
nerves of the democratic process—the production and distribution of informa-
tion,” leads to “a ‘technocratization’ of knowledge” that excludes the public at large 
from the political process.32
The outcome for the destinies of the governed is not unforeseeable. First, liberal 
governments’ policy making is largely shaped by lobbying, a much more secretive 
and less democratic mode of influence than traditional party politics.33 Secondly, 
elite control over news and the political process leads to “withdrawal from political 
participation.”34 Historian Emilio Gentile has noted that as democracies are turned 
into theatrical representations, the state becomes the stage, politicians the leading 
players, and citizens the extras.35 In a departure from the most famous passage 
from Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address—“government of the people, for the people, by 
the people”—the voting public has become the real idola, in Francis Bacon’s sense. 
What remains is not an “absent demos,” to quote the Economist’s 2015 Democracy 
Index, but an “acting demos” that plays a role scripted elsewhere.36
Early-twentieth-century American celebrity culture ostensibly publicized 
the values of freedom and individualism. Yet, even in an inaugural phase, the 
popularity of iconic personalities diluted the ideals of direct democracy in favor 
of charismatic representation. Celebrity publicity is neither conservative nor pro-
gressive but constitutes a regular component of mass democracies, and as such 
has a history that deserves to be told. As cinema has been central to this historical 
dynamic, film historians may have a privileged vantage point in telling it, particu-
larly in an epoch that is all too familiar with the convergence between celebrity 
culture and political leadership. This analysis of the encounter of film stardom 
and political leadership has shown that celebrity politics does more than merely 
promote a celebrity’s political convictions, whether liberal or conservative; it also 
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FILM & MEDIA STUDIES | HISTORY
In the post–World War I American climate of isolationism, nativism, democratic expan-
sion of civic rights, and consumerism, Italian-born star Rodolfo Valentino and Italy’s 
dictator Benito Mussolini became surprising paragons of authoritarian male power 
and mass appeal. Drawing on extensive archival research in the United States and 
Italy, Giorgio Bertellini’s work shows how their popularity, both political and erotic, 
largely depended on the efforts of public opinion managers, including publicists, jour-
nalists, and even ambassadors. Beyond the democratic celebrations of the Jazz Age, 
the promotion of their charismatic masculinity through spectacle and press coverage 
inaugurated the now-familiar convergence of popular celebrity and political authority.
“A fantastic and an eminently readable milestone in the study of celebrity. Bertellini sets 
a new standard for archival and analytical approaches to movie stardom in the 1920s 
while also illuminating the political stakes of celebrity that resonate with twenty-first-
century culture.” GAYLYN STUDLAR, author of Precocious Charms: Stars Performing 
Girlhood in Classical Hollywood
“This is a remarkable and timely study, and a model of interdisciplinary and transna-
tional scholarship. Only someone with Bertellini’s cross-disciplinary expertise and 
meticulous research skills could pull together these cases and weave them into a com-
pelling account of the ‘cinema effect’ on American politics.” BARBARA SPACKMAN, 
University of California, Berkeley
“Bertellini’s brilliant book shows clearly how celebrity and promotional culture became 
integral to new practices of mass governance in the early twentieth century. It is a 
crucial history, essential also to any genealogy of the mediatized present and the rise 
of modes of authoritarian and neofascist governance.” LEE GRIEVESON, author of 
Cinema and the Wealth of Nations: Media, Capital, and the Liberal World System
GIORGIO BERTELLINI is Professor of Film and Media History at the Uni-
versity of Michigan. He is the author and editor of the award-winning 
volumes Italy in Early American Cinema: Race, Landscape, and the Pic-
turesque and Italian Silent Cinema: A Reader.
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